L’objectif de cette thèse est de comparer l’efficacité des primes à la suggestion, des primes à la performance, et de la cession de parts aux salariés pour stimuler leur implication dans les dispositifs de suggestion (cercles de qualité, réunions d’atelier, boîtes à idées, etc.). Dans un premier chapitre,sont présentés, une approche historique, un état des lieux et une revue de littérature. Le chapitre suivant pose les jalons d’une théorie, dans un cadre simplifié ne comprenant qu’un employeur et un employé. Il développe un modèle théorique original de la cession de parts, orienté vers les augmentations de capital dédiées aux salariés. Il est montré que, tant que l’employeur n’est pas limité dans le nombre de parts qu’il peut proposer, ce mécanisme est le plus efficace. Le troisième chapitre consolide les résultats du précédent dans un cadre à plusieurs employés. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre présente une étude économétrique à partir de l’enquête REPONSE. La spécification et les variables sont retenues dans le souci d’être au plus proche des modèles théoriques. Les résultats confortent fortement ceux des modèles théoriques élaborés dans les chapitres précédents. / This dissertation aims at comparing the efficiency of suggestion pay, performance pay and shares selling, so as to involve employees into suggestions schemes (e.g. quality circles, workshop meetings, suggestion box). In the first chapter, the historical background, the current situation and the state of literature are being investigated. In the following chapter, a simple framework is considered with only one employer and one employee. A formal model of shared ownership that fits with the French scheme of ’capital increase dedicated to the employees’ is sketched. It is shownthat, as long as the employer is not limited in the number of shares he can offer, the scheme performs better than suggestion pay and performance pay. Next chapter builds upon the previous model and extends the results to a broader framework with multiple employees. The fourth chapter presents an empirical study based on the REPONSE survey. The econometric specification and the variables are chosen to fit the theoretical models. The results strongly support the theory.

<p>Dissertation in political science, D-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2010. Tutor: Malin Stegmann McCallion</p><p>“Societies in Crisis – When Washington Take Over”</p><p>An economic meltdown wreaks havoc on the world and has plunged the Western world into a spiral of economic stimulus in order to keep their way of life intact. At the same time the same institutions that support these countries have had another agenda for more unfortunate and less influential countries where nothing has been free and everything been to a price of self-sacrifice in order to get the consent of the IMF and the World Bank. Everything according to the points stated in the so called Washington Consensus.</p><p>The purpose of this dissertation is to research what impact the Washington Consensus has on the state in terms of power over the market and sovereignty. This shall be done by examining the points of the Consensus and then delve into the IMF and World Bank’s own program in four countries, Argentina, Russia, Kenya and the Republic of Korea. The findings shall then be compared to the Andersson Contract, a social contract theory summary showcasing the ideal liberal state, to determine if the Consensus gives enough room for the state to act against the market. This shall also be backed up with theories on economics from Adam Smith and Karl Polanyi in order to strengthen the comparison on the economic issues.</p><p>The research question thus for the dissertation are:</p><p>Which institutions and features does the Washington Consensus highlight as necessary for a state? Is the state they proposes to weak to uphold society according to the social contracts?</p><p>According to the research there are parts of the Washington Consensus that fits the social contract and should therefore in theory be able to maintain a level of social dignity and be able to take part in the positive effects of the market. Other parts on the other hand show that some crucial institutions lack certain strength in order to be able to keep the free market in check, but they still exist. Therefore the answer to the question is that it’s ambiguous as all the necessary institutions exist, but some of them need to be strengthened in order to make sure the market remains free as well as the countries should be able to choose their own way to economic welfare.