Comment comprendre le fait que la réalité délirante du schizophrène puisse à la fois être marquée par une certitude inébranlable mais également que cette réalité puisse se modifier au fil des échanges que nous pouvons avoir avec des patients psychotiques ? N'y a-t-il pas d'ailleurs une contradiction à envisager la possibilité d'une évolution au sein d'une certitude délirante ?Notre thèse cherchera à rendre compte de l'évolution du délire dans la schizophrénie, et plus particulièrement de celle de la certitude délirante qui caractérise ce type de pathologie. Nous nous attacherons à mettre en valeur la fonction de l'adhésion au délire en essayant de comprendre les raisons qui poussent un sujet à croire en une réalité délirante. Après nous être penché sur la manière dont ce phénomène de créance est conceptualisé dans trois disciplines de la pensée (la philosophie, la psychiatrie et la psychanalyse), nous chercherons à montrer en quoi la certitude délirante peut répondre à une nécessité fondamentale de sa construction subjective et comment elle indique une lutte du sujet par rapport au vécu de l'angoisse. Nous mettrons alors en lien cette montée angoissante avec la survenue des fantasmes tels qu'ils peuvent se manifester à l'insu du sujet. Le cas clinique sur lequel nous allons nous appuyer rendra néanmoins compte des limites de cette certitude du délire, celle-ci ne permettant pas au sujet schizophrène de tout à fait se débarrasser de la pensée fantasmatique. L'étude que nous consacrons aux « échecs » de la certitude délirante visera à rendre compte de la fragilité du système délirant et des conséquences de l'intrusion fantasmatique sur le vécu subjectif du sujet psychotique. Notre thèse nous permettra ainsi de mettre en lien les limites de la construction délirante avec l'impossibilité du sujet schizophrène à refouler la poussée fantasmatique, en faisant comme hypothèse que les glissements subies par la réalité délirante seraient une conséquence d'une non prise du nom. En considérant ces éléments de la psychopathologie il s'agira pour nous d'interroger les conditions d'une thérapeutique adaptée à la problématique psychotique. / How to understand that the delusional reality of the schizophrenic person can both be marked by an unshakeable certainty but that this reality can change over the discussions we can have with psychotic patients? Is there however not a contradiction to consider the possibility of an evolution within a delusional certainty?This research paper will aim to study the delusional processes in schizophrenia, in particular the phenomenon of delirious certainty which characterizes this type of pathology. We will focus on highlighting the function of such adhesion in the psychotic delirium, by trying to understand the reasons which lead the subject to believe in a delusional reality. After having considered how the phenomenon of credence is conceptualized in three disciplines of thought (philosophy, psychiatry and psychoanalysis), we will attempt to show how delirious certainty can answer a fundamental necessity for its subjective construction and how it shows a fight of the subject with the experience of anxiety. We will link this rise of anxiety with the onset of fantasies as they occur unbeknownst to the subject. However, the clinical case we will lean on will report the limitations of this delirious certainty, for it does not allow the schizophrenic subject to get rid entirely of fantasy thinking. The study we devote to these « failures » of the delirious certainty will aim to address the fragility of the delusional system and the consequences of the fantastical intrusion on the subjective experience of the psychotic subject. Our thesis will help us to link the limits of the delusional construction with the impossibility for delusional schizophrenic subjects to repress their surging fantasy. We will make the assumption that the evolution incurred by the delusional reality is a consequence of not taking the name. By considering these elements of psychopathology, we will examine the conditions of a therapy suitable for this psychotic problematic

The customizable area whole farm insurance (CAWFI) is proposed and evaluated as a possible wholearm revenue protection design for crop farms. The evaluation included assessing appropriate weight, optimal scale, and optimal coverage level. The optimal CAWFI was tested against no insurance program, 90% farm level whole farm insurance (90% CFWFI), and CAWFI with scale and coverage level as provisioned in GRP product (restricted CAWFI) in representative farm in Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi. The study finds the optimal CAWFI outperforms no insurance program and restricted CAWFI asserting that CAWFI is a workable insurance model and relaxing restriction on scale and coverage level can increase expected utility of farmers. The optimal CAWFI results in a risk reduction roughly equal with 90% farm-level wholefarm insurance though the expected indemnities in it are at least three fold.

