Os efeitos das cirurgias primárias sobre os arcos dentários vêm sendo objeto de estudo ao longo do tempo. O presente estudo se propõe a avaliar a relação oclusal dos arcos dentários de pacientes com fissura transforame incisivo unilateral submetidos à cirurgia de lábio e palato mole no primeiro tempo e palato duro no segundo tempo por meio de modelos de estudo documentados em pacientes portadores de fissura transforame incisivo unilateral em uma fase mais tardia. Para a avaliação das arcadas utilizou-se o índice oclusal de Goslon (Mars et al 1987) em uma amostra de 42 modelos de gesso de pacientes com idade entre 15 e 19 anos que reparam o palato mole aos 6 meses e o palato duro aos 40 meses. O objetivo dos índices consiste em facilitar o prognóstico e a aplicação de protocolos terapêuticos no tratamento dos pacientes com fissuras de lábio e palato. Em relação aos resultados, a distribuição do Índice oclusal de Goslon foi 42,86% dos pacientes no grupo 1 (G1), 19,05% no grupo 2 (G2), 16,67% no grupo 3 (G3), 7,14% no grupo 4 (G4) e 14,29% no grupo (G5). Para os escores agrupados do índice de Goslon, 61,90 % dos pacientes foram classificados nos grupos 1 e 2 (G1+G2) demonstrando uma relação interarcos satisfatória e 21,43% foram categorizados nos grupos 4 e 5 (G4+G5), considerando uma pobre relação interarcos. / The purpose of this work was to evaluate the outcomes of the application of delayed hard palate closure treatment protocol on the dental arch on a sample of Brazilian patients aging 15 to 19 years old. The sample comprised 42 patients with UCLP, on the permanent dentition, aging 15 to 19 years old, treated with the referred protocol. The mean age of closure was 6 (±3.15) and 40 (±36.07) months for soft and hard palate respectively. Dental casts were obtained and analyzed by a single calibrated (kappa > .71) examiner. Dental arch relationships were accessed on the by applying the Goslon Yardstick, which has been proved to be a useful method for longitudinal assessment of dental arch relationship. The frequencies of each Goslon Yardstick score were described in order to evaluate long-term treatment results on these patients. The distribution of the cases into their assigned Goslon Yardstick scores showed 18 (42.86%) cases on group 1, 8 (19.05%) cases on group 2, 7 (16.67%) cases on group 3, 3 (7.14%) cases on group 4 and 6 (14.29%) cases on group 5. In evaluating the results described, it was possible to conclude that long-term results of delayed hard palate closure treatment protocol for UCLP regarding dental arch relationships were satisfactory on the studied sample: 61.9% of the patients showed excellent or good arch relationship (G1+G2) while 21.43% were classified as having poor or very poor arch relationship (G4+G5).

Os efeitos das cirurgias primárias sobre os arcos dentários vêm sendo objeto de estudo ao longo do tempo. O presente estudo se propõe a avaliar a relação oclusal dos arcos dentários de pacientes com fissura transforame incisivo unilateral submetidos à cirurgia de lábio e palato mole no primeiro tempo e palato duro no segundo tempo por meio de modelos de estudo documentados em pacientes portadores de fissura transforame incisivo unilateral em uma fase mais tardia. Para a avaliação das arcadas utilizou-se o índice oclusal de Goslon (Mars et al 1987) em uma amostra de 42 modelos de gesso de pacientes com idade entre 15 e 19 anos que reparam o palato mole aos 6 meses e o palato duro aos 40 meses. O objetivo dos índices consiste em facilitar o prognóstico e a aplicação de protocolos terapêuticos no tratamento dos pacientes com fissuras de lábio e palato. Em relação aos resultados, a distribuição do Índice oclusal de Goslon foi 42,86% dos pacientes no grupo 1 (G1), 19,05% no grupo 2 (G2), 16,67% no grupo 3 (G3), 7,14% no grupo 4 (G4) e 14,29% no grupo (G5). Para os escores agrupados do índice de Goslon, 61,90 % dos pacientes foram classificados nos grupos 1 e 2 (G1+G2) demonstrando uma relação interarcos satisfatória e 21,43% foram categorizados nos grupos 4 e 5 (G4+G5), considerando uma pobre relação interarcos. / The purpose of this work was to evaluate the outcomes of the application of delayed hard palate closure treatment protocol on the dental arch on a sample of Brazilian patients aging 15 to 19 years old. The sample comprised 42 patients with UCLP, on the permanent dentition, aging 15 to 19 years old, treated with the referred protocol. The mean age of closure was 6 (±3.15) and 40 (±36.07) months for soft and hard palate respectively. Dental casts were obtained and analyzed by a single calibrated (kappa > .71) examiner. Dental arch relationships were accessed on the by applying the Goslon Yardstick, which has been proved to be a useful method for longitudinal assessment of dental arch relationship. The frequencies of each Goslon Yardstick score were described in order to evaluate long-term treatment results on these patients. The distribution of the cases into their assigned Goslon Yardstick scores showed 18 (42.86%) cases on group 1, 8 (19.05%) cases on group 2, 7 (16.67%) cases on group 3, 3 (7.14%) cases on group 4 and 6 (14.29%) cases on group 5. In evaluating the results described, it was possible to conclude that long-term results of delayed hard palate closure treatment protocol for UCLP regarding dental arch relationships were satisfactory on the studied sample: 61.9% of the patients showed excellent or good arch relationship (G1+G2) while 21.43% were classified as having poor or very poor arch relationship (G4+G5).

