S v Mshumpa dealt with the very controversial issue of third party foetal violence that terminates prenatal life. The decision of the Eastern Cape Division emphasised that, until live birth, a foetus is not a legal subject with constitutional rights. As a result of its position in the law, a foetus cannot be the victim of criminal conduct. The court refused to develop the common law crime of murder to include a foetus and referred this issue to the legislature to address. Concerns raised by the research task relate to the most effective method of law reform and the implications of law reform for well established legal principles concerning legal subjectivity, vestment of constitutional rights and female reproductive rights. In order to avoid these concerns, the introduction of a statutory crime is determined as the preferred method for law reform. The aim of the study is to develop a suitably defined statutory crime, with definitional elements that conform to the Constitution and criminal law principles. Before embarking on the mission of exploring possible grounds that justify law reform, the research first examines the extent of inability of the law to impose criminal liability in cases of third party violence that terminates prenatal life. Aspects that are specifically investigated include the common law crime of murder, contravention of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, attempting the impossible and the common law crime of abortion. A further purpose of this examination is to determine the reasons why foetal interests are not taken into account. Appreciating the lack of criminal remedy, private law principles are considered in order to determine whether there are any principles available to supplement the deficiencies in criminal law. This research found that the value of dignity established by the founding principles of the Constitution and applied in the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act demonstrates that the state has an interest in prenatal life. The value of dignity serves as the foundation for law reform. Having established the existence of a sound legal basis which justifies law reform, the research requires an investigation into foreign jurisdictions where the crime of third party foetal violence exists as a result of a state interest in foetal life. The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether the crime is effectively implemented. The United States of America is the selected country to study because third party foetal violence receives attention at both state and federal level. The research found that the implementation of foetal homicide laws in the United States infringes on female reproductive rights and to a certain extent, the foetal homicide laws also grants a foetus legal subjectivity. The United States fails to effectively implement the crime of third party foetal violence in line with its own established legal principles. The research benefits from the study conducted on the United States in that the United States demonstrates the definitional elements the proposed crime should contain in order for the statutory crime to be harmonious with established constitutional and criminal law principles. The study concludes with the recommendation that a statutory crime be developed in the context of female reproductive rights rather than considering the foetus as the victim of crime. The statutory crime is a response to unauthorised third party violence that terminates a woman’s pregnancy. The definitional elements include foetal viability for purposes of causation and will only be applicable to intentional conduct. The value of dignity in relation to prenatal life serves as a support structure for the driving force of female reproductive rights. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Public Law / unrestricted

The in duplum rule is a rule of Roman-Dutch origin which has been preserved by the South African common law. A useful consumer-protection device, it temporarily ceases interest once arrear interest has reached the unpaid capital. The rule distinguishes between arrear and accrued interest. Arrear interest is interest that has become due but because of non-payment it has accumulated. While accrued interest is also accumulated interest, this type of interest has not become due and payable. The in duplum rule prevents arrear interest from accumulating to more than the unpaid capital amount. This preclusion is only temporary, however, and as soon as the debtor makes payment towards the debt, the interest begins to run again. The in duplum rule has no effect on accrued interest. Thus, when parties agree that the capital amount plus the interest component of the debt will be paid at a future date, without installments by the debtor in the interim, the in duplum rule will have no effect on the total amount owing. The rule has recently been incorporated into the National Credit Bill of 2005. The rule seems to have been codified without due caution to its carefully sculpted common law developments. The courts have over the years cleared misconceptions that the rule prevented any interest from accruing to more than the unpaid capital or that the rule permanently affected the running of interest. The work of the courts has somewhat been neglected in clause 103(5) of the National Credit Bill which appears to include in its interest component more than just interest. This may have a very dramatic effect on the profit element of the risk takers (credit lenders) and may in the long term curb investment in the lending market. The effect of the codified in duplum rule remains to be seen through the actions of the lawmaker, and if the codified form of the rule is accepted into law, the burden will once again lie with the judiciary. / Dissertation (Magister Legum (Private Law))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Private Law / unrestricted

no / Singapore commercial contract law has taken an Asian perspective in respect of express terms of good faith in the negotiation of contract. In general, however, it adheres to the English contract law orthodoxy regarding good faith. More specifically, Singapore, like England, does not recognize a general duty or principle of good faith and it is reluctant to imply a duty of good faith into a contract. However, as a hub of international trade and a rising forum for commercial dispute resolution, Singapore will have a stronger need to reconcile the differences in good faith in contract law between the English/Commonwealth and the European-Asian legal traditions. Conventional wisdom and international commercial law instruments in this respect are not as helpful as one would expect for such a need. Instead, to an enlightening but limited extent, the “organizing principle” approach in Bhasin v Hrynew could be useful for setting up a framework for reconciling the differences. This framework could consist of an organising principle of (honouring) reasonable expectations, a duty of honesty, and a duty of fair dealing. The framework realistically concretises good faith into the three components, all of which are essentially objective and ascertainable in specific factual matrix and are well-recognised in both common law and civil law.

