我國行政機關工程獎金制度肇始於民國60年間，時值政府積極推動經濟計畫，籌建各項重要基礎工程建設，為鼓勵各機關辦理各項建設工程，提高工作效能，發展工程技術，行政院爰函頒相關工程獎金支給規定據以實施。嗣因時空環境變遷及政府待遇政策轉型，時至今日，現存的工程獎金支給規定，包括「中央政府各工程機關員工工程獎金發給要點」、「中央各級行政機關工程獎金支給原則」及「地方各級行政機關工程獎金支給原則」等3項規定，此外，配合機關組織調整實際需要，另發展出「經濟部水利署及內政部營建署城鄉發展分署之工程獎金支給模式」，共計4套支給規定。 鑒於「平等」、「正義」為世人論事用法之基本原則，亦係檢驗社會制度良善與否之首要價值，因此，公部門待遇之規劃與給與自應符合是項原則與價值體系，惟現行工程獎金制度存有4套支給規定，於適用對象、獎金發給種類、經費提撥方式等相關規定均有所差異，造成相同層級並從事相同工程業務者，卻支領不同額度之工程獎金，不僅引發各機關之質疑與批評，亦有違公平正義原則。 本研究採用文獻分析法及深度訪談法，以羅爾斯的正義論為立基及思考角度，檢視現行工程獎金制度之規劃與給與是否符合正義原則，並輔以嫻熟工程獎金制度實務運作之中央及地方機關之政策利害關係人，以及法制主管機關行政院人事行政總處之業管科長，進行深度訪談及綜合分析，進而分別從法制面及實務面提出研究發現與建議，以期提供政府檢討、評估與修正工程獎金制度缺失及規劃其他各項獎金制度之參考。 / The engineering bonus system for the administrative agencies in Taiwan started from 1970s, when the government was actively involved in the promotion of economic plans and the construction of major infrastructures. In order to encourage the government agencies to undertake various engineering projects, increasing efficiency at work and developing engineering techniques, the Executive Yuan issued relevant engineering bonus systems so that each government agency has a practical stipulation to abide by. Due to the temporal and spatial vicissitudes and the transformation of policies on government compensation, we have currently enforced three engineering bonus systems, including “Directions Governing the Engineering Bonus in each Construction Agency of Central Government”, “Directions Governing the Engineering Bonus in Central Government Agencies” and “Directions Governing the Engineering Bonus in local Government Agencies”. Moreover, in compatibility with the demand for the actual adjustment of government agencies, we also contrived the fourth engineering bonus system, “Modes of Engineering Bonus System for Water Resource Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and Urban and Rural Development Branch, Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of the Interior.” In light of equality and justice, considered not only the basic standards the public rely on while negotiating and dealing with matters but also the primary values to examine whether the social systems are conducive or not, thus, the planning of the government compensation should correspond to these standards and value systems. However, the current four engineering bonus systems vary in their targets, bonus types, and allotments, leading to a plight where there emerges to be a disparity of bonus pay among dealers at the same level engaging in the same engineering projects, which causes doubts and criticisms among government agencies, and violates the principles of equality and justice as well. Adopting citation analysis and depth interview and basing itself on John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, this research inspects whether the planning and implementation of the current engineering bonus system corresponds to justice principle. Moreover, it is also coupled with meta-analysis and in-depth interviews with policy stakeholders in local and central organizations who are familiar with the functioning of the engineering bonus system and the section chief of the Directorate-General of Personnel Administration. Then, research findings and suggestions will be proposed from a legal and practical perspectives in the hope of providing our government with the review, assessment and correction of drawbacks of the current engineering bonus systems and planning other bonus systems for reference.

