La notion d'« armes de destruction massive » (ADM) est insaisissable : au lieu d'avoir pour but de mieux définir un type d'arme, elle agit à l'inverse, en créant une confusion entre l'arme et les conséquences de son emploi. Cette nature inconsistante se poursuit au niveau juridique. En effet, bien que l'expression fasse très tôt son entrée au sein des Nations unies, aucun traité ni organe officiel n'a, jusqu'alors, réussi à en donner une définition probante. À défaut de définition incontestable, et en l'absence d'un critère vérifiable d'identification de ce qu'est une « arme de destruction massive », cette notion s'est avérée préjudiciable. L'écart entre la réalité de la menace existante en matière d'« armes de destruction massive » et la façon dont elle fut perçue, puis gérée par la communauté internationale, c'est-à-dire à la fois par les États de façon individuelle et par les organisations internationales et les traités de façon collective, a conduit à de multiples dérives. Par conséquent, s'agissant là d'une notion plus politique que juridique, il apparaît nécessaire qu'elle soit précisée ou abandonnée / The term « weapons of mass destruction » (WMD) is ambiguous: instead of aiming to clearly define a certain type of weapon, it does the opposite by creating confusion between the weapon itself and the consequences of its use. This confusion is also reflected at in the legal definition. Indeed, even though the term has been used by the United Nations from an early stage, no treaty or official entity has succeeded in providing a clear definition to this day. The lack of a clear definition, and the absence of defined criteria to determine what constitutes a « weapon of mass destruction », has turned out to be damaging. The dichotomy between the existing threat from « weapons of mass destruction » and the way it is perceived and handled by the international community, including individual states, international organisations, as well as collective treaties, has resulted in several instances of inappropriate use. As a consequence, the term has become a political rather than legal notion. A clearer legal definition is needed, or otherwise the term should be abandoned

yes / The NLW database illustrates the extensive and eclectic literature regarding NLWs which covers the last few decades. It currently contains over 250 entries. It is important to have access not only to the more recent material, but also to earlier sources since many of the general debates and controversies have already been rehearsed, and lessons learnt from them are still relevant today. Yet, it is also vital to follow new developments of NLWs closely because rapidly changing technology is producing weapons whose implications for integration into military and civil police forces have yet to be clearly defined and understood. Of particular interest are not only NLW applications for war fighting, but opportunities for deployment in peace enforcement and peace keeping missions. These technologies span many bases including: psycho-chemicals; unmanned weapons platforms and delivery systems; biogenetics; acoustic and microwave weapons; biological and chemical weapons; laser systems; kinetic energy ballistics; dual purpose (lethal/non-lethal) weapons; and, sprays and foams which inhibit movement. The database will keep up to date on these developments and future reports will highlight new issues and debates surrounding them. With these rapid technological advances come a series of associated dangers and concerns including: the ethics of use; implications for weapons control and disarmament treaties; military doctrine; public accountability and guidelines; dangers of misuse and proliferation; and, research and development strategies. Using the database, and drawing from military and non-military sources, this report will select the main current issues and debates within the non-lethal community. Bearing in mind that many operations undertaken by military forces are now more akin to policing actions (such as peace support operations) there are lessons to be learnt by military units from civil police experience. There still remains a tension between perceived benign and malign intent both in NLW operational use and non-lethal research and development.

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yes / New non-lethal technologies (weapons and delivery systems) continue to make the news, both for their civil and military applications. Technologies which were considered to be in the realm of science fiction a few years ago, are now beginning to undergo field trials or, in some cases, are being deployed with police and soldiers on active service. As this, and our previous reports have highlighted, the development of acoustic weapons (Long Range Acoustic Device) and microwave weapons (Active Denial System) have proceeded rapidly as have advances in robotic, unmanned vehicles for the delivery of both lethal and non-lethal weapons. We repeat our concern that there is a danger of these new non-lethal technologies being `rushed¿ into service (1) without thorough testing for harmful health effects, (2) without a deeper consideration of civil and human rights, (3) without full discussion of their impact on arms control treaties and conventions, and (4) without further study of their social and cultural impact. Since many such weapons will have a rheostatic capacity along the non-lethal to lethal continuum, it is important that weapons developers and manufacturers, and those charged with the responsibility of using them, are held clearly accountable and have transparent rules of engagement. Of particular concern are a new generation of biological and chemical weapons. With respect to the health impact, NATO has a panel working on NLW human effects, the Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel 073, which is due to report later this year (2004) on the Human Effects of Non-Lethal Technologies.1

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 26-29, 1998 / Town & Country Resort Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / Instrumenting the operational B-2 Strategic Bomber presents some unique problems. For example, the requirement to remain operational dictates that the aircraft must retain its stealth characteristics. This means traditional antennas cannot simply be attached to the airframe. A solution to this problem is an antenna designed with stealth, or Low Observable (LO), attributes. Stealth is not an absolute; it is relative. Therefore, antenna design becomes a balancing act between the LO relativity, antenna directivity, and antenna gain. Weapons testing is an additional concern, where instrumented ordinances transmit data that must be monitored real-time prior to launch. Stealth vehicles must carry weapons internally, restricting the Radio Frequency (RF) transmission of telemetered data from the weapon. With the development of future stealthy conveyances, such as the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), ground, and ocean-going craft, these concerns will become even more prevalent.