No description available.

La libéralisation des marchés impose aux chemins de fer une révolution économique. Elle remet en cause l'organisation monopolistique au profit du développement de nouveaux marchés. L'analyse des défaillances du marché (notamment évaluation des économies d'échelle) et celle des différentes formes de réglementation justifient le recours à une régulation incitative des marchés ferroviaires. A ce titre, la concurrence par comparaison paraît intéressante : la comparaison des performances d'entreprises semblables permet de réduire les contraintes informationnelles de la régulation classique. Malgré quelques limites théoriques, les mises en œuvre de mécanismes comparatifs sont nombreuses, comme, par exemple, dans les chemins de fer Japonais. L'application proposée de la concurrence par comparaison aux TER français doit en améliorer la performance. En effet, l'estimation d'une frontière de coût révèle d'importantes disparités d'efforts entre les régions (représentant plus de 100 millions d'euros par an), que le mécanisme comparatif proposé peut réduire.

<p>The co-operative as an economic and social institution has long been recognized for its contribution to economic development as well as its positive effect on local communities. However, over the last decade or so substantial structural changes in the agricultural sector have undermined some of the most prominent North American co-operatives. In some cases, co-ops asked for bankruptcy protection, others ceased operations while some were transformed to for-profit firms. The present study offers three essays that explore the challenges that co-operatives are facing in terms of their relationship with their members in local markets, the decision-making process of their leaders and the co-ops' role in the modern economy.</p> <p>These first two essays are linked by the fact that they both develop models that are about cognitions. Examining cognition offers some new insights to understanding the process behind the decline of agricultural co-ops. In the first essay the model examines consumers' cognitions, while the model in the second essay examines management's cognitions. The essays differ on the agent's ability to change the perceptions that result from those cognitions. Essay One assumes that consumers' perceptions are partially flexible and thus can change over time with some cost; on the other hand, essay Two assumes that beliefs are inflexible due to the high cost of changing them.</p> <p>Essay One examines the relationship between a co-operative and its membership in a local market using an economic psychological approach. More specifically, the essay presents a modified rational-choice model to investigate how cognitive dissonance can influence members' loyalty. The effect of cognitive dissonance is analyzed in a case where a local co-operative operates alongside with an investor-owned firm (IOF) in a market. The model illustrates how cognitive dissonance can give rise to switching costs for those consumers who wish to switch to the IOF. Analytical results demonstrate the effect of these switching costs on equilibrium market shares and discuss how a drop in the dissonance cost because of managerial decisions by the co-op can result in dramatic drops in its market share.</p> <p>Essay Two illustrates how management's mental frame can be incorporated into an economic model and develops a theoretical underpinning for the link between a strong mental frame and the financial difficulties that a firm might experience. The case of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool with its Project Horizon plan is proposed as an example of a situation where the established mental frame gave rise to a belief regarding future member support that had a significant influence on the decision-making process of the co-op's CEO. The analysis includes a game theoretic model of a duopoly between a co-operative and an IOF, where mental framing is explicitly incorporated into the primitives of the model. Analytical results illustrate how the CEO's belief regarding member commitment can influence decision-making and therefore affect the market share and profits of the firm.</p> <p>Essay Three uses non-parametric econometric techniques to examine the stock price effect of a co-op's acquisition by a publicly-traded IOF. The potential for this study emerged as a result of the takeover of Dairyworld, a dairy co-op, by Saputo, a publicly-traded private corporation. The study uses the prediction-error approach to estimate Saputo's returns after the acquisition as a deviation from its expected returns. A non-parametric bootstrap technique simulates Saputo's stock returns and examines its behavior around the acquisition date. The empirical results are consistent with a number of hypotheses, including the pro-competitive role that co-operatives are believed to have in the economy. The essay also includes a comprehensive discussion regarding the greater financial value that co-ops have for IOFs.</p>

