This thesis examines the joint impact of earnings management incentives (i.e., income smoothing, solvency management and tax management) and reinsurance, together with other institutional factors, on the magnitude and direction of claim (loss) reserves errors in the UK’s property-liability insurance industry. Two reserve error definitions, found in literature, are employed to conduct the analysis. Furthermore, a panel data generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimator is employed to incorporate the dynamic nature of current and past loss reserving errors. Using the GMM estimator in a panel of 151 firms over a period from 1991 and 2005, the study finds support for the conclusions of some prior studies but also inconsistencies with other previous research. The present study finds that the inferences drawn from empirical analyses can be influenced by the definition of loss reserving errors and to some extent how other incentive variables are defined. The results of this study suggest that discretionary loss reserving behaviour tends to persist from one year to another. Therefore, ignoring the dynamic nature of loss reserving errors could lead to biased and unreliable conclusions. The empirical results of this study also find that property-liability insurance managers manipulate claims reserves in order to smooth company’s earnings across accounting periods. Furthermore, empirical evidence is found which indicates that high levels of reinsurance ceded help to reduce the incidence of error in loss reserves. Contrary to expectations, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that highly solvent insurers under-estimate their claims liabilities. However, no empirical support is found to indicate that insurers over-reserve in order to reduce and/or postpone period tax liabilities. The study also produced mixed results regarding the relation between the type of reinsurance cover used and claim reserve errors. Nevertheless, the empirical results show that firm-specific effects, such as company size and product mix, can have effect on the accuracy of insurers’ reserves. Finally, as this study gives an important insight on discretionary loss reserve manipulation, its conclusions could be of interest and relevance to the business decisions of investors, policyholders, regulators, and other interested parties (e.g., credit rating agencies and accounting standard settlers).

This paper studied earnings management through Bad Debt Expense. The goal of this thesis was to see if managers manipulate Bad Debt Expense in order to smooth their bottom line. In order to test this, I created several different variables relating to Bad Debt Expense and some control variables for Net Income. I found that my results are consistent with earnings management. The results are not clearly stated and therefore I cannot say that earnings management is definitely happening, but it is a possibility.

Recent financial crises and accounting scandals resulting from perceived audit failures have given rise to increase criticism in the manner which accountants and auditors respect their professional code of ethics. As a consequence, the SEC rules in 2000 limits the services auditors are allowed to provide to their clients and also set limits on fees for internal audit services. In addition to this, they called upon all firms to disclose all fees paid to auditors for both audit and non-audit services. This thesis investigates whether the provision of Non-Audit Services is associated with auditor’s independence evidence from the earnings management perspective proxy by discretionary accruals. I began this study by examining the relevant textbooks and related articles of accounting and auditing. Furthermore, the hypotheses and research model are proposed based upon related accounting and auditing theories. The data for this thesis were manually collected from the NASDAQ OMX website from the annual financial reports of 107 Swedish public listed firms in the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The selection of these companies was based on their capitalization i.e., Large, Medium and Small size firms. In this study, quantitative research method has been used to explore the relationship between provision of NAS and auditor’s independence with the help of statistical soft wares (SPSS and Excel) for data analysis. My research outcome provides evidence that the amount of non-audit services rendered by a firm’s external auditors is not associated with earnings management; therefore, the auditor’s independence is not compromised for providing NAS to their clients. This no association is an indication that, the auditor’s independence is strengthened during the provision of non-audit services a result consistent with that of prior researches (e.g., DeFond et al. (2002); Crabtree et al. (2004); Chung & Kallapur (2003)). I also found out that, the provision of audit services is not associated with earnings management, an indication of no management discretionary accruals. Therefore, the auditor’s independence is not compromised when providing a joint audit and non-audit services. These results provide an insight concerning the perceptions of auditor independence and also afford empirical evidence regarding the role that non-audit and audit services fees plays in establishing confidence among the users of firms’ annual financial report.

This thesis first examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals and absolute performance-matched abnormal accruals in global firms. Second, I document that institutional block-holdings curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals across the world. Third, I document that analyst following is related to more reduction in earnings management in common law countries than in code-law countries. Fourth, I find that institutional block-holders are more effective monitors in common law countries than in code law countries. This thesis also examines the relation between investor attention and stock mispricing of abnormal accruals in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Consistent with the model’s hypothesis that investor attention reduces stock mispricing, I document three key findings. First, I find a significant and negative correlation between stock mispricing and analyst following in global firms. Second, stock mispricing is negatively correlated with institutional ownership in U.S. firms. Stock mispricing is not significantly correlated with institutional block-holdings in global firms. Third, stock mispricing per dollar of abnormal accrual is decreasing in analyst following for sufficiently large abnormal accruals in U.S. and global firms.

This thesis first examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals and absolute performance-matched abnormal accruals in global firms. Second, I document that institutional block-holdings curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals across the world. Third, I document that analyst following is related to more reduction in earnings management in common law countries than in code-law countries. Fourth, I find that institutional block-holders are more effective monitors in common law countries than in code law countries. This thesis also examines the relation between investor attention and stock mispricing of abnormal accruals in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Consistent with the model’s hypothesis that investor attention reduces stock mispricing, I document three key findings. First, I find a significant and negative correlation between stock mispricing and analyst following in global firms. Second, stock mispricing is negatively correlated with institutional ownership in U.S. firms. Stock mispricing is not significantly correlated with institutional block-holdings in global firms. Third, stock mispricing per dollar of abnormal accrual is decreasing in analyst following for sufficiently large abnormal accruals in U.S. and global firms.

The main purpose of this study is to find out the relationship between the characteristics of board composition and earnings management. It is a case study of steel industry and telecommunications industry ,which have state-owned enterprises after privatization. From the perspective of earnings management, the Modified Jones Model is used for the detection of earnings management ,and the period of the study samples is from 2005 to 2007. There are six independent variables .They are the proportion of shareholding directors and supervisors, the pledged share ratio of directors and supervisors , the proportion of shareholding foreign investors, the proportion of shareholding government, the number of independent directors and the if the board has set the labor director or not. SPSS statistical software is used to do empirical analysis. The empirical results of this study shows that there is significant positively correlated between the proportion of shareholding directors and supervisors and earnings management ; there is significant negatively correlated between the proportion of shareholding foreign investors and earnings management ; there is significant negatively correlated between the proportion of shareholding government and earnings management. Above all , part of the variables of characteristics of board composition in this study are not significantly affected earnings management , resulting in some of the hypotheses do not hold .Thus, this study suggests that the concept of corporate governance in Taiwan is not already universal yet in the study samples, and Taiwan's independent directors just set up in the beginning stages of implementation. Besides, the labor director only interest in the labor rights issues, not in earnings management issues , and also they do not have the ability to judge them.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Texas, Dec., 2009. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2009. / Title from title screen (site viewed September 08, 2009). PDF text: 109 p. : col. ill. ; 886 K. UMI publication number: AAT 3352412. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

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The goal of this diploma thesis "Aggressive earnings management in publicly traded companies and its impact on share prices" is to connect an interesting topic of earnings management, which is part of a wider group -- financial fraud, with specific impact on the capital market. This thesis includes identification and quantification of the impact on a well known case of corporate fraud -- Enron. First part of the thesis describes and discusses the topic earnings management including its definition, motivation, tests, connected risk and legislation. Second part discusses share valuation techniques -- relative and absolute methods, which will be used in the last part. Last part of the thesis, using the well known case of earnings management -- Enron, quantifies the extent of earnings management, its impact on share prices and total damages caused to investors.