In South Africa, courts and academia frequently refer to contracts as bonae fidei agreements. Often this term is invoked without further explanation or reflection on what the meaning of this term is. Upon closer inspection it seems that the phrase “bonae fidei has largely become devoid of any meaning. This study embarks upon a critical analysis of case law leading up to the remarks of the Constitutional Court in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC); 2012 (3) BCLR 219 (CC), with the aim of determining what the role of good faith in the South African law of contract is and how this concept is approached by South African courts. A brief overview of the historical origins of the concept is given and the English law is considered as a foreign jurisdiction in order to gain understanding of how the concept is dealt with elsewhere. This study does not propose to undertake an in-depth study of consumer protection legislation. The justification for this decision lies in the fact that moving beyond this scope will prove to be too wide a field of study; hindering the in-depth discussion and evaluation of the common law and moving beyond the research aims of this dissertation. A critical analysis of South African case law indicates that it is unlikely that the courts in South Africa will adopt a general defence based on good faith that would empower courts to set aside otherwise enforceable agreements. The principle of good faith now forms part of the umbrella defence of public policy: it is finally accepted that public policy is invested in equitable contractual relationships and not only in upholding the principle of pacta servanda sunt. This study shows that good faith has a more active role to play in the law of contract as there is a duty upon courts to develop the common law so as to bring it in line with constitutional norms and values. This study illustrates the importance of open-ended concepts such as good faith and ubuntu to achieve a greater degree of equity and justice between contracting parties. The conclusion is reached that public policy is informed by the reigning ideology of the day: the contract law of South Africa must reflect its adherence to upholding and promoting the values and norms underlying the Constitution. If courts step up and uphold the constitutional mandate to develop the common law to bring it in line with constitutional values and norms, there will be very little need for legislative interference. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Private Law / unrestricted

Cette thèse sur la fin de l’Ancien Régime s’ étend de 148 à 1791. Ce travail de recherche est une exploration de la figure judiciaire et de ses représentations savantes et populaires sur la période donnée. Ainsi Les philosophes du XVIIIème siècle contribue largement grâce à leurs théories politiques à un renouveau théorique des représentations judiciaires. Ce renouveau s’accompagne également d’une fécondité littéraire dans le genre utopique. Ceci est bien la preuve que la question pénale est une question politique à la veille de la Révolution Française. Ce travail de renouveau judiciaire se poursuit avec l’Assemblée Nationale Constituante entre 1789 et 1791. Il se poursuit sous un angle pratique. C’est probablement ici que se situe la rupture entre les députés constituants et les philosophes des Lumières. Les premiers vont mettre en place un système judiciaire où seule la logique existe. Ce système est motivé par une haine du juge pénal du XVIIIème siècle. Les second, les philosophes, critiquaient le juge dans un souci d’exigence de liberté. Ils sont à ce titre le prolongement de l’humanisme et les précurseurs du libéralisme. / This thesis on the end of the Ancien Régime extends from 1748 to 1791. This research work is an exploration of the judicial figure and its scholarly and popular representations on the given period. Thus the philosophers of the eighteenth century contributes largely through their political theories to a theoretical renewal of judicial representations. This renewal is also accompanied by literary fecundity in the utopian genre. This is proof that the criminal question is a political question on the eve of the French Revolution.This work of judicial renewal continues with the National Constituent Assembly between 1789 and 1791. It continues in a practical angle. It is probably here that lies the break between the constituent deputies and the Enlightenment philosophers. The former will put in place a judicial system where only logic exists. This system is motivated by a hatred of the 18th century criminal court. The second, the philosophers, criticized the judge for the sake of the need for freedom. They are in this respect the extension of humanism and the precursors of liberalism.

Magister Legum - LLM / Before the 1990s, corporate governance was a very rarely used term within the business world.1 Corporations over time have become more influential, larger and more complex within the global economy; therefore to ensure that they are operating on an economic and ethical basis, corporate governance has become more defined.2 Corporate governance can be defined as the procedures and methods that are used in order to ensure the functioning, direction and structure of a corporation.3 Not only can its key elements be described as procedures and methods but also a system of principles, policies, procedures, and clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities. Corporate governance has roots in ethical behavior and business principles, with the goal of creating long-term value and sustainability for all stakeholders, thus including directors.4 This practice of good corporate governance by directors is used to promote equity and deters fraud and other deceptive practices.