<p>The co-operative as an economic and social institution has long been recognized for its contribution to economic development as well as its positive effect on local communities. However, over the last decade or so substantial structural changes in the agricultural sector have undermined some of the most prominent North American co-operatives. In some cases, co-ops asked for bankruptcy protection, others ceased operations while some were transformed to for-profit firms. The present study offers three essays that explore the challenges that co-operatives are facing in terms of their relationship with their members in local markets, the decision-making process of their leaders and the co-ops' role in the modern economy.</p> <p>These first two essays are linked by the fact that they both develop models that are about cognitions. Examining cognition offers some new insights to understanding the process behind the decline of agricultural co-ops. In the first essay the model examines consumers' cognitions, while the model in the second essay examines management's cognitions. The essays differ on the agent's ability to change the perceptions that result from those cognitions. Essay One assumes that consumers' perceptions are partially flexible and thus can change over time with some cost; on the other hand, essay Two assumes that beliefs are inflexible due to the high cost of changing them.</p> <p>Essay One examines the relationship between a co-operative and its membership in a local market using an economic psychological approach. More specifically, the essay presents a modified rational-choice model to investigate how cognitive dissonance can influence members' loyalty. The effect of cognitive dissonance is analyzed in a case where a local co-operative operates alongside with an investor-owned firm (IOF) in a market. The model illustrates how cognitive dissonance can give rise to switching costs for those consumers who wish to switch to the IOF. Analytical results demonstrate the effect of these switching costs on equilibrium market shares and discuss how a drop in the dissonance cost because of managerial decisions by the co-op can result in dramatic drops in its market share.</p> <p>Essay Two illustrates how management's mental frame can be incorporated into an economic model and develops a theoretical underpinning for the link between a strong mental frame and the financial difficulties that a firm might experience. The case of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool with its Project Horizon plan is proposed as an example of a situation where the established mental frame gave rise to a belief regarding future member support that had a significant influence on the decision-making process of the co-op's CEO. The analysis includes a game theoretic model of a duopoly between a co-operative and an IOF, where mental framing is explicitly incorporated into the primitives of the model. Analytical results illustrate how the CEO's belief regarding member commitment can influence decision-making and therefore affect the market share and profits of the firm.</p> <p>Essay Three uses non-parametric econometric techniques to examine the stock price effect of a co-op's acquisition by a publicly-traded IOF. The potential for this study emerged as a result of the takeover of Dairyworld, a dairy co-op, by Saputo, a publicly-traded private corporation. The study uses the prediction-error approach to estimate Saputo's returns after the acquisition as a deviation from its expected returns. A non-parametric bootstrap technique simulates Saputo's stock returns and examines its behavior around the acquisition date. The empirical results are consistent with a number of hypotheses, including the pro-competitive role that co-operatives are believed to have in the economy. The essay also includes a comprehensive discussion regarding the greater financial value that co-ops have for IOFs.</p>

Submitted by Rafael Terra (rflterra@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-05-07T03:21:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation Final Rafael Terra de Menezes May 2012.pdf: 9750545 bytes, checksum: aa5ad52c395ae0a69a42c64b246ce7bf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-05-07T13:37:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation Final Rafael Terra de Menezes May 2012.pdf: 9750545 bytes, checksum: aa5ad52c395ae0a69a42c64b246ce7bf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-07T14:06:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation Final Rafael Terra de Menezes May 2012.pdf: 9750545 bytes, checksum: aa5ad52c395ae0a69a42c64b246ce7bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-03 / Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the viii National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1- hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities. / A provisão local de serviços públicos tem o efeito positivo de aumentar a eficiência, pois cada localidade tem as suas idiossincrasias que determinam uma demanda distinta por serviços públicos. Esta dissertação aborda diferentes aspectos da demanda local por bens e serviços públicos e sua relação com incentivos políticos O texto está dividido em três ensaios. O primeiro ensaio