Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1994. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 40-43). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph.D. Philosophy)--University of Waikato, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 265-272) Also available via the World Wide Web.

While perhaps the most recognizable hallmark of David Hume's moral philosophy is his commitment to an anti-rationalist theory of ethics, I argue that Hume came to reject this position found the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) in his later Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In the Treatise, Hume endorses the view that reason is wholly inactive and cannot be the source of our sense of morals. According to the Treatise, our human reasoning does not give rise to the feelings of pleasure that we associate with an action being right. Instead, the determination we make that an action is right arises from feelings of approval that are rooted solely in natural sympathy and fellow-feeling, and these feelings never arise from reason. Yet, I argue that in the Second Enquiry, Hume abandons these anti-rationalist commitments and allows rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that ultimately approve our actions. In this paper, I argue for two claims about the role of reason in Hume's moral philosophy. First, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume is committed to a strong form of anti-rationalism where reason has no role in the process in which we approve/disapprove actions that are right or wrong. Second, I argue Hume moves away from these strong anti-rationalist commitments in the Treatise to a version of his moral theory where reason plays a role in making determinations of morality by allowing rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that approve actions. Finally, I argue that Hume makes these changes in the Second Enquiry to rule out an egoistic interpretation of his theory, and by accepting a rationalistic sentimentalism, Hume can defend his moral theory from an egoistic interpretation and prevent his system from collapsing into egoism. / Master of Arts / In the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued for a moral theory where the rightness or wrongness of any action could be determined by our feelings of pleasure or pain that we feel when we have an idea of that action. While contemporary historians of philosophy agree that in the earlier Treatise version of his theory Hume did not allow these feelings associated with moral rightness to arise from reason, I argue that Hume fundamentally changed his theory in the later Second Enquiry to do just that. In particular, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume did not believe that our feelings about rightness or wrongness could arise from rational judgments. Nevertheless, in the Second Enquiry, Hume changed is theory to allow rational judgments about what is useful to give rise to those moral feelings. I then conclude that Hume made these changes to his theory to prevent his moral philosophy from reducing to a theory where only those actions that are in my self-interest could be considered morally right.

Omnipresent in Western society, the idea of progress is commonly advanced in relation to the development of animal protection law in Great Britain. Essentially, it is argued that the law now recognises that animals are worthy of moral consideration in their own right, that is, that they count or matter morally. From the concept of "animal as object" to that of "animal as person", indeed, the history of Western philosophical thinking bears witness to a progressive acknowledgement of animals (or, at least, of some animals) as full members of the moral community, along with all human beings. However, as political theorist Robert Garner argues in his book Animals, Politics and Morality, public policy is never simply a product of moral principles. Rather, influenced by pressure groups, it is the result of a process based on negotiation and compromise. That being the case, in the present thesis, I ask whether Great Britain has truly been the scene of moral progress through the development of animal protection law and to what extent one may speak of moral progress at all in relation to this area of law. Is animal protection law in Great Britain moving away from the traditional moral position that animals are exclusively means to human ends, thereby granting moral standing and equal moral status to animals The answer to this question lies with identifying the philosophical conception of the relations between humans and animals which is expressed through the body of animal protection law in this country. For animals' moral status within the law ensues directly from it. In the first chapter, following the great influence the position plays in the contemporary debate over our moral treatment of animals, I use Tom Regan's theory of animal rights to assess whether animal protection law in Great Britain reflects a conception of human-animal relations that is consistent with a recognition that animals possess moral rights. In the second chapter, I defend the view that animal protection law in Great Britain does not reflect utilitarianism - a position that has been popularised in animal ethics by moral philosopher Peter Singer. In the third chapter, building on the distinctive features of animal protection law in Great Britain which have emerged from the analysis in Chapters I and II, I contend that the law reflects "group egoism" - a form of consequentialism which falls between ethical egoism and utilitarianism. To be sure, what comes forth as the dominant position underlying animal protection law in Great Britain is that human beings protect animals only to the extent to which benefit is provided to them in return, or, at the very least, to the extent that so doing does not impinge on their interests in animal use. Does this position represent any kind of moral progress In the context of changing human attitudes towards animals and the development of animal protection law, I argue that it does. However, this moral progress carries no recognition that animals are worthy of moral consideration in their own right, that is, that they count or matter morally. Far from doing away with the traditional position that animals are exclusively means to human ends, animal protection law in Great Britain fits in with this way of thinking and grants to animals an instrumental value only.

