La surévaluation des capitaux propres implique le danger que le dirigeant adopte des stratégies d’investissement discrétionnaires destructrices de valeur. Pourtant, la croissance externe pourrait également être utilisée comme moyen d’accéder à de nouvelles ressources et compétences clés qui font naître de nouveaux produits. Quel est le rôle de la gouvernance de l’entreprise dans une situation de surévaluation des capitaux propres ? Va-t-elle privilégier la voie disciplinaire en encadrant le comportement opportuniste du dirigeant, ou privilégier la voie exploratoire, c’est-à-dire la découverte de nouvelles opportunités de croissance ? Dans cette perspective, l’étude se concentre sur l’analyse des stratégies de sept groupes de communication à l’aube de la bulle Internet. Ayant édifié un cadre conceptuel élargi intégrant la stratégie de diversification, la gouvernance de l’entreprise et les mesures de création de valeur, nous concentrons notre analyse sur l’étude des différents leviers stratégiques de création de valeur attribuables à une stratégie de diversification : synergies entre flux de trésorerie, synergies en capacité managériale ou synergies organisationnelles à travers le partage de ressources stratégiques et de compétences distinctives. Puis, l’analyse se focalise sur le rôle de la gouvernance dans le processus de création de valeur : quel composant soutient l’adaptation d’une stratégie de diversification concentrique, liée, verticale et conglomérale ? L’étude propose un modèle intégral mesurant l’impact des différentes variables et formule des propositions visant à améliorer la surveillance du management dans un contexte de surévaluation des capitaux propres. / The overvaluation of the stockholders' equity implies the danger of the CEO adopting discretionary strategies having a negative impact on shareholders` value. However, diversification strategies could also be used as means of reaching new resources and key competencies that give birth to new products and markets. What is the role of corporate governance in a situation of overvalued stockholders' equity? Will it privilege the disciplinary way by framing the opportunistic behavior of the chief executive officer, or will it privilege the exploratory way, i.e. the discovery of new growth opportunities? From this point of view, the study concentrates on the analysis of the diversification strategies of seven media groups at the dawn of the Internet bubble. Having built a widened conceptual framework integrating the strategy of diversification, the governance of the company and the measures of value creation, we will concentrate our analysis on the study of different strategic levers ascribable to a diversification strategy: synergies between treasury flows, synergies in managerial capacity or organizational synergies through the sharing of distinctive competencies and strategic resources. Then, the analysis focuses on the role of corporate governance in the process of value creation: which component has an influence on the implementation of concentric, linked, vertical or conglomerate diversification? The study will summarize the different results within an integral model and propose different suggestions aiming at the monitoring of top management in the context of overvalued stockholders' equity.

This thesis investigates corporate social responsibility reporting in Mexico. It is built across three studies. First, we analysed the content and semantic properties of annual reports, sustainability reports and corporate websites of 73 Mexican and foreign companies operating in Mexico to describe the extent to which these companies disclose their corporate social responsibility. Second, with the data gathered in the first study, we built thirteen disclosure scores to explore whether corporate governance and corporate social responsibility reporting in annual reports can be seen as complementary mechanisms used by companies to enhance relations with stakeholders. Third, we conducted an in-depth case study of a Mexican company acquired by a multinational company; we analysed the sustainability reports and news items during the time prior to and after the purchase to investigate the changes in corporate social responsibility reporting as a result of the acquisition. Our study contributes to the scarce literature exploring corporate social responsibility reporting in Mexico and adds to the methodological research in the field by conducting a survey of corporate social responsibility reporting across industries and reporting media and by utilising a content analysis approach of considerable measurement detail. We provide empirical evidence to previous literature suggesting that foreign ownership may have a positive impact on themes of disclosure such as the environment, but have a negative impact on community. We also contribute to corporate social responsibility reporting research in the context of mergers and acquisitions, by providing empirical evidence which suggests that company responses in the form of corporate social responsibility disclosure to institutional pressures consider both stakeholders salience and business culture.

