This paper considers empirically whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993-2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf, the Shapley-Shubik, and other power indices, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates point to significant differences in member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences of empirical (versus theoretical) power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. Interestingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variant differs from the theoretical one both under individual and bloc voting. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993- 2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates indicate significant differences between member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences between empirical and theoretical power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. This result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variants differ from the theoretical one, both under individual and bloc voting. (authors' abstract)

O presente trabalho tem por objetivos (i) apresentar a teoria do poder de votação a priori e (ii) analisar a justiça das regras de votação do Plenário do Conselho Federal de Economia (COFECON) com base nesta teoria. Utilizando como referencial teórico a teoria da escolha pública, os principais índices de poder de votação e a noção de justa distribuição de poder são apresentados. Para a análise da justiça das regras de votação do Plenário do COFECON, utilizamos os índices de poder de Banzhaf absoluto e relativo. Verificou-se que a recente mudança nas regras de tomada de decisão do Plenário do COFECON foi prejudicial do ponto de vista da justiça da distribuição do poder entre os Conselhos Regionais de Economia (CORECONs) que compõem o COFECON. CORECONs representantes de um grande número de economistas como Minas Gerais e Rio Grande do Sul passaram a ter o mesmo poder para influenciar decisões do que Conselhos pequenos como Amapá e Tocantins. Conseqüentemente, um economista membro do CORECON do Amapá tem um poder de alterar o resultado de uma decisão tomada no Plenário do COFECON muito maior do que um economista membro do CORECON do Rio Grande do Sul. / The goals of the present work are (i) present the theory of a priori voting power and (ii) analyze the justice of the voting rules in the Assembly of the Brazilian Federal Council of Economics (COFECON) based on this theory. Having as theoretical basis the public choice theory, the most important voting power indices and the notion of fair power distribution are presented. In the analysis of the fairness of the COFECON’s assembly voting rules, the Banzhaf absolute power index and the Banzhaf relative power index were employed. The analysis verified that the recent change in the rules of decision making in the COFECON’s assembly was harmful to the fairness of the voting power distribution between the Regional Councils of Economics (CORECONs). After the change, the power of CORECONs representing a great number of economists as Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul equals the power of minor jurisdictions as Amapá and Tocantins. Hence, an economist member of Amapá’s CORECON has a power to change a decision of the Assembly of COFECON much larger than that of an economist member of the Rio Grande do Sul’s CORECON.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivos (i) apresentar a teoria do poder de votação a priori e (ii) analisar a justiça das regras de votação do Plenário do Conselho Federal de Economia (COFECON) com base nesta teoria. Utilizando como referencial teórico a teoria da escolha pública, os principais índices de poder de votação e a noção de justa distribuição de poder são apresentados. Para a análise da justiça das regras de votação do Plenário do COFECON, utilizamos os índices de poder de Banzhaf absoluto e relativo. Verificou-se que a recente mudança nas regras de tomada de decisão do Plenário do COFECON foi prejudicial do ponto de vista da justiça da distribuição do poder entre os Conselhos Regionais de Economia (CORECONs) que compõem o COFECON. CORECONs representantes de um grande número de economistas como Minas Gerais e Rio Grande do Sul passaram a ter o mesmo poder para influenciar decisões do que Conselhos pequenos como Amapá e Tocantins. Conseqüentemente, um economista membro do CORECON do Amapá tem um poder de alterar o resultado de uma decisão tomada no Plenário do COFECON muito maior do que um economista membro do CORECON do Rio Grande do Sul. / The goals of the present work are (i) present the theory of a priori voting power and (ii) analyze the justice of the voting rules in the Assembly of the Brazilian Federal Council of Economics (COFECON) based on this theory. Having as theoretical basis the public choice theory, the most important voting power indices and the notion of fair power distribution are presented. In the analysis of the fairness of the COFECON’s assembly voting rules, the Banzhaf absolute power index and the Banzhaf relative power index were employed. The analysis verified that the recent change in the rules of decision making in the COFECON’s assembly was harmful to the fairness of the voting power distribution between the Regional Councils of Economics (CORECONs). After the change, the power of CORECONs representing a great number of economists as Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul equals the power of minor jurisdictions as Amapá and Tocantins. Hence, an economist member of Amapá’s CORECON has a power to change a decision of the Assembly of COFECON much larger than that of an economist member of the Rio Grande do Sul’s CORECON.