摘 要
本研究以最終控制之觀念與研究方法，分析台灣上市公司股權結構與資本結構間的關係。首先探討台灣上市公司最終控制者的型態，接著以分析研究控制股東的控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度對公司舉債的影響。最後，納入集團企業及其組織型態等因素，探討其與偏離程度的關係。
實證結果顯示，不論以10%或20%的投票權作為股權分散的判斷標準，家族皆為最普遍的控制股東型態。當假設控制股東對名目公司(其他機構)的持股比率為0%時，實證結果顯示，若控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大，則其舉債程度越高。這可能意味著控制股東在其控制權與現金流量請求權的偏離情形下，會透過負債程度的操控來侵佔少數股東的財富，亦可能對債權人甚或納稅義務人的權益產生影響。
在集團企業因素的影響方面，實證結果指出當上市公司屬於集團企業時，其控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度較之非集團企業者為大，且集團企業的組織型態越複雜，控制股東之控制權與現金流量請求權的偏離程度將越大，代表控制股東更可能透過金字塔結構及交叉持股的方式來加強對公司的控制，進而產生侵犯少數股東權益的動機。 / Abstract
This study investigates if the controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan expropriate the minority shareholders through raising debt. Two cutoff levels of ultimate control right, 10% and 20%, are applied to find out the fact that the listed companies in Taiwan are not widely held but mostly in the control of families. On top of this fact, the result indicates that the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders has positive effect on the debt ratio. It also reveals that the more the block shareholders’ control rights deviates from cash flow rights, the more the debt corporate would raise. Furthermore, the deviation is larger for conglomerate companies than their counterparties. For conglomerate companies, the deviation is positively related to the complexity of the conglomerate structure.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0090353028 |
| Creators | 高國霖 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
Page generated in 0.0019 seconds