O objetivo da presente pesquisa é examinar qual a associação entre quatro diferentes tipos de conflitos de agência previamente estudados pela literatura de governança: entrincheiramento do gestor, consumo de perquisites, decisões de liquidez e tomada de risco. Para tanto, inicialmente detalharam-se a origem e as diferenças entre esses quatro conflitos estudados. A seguir, fez-se a revisão de diferentes mecanismos de governança corporativa potencialmente capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Também se identificaram, ao nível do país, índices de proteção à riqueza e aos direitos dos investidores acionistas e credores que a literatura anterior comumente sugere serem capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Ao todo, foram analisadas 7.994 firmas de 35 países entre os anos 2010 e 2013 (aproximadamente, 22.000 observações-ano). Ao longo do trabalho, cinco diferentes hipóteses de pesquisa foram discutidas e testadas. Resumidamente, encontraram-se evidências consistentes de que gestores entrincheirados mantêm maiores níveis de liquidez e que maiores níveis de liquidez estão associados com maior consumo de perquisites. Há evidências também de que o entrincheiramento do gestor, via alta concentração de propriedade acionária e via participação no conselho de administração, altera suas preferências de consumo de perquisites e de risco. Em geral, essa tese sugere que os conflitos de agência estão associados e que, especialmente, o entrincheiramento do gestor altera suas preferências em relação aos três outros conflitos. / The purpose of this research is to investigate what is the association between four agency con icts that are studied by previous corporate governance literature: managerial entrenchment, perquisites consumption, cash holdings and risk-taking. Initially, I detail the source and di erences between these agency con icts. Then, I discuss different types of governance mechanisms that are potential candidates to mitigate these con icts. Furthermore, I collect and discuss country-level investor protection indices that relate to the protection of shareholders' and the creditors' rights, and that help to mitigate these con icts. The nal sample contains 7.994 rms from 35 countries analyzed from 2010 until 2013 (almost 22.000 year-observations). I discuss and empirically test ve hypothesis. In a nutshell, there is consistent evidence that entrenched managers choose higher levels of cash holdings, and that cash holdings are positively associated with perquisites consumption. There is also evidence that managerial entrenchment, either via high managerial ownership concentration or via CEO duality, changes managers' preferences over the consumption of perquisites and risk-taking. In general, this thesis suggests that di erent agency con icts are associated and that entrenchment a ects managerial preferences over the three remaining conflicts.

Os mecanismos de governança corporativa são originalmente propostos para empresas de capital aberto, entretanto suas práticas podem minimizar os problemas de agência encontrados em empresas de controle familiar ao estabelecer regras para as relações entre família, patrimônio societário e gestão, além da clássica separação entre propriedade e controle. São notórias a forte presença de grupos familiares e a alta concentração de propriedade entre empresas de capital privado nacional. Muitas das dificuldades enfrentadas são comuns entre as organizações familiares, entretanto, não existem regras e soluções que atendam a todas de modo satisfatório. Dessa forma o trabalho consistiu no estudo de caso de quatro empresas familiares do Rio Grande do Sul em que são investigados o alinhamento das práticas e estruturas de gestão das empresas pesquisadas às práticas de governança corporativa. / Corporate governance mechanisms are originally proposed for publicly traded companies, but their practices can minimize the agency problems found in family-owned companies by establishing rules for family relationships, corporate equity and management, as well as the classic separation between ownership and control. Notable are the strong presence of family groups and the high concentration of ownership among national private equity firms. Many of the difficulties faced are common among family organizations, however, there are no rules and solutions that suit all of them satisfactorily. In this way the work consisted of the case study of four family companies from Rio Grande do Sul in which the alignment of the practices and management structures of the surveyed companies with the practices of corporate governance are investigated.

