The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.

L’objectif de cette thèse est de comparer l’efficacité des primes à la suggestion, des primes à la performance, et de la cession de parts aux salariés pour stimuler leur implication dans les dispositifs de suggestion (cercles de qualité, réunions d’atelier, boîtes à idées, etc.). Dans un premier chapitre,sont présentés, une approche historique, un état des lieux et une revue de littérature. Le chapitre suivant pose les jalons d’une théorie, dans un cadre simplifié ne comprenant qu’un employeur et un employé. Il développe un modèle théorique original de la cession de parts, orienté vers les augmentations de capital dédiées aux salariés. Il est montré que, tant que l’employeur n’est pas limité dans le nombre de parts qu’il peut proposer, ce mécanisme est le plus efficace. Le troisième chapitre consolide les résultats du précédent dans un cadre à plusieurs employés. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre présente une étude économétrique à partir de l’enquête REPONSE. La spécification et les variables sont retenues dans le souci d’être au plus proche des modèles théoriques. Les résultats confortent fortement ceux des modèles théoriques élaborés dans les chapitres précédents. / This dissertation aims at comparing the efficiency of suggestion pay, performance pay and shares selling, so as to involve employees into suggestions schemes (e.g. quality circles, workshop meetings, suggestion box). In the first chapter, the historical background, the current situation and the state of literature are being investigated. In the following chapter, a simple framework is considered with only one employer and one employee. A formal model of shared ownership that fits with the French scheme of ’capital increase dedicated to the employees’ is sketched. It is shownthat, as long as the employer is not limited in the number of shares he can offer, the scheme performs better than suggestion pay and performance pay. Next chapter builds upon the previous model and extends the results to a broader framework with multiple employees. The fourth chapter presents an empirical study based on the REPONSE survey. The econometric specification and the variables are chosen to fit the theoretical models. The results strongly support the theory.

早期農業係臺灣社會經濟發展之基石，各相關農業政策皆以糧食增產為主要目標，後因後期臺灣經濟由農業為主漸漸轉向以工業為主，故在時代變遷下，過去多數文獻指出第一次農地改革強調以「所有權」為中心，成功達到農業生產增加目的，以及Arthur Young之名言「荒漠變花園」，認為「所有權」是激勵農民生產之誘因，在現今都市化擴張及工商業發展的社會背景下，是否仍為當前農地政策之主要思維？實有重新探討之必要。爰此，本研究為探討臺灣農地利用是否仍需存有「所有權」之迷思，嘗試釐清在時代變遷下，農民是否須擁有農地所有權才能激勵農民從事農地利用？或只要能保障農民之投入成本能於未來收益相符，即便是透過使用權方式承租農地亦能激勵農民從事利用？並期能透過財產權觀點分析現行農地利用政策，提供未來農地政策研擬修訂之重要參考依據。 基此，本研究首先整理過去相關文獻及政府統計資料，在此基礎上釐清過去涉及地權政策之農地改革變遷過程，以及臺灣農地利用現況問題，藉以建立後續分析架構。其次，針對宜蘭縣三星鄉農民進行問卷調查，以釐清農民在從事農作過程中，擁有農地所有權對農民之影響情形，並瞭解農民透過購買或承租方式擴大農場經營規模之考量為何。最後，為深入分析及探究問卷調查結果之背後影響因素，本研究再針對中央及地方政府機關行政人員進行訪談，據以進行綜合分析。透過此研究脈絡之探討，本研究獲得之重要發現與結論，茲分述如下。 一、本研究透過實證分析得知，農民擁有農地所有權雖會對農地利用有正面影響，但不必然會直接激勵農民從事農作，仍需視當時的社會制度下，何種行為能夠激勵農民達到行為目標（增加所得），即具有激勵效果。而農民擁有農地使用權，亦能提高從事農地利用意願、激勵努力從事農業生產及維護農地環境，惟因使用權具有期限，故相較於農民擁有農地所有權，在提高農地改良投資及對長期從事農作有幫助兩方面，較無法激勵農民。因此，本研究結論指出過去以所有權為中心之農地政策，因社會變遷結果，不必然須再以所有權為中心，亦能具有激勵農民從事農作生產之效果。 二、依據本研究分析及推論，第一次農地改革之成功，應不能僅歸於創設所有權，而是因為透過政策實施重新界定財產權範圍，並建置財產權之權利及義務關係，故使農民投入之成本與未來收益能相符，願意投入更多的勞力從事農作，進而激勵農民願意努力從事農業生產，而建立第一次農地改革成功基礎。以此觀點亦能說明，第二次農地改革後，即便農民擁有農地所有權，惟因從事農作收益不佳，農民投入之成本於未來並無法充分回收時，則會變相導致農民任其休耕、閒置、消極利用，或是觀望日後農地變更之增值。因此，所有權並非能直接激勵農民從事農地利用，即便農民係透過承租方式擴大農場經營規模，只要能保障農民投入成本能與未來獲得收益相符，皆可激勵農民努力從事農作。 三、經本研究調查發現，由於目前購買農地價格太高，且農民擁有農地所有權與使用權對農地利用激勵效果相似，因此在資金條件不足情況下，透過承租方式取得農地，可減輕農民在資金負擔方面的壓力，實為未來主要擴大農場經營規模之方式。而目前政府所推動之小地主大佃農政策，雖係以承租方式擴大農場經營規模，且施行迄今頗具績效，然其政策績效似有成長趨緩之趨勢，故本研究針對小地主大佃農政策績效成長趨緩之原因進行分析，發現主要因地主願意出租之農地多已經初步釋出、三七五減租政策之持續影響、農民健康保險資格影響農地整合活化、缺乏地緣關係難透過承租農地擴大農場經營規模及特殊農業經營傾向以購買農地擴大農場經營規模等五項原因，可能影響該政策績效有趨緩成長之勢。故本研究基於研究觀察及發現，據以研提五項政策修正建議，包括：1.由於農地多已初步釋出，故應開始從農地規模化轉而思考農地集中化，不再僅追求量的成長；2.透過農地管理中心整合目前委託經營、口頭租約、代耕之擴大農場經營規模方式，不僅以書面契約為必要條件；3.調整農民健康保險之資格條件，不必然以擁有或承租一定農地面積以上為審查必要條件；4.透過現有大佃農師徒學習或是參與學習方式，引領新農民獲得當地農村信任感，順利承租農地；5.獎勵地主及承租人雙方簽訂長期農地租賃契約，以刺激承租人規劃及思考更長期之農地利用等，可供作為政府機關未來進行相關政策修訂及調整之參考依據。