<strong> </strong></p> / <p>Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, D-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2010, Handledare Malin Stegmann McCallion</p><p>"Samhällen i Kris - När Washington Tar Över"</p><p>En ekonomisk härdsmälta skapar kaos runt om i världen och har kastat ner västvärlden i en spiral av ekonomiska stimulanser för att hålla deras livsstil flytande. Santidigt som detta sker har samma institutioner vilka gett första hjälpen till dessa länder har de haft en annan agenda för mer otursamma och mindre inflytelserika länder där ingenting har varit gratis och allt varit till priset av självuppoffring för att få IMF och Världsbankens samtycke. Allt utifrån punkterna fastlagda av Washington-konsensusen.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka vilken inverkan Washington-konsensusen har på staten i betydelsen makt över marknaden och suveränitet. Detta skall genomföras genom att undersöka punkterna i konsensusen och sen dyka ner i IMF och Världsbanknens egna program i fyra länder, Argentina, Ryssland, Kenya och Sydkorea. Det jag finner ska sedan jämföras med Andeersson-kontraktet, en kontraktsteori sammanfattning av den ideala liberala staten, för att utröna om konsensusen ger tillräckligt utrymmer för staten att agera mot marknaden. Detta ska också stödjas med teorier om ekonomi av Adam Smith och Karl Polanyi för att styrka jämförelsen på de ekonomiska delarna.</p><p>Frågeställningarna för uppsatsen är då följande:</p><p>Vilka institutioner och funktioner uppmärksammar Washongton-konsensusen som nödvändiga för staten? Är staten de framhäver för svag för att upprätthålla samhället enligt kontraktteorierna?</p><p>Enligt forskningen är det ett par delar av Washington-konsensusen som passar in i kontraktsteorin och borde därför i teorin möjliggöra en viss nivå av social värdighet och hantering av effekterna utav marknaden. Andra delar däremot visar att några viktiga institutioner saknar tillräckligt med styrka för att fullt ut kunna hålla marknaden i schack, men de existerar fortfarande. Därför är svaret till frågorna att det är tvetydigt eftersom alla g´rundelement finns där, men några av dem behöver förstärkas för att försäkra att marknaderna förblir fria samtidigt som länderna själva väljer deras  väg till ekonomiskt välstånd.</p>

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This thesis proposes a reading of David Gauthiers moral contractarianism (hereinafter Mb(CM)A) that demonstrates how cooperation can be rational in situations where expected utilities (EU) are stacked too high against cooperation. The dissertation critically examines Mb(CM)A and contends that it breaks down in the test of application, i.e. the problem of secession because of the conception of rationality it appeals to. Mb(CM)A identifies rationality with utility-maximization, where utility is the measure of considered coherent preferences about outcomes. Mb(CM)A links morality to reason, and reason to practical rationality, and practical rationality to interest, which it identifies with individual utility. On this view, an action (or a disposition) is rational if that action (or disposition) maximizes an agents EU. This conception of rationality the essay claims is both nave and misleading because it does not take into account an agents considered preference for the acts that are available, in addition to the EU of those acts. Therefore, the thesis argues that Mb(CM)As account of rationality be abandoned in favor of a decision-value/symbolic utilitys or morals by decision-value agreements conception of practical rationality. Morals by decision-value agreement (henceforth Mb(DV)A), the dissertation claims, handles serious problems, like the problem of secession in ways that Mb(CM)A cannot. Mb(CM)A breaks down in the test of application because when applied to the problem of secession, it suggests a single-tracked silver bullet solution. Specifically, it tracks only EU-reasons and claims that insofar as cooperation does not maximize the EU of better-off agents, it is not rational for them to cooperate with or support those that are less well-off. By contrast, Mb(DV)A offers a multi-tracked framework for solutions to the problem, namely: it factors in an agents considered preference for the acts that are available, in addition to EU of those acts. It is the argument of the thesis that when EU is stacked too high against cooperation, it may or may not be rational for an agent to cooperate, depending on which way symbolic utility (SU) for that agent points toward. If SU points in the direction of secession, then it is DV-rational for an agent not to cooperate, but if SU points toward non-secession, then it is DV-rational for that agent to cooperate.