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Imagine un sistema legal en el que se reconozca que la jurisprudencia constitucional es fuente de Derecho y que como tal, debe ser respetada no solo por todos los jueces, sino por todos los funcionarios y órganos del Estado. Imagine además, que en este sistema legal la corte que emite los precedentes cuenta con la potestad de seleccionar qué sentencias merecen el carácter de precedentes vinculantes y cuáles no. Por si fuera poco, dicho sistema legal, preocupado por generar seguridad jurídica al milímetro, concibe la parte vinculante del precedente como un instrumento que se expresa bajo la fórmula de una regla claramente delimitada, elegida por la misma corte que dicta el precedente. Los mecanismos para hacer cumplir el precedente constitucional de este sistema legal son muy rígidos y por lo tanto eficaces. No solo se conmina a los jueces a seguir cabalmente las reglas generales que contienen la parte vinculante del precedente constitucional, sino que se castiga con nulidad a las sentencias que, habiendo adquirido carácter de cosa juzgada, no siguieron el contenido vinculante del precedente. Incluso, se han establecido normas administrativas de sanción dirigidas a aquellos jueces que desobedecen el precedente constitucional, que pueden conducir a la destitución de dichos magistrados. Imagine ahora un segundo sistema legal en el cual la discusión acerca de si la jurisprudencia es una fuente de Derecho o no, resulta irrelevante. En este segundo sistema legal los casos considerados precedentes son usados como argumentos que acompañan a las pretensiones de las partes, manteniéndose abiertos a la interpretación que el juez crea conveniente aplicar. Imagine también, que en este sistema legal un precedente es dejado de lado inmediatamente si una ley dictada por el Parlamento postula el sentido contrario de lo que dicta el precedente judicial. Respecto a las sanciones, este segundo sistema legal no cuenta con una disposición normativa que obligue a los jueces a fundamentar con razones claras y prolijas las sentencias que expiden. Por supuesto, en este sistema legal tampoco se conoce de ninguna norma administrativa que sancione –y menos destituya- a ningún juez por no seguir un precedente específico, ni siquiera el de la Corte Suprema.

Toute personne souhaitant introduire une demande en justice doit être en mesure de démontrer un intérêt pour agir, c'est-à-dire un lien entre sa situation et l'objet de l'instance qui justifie sa participation aux débats judiciaires. Les critères permettant d'évaluer cet intérêt pour agir ont été assouplis au Canada dans les dernières années, notamment dans les causes d'intérêt public. Or, il est possible de constater une incompatibilité entre les règles édictées par le législateur québécois au sein du *Code de procédure civile* (« C.p.c. ») et les principes développés par la Cour suprême du Canada sur cette question. En droit québécois, ce concept s'avère fuyant, tirant sa source de principes et valeurs empruntés à la fois au droit public et au droit privé et de traditions juridiques distinctes, soit le droit civil et la common law. À cet égard, le recours au cadre théorique issu de travaux portant sur la notion de mixité permet de répondre à trois enjeux spécifiques, soit la codification de l'intérêt pour agir dans l'intérêt public au second alinéa de l'article 85 C.p.c., le sens à donner au mot « partie » au second paragraphe de l'article 529 C.p.c. et l'intérêt public comme fondement de l'analyse en deux volets de l'intérêt pour agir. Premièrement, nous concluons que l'interprète doit se référer au second alinéa de l'article 85 C.p.c., tout en demeurant soucieux de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême de laquelle cette disposition s'inspire. Deuxièmement, nous parvenons au constat que l'emploi du mot « partie » au second paragraphe de l'article 529 C.p.c. doive être limité au seul recours en évocation. Troisièmement, la distinction entre les deux volets de l'intérêt pour agir - intérêt privé et intérêt public - doit, selon nous, être davantage explicitée par les tribunaux québécois en fonction des règles de common law dont elle tire son origine. / Anyone wishing to bring a legal claim must demonstrate proper standing to sue. In other words, the claimant needs to establish a connection between his situation and the basis of the lawsuit which justifies his participation in the legal proceedings. The standing rule has been stretched in Canada in recent years, particularly in public interest litigation. However, an incompatibility between the rules enacted by the Quebec legislator within the *Code of Civil Procedure* ("C.C.P.") and the principles developed by the Supreme Court of Canada subsists on this issue. Indeed, in Quebec, this concept proves to be elusive, drawing its source from principles and values borrowed from both public law and private law as well as from distinct legal traditions, namely civil law, and common law. In this regard, legal scholarship on mixed legal systems provides opportunities to reflect on three specific issues, namely the codification of public interest standing under section 85, paragraph 2 of the C.C.P., the meaning of the word "party" under section 529, paragraph 1 (2) of the C.C.P and public interest as a basis for the two-component analysis of the standing rule. First, we conclude that the interpreter should apply section 85, paragraph 2 of the C.C.P. However, he must also recognize the influence of the Supreme Court cases from which this provision takes its roots. Secondly, we conclude that the use of the word party in section 529, paragraph 2 of the C.C.P. must be limited to writ of evocation. Third, the distinction between the two components of the standing rule - private interest and public interest - must, in our view, be further clarified by Quebec courts according to the common law rules from which it originates.