visa testar a existência de yardstick competition nos gastos em educação utilizando um painel de municípios brasileiros. O ensaio estima modelos espaciais de Durbin com dois regimes e efeitos fixos espaciais e temporais por meio de máxima verossimilhança, onde os regimes representam diferentes cenários institucionais de accountability eleitoral e educacional. Primeiro, é investigado se os prefeitos de segundo mandato tendem a interagir menos com os vizinhos como resultado da impossibilidade de reeleição, que reduz os incentivos para sinalizarem seus tipos (bons ou ruins) para os eleitores por meio da reprodução dos gastos de seus vizinhos. Além disso, é avaliado se prefeitos sem apoio político da maioria da câmara dos vereadores (que pode indicar uma falta de apoio dos eleitores) buscam reproduzir os gastos dos vizinhos em maior medida, a fim de aumentarem suas chances de reeleição. Em seguida, o ensaio calcula os efeitos da mudança institucional introduzida pela divulgação do Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (IDEB) e de suas metas em abril de 2007 sobre a interação estratégica entre governos locais. Esta mudança institucional possivelmente aumentou os incentivos para os prefeitos seguirem as melhores práticas nacionais, na tentativa de sinalizarem aos eleitores que são competentes, reduzindo assim a importância de transbordamentos de informação local. O mesmo modelo é também testado usando insumos escolares que se acreditam aumentarem o desempenho dos alunos no lugar de gastos com educação. Os resultados mostram evidências de yardstick competition nos gastos em educação. A autocorrelação espacial é menor entre os prefeitos em segundo mandato e maior entre os prefeitos com o apoio da minoria (i.e., com uma margem menor de votos). Além disso, a mudança institucional introduzida pelo IDEB reduziu a interação espacial nos gastos educação e na definição dos insumos escolares, diminuindo assim a importância de transbordamentos de informação local. O segundo ensaio investiga o papel desempenhado pela distância geográfica entre os pobres e não pobres na determinação da demanda local por redistribuição de renda. Em particular, o estudo fornece um teste empírico do modelo de altruísmo delimitado geograficamente proposto em Pauly (1973), incorporando ainda a possibilidade de custos de x participação associados à provisão de transferências (Van de Wale, 1998). Primeiramente, a discussão é motivada permitindo que o modelo original Pauly incorpore um "custo iceberg" de participação nos programas para as pessoas pobres. Foram utilizados dados seccionais do Censo Demográfico de 2000 e um painel de municípios com base na Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) de 2001 a 2007. Todas as variáveis explicativas que constituem medidas de distância indicam que uma maior proximidade entre pobres e não pobres está associada a uma melhor cobertura dos programas (demanda por redistribuição). Por exemplo, um aumento de 1 hora no tempo gasto em deslocamento casa-trabalho pelos pobres reduz a cobertura em 3,158 pontos percentuais. Este resultado é semelhante ao de Ashworth, Heyndels e Smolders (2002), mas definitivamente não se deve à existência de vazamentos nos programas. Para diferenciar empiricamente os efeitos resultantes de custos de participação daqueles devido ao altruísmo geograficamente delimitado, um teste adicional é realizado com dados em painel obtidos junto as PNAD de 2004 e de 2006, que avaliam o número de benefícios e o valor do benefício médio recebido pelos beneficiários. As estimativas sugerem que tanto o custo quanto o altruísmo desempenham papéis importantes na determinação da cobertura/focalização de programas sociais no Brasil e, portanto, na determinação da demanda por transferências. Os resultados indicam também que o tamanho do orçamento para a redistribuição tem um impacto positivo na cobertura dos programas. O terceiro ensaio tem como objetivo testar empiricamente a validade do modelo do eleitor mediano para o caso brasileiro. As informações municipais são provenientes do Censo Demográfico e do Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral para o ano de 2000. Primeiramente, a demanda do eleitor mediano para os serviços públicos locais é estimada. As cestas ofertadas pelos candidatos à reeleição são identificadas como os gastos realizados durante o primeiro mandato. A suposição de informação perfeita dos candidatos sobre a demanda mediana é relaxada e uma hipótese mais fraca, de expectativas racionais, é imposta. Assim, os representantes podem se enganar quanto à demanda mediana ao que se denominou “erros de percepção”. Assim, em um determinado ponto no tempo, os representantes podem fornecer uma cesta (dada pelas despesas per capita), que difere por um termo de erro multiplicativo da demanda do eleitor mediano por serviços públicos, o qual está incluído nos resíduos da equação de demanda. Em seguida, calcula-se o impacto do módulo deste “erro de percepção” sobre o desempenho eleitoral dos prefeitos utilizando modelos de seleção. O resultado sugere que o modelo do eleitor mediano é válido para o caso dos municípios brasileiros.

