The following thesis outlines Hegel’s interpretation of Socrates in order to prove that as a negative dialectician, Socrates constitutes both a world historic personality who met a fate (Schicksal) which was tragic and practiced a philosophy which was tragically ironic. In this undertaking, Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy takes central importance which defines tragedy as two equally justified opposing forces which clash and destroy one another. This Theory of Tragedy is extended to show that through Socrates’ absolutely free will he brought himself to a tragic clash with the Athenian Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), the Sophists’ arbitrary will, and the phenomenological will of uneducated Athenians. This clash is described in terms of a Hegelian Tragedy within which both Socrates and Athens were right and just in their actions against one another, but in the end were destroyed through those actions. His Method and Dialectic is then argued represent a negative dialectic which through the negation of negativity becomes positive as a midwifery of the consciousness. Next, because his Method and Dialectic begin in negativity and end in positivity, Socratic Elenchus is argued to not be representative of what has been termed “the Socratic Irony,” but instead only the negative moment of the Socratic Method. Finally, the Socratic Irony which Hegel argues is representative of both Socratic Philosophy and world history is defined as a Tragic Irony which sublates the finite consciousness of the phenomenological will, and the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), and the infinite arbitrary will of the Sophists in order to become a trans-subjective absolutely free will which becomes infinite itself like the Sophists’ will through reflection on the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit).

Šiame darbe atsispindi A.Schopenhauerio meno filosofijos pamatinės idėjos. Mąstytojas nuodugniai iškristalizuoja estetinės patirties sampratą remdamasis Platoniškosios idėjos pirmavaizdžiu. Kadangi A. Shopenhaueriui meninis patyrimas užima kilniadvasiškiausią gyvenimo pakopą. Jam itin rūpi paneigti, betikslės, voliuntaristinės, iracionalios valios viešpatavimą, ištrūkti iš valios vergystės. Filsofas padaro radikalią perskyrą atribodamas pagrindo principo pažinimą nuo estetinės – kontempliacinės patirties plotmės. Jis kelia klausimą: kas gali pažinti grynąsias pasaulio formas? Ir iš kart nedvejodamas atsako: tik geniali būtybė, pakylanti virš kasdieniškos rutinos persisunkusios praktinių reikmių. Nes paprasto žmogaus kasdieniškas žvilgsnis nuolatos skendi pragmatiškumo ir suinteresuotumo liūne. Tik genijus, A. Schopenhauerio samprotavimais sugeba pamatyti patį daiktą, pažvelgti objektyviai, atsisakydamas pagrindo principo. Šitokiu judesiu genijus paneigia valią ir trumpai akimirkai suranda ramybės užuovėją. Mąstytojas padaro plačią valios objektyvacijos skleistį norėdamas parodyti kokiuose meno kūriniuose ir per kokią materiją ji kyla iki aukščiausios pakopos. A.Schopenhaueris pradėdamas nuo Architektūros remiasi štai tokiomis medžiagomis, kurios atskleidžia žemiausią valios objektyvacijos pakopą: sunkis, kietumas, sankaba. Ir baigia muzikos menu, kuri yra betarpiškas valios atspindys. Nes tik muzikos mene persipina visos valios pakopos. Toliau svarbų vaidmenį suvaidina I... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The thesis presents fundamental ideas of A. Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art. Following the original Platonic ideas, the thinker developed the concept of aesthetic experience. A. Schopenhauer’s artistic experience is positioned in the noblest level of life; he seeks to deny domination of purposeless, voluntary and irrational will and to escape from slavery of will. Philosopher makes a radical separation between recognition of principle of basis and aesthetical-contemplate experience. Moreover, he raises the question about who is capable of knowing the absolute forms of the world. And he gives the answer namely, that only a genial being which can leave the everyday routine full of practical needs behind is able to do that, because an ordinary human being’s everyday attitude is covered by pragmatism and interests. According to A. Schopenhauer, only genius can see the thing as such, maintain an objective attitude and ignore the principle of basis. In this way the genius denies the will and is able to find the moment of peace. The thinker discusses objectivation of will, seeking to show in which pieces of art and in what substances it reaches the highest level. Starting with architecture, A. Schopenhauer refers to the following substances presenting the lowest stage of objectivation of will: gravity, hardness, adherence. The final element is the art of music which is a direct reflection of the will. All stages of the will are presented in the art of music. Moreover, I. Kant plays... [to full text]