Nuclear accidents and weapons tests are monitored by a worldwide network of air sensors, seismic detectors and several other techniques. At the site of the incident, contaminants are distributed and can provide insight into the time of the incident and type of incident. That information can then be used to affect policy decisions or better understand health risks. In order to evaluate a post nuclear test scenario, we must better understand the background readings at potential test sites where false positive or false negative allegations are more likely (e.g. the Nevada Test Site, the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plate, etc.) Data from these sites have been compiled and compared to high purity germanium detector background readings and activities from a hypothetical nuclear weapon test. The results indicate that the following nuclides would be the best indicator of a recent nuclear test: ⁸⁹Sr, ⁹¹Y, ⁹⁵Zr, ¹⁰³Ru, ¹²⁶Sb, ¹²⁹[superscript m]Te, ¹⁴⁷Nd, ¹⁵⁶Eu. Nuclides such as ⁹¹Sr or ⁹⁷Zr have a steady state concentration due to plutonium spontaneous fission thus would not be a good indication of a recent nuclear test. / text

Background: There is a large worldwide market for assault rifles. Many armed forces need new weapons when their old cold war equipment starts to break down. Throughout the world today, the development of new variants of assault rifles continues and the defence industries are doing business across the globe. Customers demand low prices and high quality. Objective: To investigate assault rifles that are currently being used around the world, how they evolved and which factors are important in the development of a future assault rifle, and to compare two widely used assault rifles to explore the differences and determine which one is better. Methods: A qualitative study of literature combined with a multi-target analysis of two assault rifles from a given scenario in an urban area. Results: Small arms have been the soldier's main weaponry for hundreds of years, and will continue to be so for many years to come. Development of the future assault rifle will be based on such factors as shooting distance, size of magazine and weight. The AK5C rifle was ranked number one ahead of the G36E rifle in the comparison as it was smaller and therefore easier to use in confined spaces. Conclusion: Many current rifles are similar in performance and size. Development of the future rifle will not only depend on the rifle itself, but also on the accessories, including ammunition, and the possibilities for customization. / <p>Erasmus</p>

This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the North. The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s 'Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of the modern nation state at the end of the Thirty Years Wars in 1648. Throughout these shifts, two issues have remained constant, although their relative weight has changed. First that a war can only be described as 'just' if it is being waged for legitimate reasons, jus ad bellum, and that is waged in a proportionate manner that seeks to separate combatants from non-combatants, jus in bello. Both these ideas were severely weakened in the period of warfare that followed on from the American and French Revolutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century. The new ideology of nationalism brought with it the idea of the nation at arms, the armed citizenry, and with this, a further blurring of the always weak distinction between soldiers and the wider population. By 1945, both the secular and Christian tradition lay in ruins, damaged by the total warfare in the twentieth century when anything and anyone who could contribute to the wider war effort became a target. Also, although not the most destructive weapon, this saw the advent of the nuclear bomb. In response, Christian thinkers sought to redefine the concepts of Just War for a nuclear age, with the potential for the use of weapons that could destroy all of humanity. Some saw this as the lesser evil, when faced with the victory of a totalitarian political system, and others argued that proportionality could be maintained if the size of weapons, or their targeting, was such as to minimise wider damage. On the other hand, many theologians argued that by definition they could never be discriminate or proportionate and that their use (or even the implied threat of their use) would always fail the precepts of Jus in Bello. In the modern Korean context, this debate is not abstract, but has real bearing on the practical steps being taken by all the main parties. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North (the DPRK) has meant that the desire for Korean re-unification has become entwined with how best to resolve the nuclear issue. At the moment, in the South amongst the Protestant communities (split between the CCK and the NCCK), this debate has become fixed on issues of practical politics. In effect, is it better to negotiate with the North over the nuclear weapons issue and hope that resolving this will then lead to reunification or is it better to aim to overthrow the DPRK (economically, politically or even militarily) and, this, by definition, would resolve the question of their possession of nuclear weapons. At the moment both the NCCK and the CCK have based their policies towards North Korea (the DPRK) on the basis of secular politics not the teachings of the Christian gospel. The NCCK is tending to overlook human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the threat of that regime‘s nuclear arsenal, in their emphasis on the need to overcome the political division of Korea. In turn, the CCK ignores much Christian teaching with its emphasis on seeking the collapse (perhaps by military means) of the DPRK as a precursor to unification. In this, both bodies seem to have forgotten that they are fundamentally Christian confessional bodies, and as such their public statements should be based on the Gospels, not on the practicalities of day to day politics. Neither approach is particularly grounded on either in the Christian message of the gospels or the Just War tradition. Thus this thesis does not just seek to explore and explain the current situation in Korea using the concepts of Just War, it also seeks to provide a basis on which the Protestant community can resolve their current impasse. This means the thesis is grounded on the Christian concept of political theology, in particular in so far as this approach 'offers alternatives to better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution‘. In the case of the situation in Korea, this means there is no military solution to the problem of unification. Nor can a solution be found in ignoring the human rights abuses in the DPRK. The answer lies in stressing three aspects that remain fundamental to any Christian identity in Korea – of a unified Korean koinoina, that any resort to force must meet the conditions of the Christian Just War tradition, and that, as faith groups, any response must stem from the Gospels.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive for maintaining European security. U.S. and NATO policymakers adhere to political and military utility arguments, while others argue TNWs in Europe are irrelevant-their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic interdependence, modern conventional capabilities and the existential deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including widespread participation in nuclear planning, the increasing importance of the nuclear taboo, prospects for conventional deterrence and the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant. Emphasizing their utility provides incentive for others to join the "nuclear club," degrades the nonproliferation regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and counterproliferation efforts. This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. / Major, United States Air Force