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This thesis examines the use of tax incentives to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand and the issues arising out of the way in which the Thai revenue system has chosen to implement these incentives. Thailand experiences sporadic political unrest, and has been affected by regional and global economic crises. Since FDI appears to increase economic growth and help the host country to achieve sustainable development, the Thai government has a clear policy to encourage FDI. Tax incentives have become a significant weapon in the Thai government’s arsenal for encouraging this aim. This thesis presents a detailed analysis of the tax incentives and the mechanisms used for their implantation. Analysis reveals that, unfortunately, the Thai government has also chosen to deliver the administration of tax incentives in to the hands of two separate bodies ─ the Revenue Department and the Board of Investment (BOI). This strategy is problematic because it creates unnecessary difficulties and uncertainty in the administration of incentives and promotes confusion among foreign investors. The jurisdictional problems inherent in the system of the dual allocation of tax incentive powers are highlighted in the landmark Minebea case, which involved conflicting interpretations by the Revenue Department and the BOI. In addressing these jurisdictional problems, this thesis examines norm conflict resolution principles in general and the lex specialis in particular, and argues that the Investment Promotion Act of 2001 (IPA 2001), being a special law, and so overrides the more general provisions of the Revenue Code. Two solutions are suggested in order to tackle the current problem: 1) to amend the IPA 2001 to specify methods of tax calculation and clearly define problematic terms and 2) to incorporate the tax incentive provisions provided for BOI-promoted companies into the Revenue Code. This is based on the premise that all tax matters, including tax incentives provisions, should be administered only by the revenue authority, i.e. the Revenue Department.

Published literature has focused on understanding moral distress from a descriptive standpoint. Missing from the literature is an exploration of the role a nurse can play in his/her/own moral distress.A qualitative study with an interpretive design incorporated Clandinin and Connelly' narrative methodology. Results highlighted assumptions were made by participants in the absence of resources, which led them to" know the right action to take" from their own perspective.