Depuis la crise financière de 2008 et les lois du 14 juin 2013 et du 17 août 2015 sur les représentants des salariés dans les conseils d’administration, les travailleurs s’impliquent davantage dans les mécanismes des sociétés par actions. De simple parties prenantes, ils sont devenus parties constituantes du contrat de société. Ils participent à la gouvernance de leur entreprise, bénéficient d’un actionnariat spécifique et sont informés et consultés sur les décisions importantes. Qui plus est, ils prennent des risques tout en demeurant, encore, néanmoins, les victimes de notre économie globalisée, caractérisée par le poids des marchés financiers. L’entreprise moderne connaît donc un bouleversement à la fois conceptuel et à la fois juridique grâce à la prise en compte de nouveaux acteurs et à une considération récente pour le long-termisme. Notre étude consistera à analyser l’influence du nouveau régime des salariés sur le droit des sociétés par actions. Doit-on, en effet, envisager les prochaines réformes à l’aune de cette modification conceptuelle et d’une appréhension inédite du monde du travail ? Cette évolution de l’entreprise implique une réforme du droit des sociétés et une refonte de ses grands principes directeurs ; mais, cette mutation progressive en faveur des salariés, permet surtout de différencier les sociétés cotées des sociétés non cotées. / Since the financial crisis of 2008 and the laws of June 14th, 2013 and August 17th, 2015 on the representatives of the employees in boards of directors(board meetings), the workers get involved more in the mechanisms of joint-stock companies. Of simple stakeholders, they became constituent parts of the deed of partnership. They participate in the governance of their company, benefit from a specific shareholding and are informed and consulted on the important decisions. Besides, they take risks while living(remaining), still, nevertheless, the victims of our globalized economy, characterized by the weight of financial markets.Thus the modern company knows an at the same time abstract and at the same time legal upheaval thanks to the consideration of new actors and thanks to the recent consideration for the length - termisme. Our study will consist in analyzing the influence of the new diet(regime) of the employees on the company law by actions(shares). Do we have to, indeed, envisage the next reforms in the alder(ell) of this abstract modification and a new apprehension of the world of the work? This evolution of the company implies(involves) a reform of the company law and a revision of its guiding major principles; but, this progressive transfer(transformation) in favour of the employees, allows especially to differentiate the listed companies of unlisted companies.

Traditionally, the corporate governance scholarship has emphasized heavily the "dispersed shareholder regimes" in the United States and the United Kingdom, although "controlling shareholder regimes" constitute the vast majority of the world's economy. Since there have been few systematic studies concerning controlling shareholder regimes (in particular, controlling shareholder regimes in developing countries), they have remained in a black box. With this concern in mind, in this dissertation, I proposed various analytical frameworks for understanding the corporate governance of controlling shareholder regimes that, improperly, have been overlooked for a long time. In the first chapter of my dissertation, entitled Reenvisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, I proposed theories to explain why controlling shareholders and minority shareholders "voluntarily" embrace each other in an emerging capital market while the legal system in that jurisdiction does not require controllers to protect investors. In the second chapter, entitled Controlling Shareholders - "Roving" v. "Stationary," I explored two types of controlling shareholders (i.e., "roving" and "stationary" controllers) and delved into why an economy with stationary controllers is better in terms of corporate governance and more likely to be prosperous than an economy with roving controllers. In the third chapter, entitled Transplanting a Poison Pill to a Controlling Shareholder Regime, I analyzed how a poison pill would affect the market for corporate control and the corporate governance of controlling shareholder regimes. In this dissertation, I have proposed many unconventional analyses and views on controlling shareholder regimes (in some cases, the concepts may be counterintuitive from the perspective of the conventional corporate governance scholarship). I hope that my research will guide scholars in a theoretical way to understand the various aspects of law and economics related to corporate governance that mostly have not been recognized or that have been misunderstood in the standard scholarly studies of corporate governance.