Submitted by Maurício Muniz (mauriciopmuniz@gmail.com) on 2018-08-13T21:23:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-08-14T15:42:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-14T17:19:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T17:19:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-04 / A definição das instâncias governamentais adequadas para a gestão de diferentes recursos e políticas públicas é tema de extensa e histórica discussão. Partindo do princípio de que a população de um país disfruta e exerce livre movimento no seu território, podendo migrar e se estabelecer em novas localidades, argumenta-se que, de acordo com as especificidades de cada política ou o nível central ou os níveis locais dos governos seriam melhores gestores/alocadores e garantiriam a maximização da utilidade dos impostos aos seus “consumidores”, ou seja, os habitantes de uma nação. O presente trabalho busca analisar esse fenômeno utilizando a política habitacional brasileira como indicador. Em 2009, através do Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida, denotouse a retomada parcial à competência federal desse tipo de política desde o fim do BNH (Banco Nacional de Habitação) em 1986 e, a partir dela, torna-se válido analisar se o aumento da centralização federal trouxe ganhos de eficiência na alocação dos recursos. A literatura e artigos sobre o tema apresentam teoria e evidências de que a gestão local de políticas habitacionais de cunho social podem causar spillover populacional entre municípios vizinhos advindo do welfare migration e, ao tomar isso como verdade, instaurar um jogo estratégico dos gestores municipais para reduzir a provisão de habitação popular (Mattos et al. 2014), o chamado race to the bottom. Este estudo investiga se após 2009, com o aumento da centralização na tomada de decisão da política, ainda é possível verificar essa interação, e procura encontrar indícios que a política habitacional seria uma potencial causadora de movimentação populacional, através de uma análise de spillover laboral entre os municípios. Utilizando um painel com dados anualizados de 2009 a 2014, aplicado a modelos de autocorrelação espacial, constatou-se que na média nacional ainda existem evidências de um jogo estratégico intermunicipal na alocação de recursos da política habitacional. No entanto, ao analisarmos a evolução quantitativa dos indicadores do Programa, sugere-se que a centralização da política inverteu o panorama de Race to the Bottom para um de Yardstick Competition, ou seja, um ganho significativo de eficiência quando comparado com a política local anterior. Os resultados também sugerem que há indícios de uma correlação estatisticamente significativa entre investimentos de política habitacional com movimentações laborais entre os municípios o que pode estar relacionado à teoria de Welfare Migration. / The choice of appropriate governmental instances for managing different resources and public policies is the subject of extensive and historical discussion. Assuming that a country’s population enjoys and exercises free movement within its territory, being able to migrate and settle in new localities, it is argued that, according to the specificities of each policy, the central or local levels of governments would be better managers / allocators and would ensure the maximization of utility of taxpayers. The present essay seeks to analyze this phenomenon using the Brazilian housing policy as an indicator. In 2009, through the establishment of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program, the policy got partially back to federal government control since the end of BNH (National Housing Bank) in 1986 what raised the valid question of assessing if the increase of federal centralization brought efficiency gains on the allocation of resources. The literature and articles on the subject present theory and evidence that local management of social housing policies can cause population spillover among neighboring municipalities arising from Welfare Migration. This could establish a strategic game of municipal managers to reduce the provision of social housing when they assume the migration actually takes place (Mattos et al., 2014), the so-called Race to the Bottom. This study investigates if after 2009, with the increase of centralization in the policy decision making, it is still possible to verify this game, and seeks to find evidence that housing policy would be a potential cause of population movements through a labor spillover analysis. Using a panel with annualized data from 2009 to 2014 applied to spatial autocorrelation models, it was observed that in the national average there is still evidence of a strategic intermunicipal game in the allocation of housing policy resources. However, when analyzing the quantitative evolution of the Program indicators it is suggested that the policy centralization reversed the panorama from Race to the Bottom to one of Yardstick Competition, what is a significant gain of efficiency when compared with the previous local politics. The results also suggest that there is indeed evidence of a statistically significant correlation between housing policy investments with labor movements which, in turn, could be related to the Welfare Migration theory.