Submitted by Antonio Ferreira (primo.ferreira@globo.com) on 2013-08-02T02:04:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Regulatório Petróleo_Antonio Ferreira.pdf: 766935 bytes, checksum: 130462476dcbdfbda36ca094c516be06 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-08-15T12:56:46Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Regulatório Petróleo_Antonio Ferreira.pdf: 766935 bytes, checksum: 130462476dcbdfbda36ca094c516be06 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-15T12:56:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Regulatório Petróleo_Antonio Ferreira.pdf: 766935 bytes, checksum: 130462476dcbdfbda36ca094c516be06 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-27 / Esta dissertação analisa o marco regulatório brasileiro do petróleo e gás sob a ótica da Teoria Econômica e faz uma comparação entre o regime de concessão, instituído pela Lei 9.478/97, e o de partilha de produção, adotado após a descoberta do Présal através da Lei 12.351/10. As características do modelo de concessão brasileiro são revistas assim como os resultados obtidos no setor de Exploração e Produção ao longo dos últimos quinze anos. O estudo faz uma abordagem sucinta sobre a descoberta do Pré-sal que ocasionou a alteração do marco regulatório pelo governo brasileiro. Os problemas relacionados à incerteza, poder de incentivo dos contratos, assim como as falhas de mercado relacionadas à assimetria de informação, externalidade e especificidade dos ativos são analisados para ambos os regimes. Ao longo do estudo também são abordadas questões de ordem prática como a insegurança jurídica, o papel da agência reguladora e a mudança do perfil das empresas interessadas em investir no país. / This paper analyses the Brazilian Oil & Gas regulatory framework in light of the Economic Theory, making a comparison between the concession regime, implemented in 1997 by the Law 9.478, and the production sharing model, introduced in 2010 by the Law 12.531, after the discovery of the Pre-salt province. The characteristics of the Brazilian concession regime are revisited, as well as the effects of its implementation in the Exploration & Production sector during the last fifteen years. This study makes an overview of the Pre-salt discovery, which triggered the change in regulation by the government. The issues related to uncertainty, contract incentives, and market failures related to asymmetric information, externalities and sunk costs are examined for both regimes. Also, the paper covers practical questions like the legal uncertainty, the role of the regulatory agency and the change in the profile of the companies interested in investing in Brazil.