Thesis (M.A.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of English, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 155).

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In this paper I examine the contemporary debate over Derk Pereboom’s Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. After considering the argument in its entirety, I entertain a Hard-Line compatibilist reply given by Michael McKenna, based on an improved reworking of Pereboom’s cases. In evaluating McKenna’s reply I begin with several objections raised by Ishiyaque Haji and Stephan Cuypers before arguing that the reworking of cases is unsuccessful due to a lack of freedom-undermining manipulation. I redefine the conditions for what satisfies as freedom-undermining manipulation based on a revised understanding of the process whereby agents come to evaluate their desires independently. In conclusion, I maintain that Pereboom’s argument succeeds only insofar as it satisfies an evaluative account of manipulation. However, upon doing so, Pereboom’s strategy of accounting for all desired CAS conditions fails, given that authentic evaluation cannot be manipulatively accounted for. As a result, the Manipulation Argument fails to prove the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

abstract: Since scholars first turned their attention to the subject some eighty years ago, one major area of contention in the study of Anglo-Saxon wills has been the function of the written will within Anglo-Saxon culture. Verbal agreements, formalized through oral ceremonies and symbolic actions, were recognized as legally binding; however, many of these agreements were also recorded in writing. Many scholars argue that the written document was superfluous;oral ceremonies were written down only in the case of memory failure and the documents themselves had no real performative function. Others see the existence of the written will to be evidence of a shift toward a more textually-dependent culture, reliant on the written as a way of managing society. It is unlikely, however, that the Anglo-Saxons themselves viewed the oral and written in such a binary manner. Rather, the two forms were intermingled, lending potency and performative power to one another. The present study concentrates on two Anglo-Saxon wills in order to demonstrate the ways in which the verbal and written work together in specific texts. By having such a singular focus, a more nuanced understanding of how the oral and written interanimate each other in ninth-century England can be attained. The vernacular will of Alfred, King of the West Saxons from 871-899, and the Latin will of Æðelric, son of Æðelmund (804), are particularly deserving of close attention. While they contain several features that indicate the authority of the voiced statement, they also demonstrate an exceptionally strong sense of the importance of the written. These two wills suggest a dynamic period in which the worlds of the oral ceremony and written word were still intermingled but clearly moving toward a valuing of the written as dispositive. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. English 2010

This dissertation offers an interpretation of Rousseau's theory of the general will informed by his treatment of the problem of self-love. The central claim of the dissertation is that standard accounts of the general will have neglected both the role and the problematic character of Rousseau's conception of self-love and its relationship to his theory of the general will. When Rousseau's notion of self-love is understood properly, his theory of the general will is best conceived of as an active phenomenon consisting of an exercise of the self-love of the citizens of a well-formulated republic. In the first four chapters of the dissertation, three prominent readings of the general will are problematized by comparing them to a variety of claims in Rousseau's writings. It is then demonstrated that each interpretation neglects a rich analysis of the problem of self-love, which is central to Rousseau's description of the problem of inequality, the very problem that his theory of the general will sets out to solve. The three interpretations of the general will that are analyzed and critiqued are: (1) a straightforward reading in which any bundle of individual interests are given primacy in the interpretation of the general will and the morality of the law is interpreted as secondary; (2) an ideal reading in which the transcendent idea of justice is given primacy and individual interests are constrained in relation to it; (3) a Neokantian reading in which moral autonomy is emphasized and individual interests are constrained by a rationalistic conception of freedom. Besides pointing out certain textual infelicities involved in these readings, it is shown that they fail to adequately address Rousseau's claim that the general will represents a particular configuration of interest, which he calls the common interest. It is demonstrated that his enigmatic claim requires an analysis of his theory of self-love since for Rousseau interest is ultimately motivated by the more fundamental passion of self-love. In the final chapter, an interpretation of the general will is developed that understands it as an active form of sovereignty best understood as an ongoing phenomenon in which the self-love of the citizen is exercised and civic-virtue maintained. The dissertation concludes with the suggestion that Rousseau has not solved the problem of self-love because his theory of the general will presupposes the cultivation of patriotism in each citizen, a phenomenon most effective when it inflames self-love in relation to foreigners. This antagonism to other citizens and other nations perpetuates a state of war on the international level and inflames the passions that can lead to the types of inequality Rousseau was so careful to describe.

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nÃo hà / Em linhas gerais a pergunta fundamental do texto Ã: pensar em educaÃÃo segundo Schopenhauer à falar de nÃo educaÃÃo em Schopenhauer? O estudo que se segue trata do aprendizado da vontade no que diz respeito a sua relaÃÃo com o mundo. As dores do mundo sÃo de fundamental importÃncia para que a vontade tome consciÃncia de si e se negue. O pensamento de Schopenhauer defende a ideia de que pela negaÃÃo dos prazeres à possÃvel a supressÃo da desgraÃa universal que à o sofrimento. A vontade consiste na raiz metafÃsica do mundo e configura-se o fundamento de todas as dores do mundo e quando ela se objetiva à para satisfazer os seus desejos inconscientes. A sublimaÃÃo da mÃsica faz com que a vontade por alguns instantes fique extasiada e se elevando temporariamente acima dos fenÃmenos consiga distanciar-se dos sofrimentos. Mas a mÃsica à a partitura no tempo, nÃo à possÃvel ficar ai por mundo tempo e logo que a ilusÃo cessa as dores retornam novamente. O aprendizado que a vontade consegue extrair da mÃsica nÃo à suficiente para suprimir as dores e Schopenhauer acredita que sà pela resignaÃÃo seja possÃvel extirpar de uma vez todos os nossos sofrimentos e conseguirmos chegar a um estÃgio de negaÃÃo total de si. O aprendizado da vontade ocorre quando ela chega a esse estado de total ascetismo. Ao longo da pesquisa sÃo feitas vÃrias perguntas no tocante, por exemplo, ao ato de resignar-se ser uma aÃÃo educativa como pensava Durkheim? O aprendizado da vontade à um ato educativo, jà que à uma aÃÃo prÃtica exercida sobre o prÃprio corpo? EntÃo, pensar a educaÃÃo em Schopenhauer à falar de nÃo educaÃÃo em Schopenhauer?

Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

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