This article traces different forms of the same present throughout several eras in American political and social history. I focus on two texts, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, and Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in order to examine slavery as a legal institution in the United States, and, in particular, the constitutionality of slavery. Rather than a massive contradiction, the Dred Scott decision is just another iteration of American political and racial philosophy as it was 100, even 200 years earlier. Taney’s opinion is a reflection of what the Lockean social contract came to look like in a racially hierarchized, colonial society. The Dred Scott decision paints one of the most accurate pictures of American political thought but is always written off as nothing but bad law. A close examination of race and social contract theory as they influenced the American Constitution gives insight into more productive ways to talk about race today.

Diese Arbeit enthält drei unabhängige Kapitel, jedes davon im Bereich der Dynamischen Vertragstheorie. Kapitel I zeigt, dass deterministische dynamische Prinzipal-Agenten-Verträge immer mindestens so ertragreich sind wie stochastische, falls die sogenannte Methode erster Ordnung des dynamischen Mechanismus-Designs erfüllt ist. Meine Ergebnisse legen dar, dass die in der Literatur übliche Einschränkung auf deterministische Verträge zulässig ist, so lange die Methode erster Ordnung gültig ist. Kapitel II basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Ilia Krasikov und Rohit Lamba. Ein Großanbieter (Prinzipal) handelt mit einer kleinen Firma (Agent) einen wiederkehrenden Geschäftsvertrag aus, wobei sich der Agent als ungeduldiger erweist. Der optimale Vertrag wird durch zwei Schlüsseleigenschaften beschrieben: Neustart und Abbruch, die vielerlei Eigenschaften der angebotenen Verträge darlegen. Kapitel III basiert schließlich auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Rohit Lamba. Darin besitzt der Agent dynamische private Information, die einem Markovprozess folgt. Ein monopolistischer Prinzipal verkauft dem Agenten ein nicht-dauerhaftes Gut und er verpflichtet sich in jeder Periode an den ursprünglich ausgehandelten Vertrag. Die entstehenden Informationskosten verhindern erst-beste Verträge bei auftretender Persistenz im Typ des Agenten. Diese Arbeit stellt einen Weg bereit, wie man den optimalen deterministischen Vertrag in dynamischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen erhält. Der gewöhnliche Weg mit lediglich lokal nach unten bindenden Anreizverträglichkeitsbedingungen misslingt bei hoher Persistenz der Typrealisierungen und bei stark differenzierender Diskontierung. Zudem zeigt die Arbeit wann mit Gewissheit stochastische Verträge ausgeschlossen werden können. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each in the field of dynamic contracting. Chapter I shows that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. My results demonstrate that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the first-order approach is valid. Chapter II is based on joint work with Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba. We consider a large supplier (principal) who contracts with a small firm (agent) to repeatedly provide working capital in return for payments. The agent is less patient than the principal. The optimal contract is characterized by two key properties: restart and shutdown, which capture various aspects of contracts offered in the marketplace. Finally, Chapter III is based on joint work with Rohit Lamba. We consider the problem of optimal contracting where the agent has dynamic private information, which follows a Markov process. In each period, a monopolistic principal sells a nondurable good to the agent and she commits to the contract she made in the initial period. The emerging information costs prevent first-best contracts whenever there is persistency in the agent’s type. This thesis provides a strategy on how to obtain the optimal deterministic contract in dynamic principal-agent models with Markovian type realizations. We see that the usual approach with only local downward binding incentive compatibility constraints does not work for highly persistent type realizations and for large differences in discounting. Furthermore, I show in which situations we with certainty can exclude stochastic contracts.