Asymmetric information is a large potential problem for insurance markets, especially for markets insuring health risk. Despite a large theoretical attention over the last 30 years, the empirical evidence of the extent of the problem is still limited. In part this is due to methodological problems. The fundamental problem being that the private information, on which agents' act, is generally not observable to the researcher. This thesis provides empirical evidence on selection and moral hazard, using a private dental insurance natural experiment that solves many of the methodological problems. The initial decision to select into the insurance is analyzed in the first paper. Interestingly, results indicate both adverse selection and its opposite, advantageous selection, in different parts of the sample. These results are captured in a theoretical model where agents differ in their degree of risk aversion. In the second paper the decision to opt out of insurance is related to new information on risk. Results indicate that updating is asymmetric. Agents do not take the insurer's information fully into account, even though it is public. Finally, the moral hazard effect of dental coverage is analyzed in the last paper. The treatment effect of insurance coverage is separated from self-selection, using propensity score matching, IV and difference-in-differences. The results give strong empirical evidence of moral hazard. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2004 xii s., s. 3-12: sammanfattning, s. 13-104: 3 uppsatser

Submitted by Talles Henrique Pereira (talleshbr@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-11-21T15:48:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Talles Henrique Pereira.pdf: 1160248 bytes, checksum: 9af184f95d83c740c65f55a77a7f313e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2016-11-22T18:15:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Talles Henrique Pereira.pdf: 1160248 bytes, checksum: 9af184f95d83c740c65f55a77a7f313e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-06T17:44:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Talles Henrique Pereira.pdf: 1160248 bytes, checksum: 9af184f95d83c740c65f55a77a7f313e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-16 / O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar a efetividade dos programas de movimentação interna, sob perspectiva dos empregados, em uma empresa de energia brasileira. Foram analisados os programas divulgados nos anos de 2014 e 2015. Entenda-se por efetividade um conceito integrado cujos pilares são os interesses e necessidades da empresa e dos empregados, aderentes à estratégia corporativa. Foi realizada uma extensa análise documental, através de relatórios gerenciais, pesquisa de clima organizacional e normas e procedimentos de recursos humanos. A partir desta, foram conduzidas entrevistas semiestruturadas aos empregados selecionados pelo programa, cujo perfil é composto por profissionais de nível superior, das carreiras de Análise de Sistemas e Engenharia de Telecomunicações. Os depoimentos foram avaliados em relação aos construtos carreira, dimensão organizacional, dimensão pessoal e movimentação interna à luz da teoria dos contratos, âncoras de carreira, motivação e carreira proteana. A pesquisa traz insumos relevantes à gestão de carreira nas organizações e ao recrutamento e seleção interna, considerando as especificidades e complexidade do arranjo da organização pesquisada. / This dissertation aims at analyzing the effectiveness of internal hiring programs at a large energy company in Brazil, considering the employee´s perspective. The programs considered comprised the period of two years: 2014/2015. Effectiveness was meant to be an integrated concept, which basic elements are the company and employee needs, aligned to the company main strategic plans. The methodology included an extensive documentary research, through managerial reports, organizational climate surveys and current human resources rules and procedures adopted by the company. From these sources, semi structured interviews were conducted to the selected employees by the internal hiring programs, whose professional profiles are comprised of IT and Telecommunication college graduates. Statements taken during the interviews were then analyzed through career, organization and personal perspectives. In order to analyze the interview results, academic research regarding contract theory, anchor of careers, motivation and protean careers were reviewed. The current research brings valuable resources to career management and to internal hiring programs, considering the complex organizational arrangement of the specific organization.