Este estudo teve dois objetivos. Primeiro, pretendeu-se identificar quais dados são relevantes para suportar testes sobre o impacto da existência de diretorias jurídicas no desempenho das companhias listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BM&FBovespa). Segundo, com os dados destacados no primeiro objetivo, buscou-se verificar se essas companhias apresentavam desempenho financeiro distinto, quanto ao valor e à rentabilidade, pela formalização de diretorias jurídicas. Para cumprir o primeiro objetivo apresentado, foram coletados dados de 1997 a 2008 no Formulário de Informações Anuais (IAN), relatório que as empresas de capital aberto remetem periodicamente e compulsoriamente à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), e no banco de dados da Economática: dados utilizados para avaliar e comparar o desempenho financeiro nos testes realizados para valor (Q de Tobin) e rentabilidade (ROA). Para cumprir o segundo objetivo, o método utilizado abrangeu a matriz de correlação e o teste de colinearidade, para justificar o uso das variáveis independentes e, consequentemente, para melhor explicar a regressão; o teste de independência, ou teste não paramétrico de diferença de médias, entre companhias listadas com diretorias jurídicas e o grupo de empresas sem essa diretoria; duas regressões com dados em painel, tendo o Q de Tobin e o ROA como variáveis dependentes representaram o modelo usado neste trabalho. Cumpriram-se os objetivos desse estudo pelos resultados apresentados. As respostas quanto aos dados pesquisados para suportar os testes quantitativos (primeiro objetivo) foram relevantes e representativos ao mostrar a elevação exponencial de companhias com existência de diretorias jurídicas de 1,35% em 1997 para aproximadamente 10% em 2008. Na mesma linha, houve também evolução do número de setores da economia com existência de diretorias jurídicas, aumentando de três setores em 1997 para mais de quinze em 2008. Os resultados dos testes (segundo objetivo) mostraram fortes indícios de que a formalização da diretoria jurídica na companhia favorece o valor (Q de Tobin) e a rentabilidade (ROA) das companhias listadas na BM&FBovespa. O teste de independência ou não paramétrico de diferença de média mostrou significância quanto ao Q de Tobin e ROA em 2003, 2005 e 2006; significância somente quanto ao Q de Tobin em 2002 e 2007; e, significância exclusivamente quanto ao ROA em 1999 a 2001, 2004 e 2008. Somente em 1997 e 1998 não houve significância de resultados, em vista do baixo número de empresas com diretorias jurídicas. A regressão com dados em painel, tendo o Q de Tobin como variável dependente, teve resultados consistentes quanto à parcela dos conselheiros externos, com o tamanho da firma e com o tempo de companhia listada na bolsa de valores. Quanto à regressão com dados em painel, tendo o ROA como variável dependente, os resultados foram significantes para o número de conselheiros da empresa, tamanho da empresa e, finalmente, para a existência de diretorias jurídicas na empresa. / This study had two objectives. First, we sought to identify what data are relevant to withstand tests on the impact of the existence of the boards with legal member in the performance of companies listed on São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo, BM&FBovespa). Second, the data highlighted in the first goal, we sought to determine whether these companies had separate financial performance, as the value and profitability, the formalization of legal directors. To accomplish the first goal made, data were collected from 1997 to 2008 on Annual Information Form, report that publicly traded companies regularly and compulsorily refer to brazilian securities exchange commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM), and the database Economática: data used to evaluate and compare the financial performance in tests for value (Tobin\'s Q) and profitability (Return on Assets, ROA). To achieve the second objective, the method used included the correlation matrix and collinearity test, to justify the use of independent variables and hence to better explain the regression, the independence test, or nonparametric mean difference, between listed companies with boards and the legal group of companies without such a board, two regressions with panel data, and Tobin\'s Q and ROA as dependent variables represented the model used in this work. Fulfilled for the purposes of this study the results presented. The responses regarding the research data to support quantitative tests (first goal) were relevant and representative to show the exponential rise of companies with boards of legal existence from 1.35% in 1997 to about 10% in 2008. In the same vein, there were also changes in the number of sectors of the economy with existence of legal directors, increasing from three sectors in 1997 to more than fifteen in 2008. The test results (second goal) showed strong evidence that the formalization of the board with legal member at the company promotes the value (Tobin\'s Q) and profitability (ROA) of companies listed on BM&F Bovespa. The independence test or nonparametric mean difference showed a significant relation to Tobin\'s Q and ROA in 2003, 2005 and 2006; significance only in relation to Tobin\'s Q in 2002 and 2007, and, solely on the significance of ROA from 1999 to 2001 , 2004 and 2008. Only in 1997 and 1998 there was no significant result, considering the low number of companies with that director. The regression with panel data, and Tobin\'s Q as the dependent variable had consistent results in the proportion of outside directors, with firm size and time of a company listed on the stock exchange. As for the regression with panel data, with ROA as the dependent variable, the results were significant for the number of directors of the company, company size and finally to the legal existence of the company directors.

The multitude of public-private partnership (PPP) designs and interpretations reflects the lack of an authoritative definition of PPP. What each definition of PPP has in common is an emphasis on collaboration and shared decision-making towards a common goal. To explore what partnership means to PPPs that are focused on health system strengthening, the researcher conducted a literature review and two case studies: one on Labs for Life, and another on a partnership between the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Sysmex, and the Namibian Ministry of Health. The emphasis on collaboration led the researcher to use collaborative governance as a conceptual framework, drawing from a paper by Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2007). The two PPPs varied greatly in how external factors (e.g. power and prehistory) impacted the partnership, and to what extent the PPPs embraced the collaborative process. The PPPs were similar in many ways, too – both acknowledged the importance of building trust through cultural understanding and expectation management. Third parties were key in both partnerships, enabling the collaborative process. The results of this study underscore the heavy burden that the word, partnership, carries; if public-private partnership implies the purposeful application of collaborative governance, then this study supports an alternative term: public-private interaction (PPI). This new term removes the assumption that all partners are fully equal and that decision-making processes are collaborative and consensus-oriented. Indeed, PPPs (or PPIs) come in all shapes and sizes and degrees to which they are true to collaborative governance. These findings contribute to an evidence base of lessons-learned that will enable PPPs/PPIs to focus on health system priorities while honestly assessing the relevance and application of collaborative governance.

