No description available.

We present three distinct works on the subject of incentive design. The first focuses on a fundamental aspect of all principal-agent models, the participation constraint. We endogenise the constraint, allowing the agent to influence his outside option, albeit at some detriment to the project he is contracted to work upon. We compare the optimal contract to the literature on the supposed trade-off between risk and incentives. We find support for the Prendergast (2002) observation of a positive relationship between the two variables and ofer an explanation through the use of said influence activities. The second contribution introduces another principal-agent framework for models with both adverse selection and moral hazard, with the novel inclusion of limited liability. Described in a target-setting environment, the findings are related to and support the use of tenure contracts in academia. This is justified by the fact that pooling equilibria maximise the value to the principal and fully separating equilibria are implemented with non-monotonic wage structures. Finally, in opposition to conventional literature, those of low type make rent gains over and above their reservation utility, while the high types break even. The final chapter studies organisational design and allocation of control. We offer conditions whereby firms would wish to integrate, or profit-share, with another, given varying degrees of control allocation. We show that integration comes at a lower cost for the decision-making firm when control is contractible as opposed to transferable. Also we show that the level of incompatibility between firms, unrelated to financial gain, can affect the integration decision.

none

The study follows the "contract theory" to establish a model of a classification system for certification under the Lease of agricultural products for the design contract. In addition to show the optimal lease¡¦s prices and classification standards for certification of the determining factors, an important phenomenon, this model can be used to interpret, Lease contract with a decline in transaction costs discount and gradually disappear from the market.

Contracts capture an agreement between two parties to exchange a resource in the future (ex-ante), however the future is not certain. Only after the event has happened, might the two parties compare the resources they have received to what they expected (ex-post). Entering into a contract with unknowns gives rise to incomplete contracts theory, the focus of which includes the study of human behavior. Relational contracting is currently being studied as a method of reducing the transaction costs and incompleteness of contracts. Using case studies, this research aimed to reach a conclusion regarding why certain contractual projects run over budget. Overruns are often related to a variation agreement that is incomplete and open to interpretation. Understanding what the issues are and how to mitigate contractual risks was thus a key focus of this research. The research examined two industries - construction and IT. From the case studies, 16 interviews were conducted and 12 contracts reviewed. The least concern for all the parties was disputes, as the parties find solutions to address issues not considered when drafting contracts. Industry specific experience and knowledge is needed to mitigate some unknown contractual risks, however. Relational contracting was also very evident in resolving issues outside of a contract. Further studies into ancillary contracts will reveal more insight into behavioural and relational contracting. / Dissertation(MBA)--Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria,2018. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

Despite the broad discourse on fragile states and the threat they pose to the contemporary world order, the literature on the subject does to a large extent ignore the material factors behind the causes of state fragility. Scholars and organizations in the field have almost exclusively adopted the Social Contract Theory (SCT) in order to explain state fragility as a problem caused by social factors. This study broadens the discourse by applying SCT as well as the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) on the case study of Sudan, in order to do a deductive theory testing of the added value of each theory. The results of this study show that while the Social Contract Theory does explain many factors behind state fragility, the application of the Actor-Network Theory adds to this by also incorporating the networks between the social and material determinants in societies. This research contributes to the debate on fragile states by adding to the scarce research on the materiality of fragility through the use of the Actor-Network Theory. The positive results of this thesis encourage future use of this theory in the field as it has the potential to give new insights in how to deal with fragile states.

Firms outsource productive tasks to different locations in order to exploit factor price differentials and gain efficiencies from specialization. However, the benefits of outsourcing come with two risks. The first problem occurs when firms share their pre-existing intellectual property (IP) such as database and trade secrets with contractors. While IP is shared to facilitate the outsourcing project, the contractor may behave opportunistically and misappropriate the IP for its own benefit. Since firms derive significant value from their IP, this can lead to severe economic damages in terms of reduced market share and brand value. The second agency problem arises due to non-contractible effort exerted by the contractor. Depending on the outsourced task, shirking can lead to higher costs and poor quality product. In this dissertation, contractual solutions are developed to mitigate these agency problems associated with outsourcing. First, several IP misappropriation cases are enumerated in the context of outsourcing. The existing literature is reviewed and the limitations are addressed in the light of these actual cases. Second, theoretical models are developed by considering two forms of IP misappropriation, depending on whether a R&D contractor emerges as a direct competitor of the principal firm, or the contractor sells the principal?s IP to a competitor. Contracts are developed to implement a ?carrot and stick? strategy, whereby firms share limited IP with their contractor and also provide incentive payments to deter shirking problem. It is shown that complementary strategies like product differentiation, task modularization, and investment in technological solutions can be useful when legal enforcement is weak. It is also demonstrated that even under the possibility of IP misappropriation; firms may gain from outsourcing if in-house inefficiency is high. However, if legal enforcement is weak, outsourcing would entail higher transaction costs. Finally, an event study is conducted to examine the effect of trade secret misappropriation on the value of Lexar. While Lexar is still outsourcing, it is explored how Lexar survived the IP misappropriation problem through product differentiation and marketing strategies.

