摘 要 本研究以最終控制之觀念與研究方法，分析台灣上市公司股權結構與資本結構間的關係。首先探討台灣上市公司最終控制者的型態，接著以分析研究控制股東的控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度對公司舉債的影響。最後，納入集團企業及其組織型態等因素，探討其與偏離程度的關係。 實證結果顯示，不論以10%或20%的投票權作為股權分散的判斷標準，家族皆為最普遍的控制股東型態。當假設控制股東對名目公司(其他機構)的持股比率為0%時，實證結果顯示，若控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大，則其舉債程度越高。這可能意味著控制股東在其控制權與現金流量請求權的偏離情形下，會透過負債程度的操控來侵佔少數股東的財富，亦可能對債權人甚或納稅義務人的權益產生影響。 在集團企業因素的影響方面，實證結果指出當上市公司屬於集團企業時，其控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度較之非集團企業者為大，且集團企業的組織型態越複雜，控制股東之控制權與現金流量請求權的偏離程度將越大，代表控制股東更可能透過金字塔結構及交叉持股的方式來加強對公司的控制，進而產生侵犯少數股東權益的動機。 / Abstract This study investigates if the controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan expropriate the minority shareholders through raising debt. Two cutoff levels of ultimate control right, 10% and 20%, are applied to find out the fact that the listed companies in Taiwan are not widely held but mostly in the control of families. On top of this fact, the result indicates that the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders has positive effect on the debt ratio. It also reveals that the more the block shareholders’ control rights deviates from cash flow rights, the more the debt corporate would raise. Furthermore, the deviation is larger for conglomerate companies than their counterparties. For conglomerate companies, the deviation is positively related to the complexity of the conglomerate structure.

台灣金融市場規模小，家數多，造成金融機構過度競爭的情形，導致各銀行為爭取客戶，紛紛降低授信標準，手續費也一再調降，不只導致一連串銀行資產品質問題的出現，逾放比過高，準備覆蓋率卻不足，銀行經營的風險大大提高；而銀行的獲利空間也遭到壓縮，資產報酬率與淨值報酬率呈現持續下降的趨勢。管理階層如果只是利用盈餘管理的工具，窗飾盈餘，以取信於一般大眾，金融危機仍會是台灣經濟上的一顆不定時炸彈。再加上金融產業手上擁有龐大資金，並掌握一般大眾投資的資本，若產生董事會坐大，欺瞞股東的行為，則對社會必定造成莫大的衝擊，所以金控公司的公司治理情形，深為各界所關心。 本篇論文以現金流量請求權與控制權的計算，來一窺金控公司合併子公司時的公司治理是否存在道德危機的議題。現金流量請求權的計算，相當於投入成本的概念；而控制權則相當於所得到的報酬。以一股一權的前提下，投入與報酬應當不會有所偏離，但投資者能以較少的投入而得到較大的報酬時，投資者將產生投機心態。文中特別以三間金控公司合併其他銀行時的現金流量請求權與控制權偏離程度的改變，來推測主要股東的道德危機是否因此增加。

Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em curso - dos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. / Most of the large listed companies outside USA and UK have a controlling shareholder. The dominant control structure in each country is the result of multiple determinants, many of them arising from the legal system. The gradual convergence of ownership patterns around the world from the extremes of the total concentration and separation of ownership and control to the intermediate scenario of significant blockholdings held by institutional investors - has not been accompanied by a relevant shift in the control structures in listed companies of most of the countries, specially those in the Brazilian Novo Mercado. This Doctorate Thesis presents a specific subset of legal factors contributing for that outcome: the legal instruments separating voting rights from cashflow rights.

Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em curso - dos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. / Most of the large listed companies outside USA and UK have a controlling shareholder. The dominant control structure in each country is the result of multiple determinants, many of them arising from the legal system. The gradual convergence of ownership patterns around the world from the extremes of the total concentration and separation of ownership and control to the intermediate scenario of significant blockholdings held by institutional investors - has not been accompanied by a relevant shift in the control structures in listed companies of most of the countries, specially those in the Brazilian Novo Mercado. This Doctorate Thesis presents a specific subset of legal factors contributing for that outcome: the legal instruments separating voting rights from cashflow rights.

In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 / This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Their results can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration.

本論文主要目的係探討政府持股與企業避稅間之關係。本文以2005年至2014年台灣公開發行以上公司為樣本，分析政府持股比例、代表政府董監事席次比例對租稅規避的影響，並檢視公股主導企業之避稅程度。 實證結果顯示，政府持股比例對企業避稅無顯著影響，然而，當代表政府的董監事席次比例愈高，企業會減少避稅行為。此外，研究結果亦指出公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低。進一步分析公股主導之企業和雙權偏離互動對企業避稅之影響。實證分析發現，當股份盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較高，隱含公股主導之企業會透過避稅行為將財富移轉至企業本身；反之，當席次盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低，表示政府掌握董事會席次時，能有效監督企業遵循稅法規定，採用較保守的租稅政策。 / The purpose of this study is to examine the association between government shareholding and tax avoidance. This study uses the data of Taiwan public companies from 2005 to 2014 to analyze whether government shareholding percentage and the ratio of directors held by the government have impact on tax avoidance, and investigate the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies. The empirical results reveal that government shareholding does not significantly affect corporate tax avoidance. However, when the ratio of directors held by the government increases, companies would reduce the level of tax avoidance. In addition, the results also indicate that government-controlled companies are less tax avoidance compared with family-controlled companies. This study conducts further analysis on the influence of the interaction of government-controlled companies and the deviation between control rights and cash flow rights on tax avoidance. The results show that the higher the level of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies than family-controlled companies. It implies that government-controlled companies might transfer fund to themselves through tax avoidance. On the contrary, when the deviation between the ratio of controlled board seats and cash flow rights increases, the government-controlled companies engage in less tax avoidance than family-controlled companies. It represents that when the board of directors is controlled by the government, it could effectively supervise the company to comply with tax regulations, and the company would adopt conservative tax strategies.