PurposeThe purpose of this pilot study was to explore nutritional injury in the context of oral mucositis (OM). It was a beginning look at oral L-glutamine (L-Gln) treatment efficacy through investigation of three "Reaction-to-Nutritional Injury" hypotheses defining OM as a localized secondary nutritional disorder of deficiency (Van Itallie, 1977) resulting from absence of/limited nutritional collateral systems (Kight, 1994):(1) OM severity and human buccal epithelial cell glutamine synthetase (HBEC GS) abundance,(2) HBEC GS abundance and L-Gln treatment, and(3) OM severity and L-Gln treatment.Patients and MethodsThree female colorectal cancer (CRC) outpatients between 61 and 70 years of age receiving FOLFIRI chemotherapy regimen and diagnosed with grades 1 and 2 OM were followed daily throughout treatment cycles and randomly assigned into a two-week mouthwash regimen of 1.0 gm/m2 qid L-Gln or placebo. Treatment crossover occurred every two weeks without defined washout periods. Four controls were recruited as controls for single Western blot (WB) analyses.ResultsOral L-Gln effect on OM severity was statistically significant in all three study participants, although two of the relationships had positive direction. Treatment and OM severity were moderately correlated with a negative direction in one patient. Glutamine appeared to be most efficacious in severe grade 2 OM erythema. Western blot analysis demonstrated absence of HBEC GS activity in cancer patients receiving FOLFIRI treatment for colorectal cancer suggesting competitive inhibition of GS enzyme by chemotherapy. Higher WB bands observed at 55 and 66 kDa may be O-linked glycosylation posttranslational modifications, a possible explanation for the Gln-influenced mechanism of Hsp70 biosynthesis and apoptosis prevention. This may be suggestive of compression of the nutritional injury clinical horizon from stage 4 to stage 1 or 2 where adaptation to absence of/limited nutritional collateral systems theoretically begins after chemotherapy insult. An extended definition of nutritional injury may be the acquired loss of nutritional status at the biomolecular level by way of drug-induced disruption of normal, adaptive metabolic pathways resulting in absence of/limited HBEC GS abundance affecting Gln and Hsp70 availability. This may suggest the need for preemptive L-Gln treatment prior to initiation of a 5-fluorouracil-based chemotherapy regimen.

Questo lavoro è diviso in tre capitoli. Il primo capitolo fornisce una rassegna della letteratura economica riguardo gli effetti della liberalizzazione finanziaria sulla volatilità macroeconomica e descrive il ruolo delle politiche macroprudenziali nel favorire stabilità economica. Il secondo capitolo presenta un modello dinamico e stocastico di equilibrio economico generale neo-keynesiano, con rigidità reali e nominali e LAMP, per studiare l'impatto della liberalizzazione finanziaria sulla volatilità macroeconomica. La liberalizzazione finanziaria è modellata lungo due direzioni: il margine estensivo (un aumento del numero di consumatori che accedono ai mercati finanziari) e il margine intensivo (un allentamento dei criteri patrimoniali richiesti alle famiglie per l'ottenimento di credito). In contrasto con la teoria convenzionale, i risultati suggeriscono che una maggiore liberalizzazione finanziaria comporta un aumento della volatilità macroeconomica in presenza di famiglie altamente indebitate. Il terzo capitolo presenta un'estensione del modello di Kyotaki e Moore (Credit Cycles (1997)) in grado di tenere in considerazione del ruolo dello "spread" tra il tasso interesse attivo e passivo nel meccanismo di trasmissione di shocks esogeni. Si studia in che modo il meccanismo di amplificazione garantito dalla presenza di mutuatari soggetti a vincoli di garanzia è modificato quando anche il prestatore è soggetto ad un vincolo di valore massimo sul credito erogabile (capital adequacy requirement). I risultati suggeriscono che un allentamento del "capital adequacy requirement" aumenta ulteriormente il meccanismo di trasmissione originale in risposta a shocks esogeni alla produttività. / This work is divided in three chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the economic literature dealing with the effects of financial liberalization on macroeconomic volatility, and describes how macroprudential policy can be used to induce economic stabilization. The second chapter presents a New Keynesian DSGE model with real and nominal frictions and LAMP to study the implications of financial liberalization on aggregate volatility. Financial liberalization is modeled along the extensive margin (number of consumption smoothers) and the intensive margin (loan-to-value ratio). In contrast to the conventional view, our findings suggest that financial liberalization leading to highly leveraged households increases macroeconomic volatility. The third chapter presents an extension of the Kiyotaki and Moore model of Credit Cycles (1997): the original framework is augmented to account for the role of financial intermediation and interest rate spreads in the transmission of exogenous shocks. We study how the amplification mechanism guaranteed by the presence of collateralized borrowers is altered in the presence of the additional constraint faced by lenders. We find that if the lender's collateral constraint binds, loosening the capital adequacy requirement burdening on lenders increases the original amplification mechanism in response to exogenous productivity shocks through the interest rate spread.