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivos (i) apresentar a teoria do poder de votação a priori e (ii) analisar a justiça das regras de votação do Plenário do Conselho Federal de Economia (COFECON) com base nesta teoria. Utilizando como referencial teórico a teoria da escolha pública, os principais índices de poder de votação e a noção de justa distribuição de poder são apresentados. Para a análise da justiça das regras de votação do Plenário do COFECON, utilizamos os índices de poder de Banzhaf absoluto e relativo. Verificou-se que a recente mudança nas regras de tomada de decisão do Plenário do COFECON foi prejudicial do ponto de vista da justiça da distribuição do poder entre os Conselhos Regionais de Economia (CORECONs) que compõem o COFECON. CORECONs representantes de um grande número de economistas como Minas Gerais e Rio Grande do Sul passaram a ter o mesmo poder para influenciar decisões do que Conselhos pequenos como Amapá e Tocantins. Conseqüentemente, um economista membro do CORECON do Amapá tem um poder de alterar o resultado de uma decisão tomada no Plenário do COFECON muito maior do que um economista membro do CORECON do Rio Grande do Sul. / The goals of the present work are (i) present the theory of a priori voting power and (ii) analyze the justice of the voting rules in the Assembly of the Brazilian Federal Council of Economics (COFECON) based on this theory. Having as theoretical basis the public choice theory, the most important voting power indices and the notion of fair power distribution are presented. In the analysis of the fairness of the COFECON’s assembly voting rules, the Banzhaf absolute power index and the Banzhaf relative power index were employed. The analysis verified that the recent change in the rules of decision making in the COFECON’s assembly was harmful to the fairness of the voting power distribution between the Regional Councils of Economics (CORECONs). After the change, the power of CORECONs representing a great number of economists as Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul equals the power of minor jurisdictions as Amapá and Tocantins. Hence, an economist member of Amapá’s CORECON has a power to change a decision of the Assembly of COFECON much larger than that of an economist member of the Rio Grande do Sul’s CORECON.

Cette thèse est la compilation d’essais qui appliquent les méthodes expérimentales et d’enquêtes à deux sujets portant sur la prise de décisions en groupe. La prise de décision en groupe est un type de processus participatif dans lequel plusieurs individus agissent collectivement, analysent des problèmes ou des situations, examinent et évaluent les solutions alternatives d’action, et choisissent parmi les différentes alternatives, une ou plusieurs solutions (Van den Ven et Delbeq, 1974). Une des caractéristiques parmi les plus importantes dans la prise de décisions en groupe est que les individus ont une responsabilité individuelle (Katzenbach et Smith, 1993). Par conséquent, cette thèse s’intéresse à la fois aux décisions effectivement prises au niveau du groupe, mais également aux opinions individuelles.Le premier sujet s’inscrit dans le domaine du bien-être et du choix social et porte sur l’égalité des chances (désignée EOP par la suite). Nous testons d’abord les fondements intuitifs de l’EOP au moyen d’une enquête, pendant laquelle les individus sont "des spectateurs impartiaux" sans aucun gain personnel. Cette enquête nous permet d’illustrer la notion de justice impartiale en absence d’intérêt. Nous testons ensuite les fondements au cours d’une expérience non coopérative, où les décisions prises ont des conséquences sur les gains des individus. L’expérience utilisée dans ce sujet s’intéresse aux préférences révélées en matière de justice par les preneurs de décisions. Le deuxième sujet porte sur les systèmes de vote à majorité pondérée (désignés WMV par la suite). Nous réalisons d’abord une enquête auprès de différents groupes d’étudiants pour découvrir que les individus ne tiennent pas compte de la relation non monotone entre le nombre de votes et le pouvoir de vote associé. Nous menons ensuite plusieurs expériences de laboratoire afin de tester si cette relation non monotone peut être apprise dans le cadre d’un jeu répété. Ainsi, la première partie de cette thèse comprend deux chapitres à propos de l’EOP, tandis que la deuxième comprend deux chapitres à propos des WMV. Le premier chapitre est une introduction générale, le Chapitre 6 expose les conclusions.Le Chapitre 2 présente l’enquête de l’EOP, laquelle est une enquête sur les préférences utilisant de nombreux visuels pour présenter des scénarios hypothétiques. Ceci