Submitted by Danilo Valença Hernandes Vila (danilovhv@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-05-08T23:42:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2018-05-09T22:24:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-05-10T12:49:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-10T12:49:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-28 / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo estudar o controle concreto de constitucionalidade dos processos de crime comum contra prefeitos, definidos pelo art. 1º do Decreto-Lei 201/67, julgados pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal desde 1968 até 2016. Para tal, examinamos a literatura sobre o DL 201 e Poder Judiciário nas áreas do direito, ciência política e administração pública. Coletamos do site do Supremo 190 casos de recursos, inquéritos e ações penais originárias referentes ao art.1º do DL 201. Os processos foram lidos e extraímos informações para montagem de uma base de dados que nos permitisse analisar o processo de judicialização desse instrumento jurídico. Nosso achado é que, em via de controle concreto como recurso somado a uma decisão precedente de ação penal originária do DL 201, entre 1971 e 1987, ocorreu uma judicialização do tipo arbitragem de interesses em conflito, criando uma jurisprudência sobre o DL 201 com força vinculante sobre a primeira instância, para 'salvar' os prefeitos de um suposto uso politizado desse Decreto-Lei em nível local. A partir de 2003, em controle concreto de ação penal originária, não constatamos força vinculante para o Supremo nem para instâncias inferiores. Ao assumir cargos de deputado federal e fazer o processo subir ao Supremo, os ex-prefeitos praticam uma judicialização como tática de oposição, que tem como conseqüência grande número de prescrições e arquivamentos desses processos, um aumento de decisões majoritárias dos órgãos colegiados e queda da correlação entre voto do relator e resultado do julgamento. / This dissertation aims to study the concrete control of constitutionality of common crime proceedings against mayors defined by art. 1 of Decree-Law 201/67, judged in the Federal Supreme Court from 1968 to 2016. To this end, we have examined the literature on DL 201 and Judiciary in the areas of law, political science and public administration. We collected from the Supreme's website 190 cases of appeals, inquiries and criminal prosecutions referring to DL 201’s article 1. The cases were read and we extracted information to set up a database that would allow us to analyze the judicial process of this legal instrument. Our finding is that, through concrete control as a resource, added to a previous decision of criminal action originating in DL 201, between 1971 and 1987, there was a judicialization of the type of arbitration of conflicting interests, creating a jurisprudence on DL 201 with binding force on the lower courts to 'save' the mayors from an alleged politicized use of this Decree at the local level. As of 2003, in concrete control of the originating criminal action, we did not find a binding force either for the Supreme Court or for lower instances. In assuming positions of federal deputy, and bringing the process rise to the Supreme, the former mayors pratice a judicialization as a tactic of opposition, which has as consequence a great number of prescriptions and fillings of these actions, an increase of majority decisions of the collegiate organs and fall of correlation between the rapporteur's vote and the outcome of the trial.

Cette thèse met en lumière l’apport considérable du juge constitutionnel de la 5ème République nigérienne, dans l’œuvre de la protection audacieuse du principe de la suprématie de la Constitution (du 09 août 1999). L’exposition du schéma organisationnel de la justice constitutionnelle s’opère sans préjudice du nécessaire rappel de l’histoire socio-politique mouvementée du Niger, qui n’est pas étrangère dans l’originalité qui fonde le modèle nigérien. L’évocation de l’activité constitutionnelle va s’atteler à la mise en évidence des grandes décisions de la Cour, aussi bien dans le cadre de la défense des droits fondamentaux garantis, que celui de la régulation constitutionnelle du fonctionnement des institutions de la République. La jurisprudence relative au Président de la République, qui bénéficie d’un chapitre entier est au cœur de la problématique de la consolidation de la démocratisation du Niger post-Conférence nationale de 1991. L’étude fait ressortir une trajectoire d’analyse ambivalente. D’une part, la ré-fondation de la justice constitutionnelle par la consécration d’une juridiction spécialisée et indépendante, a eu pour effet de plonger le Niger dans l’ère de la démocratie constitutionnelle. D’autre part, l’audace du juge constitutionnel s’est avérée insuffisante, face à la dérive autoritaire du Président de la République de l’été 2009 (dissolution de la Cour). Il n’en demeure pas moins que, le constitutionnalisme démocratique ébauché sous la 5ème République semble bien demeurer la révolution appropriée de lutte contre toute résurgence autoritaire. / This dissertation highlights the considerable contribution of the constitutional judge of the 5th Republic of Niger, in the audacious protection work of the supremacy of the Constitution principle (the 9th of August, 1999). The presentation of the organizational structure of constitutional law requires taking into account Niger’s sociopolitical history, which has contributed to the model of constitutional justice of Niger. The evocation of constitutional activity underlines the major decisions of the Court, regarding the defense of the guaranteed basic rights as well as the constitutional regulation of the functioning of the Republic's institutions. An entire chapter is dedicated to the case law regarding the President of the Republic, which has been in the center of the issue of strengthening the democratization of Niger since the National Conference of 1991. The research results in the ambivalent analysis. On the one hand, the re-foundation of the constitutional justice through the institution of a specialized and independent jurisdiction marked Niger's entry into an era of constitutional democracy. On the other hand, the constitutional judge audacity has proved deficient facing the authoritarian trend of the President of the Republic in 2009 (dissolution of the Court). Nonetheless, the democratic constitutionalism designed under the 5th Republic of Niger seems to remain an appropriate revolution to fight against any authoritarian resurgence.

Dans un contexte politique, économique et culturel différent, la justice constitutionnelle se développe en Égypte et en France. D’un point de vue purement juridique, le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois s’exerce dans les deux pays selon une procédure différente. Le développement du contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois dans les deux pays avait, toutefois, pour effet de reproduire progressivement des rapprochements quant au contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois. L’Égypte établit en 2005 un mécanisme a priori sur la constitutionnalité des certaines catégories des lois électorales. De son côté, la France finit en 2008 par inaugurer un mécanisme du contrôle a posteriori (la QPC). Cette thèse propose de montrer que la justice constitutionnelle dans les deux pays s’appuie sur les mêmes fondements, tant sur un plan matériel que formel. Le contrôle exercé par la Cour constitutionnelle dans chacun des deux pays peut être considéré comme une application du modèle européen de justice constitutionnelle adaptée aux différentes données politiques, juridiques, économiques et culturelles de chacun de deux pays. / In the political, economic, and cultural status quo, constitutional justice has been developed in both Egypt and France. From the legal perspective, it has been realized that various difference between both countries within the mechanism of the constitutional review of laws. Recently, the development of this legal issue in both countries leads to some of similarities between the mechanism in both Egypt and France, especially on the procedural level. Egypt adopted the same French scheme in 2005 with respect to some of the election laws. Further, France adopted the same constitutional review as Egypt via subordinate claim in 2008. But that does not mean that the constitutional review in both countries include only the procedural levels but also the main principle of the legal constitutional reviews in Egypt and France