This thesis tackles three different issues of relevance for economic policy, with an explicit reference to the Euro area. Does the inclusion of monetary targeting in a monetary policy strategy improve macroeconomic stability? Which role does the banking sector play in the impulse and transmission of shocks? Which fiscal tools have the greatest and the most persistent impact on the real economy, helping effective stabilization policy design? Answers to each question, derived from data-matching dynamic general equilibrium models, imply noteworthy indications for policy-makers. / Esta tesis afronta tres temas de relevancia en lo que se refiere a la política económica en la zona euro. ¿Establecer un objetivo monetario en la conducción de la política monetaria contribuye a alcanzar una estabilidad macroeconómica? ¿Qué papel desempeña el sector banquero en el impulso y en la transmisión de choques macroeconómicos? ¿Cuales son los instrumentos de política fiscal con el mayor y más persistente impacto sobre la economía real, capaces de ayudar en el diseño de políticas de estabilización eficaces? Las respuestas a cada pregunta, derivadas desde modelos de equilibrio económico general dinámicos ajustados a los datos, permiten extraer indicaciones útiles para las autoridades responsables de las políticas económicas.

Since the 1980s, regulators in the U.S. and the U.K. have protected the collateral taker's right to re-use securities collateral in securities financing and OTC derivatives markets on the understanding that it would promote liquidity and credit growth, and reduce systemic risk. However, this rationale was incomplete: it failed to acknowledge the full implications of collateral re-use for systemic risk. In this dissertation, I aim to complete that understanding by illustrating how the re-use of securities collateral in those markets can aggravate systemic risk. In particular, I describe two effects. First, re-using securities collateral multiplies the number of market participants that will be exposed to changes in the price of the collateral asset and can thus amplify the role of asset prices as channels of contagion. Second, by conferring a right to re-use, the collateral provider will effectively waive its proprietary interests in the collateral assets and retain a mere contractual claim against the collateral taker for the return of equivalent securities. This transformation will accentuate the incentive of the collateral provider to run from an over-collateralised collateral taker if the latter were to experience financial difficulty. Information asymmetries and a lack of coordination among collateral providers could push the collateral taker over the brink of insolvency. These risks pose an obvious question for regulators: what should we do about collateral re-use? At a time when international bodies are drawing their attention to this widespread market practice, the question is an invitation to a very timely reflection. The final chapter of the dissertation offers an answer to this question and assesses the potential efficacy of the most recent regulatory initiatives in relation to collateral re-use.

[pt] Os preços de ativos são fortemente influenciados pelas expectativas. Dessa forma, na presença de dívida colateralizada, a disponibilidade de crédito vai depender dessas expectativas. Nós desenvolvemos um modelo RBC simples, com restrição ao crédito, para formalizar essa intuição. Em seguida, nos construímos um modelo mais complexo, próprio para análise quantitativa, e estudados a relevância desse mecanismo. Nossa principal descoberta é que a restrição ao crédito não afeta a economia significativamente se permitirmos que as firmas substituam entre dívida e equity. Esse resultado se mantém mesmo que essa substituição esteja sujeita a fricções severas. / [en] Asset prices are strongly influenced by expectations. Therefore, in the presence of collateralized debt, credit availability will depend on those expectations. We develop a simple RBC model, with credit constraints, to formalize this intuition. We then build a more complex model, fit for quantitative analysis, in order to study the relevance of the mechanism. Our main finding is that the credit constraint does not significantly affect the economy if we allow firms to substitute between equity and debt. This result holds even if such substitution is subjected to severe frictions.

