Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Divinity School, March 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Project (M.S.)--Brigham Young University. Dept of Mathematics, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 19).

Thesis (M.A. in English)--Vanderbilt University, Aug. 2006. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

My dissertation explores the ecological implications of a process metaphysics, focusing in particular on subjectivity. Primarily using the work of Whitehead and Deleuze, I explore how taking a process metaphysics seriously undoes the assumption that an individual self is a discretely bounded and independent subject. I argue that this framework troubles expansive identifications of the self with a unified whole that one finds in some metaphysically inflected strands of environmental thought (for example Deep Ecology). Instead, it encourages an orientation towards the qualitative and affective aspects of micro-relational moments, since these are the most ‘real’ metaphysically. Macro-level entities such as the self (as well as other ‘wholes’) are understood as abstractions from these primary occasions. I consider the existential impacts of taking these views seriously, in particular with regard to the transformed standing of tertiary or affective qualities that follows from the metaphysical view developed. / 10000-01-01

In this project, I explore the projects of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 CE) and the process metaphysician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). Despite their very different historical contexts, I argue that both thinkers defend a process-relational metaphysics: the view that a fundamental aspect of our universe is constant change, in which each moment is interrelated with the next. Though many interpreters have suggested that the projects of Nāgārjuna and Whitehead are fundamentally at odds, I argue that their approaches are compatible and complementary. This interpretation allows us to more deeply understand the central claims of process metaphysics and defend their shared view from two common criticisms, which I call the problems of continuity and identity. In the former, critics of process metaphysics allege that if a person is constantly changing from moment to moment, we cannot explain how that person remains in some sense the same self over time. In the problem of identity, critics allege that if everything is change and process all the way down, nothing could come to be in the first place. Nāgārjuna provides a solution to problem of continuity, but critics argue that he still has trouble answering the problem of identity. Whitehead provides a compelling solution to the problem of identity, but his critics allege that he fails to adequately answer the problem of continuity. By showing how these two philosophers can be read as two sides of a larger system, we can defend process metaphysics from both criticisms at once

In this thesis I examine three models of justification for the epistemic authority of the principle of contradiction. Aristotle has deemed the principle "that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect" the most certain and most prior of all principles, both in the order of nature and in the order of knowledge, and as such it is indemonstrable. The principle of contradiction is involved in any act of rational discourse, and to deny it would be to reduce ourselves to a vegetative state, being incapable of uttering anything with meaning. The way we reach the principle of contradiction is by intuitive grasping (epagoge) from the experience of the particulars, by recognizing the universals in the particulars encountered, and it is different from simple induction, which, in Mill's view, is the process through which we construct a general statement on the basis of a limited sample of observed particulars. Hence, the principle of contradiction, being a mere generalization from experience, through induction, loses its certainty and necessity. Even though it has a high degree of confirmation from experience, it is in principle possible to come across a counter-example which would refute it. Mill's account opens the path to the modern view of the principle of contradiction. In Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead contend that the principle of contradiction is still a tautology, always true, but it is derived from other propositions, set forth as axioms. Its formulation, "~ (p & ~p)" is quite different from Aristotle's, and this is why we are faced with the bizarre situation of being able to derive the law of contradiction in a formal system which could not have been built without the very principle of which the law is an expression of. This is perhaps because the principle of contradiction, as a principle, has a much larger range of application and is consequently more fundamental than what we call today the law of contradiction, with its formal function.

<p> Science has exerted a tremendous influence on modern thought. This occurrence has brought with it its share of benefits and problems. Science has offered humankind the growing ability to understand and master nature. This benefit has also brought with it the critical problem of environmental destruction. Within its philosophical roots, science is tied to a cosmology that has alienated humanity from its 'spiritual' experience. This includes aesthetic and theological experience. Two extremes choices are possible: either to reject the scientific cosmology or to reject 'spirituality' as central to the functioning of reality. For those who wish to include the integrity of all human experience in a cosmology, the hope of synthesizing the scientific with the 'spiritual' stands as an ideal.</p> <p> The thought of Alfred North Whitehead is an attempt at such a synthesis of thought. This thesis examines Whitehead's metaphysical synthesis. It begins, in the first and second chapters, with an examination of what Whitehead understands as the problem. The first chapter deals with his description of the mechanist-materialist understanding of nature. The second chapter shows the deep problems which make such an understanding untenable. In the third chapter we explicate Whitehead's attempt at a more plausible metaphysical synthesis. Lastly, we apply Whitehead's thought to questions of ecological ethics. In this chapter we note how reintegrating the idea of a living nature occupied by things with 'inherent value' with a renewed assessment of the importance of human aesthetic and theistic experience, form together a mandate for the ethical treatment of nature.</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

No description available.

Master of Arts (MA)

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.