This thesis explores the interplay between global finance and remote firms and institutions. It highlights the interactions between global institutional investors and Japanese firms on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) standards, and the process of change in Japanese corporate governance practices. It focuses on analysing the responses of large Japanese firms with a high level of foreign ownership to global finance and global institutional investors' strategies for engagement. Japan provides an excellent research environment for the topic. It is geographically and culturally remote from the West, and has the world's third largest economy with increasing foreign ownership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Under the influence of global finance, the Japanese economy has been in transition despite the persistence of its traditional institutions. There are many globally recognised Japanese firms, although certain firms have come under scrutiny in several recent corporate governance scandals. Recently, corporate reform has become one of the priority policy agendas, which has led to incremental convergence to global standards. The aims of this thesis are as follows: (i) to analyse the evolution of shareholder activism and corporate governance practices in ownership structure change (Chapter 3); (ii) to examine how global institutional investors privately engage with remote firms (Chapter 4); (iii) to explore the power of global investors in an industry with lower foreign ownership (Chapter 5); (iv) to analyse the perceptions of local firms towards global ESG standards under policy change (Chapter 6). The thesis revealed the following findings. First, global investors provide one of the only opportunities for ESG-related dialogues for local firms, in a country where local institutional investors are not active shareholders. Global finance has the power to transform local corporate governance practices by breaking down path dependence and institutional complementarities, although the status quo does persist. Second, local firms' norms and perceptions based on the existing institutions are culturally derived informal constraints, which slow down the change of corporate governance practices even after instrumental change. Third, the target firms of engagement activities are home-biased and limited to a small number of large global brand firms; hence, non-target firms and industries maintain their ESG standards unless policy reform occurs. Finally, local firms' unfamiliarity with engagement activities limits the power of global finance in a remote market. There is a gap between global institutional investors' motivation for engagement and Japanese firms' readiness to respond; hence, considered strategies and modes of communication are critical for effective engagement with remote firms, especially when language and organisational issues are present.

This thesis explores the extent to which the law in the UK, Delaware and Germany imposes an obligation on directors of solvent public companies to take into account the long-term consequences of their decisions while establishing the content and scope of long-termism in these three legal systems. It adopts a comparative methodology with the aim of determining whether the approaches taken in the chosen jurisdictions regarding both the parameters of long-termism and its legal sources and forms are radically different or very similar. It is also scrutinised here if it can be stated with any certainty that the approach taken in any particular jurisdiction regarding long-termism is ‘better’ for the protection of a company’s interests. This thesis makes four original contributions. Firstly, it conducts a comprehensive, comparative study on the relevance of long-term considerations. The concept of long-termism is analysed in the contexts of current legislation, case law, soft law, academic literature, and incentives that encourage long-termism decision-making. Secondly, hard law in the UK, Delaware and Germany does not currently offer much guidance regarding the content and scope of long-termism. A key original contribution made by this research draws on the academic literature and performs a gap-filling exercise by identifying examples of long-term decision-making in these jurisdictions, as well as examples of decision-making and conduct that is not long-term in nature. In the gap-filling exercise, case studies are presented in the context of (i) the contemporary shareholder v. stakeholder debate in corporate governance scholarship and (ii) the relevance of the share ownership structure of the company. These two important debates are used as variables to cast light on the ambit of the notion of long-termism, and the structural differences and similarities between the corporate governance systems and concepts of long-termism in the UK, Delaware and Germany. Thirdly, this thesis identifies specific and concrete factual examples of the incentives that the legal systems in the UK, Delaware and Germany do or could provide to encourage long-term managerial decision-making. Finally, it will make a positive contribution to the ongoing ‘convergence v. divergence’ debate, as the thesis has the scope to offer insights into whether the law on the duties of directors is converging in different legal systems particularly in the specific context of what is meant by long-term decision-making by such directors.