The present thesis is a study of Robert Browning¡¦s male narrators in his dramatic monologues that deal with problematic man-woman relationships. Being a renovator of the poetic genre of dramatic monologue, Browning employs it to present men¡¦s innermost struggle and obscure emotions in love. While the Victorian gender stereotype emphasizes men¡¦s preoccupation with the business world, he demonstrates men¡¦s intense relation with love. In his poems depicting man-woman relationships, men¡¦s struggles are mainly caused by their eagerness to retain their masculinity, namely, the patriarchal order. This thesis is to explore the concept of masculinity in Browning¡¦s poems. It examines Browning¡¦s typical egoistic men and men¡¦s fantasy about women¡¦s passion. Browning¡¦s female narrators are also discussed to underscore the male-dominated viewpoint on man-woman relationships. Meanwhile it explores Browning¡¦s artist characters, including artists as narrators and not as narrators. Close textual analysis will be made of a selection of poems from Dramatic Lyrics (1842), Dramatic Romances and Lyrics (1845), Men and Women (1855), and Dramatis Personæ (1864) to see the poet¡¦s pondering upon men¡¦s twisted emotions.

Voluntary work - why? There are many people who work as volunteers within different organizations and we have chosen to study an organization that aims to help women and girls around the world. The members give their time and dedication in order to give other people a better life. The purpose of the study is to examine the factors that motivate people to join the organization. When we heard about the organization the first time we wondered if the volunteers were there to help others, or to have something to do for themselves. We chose to conduct a survey of the selected organization and have grouped the results according to different factors. One grouping is how long they have been members. Another is if there is a difference between two groups, where one is more comitted to voluntary work in their own neighborhood compared to those who are not. We have used altrusim, egoism and motivation as key concepts för understanding and analyzing our results. We have come to the conclusion that there are differences between different groups of why they are in this organization. One of the main reasons for all groups is that they truly want to help women and girls around the world. The social aspects of being in a group, to be on activities was not as high on the list as we first anticipated.

The primary goal of this study was to assess the development of maltreated school-age children's ability to understand the thoughts, feelings, and points of view of others. Level of egocentrism and social perspective-taking coordination were assessed in a group of 49 maltreated and 49 demographically matched nonmaltreated children. Twenty-six elementary and 23 high school students in each group are individually interviewed and their responses to hypothetical interpersonal situations coded for egocentricity and level of perspective-taking ability. The findings revealed that the maltreated students were more egocentric and delayed in their perspective-taking development at both the elementary and high school level. Maltreated elementary school children with higher levels of egocentrism were more likely than their less egocentric peers to report higher perceived social competence and self-worth. Theoretical implications, within the context of an organic-developmental approach, and implications for future research and clinical interventions are discussed.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (294-301).

No description available.

Forskning inom altruism och egoism är omfattande, båda sidorna hävdar att det finns bevis för deras sak. Syftet med undersökningen var att förstå motivationsfaktorer gällande hjälpande, samt en inblick angående relationer och typen av hjälpande. Deltagarna bestod av 85 studenter, åldrarna 19–50, 65 var kvinnor. Databearbetning var inspirerad av empirisk metodik, varje berättelse meningskoncentrerades. Främlingar var typen av relation som mest blev hjälpt. Vardaglig fysisk hjälp var den vanligaste typen av hjälpande. Egoistiska motiv som låg på 40% visade sig vara mer dominerande än altruistiska motiv som låg på 20%, resterande 40% var neutrala. Andelen av de 40% berodde på att egoistiska motivationsfaktorer förklarades som känsla av skyldighet att hjälpa, känna sig behövd och en känsla av att må bra. Altruistiska motivationsfaktorer förklarades som instinkt och empatiska tankebanor. Studien tyder på att egoistiska och altruistiska motivationsfaktorer existerar, dock krävs mer forskning inom dessa ämnen