本論文試圖從霍布斯在形上學的立場，關聯至他政治思想中的相關討論。霍布斯同時兼有決定論以及懷疑論的哲學思維，他藉此劃出理性與啟示之間的界線。本論文認為霍布斯藉由「事實存在」（de facto）主權的論證方式，消解了代表論的弔詭以及第一履約者的弔詭。再者，霍布斯藉由獨特的末世歷史觀，使人對於啟示領域的焦慮與盼望，轉為支持塵世和平的重要助力。

本文主旨是要說明：就《道德形上學》的論述而言，康德在何種意義上能夠被視為一個契約論思想家。本文將從兩條線索出發來理解康德所提出的契約論，這兩條線索分別是：康德的財產權理論、以及契約論中處理政治權威正當性時所必須面對的統一性問題。 本文認為：康德所提出的作為理念的原初契約，是一種提供給已處身在政治社會之下的個人，去設想當下所面對的法律強制力之正當性的方式。藉由康德在《純粹理性批判》之中對於「理念」的界定，可以將賦予原初契約一個確實的契約作用：人民的同意。儘管是一個被想像的同意，但康德賦予它積極的意義即形塑公民為一個自主、自律的主體，因此，在這個面向上，本文認為康德提出了儘管與霍布斯、洛克、盧梭迥異但卻仍然極富意義的契約論。 / The purpose of this thesis is that Kant should be seen as a theorist of the social contract theory in the discourse of the Metaphysics of Morals. This thesis will perceive the social contract theory provided by Kant in accordance to two clues, including the theory of property and the problem of unity. The main point of the thesis is that the original social contract as an idea of reason is the method providing for the individual existing in the civil society of constructing the legitimacy of the political authority. By definition of “Idea” in Critique of Pure reason, Kant gives the original social contract a meaningful function: the consent of people. Though the consent is a concept imagined by the people, Kant gives it a positive meaning of forming the people to the independent subject in politics. In conclusion, this thesis claims that Kant provided a meaningful social contract theory different from other theorists in the social contract tradition, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

本論文題旨為：「論代間正義：一個羅爾斯式的觀點」。代間正義是晚近三十年來新興且益愈受到重視的倫理學議題之一，其主要關切的核心問題，乃在於追問「當代之於後代所應擔負的責任」。本文透過當代政治哲學與倫理學家羅爾斯（John Rawls）有關社會正義理論的設計與主張，分兩部分處理此問題。 / 第一部份所處理的問題為由帕菲特（Derek Parfit）所深化之「後代人格不同一問題」（The Non-Identity Problem），旨在探究「代間正義是否可能」。帕菲特指出，前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在，而這使得現存既有之各種權利與責任相對應的理論，無法合理地適用於代間關係。帕菲特主張，可以採取「忽略特定人格的比較（品質）原則」以解決此後代人格不同一問題。然而，帕菲特此舉卻陷入「不特定人格的後代無法追究前代之行為責任」的理論困境。本文主張，透過羅爾斯原初位置（original position）的理論設計啟發，即便在代間存在著「前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在」的後代人格不同一疑慮，當代仍可採納原初位置的理論啟示，區分人的屬性（properties）與獨特性（particular）的差異，在後代存有人格不同一問題（獨特性）的情形下，針對「屬性」而確立追問當代之於後代所應擔負責任之正當性。 / 第二部分主要處理羅爾斯有關代間正義觀點的內部論證問題，並進一步藉此說明「代間正義如何可能」。羅爾斯以「正義的儲蓄原則」（just savings principle）說明代間的分配正義問題，並《正義論》（A Theory of Justice）中將它納入正義二原則之中，成為建構社會基本體制的基本原則之一。然而，羅爾斯早期解釋與證成儲蓄原則的相關理據如動機假定（motivation assumption）與家族模式等，卻可能與其他理論假定如締約者的理性等相衝突、衍生解釋融貫上的困難，而遭到眾多學者們的質疑。羅爾斯在一九九三年的《政治自由主義》（Political Liberalism）中對此做出回應，並將關切下一代的動機假定，修正為「要求前代也承諾遵守他們所遵守的儲蓄原則，無論向前或向後追溯多遠」。除此之外，羅爾斯於《正義論》以外的其他著作，在提及正義二原則時，皆不再表述「正義的儲蓄原則」。本文認為羅爾斯後期所提出的證立主張，不僅整合了代內分配正義（差異原則）與代間分配正義（儲蓄原則）的論證理據（小中取大規則的應用），更與其主張「社會作為一世代相繼之公平的合作體系」時所標舉之「相互性理念」（the idea of reciprocity）的核心概念相符應。本文認為，在論證理據得到順利整合的前提下，羅爾斯仍可在後期表述正義二原則時，將「正義的儲蓄原則」放回其中，並可據此呼應當代永續發展理念「既滿足當代人的需求，又不對後代人滿足其需求的能力造成危害」的核心主張。 / The topic “Intergenerational Justice” is one of the newest but getting more important ethics problems to contemporaries. One of the key points of this issue is how to make sense of our obligations to the posterity (include future people) if possible. In this dissertation, I intend to clarify this problem by Rawls’s theory of justice into two parts. / The first part is “The Non-Identity Problem” held by Derek Parfit. This problem shows that “in the different outcomes, different people would be born”, and it seems inactive the traditional theories of rights. Parfit suggests that we can through it by the priinciple Q: “if in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.” But this principle makes new difficulties about this problem. According Reiman, I argue that we can adjust this non-identity problem by the theory hypothesis “Original Position” of Rawls’s theory of justice, and that there are obligations from contemporaries to the future people. / The second part is about the arguments of Rawls’s theory of justice between generations. According to early Rawls in 1971, the theory of justice between generations represented by the “just savings principle” and was one part of the Two Principles of Justice in A Theory of Justice. But there are some argument troubles about the assumptions that makes the theory of justice between generations difficultly, especially on the “motivation assumption” and the family mode and so on. In 1993, Rawls changed his arguments about the theory of justice between generations, but he also take off the just savings principle from the Two Principles of Justice in other books or articles besides A Theory of Justice. I argue that latter arguments seem more reasonable to the theory of justice between generations, and they also makes the whole theory of social justice comprehensive. Then I argue that Rawls can still presents the just savings principle when he says about the Two Principles of Justice.