nous permet de révéler les préférences des individus sur les principes de l’EOP. À notre connaissance, notre enquête est la première tentative pour explorer pleinement le concept de l’EOP du point de vue d’un “spectateur impartial”. Nous avons analysé systématiquement cinq facteurs qui relèvent de l’EOP dans deux vignettes et plusieurs scénarios. Entre les deux vignettes : ventes et alcool, nous avons trouvé un niveau élevé de consensus sur les circonstances. Toutes les personnes ne devraient pas subir les conséquences liées aux circonstances dans toutes les situations pour au moins deux raisons : premièrement, cela serait clairement arbitraire du point de vue moral et deuxièmement parce qu’il faut ajuster la péréquation résultante. Le maigre consensus sur l’effort et la chance brute est également présenté dans nos résultats. Puisque la chance brute est définie par rapport au décroissement des risques liés à la chance de non-option, elle peut entrainer des résultats non souhaitables au regard de l’EOP. Inversement, l’effort est défini comme un reflet du comportement des individus. Ils contrôlent cet effort, lequel exerce une influence sur leur statut. Ainsi, les effets des différents niveaux d’effort pourraient être non neutralisés. / Decision making in groups largely exists in almost every aspect of daily life. In this thesis, we use survey and experimental methods to examine decision making in two different areas, equality of opportunity (EOP) and weighted majority voting (WMV). The goal of the research efforts is to understand the importance of achieved decisions for the functioning of the group, involving taking into account the needs and opinions of every group member.In the survey study of EOP, we used the attitude survey consisting of vignettes to elicit stated preferences of quasi-spectators over the conceptions of EOP problems. Impartiality in this study is achieved by considering only evaluations of individuals who have no stake in the situation they are judging. We analysed whether individuals are considered to be held responsible for outcomes by different factors: circumstances, effort, talent, brute luck and option luck. Apart from the baseline treatment, another compared treatment was designed to test context effect, with the introduction of ``need'' and social-cognitive age. In these two treatments, we found a high level of consensus on non-responsibility of circumstances, slight consensuses to responsibility of effort but non-responsibility of brute luck, and no agreement on talent and option luck. When other considerations are not involved, inequality caused by differential option luck and talent is unobjectionable. While with other considerations, people should not fully be held responsible for the outcomes resulting from option luck and talent.We then tested revealed preferences over the conceptions of EOP problems in an experiment, where subjects were stakeholders of each decision. People were recruited to form a micro society, and engaged in actual decisions about redistribution of their own money they earned in a previous phase through four factors: circumstances, effort, brute and option luck. Yet despite a lot of self-interested behaviours when participants have a stake in the redistribution, we clearly observe that participants are sensitive to the different factors through which people can earn their money. There were three treatments in our experiment: the baseline, prior reflection and talent treatments. The voting results among three treatments are very homogeneous, with only one exception on effort in the talent treatment, and present a very high level of self-serving bias.For WMV, the survey study investigates whether people have the knowledge of the relation between the number of votes and corresponding power which they have in a committee that takes decisions with a WMV system. Power indices show that actual voting power is often quite different from the nominal distribution of voting weights. Our survey observed that subjects cannot see through the non-monotonic relationship between the number of votes and voting power. In addition, we found that subjects trained in political sciences had more acquaintance on this issue.The experiment on WMV wanted to see whether people could learn this non-monotonic relation between the number of votes and the actual voting power. In the laboratory experiment, people played similar games 20 times. The first stage of games was the votes apportionment stage, where two out of four subjects in a group independently and simultaneously made decisions to determine the distribution of votes among four members. The second stage of games was the point allocation stage, where four member bargained to divide fixed amount of resources among themselves through the WMV determined in the first stage. The results of our experiments show that initially subjects tend to choose an option that gives them more votes ignoring how remaining votes are distributed among others. But, as subjects ``learn'' about the payoffs they can obtain in the points allocation stage, they start to choose the option in the first stage that could have chance to give them higher payoffs.

Need to form a coalition accompanies most of legislative bodies in multi-party systems without directly-elected executive, including party system in the Czech Republic. This thesis analyses coalition building processes and coalitions formed after regional elections in 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. Main goal is to identify what factors, trends and party behaviour patterns affects coalitions bargaining and final form of a coalition. Secondary goal is to evaluate the stability and continuity of these factors and trends. In order to achieve these goals, diachronic and synchronous comparative analyses was used together with quantitative method of voting power measurement. Text is divided into four chapters. First chapter is devoted to discussion about American and European approach to the study of theory of coalitions. Two points of view of motivation of political parties to compete in the elections are presented: Office and Policy seeking. Second part of this chapter is focused on multi-level governance with emphasis on specifics of the coalition formation process and relationships between parliamentary and regional systems. Second chapter presents method of voting power indices. In the third chapter regional political system of Czech Republic, its organs, powers and voting system are described. Final chapter contains the analysis of coalitions and coalition bargaining. Chapter is divided into two parts; one focused on coalition formation in particular regions and second analyzes continuous and long-term factors and trends.

In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

一般而言，股東會議程所有議案資訊必須事前揭露給全體股東，提供股東充分資訊，其方能在充分瞭解下作成投票決定。惟我國公司法長久以來承認股東有臨時動議與議案修正之權利，允許出席股東就第一七二條第五項規定除外事項之其他一切事項，在股東會現場提出臨時動議或原議案之修正，此舉不但將形成股東會議程資訊之漏洞，復以實務一般認為只要未違反第一七二條第五項之規定，股東可以在現場以臨時動議提議召開股東臨時會針對法定除外事項進行決議，或在同一議題下，可以提出任何修正案，而架空第一七二條之一股東提案權制度所寓有之資訊揭露功能。在無法獲得充分資訊之下，股東應當如何行使表決權，尤其未出席股東以書面或電子方式事前行使表決權時，更是需要充分資訊，否則一旦面對臨時動議或議案修正時，其表決權將依法視為棄權，更進一步衍生出表決權操縱和應否親自出席之問題，橫生枝節，臨時動議與議案修正之突襲性問題，亟待解決。 因此，參考美國、日本、德國、英國、香港、韓國和中國大陸公司法制，公司法應明文要求將股東會議程之主要內容或要領記載於召集通知中，股東會不得就召集通知所未記載之議案進行決議，股東如欲發表任何意見，應循事前提案權提出，而非在現場提出臨時動議或議案修正突襲其他股東。因此，本文建議禁止在現場提出任何臨時動議或議案修正。 / Generally speaking, the agenda of general meeting, including all motions, should be disclosed to all shareholders of the company in advance of a general meeting to provide them with sufficient information to vote (informed voting). However, according to Taiwan Company Act, shareholders have right to move extemporary motions or amendments all but any items as set forth in §172(5) hereof at the meeting. This will not only come to be a loophole resulting from blank statements in a notice of a general meeting, but also sideline the information disclosure function by implication of shareholder proposal in §172-1, because the court hold that the shareholder are entitled to move an extemporary motion to call a meeting to make a resolution on exclusion items in §172(5), or any amendment under the same subject. Thus shareholders are unable to vote without sufficient information, especially who cast their vote through writing or electronic transmission without participating in person in advance of the meeting. In case of extemporary motions or amendments, shareholders who cast vote through writing or electronic transmission shall be deemed to withhold their voting power. This result would bring some issues of manipulation of voting power and whether shareholders who have cast their vote through writing or electronic transmission should participate in person afterwards or not. However, extemporary motions and amendments with surprising nature shall be or shall not be, that is the question. In order to deal with this problem, the main component or general nature of items in the agenda of a general meeting shall be stated in the notice, and only the items stated in the notice could be validly passed at the general meeting by referring to the Company Act of the U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., Hong Kong, South Korea, and Mainland China. If shareholders are willing to express their opinions, they should propose to ask to put in the agenda in advance of the meeting, instead of moving extemporary motions and amendments to surprise the others. This study suggests that no extemporary motion or amendment shall be allowed to move at the general meeting.

Submitted by João Patah (joaopatah@uol.com.br) on 2012-02-13T23:00:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - entregue.pdf: 712466 bytes, checksum: 84c7a6ea77cae324255c3817c658d668 (MD5) / Rejected by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br), reason: Prezado João, Após a folha da ficha catalográfica, deve constar a folha de assinaturas (com o nome dos membros que compuseram sua banca). Modelo no site da Biblioteca: http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/site/bkab/normalizacao Att, Secretaria de Registro on 2012-02-14T11:24:34Z (GMT) / Submitted by João Patah (joaopatah@uol.com.br) on 2012-02-14T12:17:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - entregue.pdf: 714165 bytes, checksum: ccfbe05ea31a2bf5542b1f78fe329c13 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-02-14T12:57:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - entregue.pdf: 714165 bytes, checksum: ccfbe05ea31a2bf5542b1f78fe329c13 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-02-14T13:09:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - entregue.pdf: 714165 bytes, checksum: ccfbe05ea31a2bf5542b1f78fe329c13 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-01-30 / Os efeitos dos diferentes graus de concentração do controle e de governança corporativa das empresas no desempenho das ações têm crescido em interesse no Brasil. Este estudo utiliza a concentração do poder de voto e um índice de governança corporativa para analisar se há impacto destes fatores na liquidez das ações, o que poderia ser um canal de sua influência nos diferenciais de retorno. Becht (1999) conclui que maior concentração de controle reduz a liquidez, Attig el al. (2006) argumentam que a separação do poder de voto e do direito sobre o fluxo de caixa levam à redução da qualidade de informações e expropriação de minoritários, reduzindo a liquidez das ações, e Chung, Elder e Kim (2010) concluem que melhoria da governança interna tem impacto positivo na liquidez. Os resultados obtidos neste estudo sugerem que, para uma amostra de empresas brasileiras, o indicador de governança corporativa não influencia a liquidez com significância estatística. A maior liquidez das ações está em empresas com concentração de controle entre 30% e 50%, com menores preços de negociação, abertura de capital recente e/ou listadas no Novo Mercado. / The effects of different degrees of control concentration and corporate governance on stock returns have rising interest in Brazil. This study makes use of the voting power concentration and of a corporate governance index to examine whether these factors affect stock liquidity, which can be the channel of influence in excess returns. Becht (1999) concluded that concentration of voting power reduces liquidity, Attig el al. (2006) argue that deviations between ultimate control and ownership result in reduced quality of information and extraction of value from minority shareholders, reducing liquidity, and Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) concluded that better corporate governance positively impacts liquidity. The statistical results of this study suggest that, for a sample of Brazilian companies, the corporate governance index does not affect liquidity. Superior liquidity is found when concentration of voting power is between 30% and 50%, with lower share prices, recently listed and on the Novo Mercado segment.