Submitted by Pedro Vaissman Guinsburg (pedro.guinsburg@gmail.com) on 2014-05-23T18:08:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 560951 bytes, checksum: f9e8876e333a9b2586aa35e3a02cd829 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2014-05-26T15:30:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 560951 bytes, checksum: f9e8876e333a9b2586aa35e3a02cd829 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2014-05-28T12:37:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 560951 bytes, checksum: f9e8876e333a9b2586aa35e3a02cd829 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-28T12:37:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 mestrado.pdf: 560951 bytes, checksum: f9e8876e333a9b2586aa35e3a02cd829 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-30 / In this article I introduce collateralization in the Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano environment. In my paper, collateral can be understood as Foreign Direct Investment. I find that collateral increases the equilibrium levels of defaultable debt and, at the same time, avoids the use of default. Restrictions of collateral leads to higher use of default in equilibrium. / Neste artigo eu introduzo colateralização no ambiente de dívida soberana de Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano. Esta colateralização pode ser vista como Investimento Estrangeiro Direto. A entrada de recursos colateralizados serve como uma estratégia de comprometimento dos países. Ao abrir a economia para este tipo de aporte de recursos, meu modelo prescreve maior tomada de dívida em equilíbrio pelos países e menos uso de default como instrumento de suavização da trajetória de consumo. Além destas características, eu mostro que limitação de colateral pode gerar mais default em equilíbrio do que um modelo sem Investimento Estrangeiro Direto ou colateral.

The jus in bello proportionality rule establishes an upper boundary on how much collateral damage combatants can cause whilst striking a lawful target and its associated rule on precautions in attack compels them to take all feasible measures to properly understand the situation on the ground and to mitigate civilian harm. Proportionality and precautions in attack have been codified in API for over forty years, but in that time, it has been difficult to hold troops and their leaders accountable for breaches of these rules. In this study, I examine several reasons for why these rules have been difficult to apply ex post by considering the strategic motivations of state officials and prosecutors. Specifically, I propose a game-theoretic model which describes the decisions that state officials and prosecutors have historically made, and I explore what changes to this model would prompt these actors to behave differently. The model was developed using insights gained from legal case studies, archival research and a series of interviews with relevant actors. It suggests, inter alia, that to induce state officials to support a stricter liability standard for unlawful attacks, they must either ascribe much more value to legitimacy than to the success of future military operations, or they must perceive the success of future military operations to be unaffected by the possibility of losing criminal or civil adjudication. State officials may perceive losing a civil case based on state liability as being less likely to affect the success of future military operations compared with criminal liability against individual troops. Therefore, state officials may be inclined to support a stricter civil liability standard, if they believed it would help the state to secure greater legitimacy.

The objective of my Diploma Thesis is a comparison of conditions for getting a mortgage credit at more banking institutions, evaluation of investigation among people and evaluation of the current situation of mortgage banking in the Czech Republic and its estimated development. In the theoretical part I describe banking institutions and their position within the mortgage banking sector in the Czech Republic. I further clarify everything comprehended in the mortgage credit for physical entities, its financing, I list essential features of the credit, describe the process, granting and approval of the mortgage credit, drawing and finally its back payment. In the analytical part I briefly characterise three selected banking institutions and further describe individual types of the provided mortgage credits. For my Diploma Thesis I selected the following banks: Raiffeisenbank, a. s., Československá obchodní banka, a. s. (hereinafter referred to as ČSOB, a. s.) and Komerční banka, a. s. (hereinafter referred to as KB, a. s.). I also devoted to a public analysis using questionnaire investigation. For comparison of mortgage conditions I further present 2 practical examples within three selected banking institutions showing advantages and disadvantages of individual banks. In conclusion I selected the most prospective bank for the client. Based on the found out data gathered from initial calculations of individual banks, in my opinion the most perspective bank for the client is ČSOB, a. s.

Embora o objetivo primário da contratação administrativa seja a aquisição de bens e serviços nos melhores termos possíveis, os entes estatais frequentemente se utilizam de seu inquestionável poder de compra para promover questões nacionais outras, que são industriais, sociais ou ambientais em sua natureza. Todavia, essas políticas, também conhecidas como políticas secundárias, colaterais ou horizontais, legitimamente perseguidas pelos governos nacionais, podem estar em contraste com outros propósitos nacionais ou internacionais legítimos, tais como livre comércio, transparência e lealdade. Esta tese analisa a taxonomia do que denominamos função horizontal da licitação e da contratação administrativa, bem como o modo por meio do qual o regime brasileiro de compras públicas lida atualmente com essas preocupações secundárias (mas de igual importância) econômicas, sociais e ambientais e com os limites impostos à adoção de tais políticas. / Although the primary objective of procurement is the acquisition of goods or services on the best possible terms, governments have frequently used their unquestionable power of procurement to promote further national concerns, which are industrial, social and environmental in their nature. However, these public policies, also known as secondary, colateral or horizontal policies, legitimately pursued by national government, could be in contrast with other nacional and international legitimate purposes, such as free trade, transparency and fairness. This essay analyzes the taxonomy of what we name horizontal function of public procurement and the way in which brazilian regime of public purchasing is dealing nowadays with these economic, social and environmental secondary (but not less importante) concerns and the limits imposed on the adoption of such policies.

