Real earnings management has been a subject of increasing debate ever since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the united states. As research has pointed towards real earnings management increasing this has sparked discussions on whether real earnings management is damaging to companies, or if it is benefiting them, or if it lies somewhere in between. Forthis paper we wanted to examine how the financial incentives of a CEO would affect the usage of real earnings management. Are CEO’s being poorly motivated, and as a result harming their companies? To guide the paper,we decide to formulate our research question thusly: How do different forms of CEO compensation affect real earnings management? In this paper we attempt to find correlations between indicators of realearnings management and threedifferent forms of CEO compensation. For our indicators we follow to a paper by Roychowdhury, titled “Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation”and calculate abnormal cash flow from operations, and abnormal production. These indicate usageof overproduction, reduction of discretionary expenses, and moving sales across periods (Roychowdhury, 2006). For forms of CEO compensation,we measure them as a ratio of total compensation. We track salary, bonuses, and stock ownership. In our results we can see that all three of these are significantly correlated to both of our real earnings management indicators. Bonuses have a positive correlation to abnormal production, and a negative correlation to abnormal cash flow from operations. Salary is positively correlated to both our indicators, and ownership is negatively correlated to both our indicators. Our final conclusion is that yes, the makeup of a CEO’s compensation has a significant effect on the usage of real earnings management within the company.

This research investigated whether earnings management of listed companies, have increased or decreased since the implementation of King II in 2003. This study assessed the extent of earnings management for certain sectors and for large and mid cap companies. The discretionary component of total accruals was used as proxy for earnings management – calculated by using the Modified Jones Model. The top-100 JSE-listed firms by market capitalisation were assessed, excluding the Financial, Mining and Resource Sectors. It was found that discretionary accruals has increased since 1996 and peaked in 2005 (see graph Figure 13). It was concluded with 89% certainty that discretionary accruals during “2003-2009” were higher than during “1996-2002”. Hence, the research suggests that accrual based earnings management is likely to have increased since 2003. However, the results were not statistically significant. Also, the cause of this increase could be due to many factors (not necessarily due to King II). Discretionary accruals were found to be higher for mid cap companies and for the retail sector. However, the analysis was not statistically significant. Discretionary accruals have fluctuated significantly over time and amongst companies. In order to identify which companies and sectors manage earnings the most, a more detailed micro-level investigation, using multiple detection models, is required. Copyright / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Book entries are vehicles used in accounting to accommodate non-cash transactions, timing differences and provisions. The use of book entries is a normal activity in accounting and may have their origin in accrual accounting. The management of a company may apply creative accounting techniques in the form of earnings management, in particular, adopting the practices of income smoothing and taking the so-called ‘big bath’. These practices may result in the financial manager or accountant misusing book entries. This could then lead to information of a different integrity to that which would have resulted had these creative accounting practices not been performed in the company. The question addressed in this dissertation and for which an answer is sought, is whether there is any notable difference in the integrity issues of information supplied through the accounting process and created by real transactions (real events) as opposed to information created by book entries (artificial events). The hypothesis underlying this dissertation is: The integrity of information created by book entries is based on subjective opinions because it is based on future events therefore it is not the same as integrity of information created by real transactions that is based on historical events. The new science is concerned with new guidelines, amongst other things, regarding reality, observation, objectivity, predictions and relationships among events. These new guidelines could be seen as explaining certain aspects which is relevant to the field of accounting. The attributes of a book entry are not based on reality, but are based on subjective predictions of future transactions etc. Another similarity is that a book entry is often not objective but is based on subjective observation. Notable differences were observed in the integrity of the information emerging from a real, historical event and a future event. These differences were established through the application of two research methods, namely, the use of a questionnaire and the analysis of the financial statements of 30 companies listed on The JSE Securities Exchange South Africa (JSE). The influence of book entries on certain ratios was considered, and the ratios influenced by two major book entries, namely, depreciation provision and deferred taxation, differ substantially in interpretation when the two book entries are reclassified. The results of the questionnaire also indicate that a large proportion of the financial managers in practice believe that book entries substantially influence the integrity of information. / Dissertation (MCom Financial Management Sciences)--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Financial Management / unrestricted

My dissertation consists of two essays on CFOs' promotion-based tournament incentives and performance-based equity incentives. The first essay examines the joint implications of CFOs' tournament incentives and equity incentives for firms' risk-taking. With the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO as the proxy for the CFO's tournament incentives, I find that the relationship between a firm's risk taking and the CFO's tournament incentives is non-monotonic. In particular, I show that below a certain level, increase in pay gap is associated with increase in firm risk taking (e.g., higher leverage, lower cash holding balance and higher R&D intensity). However, after reaching a certain level, the CEO-CFO pay gap negatively impacts risk-taking, as increase in pay gap is associated with lower leverage, higher cash holding balance and lower R&D intensity. With the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity as the proxy for the CFO's equity incentives, I find that the CFO's equity incentives negatively impact firm's R&D intensity, but have no significant impact on broader financial decisions such as capital structure and cash policy. Collectively, my findings indicate that CFO incentives play an important role in firm's risk-taking behaviors, and the effect of the CFO's tournament incentives is more pronounced. The second essay studies the impact of tournament incentives and equity incentives for CFOs on firms' earnings management, including accrual-based earnings management (e.g., total accruals, abnormal accruals) and real activities manipulation (e.g., abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal production costs). Measuring the CFO's tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO, I show that the CFO's tournament incentives positively influence total accruals and abnormal accruals. Meanwhile, the CFO's equity incentives, measured as the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity, are found positively related to real activities manipulation proxies and total accruals. My findings show a consistent pattern before and after the passage of SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), but the incentives' effects on earnings management have become less significant in the post-SOX period. Overall, the CFOs' tournament and equity incentives both play an important role in earnings management, but their relative importance lies in different earnings management techniques.