This dissertation studies three economic problems plagued by multiple equilibria. Indeterminacy of equilibrium outcome often poses a challenge in deriving robust predictions and policy guidance. The dissertation shows how the utilization of potential game theory can better deal with this challenge. Chapter 1 studies a general contracting problem between one principal and multiple agents. The interdependence of agents’ actions and payoffs creates a coordination problem among them, leading to multiple equilibria. In general, the principal’s optimal contracting scheme varies with how one selects among equilibria. Nevertheless, for a large class of contracting models where agents’ payoffs constitute a weighted potential game, I show that one contracting scheme is optimal for a large class of equilibrium selection criteria. This scheme ranks agents in increasing weight in the weighted potential game and induces them to accept their offers in a dominance-solvable way, starting from the first agent. I also apply the general results to networks and pure/impure public goods/bads. Chapter 2 studies two-sided markets, where two groups of agents interact via platforms. These markets exhibit network effects, i.e., the value of joining a platform increases with the number of users, which in turn lead to multiple equilibria. I show that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games, enabling the selection among equilibria by potential maximization—a refinement of Nash equilibrium justified by many theoretical and experimental studies. Under potential maximization, platforms often charge the side deriving more network benefits and subsidize the other side. Therefore, profit-maximizing platforms are often designed to favor the money side much more than the subsidy side. Chapter 3 studies markets with strong network effects. In these markets, firms compete for the adoption of all consumers rather than the marginal consumer. Therefore, the Spence distortion—a quality distortion driven by competition for the marginal consumer—should be absent, contradicting the findings in the network economics literature. This inconsistency stems from the choice of equilibrium selection criterion. I show that all popular selection criteria in that literature lead to Spence distortions, whereas potential maximization does not. Therefore, network market regulations based on Spence distortion arguments may be misguided.

Vid utveckling av tyngre fordon inför man allt fler avancerade funktione. Mycket av denna funktionalitet handlar om att maskiner automatiskt ska utföra uppgifter för att assistera föraren. Detta leder till att nya risker uppstår. Och till följd av detta har man börjat skapa nya funktionella säkerhetsstandarder. ISO 26262 är en ny funktionell säkerhetsstandard som finns för vanliga personbilar men som ännu inte trätt i kraft för lastbilar. I ISO-26262 standarden ska krav kunna mappas till andra krav samt till systemarkitektur. I nuläget finns det vissa verktyg på marknaden som stödjer användaren när den skriver kravspecifikationer. Men undersökningar av verktyg ledde till att vi kommit fram till att alla hade någon brist. Och ingen hade bra stöd för mappning mellan krav och systemarkitektur. I detta examensarbete har arbetet varit att testa implementera funktionalitet för ett verktyg som assisterar användaren på olika sätt när den skriver kravspecifikationer. Baserat på kontraktteori och konceptet om portar som hjälp för att koppla samman krav med systemarkitektur ska applikationen se till att det finns en formell koppling mellan dessa. För att testa och validera att portar går att använda för att testa intressant funktionalitet har också en applikation utvecklats där mycket funktionalitet implementerats. Resultatet har varit lyckat då vi baserat på kontraktteori lyckats implementera och validera att det är möjligt att använda portar för att skapa koppling mellan krav och systemarkitektur, samt mellan krav och krav. Validering av att det valda lagringsformatet JSON också förser implementeraren med nog starkt stöd för att kunna spara dessa krav så att data i filerna kan brytas ner och lagras i temporära databasen Neo4J och på så sätt skapa ett fungerande kretslopp. / When developing new heavy vehicles today demands for increasingly more advanced features are asked for. A lot of the new functionality is about machines performing tasks automatically to assist the driver when driving. This leads to new risks, and as a result a new functional safety standard has been created. ISO 26262 is a functional safety standard that today exists for ordinary cars, but has not yet became a standard for trucks. According to the ISO 26262-standard requirements can be mapped to other requirements as well as to the system architecture. At present there are several tools on the market that supports the user when writing specifications. However, our research of the tools has led us to conclude that all lacked something. For example neither of the tools had good support for mapping between requirements and system architecture. In this thesis work, functionality for a tool which is supposed to support the user in various ways when writing requirements specifications was to be examined. Based on contract theory and the concept of ports that links requirements together with system architecture, an application can ensure that there is a formal link between the two. To test the suggested functionality a prototype is being developed. The result has been a successful as we based on contract theory could validate that using ports to create links between different requirements as well as between requirements and system architecture works through the implementation of the tool. Validation that the selected storage format JSON also provides the implementer with enough support to save the requirements in a way so that the data files can be decomposed and stored in the Neo4J database.