The financial crisis that started in 2007 has seen central banks play an unprecedented role both to ensure financial stability and to support economic activity. While the importance of the central bank in ensuring financial stability is well known (see e.g. Padoa-Schioppa (2014)), the unprecedented nature of the financial crisis led central banks to resort to new instruments for which the literature offered little guidance. This thesis aims to bridge this gap, using both theory and data to better understand one of the main instruments used by central banks: collateralized loans. The general contribution of the thesis is thus both retrospective and forward looking. On a retrospective point of view, it helps understanding the actions of the central bank during the crisis and the mechanisms involved. Looking forward, a better understanding of the tools used during the crisis allows to better inform future policies.The first chapter starts from the observation that the literature, starting with Bagehot (1873), has generally assumed that the central bank should lend against high quality collateral. However in the 2007-2013 crisis central banks lent mostly against low quality collateral. In this chapter, we explore when it is efficient for the central bank to relax its collateral policy. In our model, a commercial bank funds projects in the real economy by borrowing against collateral from the interbank market or the central bank. While collateral prevents the bank from shirking (in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (2011)), it is costly to use as its value is lower for investors and the central bank than for the bank. We find that when the bank has high levels of available collateral, it borrows in the interbank market against low collateral requirements so that the collateral policy of the central bank has no impact on banks' borrowing. However, when the amount of available collateral falls below a threshold, the lack of collateral prevents borrowing. In this case, the collateral policy of the central bank can affect lending, and it can therefore be optimal for the central bank to relax its collateral requirements to avoid the credit crunch.The second chapter focuses on collateralized loans in the context of the euro area. According to the literature on optimum currency area, one of the main drawbacks of currency unions is the inability for the central bank to accommodate asymmetric shocks with its interest rate policy. Suppose that there are 2 countries in an economy and one suffers a negative shock while the other has a positive shock. Theory would suggest an accommodative policy - low interest rates - in the first country and a restrictive policy - high interest rates - in the second one. This is however impossible in a currency union because the interest rate must be the same for both countries (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963, de Grauwe 2012). In this chapter I show that collateral policy can accommodate asymmetric shocks. I extend the model of collateralized lending of the first chapter to two banks A and B and two collateral types 1 and 2 .I also introduce a central bank deposit facility which allows the interest rate instrument to be compared with the collateral policy instrument in the context of a currency area hit by asymmetric shocks. Macroeconomic shocks impact the investment opportunities available to banks and the value of their collateral and the central bank seeks to steer economy rates towards a target level. I show that when banks have different collateral portfolios (as in a monetary union where banks invest in the local economy), an asymmetric shock on the quality and value of their collateral can increase interest rates in the country hit by the negative shock while keeping them unchanged in the country with a positive shock.The third chapter provides an empirical illustration of this “collateral channel” of open market operations. We use data on assets pledged by banks to the ECB from 2009 to 2011 to quantify the “collateral substitution / smoother transmission of monetary policy” trade-off faced by the central bank. We build an empirical model of collateral choice that is similar in spirit to the model on institutional demand for financial assets of Koijen (2014). We show how the haircut of the central bank can affect the relative cost of pledging collateral to the central bank and how this cost can be estimated using the amount of assets pledged by banks. Our model allows to perform a broad set of policy counterfactuals. For example, we use the recovered coefficient to assess how a 5% haircut increase on all collateral belonging to a specific asset class (e.g. government bonds or ABS) would affect the type of collateral used at the central bank. The final chapter focuses on the use of loans as collateral by banks in the euro area. While collateral is generally viewed as consisting of liquid and safe assets such as government bonds, we show that banks in Europe do use bank loans as collateral. We identify two purposes of bank loan collateral: funding and liquidity purposes. The main distinction between the two purposes is with respect to the maturity of the instruments involved: liquidity purposes refer to the use of bank loans as collateral to obtain short term liquidity and manage unexpected liquidity shocks. In practice the central bank is the main acceptor of these collateral. The second type of use is for funding purposes, in which case bank loans are used as collateral in ABSs or covered bonds. The collateral in these transactions allow banks to obtain a lower long-term funding cost. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished