自1980年代以降，私有化成為跨國、跨區域的全球化現象。在各種國公營事業私有化中，電信私有化堪稱是其中最具政治意涵的項目之一，其遭遇的政治阻力也最大。有鑑於過去相關研究多半側重意識型態、制度或利益團體等單一途徑，本研究嘗試統合理念、制度與利益等途徑，以完整的政治分析架構來解釋影響電信私有化三面向－進展速度、成功機率與順暢性－的最重要條件，建構電信私有化的政治理論。
衡量理念的兩項指標為「電信私有歷史遺緒」與「執政者（黨）連任勝選幅度」。衡量制度的兩項指標為「政治權力融合」與「資本市場體質」。衡量利益的兩項指標為「首次釋股套利誘因」與「全民與員工釋股」。若研究個案同時具備這兩項指標或表現較優，意味該個案在該面向上的表現也可能較佳。若個案不具備這兩項指標或表現較遜，意味該個案在該面向上的表現也可能較差。若個案僅具備其中一項指標或僅一項指標較佳，意味該個案在該面向上的表現可能持平。
作者發現，從英國、俄羅斯與台灣電信私有化過程的實際表現而言，理念、制度與利益確實能解釋三國在電信私有化進展速度、成功機率與順暢性上的差異。換言之，若欲迅速、成功與順利推動電信私有化，端視該國的理念、制度與利益而定。雖然理念不易改變，但政府可先從制度與利益著手。制度對電信私有化政策發揮「制度承諾」的效果，而利益則扮演策略性誘因的角色，對電信私有化政策發揮「利益分配」的效果。尤其，利益分配愈普遍、愈讓全民與電信員工有利可圖，電信私有化愈能獲得市場與投資人認同，愈能化解阻力。本研究建議，政府應逆向思考，唯有在首次釋股時先「賤賣」電信資產給全民與員工，電信私有化方能順利推動。 / Privatization has become international and interregional phenomena since 1980s. Among the privatizations of all state-owned and public enterprises, telecom ones can be described as one of the most political implications, facing more political resistance than others. Given the fact that the past researches mostly focused on such single approaches as ideology, institutions and interest groups, this study tries to integrate idea, institutions and interests into a political analytical framework. This study hopes to answer the key prerequisites affecting telecom privatization’s three dimensions-speed, success and smoothness, constructing the political theory of telecom privatization.
Two indicators of measuring “idea” are “telecom assets historically privately-owned” and “re-elected ruler (or ruling party)’s winning margins”. Two indicators of measuring “institutions” are “fusion of political powers” and “health of capital markets”. Two indicators of measuring “interests” are “arbitrage incentives during first shares sale” and “offering shares to individual investors and employees”. If the case is simultaneously qualified for two indicators, it means the case could perform well in that dimension, and vice versa. If the case only satisfies one indicator, it means the case could perform intermediately.
The author found that as far as the results of telecom privatizations in United Kingdom, Russia and Taiwan are concerned, idea, institutions and interests actually are able to explain the difference of the three cases in terms of speed, success and smoothness. In other words, a speedy, successful and smooth telecom privatization depends on idea, institutions and interests. Although it is difficult to change idea, the governments can begin with institutions and interests. Institutions play the “commitment” role, and interests show the “allocation” effect. In particular, the more broadly interests being allocated, and the more profitable individual investors and employees obtaining from telecom privatization, the less opposition the government encountering. The study suggests that the government think of telecom privatization reversely. Telecom privatizations can be pressed ahead smoothly only with “cheaply selling” telecom assets to individual investors and employees during first shares offering.
Keywords: Telecom privatization, idea, institution, interest, arbitrage.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0912525031 |
| Creators | 羅彥傑 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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