This study attempts to systematically analyze the determinants of state participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The study focuses on two core elements: (i) IEA characteristics; and (ii) state characteristics. Hypotheses for state participation in IEAs are formulated based on the two main International Relations theories dealing with cooperation – Realism and Liberalism. The study presents five different models for state participation in IEAs. The first model analyzes the influence of treaty variables, while the remaining four focus on state variables. The second and third models analyze the influence of Realist and Liberal variables respectively. The fourth model specifically focuses on variables which reflect the various socio-economic, political and logistical constraints of developing countries. The fifth model presents an integrated analysis of participation based on the previous models. Results of the study show that participation can be understood in terms of both the Realist and Liberal variables, and that there can be no rarefied partitioning of those factors on participation. More specifically, the study empirically demonstrates that state participation in IEAs is influenced by the following four main factors: (i) the impact of domestic and international institutions (ii) human development; (iii) power motivations; and (iv) IEA design. Policies proposed to increase participation in IEAs therefore have to enhance any positive influence exerted by these parameters, and mitigate their negative influences, if any.

The minority party in the House of Representatives possesses few procedural advantages. As a result, it is typically dominated by the majority party. I argue that the minority controls the use of one procedure in the House, the motion to recommit, and that it uses this control to strategically cross-pressure members of the majority party. Ultimately, this cross-pressuring places the minority in a win-win situation where they either receive a policy victory or better election results. The results of this project overwhelming support the theory of cross-pressuring and indicate that the minority is able to design, implement, and reap the benefits of its own strategy in the House.

This dissertation proposes a multi-level explanatory framework that strengthens explanations of variation in European Union member states’ compliance with the Anti-Discrimination Directives, and offers novel approaches to testing relationships between key constructs situated at multiple levels of analysis. The framework entails three different yet inter-related levels: system structure, organizational design of public agencies, and the attitudinal and behavioral attributes of civil servants. The theoretical model, proposed in this dissertation, conceptualizes compliance from an integrative approach, and also enables more accurate explanations of the role of information in modifying compliance behavior. This dissertation relies on a multi-method empirical approach, and a combination of secondary and primary sources (i.e. surveys, interviews, observations, and primary documents) to provide answers to the research questions raised in this dissertation.

During campaigns, voters often learn that their party's candidate advocates policy positions that conflict with their own attitudes. These cross-pressured voters can either adjust their policy positions to be consonant with their party's candidate or voting for others. I use monthly NES Panel Data from 2008-2009 to examine how voters' beliefs change about a specific policy: the redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation during a presidential campaign. I test this by creating a Random Effects Ordered Probit Panel regression model of ten monthly waves of survey data before the 2008 presidential election. The study shows that over the campaign, voters' policy positions evolve on redistributive taxation policy; voters adjust their prior policy cognitive dissonance to be in agreement with their candidate. The results indicate that in the 2008 Presidential election, the electorate more often moved their policy beliefs to be in agreement with their candidate, rather than switch votes.

Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest. All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United States apply the concept of recusal, but this study focuses on the United States Supreme Court. Title 28 of the United States Code provides standards (not obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves. But Supreme Court Justices are themselves the arbiters of their own recusal and often these substantive standards are not met. The method of study applied is theoretical, using both quantitative and qualitative data from past Supreme Court cases.

This thesis seeks to examine why the Lavalas elite faction and its oppositions have failed to make and implement mutual agreements, to resolve regime crises and to create an environment conducive to democratic norms. The study derives explanations stemming from three alternative models: modernization, rational choice and misperception. Three periods of consensus-building attempt between the Lavalas elite and its oppositions (1991-1995: Consensus-Building attempt I; 1996-2000: Consensus-Building attempt II; 2000-2004: Consensus-Building attempt III) are considered. By using interpreted models a la Graham Allison, the thesis applies the criteria produced by each model to help interpret the failure of consensus-building in these three historical periods. The thesis' conclusion then assesses the models' strengths and weaknesses, prompting interesting questions for further research in the near future.

Are mobile phones the best vehicle for reducing gender inequality in the developing world? ICT experts champion the use of mobile phones to improve women’s lives, and various stakeholders have invested millions of dollars to launch mobile phone programs for women. Yet, given high female illiteracy rates, patriarchal societies, and other structural and cultural barriers in developing countries, many scholars contend that limited access to ICTs can perpetuate gender inequality. Rooted in the theory that women’s empowerment and equality are inseparable and necessary components for the realization of sustainable economic and social development, this paper aims to determine if stakeholders are jumping on the mobile phone bandwagon too soon by using a multivariate regression of cross national data to demonstrate whether or not mobile phones fall short of advancing women at the same rate that men develop.

Most studies examine how homeland policies influence the host state and what role the homeland plays for diaspora. In this paper, I will examine the reasons and conditions for why ethnic groups do or do not support violent ethnic groups. This study tests how external threats impact the level of support within the same ethnic groups. I will examine the causal relationship between external pressure and non-cooperation through a structured, comparative study of Kurdish ethnic groups.

This dissertation considers the impact of voter exit on the survival of incumbent regimes. I argue that voters exit the political process as a result of emigration or political violence. Using the example of Zimbabwe, I argue that ZANU-PF benefited from the exit of nearly four million Zimbabweans who emigrated outside the country in response to declining economic conditions and who exited the political system as a result of violence.

This dissertation builds on existing scholarship in political science and political sociology to explore the influence of interest groups in legislative action networks. The primary theoretical insight is that as the number of interest group affiliations between two members of Congress increases, so does the frequency with which they forge other sorts of social ties necessary to advance the interests of their interest group constituencies. In particular, the analysis looks at interest group donation strategies, legislative co-sponsorships, and roll-call votes during the 111th Congress (2009-2010). The analysis uses social network analysis methods to create network models of 19 different policy domains, as well as an aggregate model, for both the House and Senate. Legislator ideology, state, committee assignments, and experience have a generally significant impact on the number of interest group affiliations shared by each pair of legislators, whereas gender, race/ethnicity, office location and occupational history do not. The results show that interest groups do have consistent impact over co-sponsorships in the House, but somewhat more mixed influence in the Senate. In some instances, groups in the policy domain encourage policy change, and in other instances, status quo protection. The theory did not anticipate the latter effect, though it does make sense in context of other research findings. For roll-call votes, interest groups have a significant influence over some House policy domains but not many Senate policy domains. The increased polarization of the Senate, necessity of minority party discipline to maximize their leverage through use of the filibuster, and staggered nature of Senate elections makes interest group influence tougher to muster in the upper chamber of Congress.