Notre projet de recherche consiste à analyser les relations étroites qu’entretiennent la logique juridique et le raisonnement probabiliste dans la constitution du calcul des probabilités, c’est à dire depuis son origine au XVIIe siècle jusqu’au siècle des Lumières.L’étude de la logique juridique pousse inévitablement à examiner les rapports entre logique et rhétorique, et à repenser la rhétorique à la lumière de son incontournable rôle logique et, de même, à montrer que toute étude sur la logique juridique doit passer inévitablement par l’étude de la logique de l’argumentation.J'ai montré, contre la thèse qui réduit le raisonnement juridique à une simple rhétorique, que celui-ci répond à une exigence de vérité, ce qui exige de repenser la relation essentielle entre logique et rhétorique dans le champ juridique. La logique ici mobilisée est une logique de la probabilité, laquelle est appropriée à la rationalité pragmatique.C’est du même coup la relation entre logique juridique et logique probabiliste qui se trouve interrogée, à la fois dans une perspective historique, mais surtout du point de vue de philosophie de la science, puisque ces éléments constituent un bon point de départ pour se poser la question de la signification de la gnoséologie et, plus largement, de la validité des théories gnoséologiques. Mais pas seulement : en effet, nombre de philosophes contemporains des sciences ont mis l’accent sur le rôle des métaphores humanistes et des « sciences humaines » dans le développement des théories scientifiques.C’est en quoi consistent l’actualité de ces études et l’utilité de ces questions qui sont intéressantes parce qu’elles se posent à la limite entre la philosophie des sciences et la philosophie morale, brisant ainsi l’ancien dualisme qui a fait écran à la théorie de la connaissance pendant des siècles et qui a encore ses défenseurs dans le monde de certains philosophes analytiques.Nous avons donc montré que logique juridique et logique probabiliste peuvent être considérées comme des paradigmes gnoséologiques tout à fait nouveaux. / When I started to study the relationship between legal logic and probabilistic logic, I immediately realized that this relationship could not really be understood without investigating more specifically the link logic-rhetoric included in it. A long philosophical tradition has accustomed us to consider the legal logic as essentially tied to the rhetoric and the latter as completely detached from the logic.With the word "rhetoric" we usually refers to the '"art of speaking well." But ρητορική τέχνη (retoriké tekne) that arises in the fifth century BC on empirical grounds of the art court has, from its birth, a practical purpose : it wants to be an instrument of persuasion, and the medium he uses is the εικός (eikόs), the plausible. One of the foundations of Greek logic is thus to be found on the empirical grounds of judicial logic. But even if the rhetoric was born with practical and not theoretical purposes, however, this fact requires a study of argumentation theory and its evidence, apart from the prejudice that, even if logic and rhetoric are both related to the argument, the logic should deal with the correct arguments while rhetoric deals with only persuasive arguments.Through historical and logical analysis drawn from Aristotle and which comes to consider the positions of prominent contemporary scholars such as Giuliani, Taruffo, Capozzi, Cellucci, Spranzi, etc., in this article I will show that, instead, logic and rhetoric have a strong bond which should be rethought so as to better understand the essence of legal logic, but also because the break of dualism logical-rhetoric can open much wider perspectives of reflection. Particularly I refer to the reflection of logical and moral relationship that, in turn, would lead us to reflect on the opposition between mind and body. In fact, when we turn a look at the history of logic, we will realize that, since ancient times, there were no sharp and radicals divisions between logical and rhetorical field and that, even in modern times, it is possible to draw a line of continuity between the field of rigorous proof and the field of demonstration of rhetoric, thanks to the recognizable theoretical role of metaphor.

Trata-se de mostrar alguns argumentos, desenvolvidos por Ludwig Wittgenstein nos seus últimos escritos, contra uma espécie de investida cética que pretende colocar em suspensão a certeza que temos a respeito da existência do mundo. Para tanto, procuramos, primeiramente, a partir da exegese do parágrafo 308 de Da Certeza, explorar a relação estabelecida entre os conceitos de dúvida, saber e certeza a fim de esclarecer a concepção de que a dúvida apenas pode ser aplicada sobre proposições empíricas e jamais sobre proposições gramaticais. Em segundo lugar, mostramos que, ao entender que a dúvida ( o ato de duvidar) sobre qualquer coisa faz sentido apenas quando aceitamos um sistema de proposições, Wittgenstein a (o) coloca como dependente da estabilidade da gramática de nossa linguagem. Nesse sentido, buscamos elucidar a maneira como o filósofo caracteriza a lógica demonstrando-a, de um lado, como algo constante um quadro de referência que possibilita o curso das proposições relacionadas à experiência e, de outro, como algo inconstante que comporta fissuras, quebras e até desmoronamento. Por fim, desenvolvemos a ideia de que essa precária condição de nossa gramática não impede que confiemos nela e que, unicamente por conta disso, possamos dizer que algumas proposições fundamentam nossos jogos de linguagem. É nesse sentido que o cético, ao tentar colocar uma proposição fundante em nossos jogos tal qual o mundo existe em dúvida, suspende sem perceber a fluência do jogo assertivo que pretende estabelecer e, por que não dizer, sua lógica. / This work aims to show some arguments, developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, against a kind of skeptical assault that wants to put in suspension our assurance about the existence of the world. First, we should clarify the conception that a doubt can only be applied on empirical propositions and never on grammatical ones, from the relationship established between the concepts of doubt, know and certainty. Secondly, we aim to show that by identifying that raising a question makes sense only when we accept a system of propositions, Wittgenstein puts it as dependent on the stability of our grammar. Accordingly, we seek to elucidate how the philosopher characterizes grammar as something stable, on one hand as a reference framework which enables the course of the propositions that refer to the experience and, on the other, as something unstable that can crack, break and even collapse. Finally, we developed the idea that this precarious condition of our grammar does not prevent us to trust her and solely because of that we can say that some propositions underlie our language games. In this sense, the skeptic, when trying to put a founding proposition for our language games like \"the world exists\" in doubt, suspend without notice the fluency of the assertive game he intended to stablish, its consistency and, for that matter, its logic.