This dissertation explores Ainslie's account of self-defeating behaviour as portrayed in Breakdown of Will (2001). Self-defeating behaviour can be described as voluntarily doing that which we know we are going to end up regretting (Ainslie 2001:3). It is puzzling why anyone would willingly choose to behave in such an ill-rewarding manner of which they know the negative consequences it will bear prior to them engaging in that behaviour; yet, at the same time, it is also fascinating, as despite it being behaviour people know that they are undoubtedly going to regret; many can claim to have fallen prey to it. Exploring this weakness of self-defeating behaviour, I refer to Ainslie's explanation of the phenomenon and his suggestions regarding possible strategies for curbing it. One of the strategies Ainslie suggests against self-defeating behaviour is personal rules (also known as the will), which he argues is a form of intertemporal bargaining between the successive interests, or temporal stages of the self (Ainslie 2001:78-85). Although, for the most part, his description is quite detailed, comparing our successive selves to players in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, there are limitations in his explanation as he seems, for one, not to consider some of the conditions for cooperation associated to the concept of an iterated prisoners' dilemma game. I, thus, turn to social norm theorist, Bicchieri's The Grammar of society (2006), in an attempt at an improved illustration of personal rules beyond its comparison to an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. I note similarities between social norms (Bicchieri) and personal rules (Ainslie) such that the reasons we follow social norms could be analogous to the reasons behind us following certain personal rules. But Bicchieri's description of social norms can be explained in a more general way, which I suggest may be a better framework for thinking about the will than an iterated prisoner's dilemma. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2011.

A review of the philosophical and psychological literature on free will is presented. Three major positions are identified: libertarianism, hard determinism and compatibilism (or soft determinism). The latter enjoys widespread and largely unchallenged support in psychology. Substantive conceptual and empirical grounds are presented which suggest that psychologists may be dismissing free will at their peril. It is argued, first of all, that belief in the reality of free will has profound implications for conceptions of human action, of moral responsibility, of the form and veracity of scientific accounts and of the validity of scientific reduction. Moreover, the results of a multi-disciplinary survey of academics reveal that 80% of those surveyed believe free will is real. Contrary to popular assumptions in psychology, determinism is not endorsed by many scientists outside of psychology, nor does belief in free will reflect naive belief in mind-body dualism. Modern libertarians reject both dualism and reductionism, distinguishing instead between different levels of scientific explanation. The findings are discussed in terms of their theoretical implications for cognitive, social and clinical psychology, and directions for further research are suggested.

In Jacques Maritain's text The Education of Man (1962) a Christian perspective affirming the individual's free will is presented. This study examines the validity of Maritain's argument and speculates upon some consequences for public schooling. The conclusions of the study are as follows: First. Maritain's exposition of the existence of absolute free will is unconvincing as it is not successfully reconciled with his religious world view. Second. if Maritain's views may be assumed to complement the religous educational and institutional objectives of Alberta's Catholic schools, the potential for conflict between these views and the 'secular' (i.e. the common goals, contents and processes of all public and separte schools) objectives of Catholic schools exists. / vi, 81 leaves ; 28 cm.

Severe poverty and ethnic-conflicts are the two most devastating problems of the contemporary world. Eighteen million persons die every year from causes related to poverty and a vast amount of developing countries suffer from tremendous processes of destabilization –frequently involving highly violent actions– associated to the relations between majority and minority groups. In both cases, the intervention of international powers and institutions has not been helpful enough to make a difference, and this present reality projects itself as a distressing scene for the future. Human rights and minority rights are the most powerful international tools in trying to change this sad global scenario. However, there is an extensive debate on the nature of these rights in a theory of international justice. This is often characterized as a debate between “minimalist” who seek to reduce the currently –recognized list of human rights to a bare minimum in order to accommodate non-liberal societies, and more expansive liberal approaches, which seek to expand the list of human rights to include the full set of civil and political rights characteristic of modern liberal-democracies. In this thesis, I will argue in favour of a third position. In line with some of the more minimalist approaches, I will argue that constraints of legitimacy rule out attempts to include full civil and political rights into our list of human rights. However, I will argue that these same constraints of legitimacy advocates for expanding the currently-recognized list of human rights in at least two key respects: the recognition of certain basic social and economic rights; and the recognition of certain minority rights. In short, we should be minimalist on some issues, while more expansive in others. In developing this argument, I will relay on the framework provided by The Law of Peoples of John Rawls. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-05 10:41:44.771

Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601

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The aim of this study is to investigate how the modal auxiliaries will and shall and the semi-modal BE going to are used to express futurity by individuals whose first language is Swedish. The study is corpus based, and the corpora used in this study consist of Swedish newspapers in English (SWENC) and material from blogs which are written in English by Swedes (BESC). These are compared with the press sub-corpora in F-LOB (the Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English) and Frown (the Freiburg-Brown corpus of American English), which represent British and American varieties of English. The method is quantitative and the results are mainly presented in frequencies. The results show that all of the modals are used in SWENC and BESC. The core modal will is the most frequently used modal in all of the corpora and sub-corpora. The semi-modal BE going to is most frequently used in BESC and the second core modal shall is most frequent in SWENC. However, qualitative examination of shall revealed that the writers in SWENC use the modal differently from how it is used in F-LOB Press. This study shows evidence of variation in use of the modals which express futurity. The fact that the semi-modal BE going to exists in the Swedish material indicates that the process of grammaticalization continues in the Swedish form of English.

Several commentators make the claim that Augustine is not a systematic thinker. The purpose of this thesis is to refute that claim in one specific area of Augustine's thought, the metaphysical foundations underlying his solutions to the problem of evil. Through an exegetical examination of various works in which Augustine writes on evil, I show that his solutions for both natural and moral evil rely on a coherent metaphysical system, conceived of and expounded upon within a Platonically influenced Christian context.