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf.jpg: 2508 bytes, checksum: a2f65c5af5b23551a4dc0fe1c3abcbd3 (MD5) Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf.txt: 52096 bytes, checksum: 449900717082efece5863c8e2fe88909 (MD5) license.txt: 4712 bytes, checksum: 4dea6f7333914d9740702a2deb2db217 (MD5) Andre Alvares Leite Bucione - Turma 2006.pdf: 168087 bytes, checksum: a635f49727d9a7e37d08060c75001c86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-11T00:00:00Z / Top management from retail bank industry (PRINCIPAL) needs to delegate authority to lower level managers (AGENTS) under the existence of conflicting interests, asymmetric information and limited monitoring. A system of performance targets and incentives is adopted in order to induct those agents into principal’s interests. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the existence of a casual relationship between the so called “contract of guaranteed variable wage” and the performance of the lower level managers. It means, to investigate how the appliances of this implicit contract, which promote a substantial change in the direct incentive scheme, affect the performance delivered by those agents. We analyze, econometrically, data from jan.2007 to jun.2009 got from one of the largest Brazilian retail bank through an estimator of fixed effects for an unbalanced panel data. The results indicate that the agents subject to the contract of guaranteed variable wage have delivered an inferior performance compared to the agents subject to variable payment. We conclude, therefore, that problem of moral hazard can be observed on the behavior of the agents subject to this contract. / A alta gerência do banco de varejo (PRINCIPAL) necessita delegar autoridade a gerentes de níveis inferiores (AGENTES) sob a existência de interesses conflitantes, informações assimétricas e a impossibilidade de monitoração completa. Um sistema de metas e incentivos é adotado de modo a induzir estes agentes na direção dos interesses do principal. O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar a relação causal existente entre o chamado 'contrato de salário variável garantido' e o desempenho dos agentes. Isto é, investigar de que forma a aplicação deste contrato implícito, que promove uma substancial mudança no sistema de incentivos diretos, afeta o desempenho destes agentes. Analisamos econometricamente dados de jan.2007 a jun.2009 obtidos junto a um grande banco de varejo nacional através de um estimador de efeitos fixos para um painel de dados não balanceado. Os resultados indicam que os agentes sujeitos ao contrato de salário variável garantido têm um desempenho inferior aos agentes sujeitos a remuneração variável. Concluímos que não podemos descartar existência do problema de risco moral no comportamento dos agentes sujeitos a este contrato.

This thesis provides a critical examination of John Rawls’s political philosophy as it relates to international justice and human rights, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has made an enormous impact on contemporary political and ethical theory, yet it has been criticized by some for failing to address the extra-domestic aspects of social justice, including universal human rights. In Chapter One I describe the theoryof.rights, developed in the social contract tradition and how this theory has influenced the modern discourse of human rights. In Chapter Two I discuss Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the basic rights and liberties, and the idea of political liberalism. In Chapter Three 1 analyze Rawls’s account of international justice and argue that it fails to uphold the same rigorous principles of justice as found in his account of domestic justice. Finally, in Chapter Four l discuss Rawls’s more recent attempts to theorize international justice and human rights, I conclude that Rawls is not justified in limiting the set of human rights available to persons in different societies, and that this limitation is an unnecessary feature of his theory of justice. In contrast 1 argue for a more cosmopolitan system of social justice that is strongly normative and grounded in Rawlsian ideal theory. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson “The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?” In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization. My question for this was as follows: Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories? During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found: 1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation 5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract. The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation. The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization. / Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson "Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?" I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen. Min fråga var följande: Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna? Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt: 1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta 5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet. De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier. Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.