Este trabalho é resultado da pesquisa desenvolvida sobre a concepção do certum em Giambattista Vico. O nosso interesse foi encontrar nos diversos escritos filosóficos de G. Vico (1668-1744) um novo modo de apreensão da concepção original do pensador acerca do Conhecimento e de que modo ele apreendeu e trabalhou essa visão de mundo, ao contrário da visão tradicional, que atribuiu valor lógico ao modo de conhecer mediante o verdadeiro e o falso. Vico concebeu o conhecimento tanto como ordem do certum quanto como ordem do verum, realçando o papel originário do certum. Esse novo modo de perceber a ordem do certum confere ao saber viquiano uma lógica própria: a lógica do verossímil. A verossimilhança é trabalhada enquanto elemento que nos leva à certeza mediante a exclusão de toda exatidão matemática conferida ao conhecimento, nos propiciando a possibilidade de alcançá-lo na sua incerta abrangência e/ou nos seus incertos limites. / This work is the result of the research developed about the conception of the certum in Giambattista Vico. Our interest was to found, in the various philosophical writings of G. Vico (1668-1744), a new way of understanding the original conception of the thinker about knowledge and how he worked and seized this vision of the world, unlike the traditional view which gave a logical value to the way of knowing before the true and false. Vico conceived the knowledge both as certum and verum, highlighting the original role of certum. This new way of perceiving the order of certum gives to the Vico´s knowing its own logic: the logic of credible. The credibility is treated like the element which leads us to the certainty before the exclusion of all mathematical accuracy given to knowledge in providing the possibility of reaching it in its uncertain scope and / or its uncertain boundaries.

This dissertation explores how antiquity and some of its early modern admirers understand the notion of certainty, especially as it is theorized in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, a first-century educational manual for the aspiring orator that defines certainty in terms of consensus. As part of a larger discussion of argumentative strategies, Quintilian turns to the “nature of all arguments,” which he defines as “reasoning which lends credence to what is doubtful by means of what is certain” (ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis adferens: quae natura est omnium argumentorum, V.10.8). These certainties, he later specifies, include not matters of scientific demonstration or objective fact, but the agreements of various communities: the laws of cities, local customs, and other forms of consensus. As the foundation of persuasive rhetoric, these consensus-based certainties situate argumentation as the practice of crafting agreements rather than demonstrating necessary conclusions. Taking as its point of departure Quintilian's novel understanding of certainty, this study looks to some of Quintilian's intellectual forebears as well as his later readers to show how his work is both a nexus of earlier intellectual developments as well as an important inspiration for later accounts of certainty, even into the early modern period. After illustrating in the first chapters of this dissertation how Quintilian's manual incorporates elements from Aristotelian notions of dialectic and rhetoric as well as from Ciceronian skeptical approaches to epistemology, I show how Quintilian's curriculum for the orator shapes the thought of Italian humanists, especially that of Lorenzo Valla (1406–1457), a reformer of scholastic logic and dialectic, and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), an influential Neapolitan jurist. Adopting Quintilian's rendering of certainty as a matter of agreements and conventions, these later authors elaborate their own novel approaches to various fields—including law, language, and logic—through this ancient understanding of certum. Contrary to modern notions of certainty as objective or scientific fact, Quintilian's humanist readers continue to root this concept in consensus, both within the courtroom and without.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-249).