No description available.

The purpose of this research is to examine whether managers of troubled firms engage in income-increasing earnings management for capital market purposes to maintain a listing on the NASDAQ National Market. Troubled firms are defined as those firms whose share price has fallen below the specified dollar-per-share minimum mandated by the market. The two hypotheses attempt to answer two separate, but interrelated questions: First, do managers of troubled firms engage in earnings management more in periods of distress than in periods of non-distress? And second, do managers of troubled firms engage in earnings management more than similar firms not in jeopardy of delisting? Both a time-series and cross-sectional approach is used to answer these questions. The initial grouping consisted of all NASDAQ National Market firms with a share price of $1 or below at some point during the period from March 1997 through September 2002. The final sample consisted of 215 firms for the time-series analysis and 495 firms for the cross-sectional analysis. Two accrual expectation models were used, including the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). The results were unable to confirm that managers engage in this behavior, and similar to the results of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994), the findings suggest that managers' accounting choices primarily reflect their firms' financial difficulties, rather than attempts to inflate income through discretionary accruals. After controlling for reverse stock splits, dividend reductions, going-concern issues/bankruptcy, and changes in management, the models found significantly negative abnormal accruals. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of possible interpretations for the findings. / Ph. D.

This study examines an aspect of earnings management that I refer to as audit management. I define audit management as a client's strategic use of techniques (e.g., baiting tactics) to prevent auditors from discovering earnings management during the audit. Specifically, I examine whether two baiting tactics, diversionary statements and distracting errors, affect an auditor's ability to uncover an accounting error used to manage earnings. Auditors performed analytical review on financial statements that contained an earnings management error (i.e., an intentional error that results in the client meeting an earnings target). I manipulated whether management provided a diversionary statement that explicitly identified risk in other areas of the audit, and whether management seeded easier, distracting errors into those other areas, both of which were designed to lure the auditor away from the earnings management error. I found that when auditors were intentionally directed to error free accounts they were unlikely to uncover an earnings management error elsewhere in the financial statements. On the other hand, auditors were most accurate in identifying earnings management when they were directed to audit areas that contained distracting errors. These results suggest that managers can use certain baiting tactics to strategically manage the outcome of the audit, but that, in some circumstances, baiting tactics may actually make auditors more likely to uncover managed earnings.

An increase in the prevalence of earnings restatements and cases of financial statement fraud in the early 21st century led to a significant loss of market capitalization and investor confidence in the attestation process. In an effort to restore such confidence, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July of 2002. The Act significantly increased the penalties for engaging in accrual activities aimed at either misleading users of the financial statements concerning the underlying economic condition of the firm or influencing contractual outcomes. Recent literature separates earnings management into accrual and real activities. Accrual activities include the management of accounts that have not yet been realized in cash, such as receivables and payables. Real activities include the management of actions that deviate from normal business practices, such as price discounts aimed at temporarily increasing sales, excessive inventory production aimed at lowering the cost of goods sold, and aggressively reducing discretionary expenditures such as R&D to improve profit margins. As a result of the increased penalties for engaging in accrual activities, one would expect a relative shift from accrual activities to real activities to facilitate earnings management in the post-SOX period. As with most academic social disciplines, the test employed in my dissertation is a joint test of the sensitivity of the tools available to detect management activities, the research design, and the presence and strength of the effect for which I am searching. This dissertation is the first to test for changes in both accrual quality and real activity-based earnings management in the post-SOX period. In order to test for a change in accrual quality in the post-SOX period, I utilize a model developed by Dechow and Dichev in 2002. The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model of accrual quality is an appropriate measure of accrual information risk, and may therefore be superior to the use of discretionary accrual models to test for an economic effect (Francis et al. 2004). I also utilize three empirical measures of real activity-based earnings management developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to document a change in real earnings management in the post-SOX period. The findings of the study empirically support a change in earnings management techniques in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. Specifically, the quality of accruals incorporated into the accounting earnings figure have significantly increased in the post-SOX period. However, instances of earnings management using real activities have also significantly increased in the post-Sox period. These findings inform academics about the power of the tools used in academic accounting research and the overall quality of the argument. They inform users of financial statements about where to direct their attention in reading and evaluating the financials. Finally, they inform regulators, practitioners and policy makers of the effectiveness of the law at improving the quality of accruals, and bring to their attention a potential substitution in the techniques used to manage earnings.

This study investigates the earnings management practices of firms around product recalls. In recent years, the management of earnings around firm-specific events has received considerable attention in the finance and accounting literature. New equity issues, mergers and acquisitions, share repurchases, and management buyouts are some events around which at least some firms have been shown to manage their earnings to achieve managements? objectives. Product recalls offer yet another interesting occasion when managers have incentives to cover up the true financial performance of their firms and mislead investors. In order to determine whether firms announcing product recalls manage earnings more aggressively than non-announcing firms, this study employs the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones (1991) model, as adapted by Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998 a and b). In order to address the misspecification concern of the model, especially in the context of a performance-related event like product recall, we suggest a modification in the model. We show that the proposed change in the model not only better controls for event-specific working capital changes around recalls, it also increases the explanatory power of the model. Overall, our results suggest that managers tend to manage earnings upwards in quarters immediately preceding and following the recall announcement quarter. We also find weak evidence of downward earnings management in the quarter of recall. These results are in line with the predictions of theoretical models and the findings of past empirical studies in earnings management. The results of our research have important implications for investors and regulators.

No description available.