Die Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkung fehlenden Commitments eines zentralen ökonomischen Akteurs in verschiedenen institutionellen Umfeldern. Aufsatz 1 bietet eine neuartige Erklärung für grobe Zertifizierung: Diese verringert die Anreize für Kollusion zwischen Zertifizieren und Zertifizierten. Kollusion wird verstanden als die Möglichkeit, gegen Bestechung, ein vorteilhaftes Zertifikat an einen Verkäufer zu vergeben. Konfrontiert mit einem Bestechungsangebot wägt der Zertifizier ab ob der kurzfristige Ertrag - in Form eines Bestechungsgeldes - die langfristigen Kosten – in Form des einhergehenden Reputationsverlustes – aufwiegt. Dabei erweist sich eine gröbere Zertifizierung als besonders nützlich um den kurzfristigen Ertrag zu reduzieren. Im zweiten Aufsatz werden optimale Vertragsmechanismen untersucht, wenn sich der Prinzipal nicht auf eine Auditstrategie verpflichten kann. Solche optimalen Mechanismen nutzen unparteiische Mediatoren aus. Die Verwendung eines Mediators ist profitabel, da somit Korrelation zwischen dem Report des Agenten und der Handlungsempfehlung an den Prinzipal erzeugt werden kann. Optimale Mechanismen verwenden zudem strikt mehr Verträge als Typen des Agenten, was unter vollständigem Commitment nie optimal sein kann. Der dritte Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit Verträgen welche die Abwanderung von Unternehmen verhindern können. Der Regulierer kann sich dabei nur auf kurzfristige Verträge verpflichten und die Firmen können standortspezifische Investitionen tätigen. Wenn im Gleichgewicht Abwanderung permanent verhindert wird, dann werden keine Subventionen in der Zukunft gezahlt. Dies bedeutet, dass die Firma in Zukunft gar keinen Anreiz mehr haben darf abzuwandern. Um dies zu erreichen muss also der heutige Vertrag enorme Investitionsanreize setzen. Im Extremfall ist dann teurer Abwanderung zu verhindern wenn die Firma investieren kann, als im hypothetischen Fall ohne Investitionsmöglichkeit. / This dissertation studies the impact of a lack of commitment of a central economic actor in a given institutional environment. Essay 1 offers a novel explanation for the occurrence of coarse disclosure in certification: coarseness reduces the threat of collusion between certifiers and sellers. Collusion is understood as the possibility of selling a favorable certificate to a seller. Upon accepting a bribing offer, the certifier trades-off short-run gains – in form of the bribe – against long-run losses, from loosing reputation. Coarse disclosure is shown effective in reducing the short-run gain. The second essay studies optimal mechanisms in a contracting problem where the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy. In this framework optimal mechanisms make use of an impartial mediator. Employing a mediator is strictly beneficial because it allows for correlating the agent’s report with the recommendation to the mediator. In general, optimal mechanisms use strictly more contracts than types, which would be not profitable under full commitment. The third essay studies contracts that avert relocation of a firm. The regulator can offer contracts only on a short-term basis, and the firm can undertake a location-specific investment. If in equilibrium relocation is permanently averted, then there are no future transfer payments. But this implies the firm cannot have an incentive to relocate in the future. Tom guarantee the latter, the initial contract has to provide string investment incentives. In the extreme, averting relocation with the firm’s possibility of investing becomes more costly than in the hypothetical case without an opportunity to invest.

The diploma thesis is focused on social contract theories, as presented by the philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. My research is based on Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, Second Treatise of Government by John Locke and Discourses and The Social Contract by Jean-Jacque Rousseau. In their respective theories, these authors present their opinions on how any state comes to life through entering into a social contract and how it should operate. The aim of my thesis is to look into their theories and using method of comparison to determine how they correspond with each other on the fundamental aspects of their ideas. These include the natural state, the act of entering into a social contract, the sovereign, sovereignty and the order of state establishment. The research suggests that although the authors agree on some points, in some cases they differ significantly. It also shows the significant influence of the environments and events experienced by the authors during their lives, on the formation of their thoughts and theories. At the very end of the thesis there is a reflection on the legitimacy of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and the contribution of the theories of appointed authors to today's society.

<p><strong> </strong></p><p>Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson</p><p>“The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?”</p><p>In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules.</p><p>The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization.</p><p>My question for this was as follows:</p><p>Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories?</p><p>During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found:</p><p>1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation</p><p>5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract.</p><p>The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation.</p><p>The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization.</p> / <p>Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson</p><p>"Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?"</p><p>I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen.</p><p>Min fråga var följande:</p><p>Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna?</p><p>Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt:</p><p>1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta</p><p>5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet.</p><p>De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier.</p><p>Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.</p>

Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based ("next generation access", NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, most countries have to date only undertaken NGA investments on a small scale. Accordingly, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. Indeed, many governments have already initiated diverse subsidy programs in order to stimulate NGA infrastructure deployment. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities' incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider. Simple linear profit-sharing contracts can be designed to control the NGA provider's incentives and to put in balance the public objectives of network expansion and limitation of public expenditure. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

本文主旨是要說明：就《道德形上學》的論述而言，康德在何種意義上能夠被視為一個契約論思想家。本文將從兩條線索出發來理解康德所提出的契約論，這兩條線索分別是：康德的財產權理論、以及契約論中處理政治權威正當性時所必須面對的統一性問題。 本文認為：康德所提出的作為理念的原初契約，是一種提供給已處身在政治社會之下的個人，去設想當下所面對的法律強制力之正當性的方式。藉由康德在《純粹理性批判》之中對於「理念」的界定，可以將賦予原初契約一個確實的契約作用：人民的同意。儘管是一個被想像的同意，但康德賦予它積極的意義即形塑公民為一個自主、自律的主體，因此，在這個面向上，本文認為康德提出了儘管與霍布斯、洛克、盧梭迥異但卻仍然極富意義的契約論。 / The purpose of this thesis is that Kant should be seen as a theorist of the social contract theory in the discourse of the Metaphysics of Morals. This thesis will perceive the social contract theory provided by Kant in accordance to two clues, including the theory of property and the problem of unity. The main point of the thesis is that the original social contract as an idea of reason is the method providing for the individual existing in the civil society of constructing the legitimacy of the political authority. By definition of “Idea” in Critique of Pure reason, Kant gives the original social contract a meaningful function: the consent of people. Though the consent is a concept imagined by the people, Kant gives it a positive meaning of forming the people to the independent subject in politics. In conclusion, this thesis claims that Kant provided a meaningful social contract theory different from other theorists in the social contract tradition, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

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Chapter 11 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) and the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) both introduce procedural requirements to the process for creation of land contracts and were both introduced to address a perceived lack of conscience in each of the industries affected. These represent a recent broadening of the ambit of consumer protection legislation in Queensland which deviates from more traditional methods of statutory intervention into land contracts. This paper focuses on the extent to which the Acts effectively introducing a conscience element into certain land contracts, and the extent to which this alters classical contract law. The effectiveness of the approach is then tested against the critiques of two alternative theories of law - law and economics and feminist contract theory - to see whether the legislative approach answers the deficiencies in contract identified within the terms of each theory.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:58:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 GabrielRamirezCoelho09032007.pdf.jpg: 13935 bytes, checksum: 3f3eb512654eb4aab5795e66a64e3ff1 (MD5) GabrielRamirezCoelho09032007.pdf.txt: 55253 bytes, checksum: 70baafb810cc2a579c699206c014fc48 (MD5) GabrielRamirezCoelho09032007.pdf: 311369 bytes, checksum: 4bd2e40af4810a1317ab7434ded20f0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-03-09T00:00:00Z / During the last two decades, the private equity and venture capital industry role in Brazil has significantly increased, with the expansion of resources under management and number of transactions. At the same time, the degree of sophistication of its legal environment and contractual structures has increased to cope with the particularly intense agency problems present due to (i) low liquidity of assets; (ii) the long term nature of contracts; (iii) the potentially huge asymmetry of information between investors and managers. This dissertation explores the presence of restrictions to the venture capital fund managers’ activities; and shows that there is a strong relation between the number of restrictions and the intensity of agency problems, but inconclusive evidence relating the restrictions to demand conditions. / Nas duas últimas décadas, o papel dos setores de private equity e venture capital no Brasil aumentou significativamente, com a expansão do volume de recursos sob gestão e do número de transações. Ao mesmo tempo, a sofisticação do marco legal e das formas de contratação aumentou para que fosse possível lidar com os problemas de agência, que são particularmente intensos devido (i) à baixa liquidez dos ativos em que investe, (ii) à duração do compromisso entre as partes e (iii) à potencialmente elevada assimetria de informação entre elas. Este trabalho explora a presença de restrições às atividades dos gestores de recursos de private equity e venture capital, e mostra que há uma forte correlação entre a quantidade de restrições e a intensidade dos problemas de agência, mas que as evidências quanto à relação entre as restrições e as condições de demanda não são conclusivas.