Abstract The aim of this thesis is to propose an array of novel cooperative content delivery (CCD) methods and related incentive mechanisms for future fifth-generation (5G) and beyond networks. CCD using multiple air interfaces is a powerful solution to mitigate the problem of congestion in wireless networks, in which the available multiple air interfaces on smart devices are utilized intelligently to distribute data content among a group of users that are in the vicinity of one another. The requirements for higher capacity, reliability, and energy efficiency in the 5G networks have warranted the development of methods focusing on CCD. Moreover, critical to the efficiency of a CCD process are incentive mechanisms to induce cooperation among the mobile users engaged in CCD. The first part of the thesis studies an ideal condition of reliable and error-free distribution of content using cellular and short-range links. The main contribution is to introduce different device selection CCD methods that take into account only the link quality of the devices’ primary (cellular) interfaces. The proposed methods provide frequency carrier savings for the operator while allowing users to enjoy higher downlink rates. The second part of the thesis studies a more realistic CCD situation where users with low data rate wireless links can be a bottleneck in terms of CCD performance. The main contribution is to propose a novel device selection CCD method that considers the link quality of both primary (cellular) and secondary (short-range) interfaces of the devices. Additionally, a carrier aggregation-based incentive mechanism for the proposed method is introduced to address the challenge of selfish deviating users. The proposed mechanism maximizes individual and network payoffs, and is an equilibrium against unilateral selfish deviations. The third part of the thesis addresses the adverse selection problem in CCD scenarios. The operator is assumed to have incomplete information about the willingness of the users to participate in CCD. The main contribution is to introduce contract-based methods through which the operator could motivate users to reveal their true willingness towards participation. The proposed methods incentivize users according to their willingness and improve system performance in terms of the utility of the operator and the users. / Tiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on kehittää menetelmiä yhteistyössä tapahtuvaan sisällön jakamiseen (cooperative content delivery, CCD) sekä siihen liittyviä kannustinmekanismeja viidennen sukupolven (5G) ja sen jälkeisille matkaviestinverkoille. CCD:n käyttö hyödyntämällä älylaitteessa olevia useita ilmarajapintoja on tehokas ratkaisu välttää langattomien verkkojen ruuhkautumista. CCD-menetelmissä laiteen ilmarajapintoja käytetään älykkäästi datan jakamiseen käyttäjäryhmälle, kun käyttäjät ovat lähellä toisiaan. 5G-verkkojen vaatimukset korkeammalle kapasiteetille, luotettavuudelle ja energiatehokkuudelle ovat motivoineet CCD-menetelmien kehitystyötä. Erityisen tärkeää CCD-menetelmien tehokkuudelle on kannustinmekanismien kehittäminen mahdollistamaan yhteistyö mobiilikäyttäjien välillä. Väitöskirjatyön ensimmäinen osuus käsittelee ideaalista tilannetta luotettavalle ja virheettömälle sisällön jakamiselle hyödyntämällä solukkoverkkoa ja lyhyen kantaman linkkejä. Tässä osuudessa päätuloksena on kehitetty käyttäjien valinnalle menetelmiä, jotka huomioivat linkin laadun solukkoverkon ilmarajapinnassa. Ehdotetut menetelmät tuovat operaattorille säästöjä taajuusresurssien käytön osalta ja käyttäjät saavuttavat korkeampia laskevan siirtotien datanopeuksia. Työn toinen osuus tutkii todenmukaisempaa CCD-tilannetta, jossa alhaisen datanopeuden linkkien käyttäjät voivat olla pullonkaula CCD:n suorituskyvylle. Päätulos tässä on uusi käyttäjien valintamenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon linkkien laadun sekä solukkoverkossa että lyhyen kantaman linkeissä. Lisäksi esitellään eri taajuuksien yhdistämistä hyödyntävä kannustinmenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon itsekkäiden käyttäjien aiheuttamat ongelmat. Ehdotettu mekanismi maksimoi yksittäisen käyttäjän ja verkon hyödyt ja saavuttaa tasapainotilan käyttäjien yksipuolista itsekkyyttä vastaan. Väitöskirjan kolmannessa osuudessa tutkitaan haitallisen valikoitumisen mahdollisuutta CCD:ssä. Operaattorilla oletetaan olevan epätäydellistä tietoa käyttäjien halukkuudesta osallistua yhteistyöhön CCD:ssä. Tämän osuuden päätulos on esitellä sopimuksiin perustuvia kannustinmenetelmiä, joiden avulla operaattori voi motivoida käyttäjiä paljastamaan heidän todellinen tahtotilansa osallistua yhteistyöhön. Ehdotetut menetelmä kannustavat käyttäjiä heidän todellisen tahtotilan perusteella ja parantavat järjestelmän suorituskykyä operaattorin ja käyttäjien saavuttamien hyötyjen osalta.