羅爾斯於一九九三年發表《政治自由主義》，試圖為多元社會的整合提供一套哲學基礎。羅爾斯認為價值的差異與分歧是當代社會的重要特徵，多元的宗教觀、哲學觀、道德觀、人生觀是一個既存的事實，然而合理的公民能夠形成「交疊共識」，支持一套政治性正義觀，作為規範社會基本結構的基礎。尤其在面對憲政核心爭議與基本正義問題時，合理的公民能夠擱置具爭議性的整全性學說，遵循公共理性的理念，根據同一套政治性正義觀所提供的政治價值與正義原則來解決爭議、凝聚共識、證成決策。不過，羅爾斯的公共理性論受到許多批評，其至少面臨「公共理性無法證成政治共識」、「公共理性不公平地排除整全性學說」、「公共理性是多種而非一種」、「公共理性將淪為膚淺的大眾理性」四種挑戰，此四種挑戰分別是對於公共理性之「完備性」、「公平性」、「單一性」、「公共性」的質疑。針對這些挑戰，羅爾斯對其理論進行了三項主要修正：第一，以「寬觀點公共理性」與「包含式公共理性」補充「排除式公共理性」。第二，公共理性的內容是由一整套「自由主義政治性正義觀之族系」所給定，「正義即公平」也只是諸多合理的政治性正義觀之一。第三，羅爾斯承認公共理性的侷限，然而在必要時，得以「基於公共理性的投票」做出決策。根據這些修正，筆者認為羅爾斯的公共理性論能夠回應「完備性」、「公平性」、「單一性」三方面的挑戰，但是仍無法完全解決「完備性」的問題。因此在本文中，筆者試圖以「寬觀點公共理性」與「廣泛的反思均衡」證成「羅爾斯式的審議理論」，以突破公共理性的限制。尤其是筆者認為，「羅爾斯式審議理論」具有「公共證成的審議模式」、「尊重民主文化」、「兼顧程序正義與實質正義」、「滿足『真誠要求』」、「強化公民意識」、「重視公共理由」等特質，體現了一種自由主義式的審議式民主理論。因此，當我們思索「多元社會的政治共識如何可能？」時，「羅爾斯式審議理論」是一項較合理的方案。 / This dissertation intends to explore John Rawls’s idea of public reason. Public reason is the core conception of Rawls’s political liberalism. Its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice. Rawls argues that, though value diversity is the fact of a modern democratic society, reasonable citizens will follow a political conception of justice endorsed by the overlapping consensus between different kinds of comprehensive doctrines in order to resolve the deep conflicts. Especially, when the problems about constitutional essentials and basic justice occur, reasonable citizens will abide by the idea of public reason to deal with the problems. The idea of public reason is helpful for us to justify political consensus in a pluralistic society. However, some philosophers challenge the idea of public reason. They criticize that the idea of public reason cannot deal with the hard issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and affirmative action. Faced with these criticisms, Rawls revises his theory in three aspects. First, he revises the exclusive view of public reason by the inclusive view of public reason and the wide view of public reason. Secondly, he argues that the content of public reason is given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice. Thirdly, he asserts that we can make a political decision by voting in accordance with the idea of public reason if it is necessary. But, these revisions seems cannot completely overcome the shortcoming of the theory of public reason. Therefore, I want to justify Rawlsian deliberative theory based on the wide view of public reason and the wide reflective equilibrium to overcome the shortcoming of the idea of public reason. Owing to Rawlsian deliberative theory can reconcile liberalism and deliberative democracy, strengthen our civic friendship, and urge us to value public reasons more, I think it is a more plausible theory to justify political consensus in a modern pluralistic society.

本論文題旨為：「論代間正義：一個羅爾斯式的觀點」。代間正義是晚近三十年來新興且益愈受到重視的倫理學議題之一，其主要關切的核心問題，乃在於追問「當代之於後代所應擔負的責任」。本文透過當代政治哲學與倫理學家羅爾斯（John Rawls）有關社會正義理論的設計與主張，分兩部分處理此問題。 / 第一部份所處理的問題為由帕菲特（Derek Parfit）所深化之「後代人格不同一問題」（The Non-Identity Problem），旨在探究「代間正義是否可能」。帕菲特指出，前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在，而這使得現存既有之各種權利與責任相對應的理論，無法合理地適用於代間關係。帕菲特主張，可以採取「忽略特定人格的比較（品質）原則」以解決此後代人格不同一問題。然而，帕菲特此舉卻陷入「不特定人格的後代無法追究前代之行為責任」的理論困境。本文主張，透過羅爾斯原初位置（original position）的理論設計啟發，即便在代間存在著「前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在」的後代人格不同一疑慮，當代仍可採納原初位置的理論啟示，區分人的屬性（properties）與獨特性（particular）的差異，在後代存有人格不同一問題（獨特性）的情形下，針對「屬性」而確立追問當代之於後代所應擔負責任之正當性。 / 第二部分主要處理羅爾斯有關代間正義觀點的內部論證問題，並進一步藉此說明「代間正義如何可能」。羅爾斯以「正義的儲蓄原則」（just savings principle）說明代間的分配正義問題，並《正義論》（A Theory of Justice）中將它納入正義二原則之中，成為建構社會基本體制的基本原則之一。然而，羅爾斯早期解釋與證成儲蓄原則的相關理據如動機假定（motivation assumption）與家族模式等，卻可能與其他理論假定如締約者的理性等相衝突、衍生解釋融貫上的困難，而遭到眾多學者們的質疑。羅爾斯在一九九三年的《政治自由主義》（Political Liberalism）中對此做出回應，並將關切下一代的動機假定，修正為「要求前代也承諾遵守他們所遵守的儲蓄原則，無論向前或向後追溯多遠」。除此之外，羅爾斯於《正義論》以外的其他著作，在提及正義二原則時，皆不再表述「正義的儲蓄原則」。本文認為羅爾斯後期所提出的證立主張，不僅整合了代內分配正義（差異原則）與代間分配正義（儲蓄原則）的論證理據（小中取大規則的應用），更與其主張「社會作為一世代相繼之公平的合作體系」時所標舉之「相互性理念」（the idea of reciprocity）的核心概念相符應。本文認為，在論證理據得到順利整合的前提下，羅爾斯仍可在後期表述正義二原則時，將「正義的儲蓄原則」放回其中，並可據此呼應當代永續發展理念「既滿足當代人的需求，又不對後代人滿足其需求的能力造成危害」的核心主張。 / The topic “Intergenerational Justice” is one of the newest but getting more important ethics problems to contemporaries. One of the key points of this issue is how to make sense of our obligations to the posterity (include future people) if possible. In this dissertation, I intend to clarify this problem by Rawls’s theory of justice into two parts. / The first part is “The Non-Identity Problem” held by Derek Parfit. This problem shows that “in the different outcomes, different people would be born”, and it seems inactive the traditional theories of rights. Parfit suggests that we can through it by the priinciple Q: “if in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.” But this principle makes new difficulties about this problem. According Reiman, I argue that we can adjust this non-identity problem by the theory hypothesis “Original Position” of Rawls’s theory of justice, and that there are obligations from contemporaries to the future people. / The second part is about the arguments of Rawls’s theory of justice between generations. According to early Rawls in 1971, the theory of justice between generations represented by the “just savings principle” and was one part of the Two Principles of Justice in A Theory of Justice. But there are some argument troubles about the assumptions that makes the theory of justice between generations difficultly, especially on the “motivation assumption” and the family mode and so on. In 1993, Rawls changed his arguments about the theory of justice between generations, but he also take off the just savings principle from the Two Principles of Justice in other books or articles besides A Theory of Justice. I argue that latter arguments seem more reasonable to the theory of justice between generations, and they also makes the whole theory of social justice comprehensive. Then I argue that Rawls can still presents the just savings principle when he says about the Two Principles of Justice.

國族是什麼？國族主義又是什麼？ 面對許許多多歧異又紛雜的關於國族與國族主義的論述，本論文嘗試另闢蹊徑，從哲學層面來闡釋這一問題。本文區分國族之形成的主觀條件與客觀條件，認為國族不同於國家與民族，不能單純以客觀條件作為依據，而是必須以主觀條件作為依據。本文又進一步區分形式條件與實質條件，認為主觀條件中必須同時包括形式條件與實質條件，也就是說，一群人若要組成一個國族共同體，這些人必須是出於各自之自由意志，決定共同組成一個不同於其他之團體的共同體，而且要尋找並形成某種歸屬核心，當做共同體之根本質素，使之成為維繫共同體之長久存續的道德基礎。 本文以羅爾斯的政治自由主義與民族觀點作為論述根基，由此開展一種新的國族觀點，一種特殊的、只在自由主義式的民主政治體制中存在的政治共同體。並認為，人類理性必然要求人類朝這樣的政治共同體邁進，使每個人的自由都夠有最合理的、最和諧的發展，而不致釀成戰爭衝突。 / What is “nation”? And what is “nationalism”? There are many diverse and conflicting theories about nations and nationalism. We look into these theories and then abandon them because there are too many definitions. We believe that the nation is a special and unique political community and it accrues only in the liberal constitutional democracy of the modern period. There are two kinds of conditions for the construction of a nation: the subjective condition and the objective conditions. The former is an inner characteristic, while the later are external features. Unlike a state or a people, a nation must be founded the subjective condition as much as the objective conditions. In other words, the subjective condition, human beings’ free will, is the essential bedrock for the construction of a nation. In this perspective, we further distinguish the formal condition from the substantive condition. The formal condition has no content; its only function is pure decision-making. If a group of people is willing to associate together and form a community, it’s necessary for them not only to make a decision but also to decide what community they want to be. Furthermore, they have to search for and fashion their own defining core as the underlying element of the community as well as the moral foundation for the continuance of the community. Based on John Rawls’ political liberalism and his views about peoples, this paper evolves a new viewpoint of the nation as a unique political community that exists only in the liberal democracy. We also assume it is required by human reason that mankind should move forward to such a political community, enabling everyone to develop his or her liberty in the most reasonable and harmonious way without leading to wars and conflicts.