Les Hôpitaux d’Instruction des Armées français ont fait l’objet d’évaluations successives de la Cour des Comptes. Cette dernière souligne une sous-activité qui engendre un déficit comptable. Les activités militaires et en particulier la participation aux Opérations Extérieures (OPEX) expliquent- elles en partie le déficit et la sous activité constatés?Cette question pratique nourrit la réflexion théorique menée dans la thèse. Les OPEX menées par les hôpitaux militaires sont des projets indéterminés. La littérature consacrée à ce type de projets favorise une remise en question de l’adéquation des standards de gestion de projet aux projets indéterminés. Les notions d’engagement des parties prenantes et de flexibilité de la planification sont mises en lumière par l’analyse de la littérature. Cette première analyse nous permet de poser la problématique théorique de la thèse : Quelle place pour l’engagement des acteurs et la flexibilité de la planification dans la gestion des projets indéterminés ?Afin d’étudier les modes de gestion appropriés aux projets indéterminés, nous recourons à la simulation dans le cadre d’une recherche intervention. La simulation sert d’outil d’observation de la gestion des OPEX dans les hôpitaux militaires et permet de mettre en lumière leur impact sur l’activité et donc sur les ressources financières des hôpitaux. Cet impact amène à questionner le processus de planification actuel des OPEX et à proposer une planification collective et flexible. La simulation révèle également le rôle important de l’engagement des personnels des HIA dans la gestion des OPEX.Ces constatations de terrain, permettent de progresser sur la connaissance théorique des outils de gestion appropriés aux projets indéterminés. Deux notions nous semblent particulièrement adaptées aux contraintes imposées par l’indétermination des projets : la planification interactive qui apporte flexibilité et coopération au sein de l’équipe projet et le contrat relationnel qui permet d’allier incitation et adaptabilité.La thèse se conclue sur une proposition de structuration de l’espace des projets selon deux dimensions : le degré de détermination de l’objet du projet et le degré d’engagement des parties prenantes. Ces dimensions permettent de poser des frontières entre l’espace d’applicabilité des outils classiques de gestion de projet et de ceux qui se révèlent appropriés aux projets indéterminés. La diversité des projets indéterminés menés actuellement (secteur public, développement international, changement organisationnel) renforce l’intérêt d’une telle structuration, facilitatrice de la diffusion d’outils de gestion propres aux projets indéterminés. / Successive evaluations of French Military hospitals by the Court of Auditors point out a sub-activity that generates a deficit. The French Military Health Care Service acknowledged these points but considers that military activities (in particular participation in External Operation), may explain, at least partly, the deficit and sub-activity mentioned by the Court of Auditors.This practical question feeds the theoretical reflection conducted in this thesis. A detailed description of external operations shows that they can be considered as soft projects. These projects are characterized by the progressive determination of their goals: that are not completely known when the project starts. The literature questions adequacy of project management standards to soft projects and the following research question emerges: what is the role of stakeholders’ engagement and planning flexibility in soft projects management?The thesis is based on an intervention research. A simulation is built to objectify external operations management in military hospitals. It highlights the impact of external operations on care production and consequently on hospitals ‘deficit. Two analyses are conducted to understand the causes of this impact. First, an analysis of the current planning process of external operations suggests that renewing planning methods can be necessary to offer a flexible planning based on cooperation. Second, the simulation reveals the important role of physicians and nurses’ commitment in managing external operations. This commitment, driven by strong relationships between project stakeholders, positively influences external operations’ outcomes.These observations allow theoretical progress on management tools for soft projects.Two concepts seem particularly suited to soft projects’ constraints: interactive planning developed in companies facing high uncertainties and relational contracting described by law and economics scholars. Interactive planning brings both flexibility and cooperation that appear decisive to build a response to soft goals. Relational contracts help understand how high commitment can bring simultaneously motivation and adaptability, that are both essential to achieve soft goals.To conclude, I suggest structuring projects’ space according to the degree of determination of projects’ goals and the degree of stakeholders’ engagement in the project. These dimensions allow defining areas where project management standards will be applicable and those where they might need to be adapted to soft projects. The diversity of soft projects (public sector, international development, organizational change) calls for such a structure that can facilitate the spread of specific management tools.