Russia has always been a primary factor in the development of the Baltic States. It is impossible to analyse Baltic security without looking into the processes inside Russia and the prevailing trends vis-a-vis the Baltic States. However, the changes in the Baltic security landscape in the 21st century lack a comprehensive analysis. This thesis seeks to bridge the gap. Two key aims are being pursued in this thesis. The first is to present an analysis of Russia's European agenda under President Vladimir Putin and to examine the place of the Baltic States in this agenda. The second aim is to define Russia-related threats and challengers to the Baltic States, as well as prospects in Russo-Baltic relations. To attain these aims, inter-active approach to international relations, comprising three levels of analysis - the international system, the nation state (domestic level) and the individual (personality) level - has been applied. The neo-realist paradigm of international relations theory, comparative analysis and the Knudsen model, which addresses the peculiarities of relations between great powers and small states, are the methodological framework of the thesis. When analysing the development of Russo-Baltic relations in 1990-2006, this thesis focuses on the evolution of the Baltic States from factors to actors and their chance of shaping Russo-Baltic relations from within the enlarged EU and NATO. It also examines possibilities for more active engagement of Russia in the Baltic region. The thesis concludes with an analysis of perspectives for the Baltic States in countering Russia-related threats and building cooperativer elations with Russia. The author maintains that 'high politics' in Russo-Baltic relations has ended, yet, the tensions do remain in 'low politics'. Russia seeks to retain her political and economic influence in the Baltics by exploiting various tools, primarily economic levers and Baltic dependence upon Russian energy.

Text in English / This study examines the successes and limitations of the Competency Passport (CP) for the empowerment of unemployed citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The CP was designed to identify formally, informally and non-formally acquired competencies of people with the help of a counsellor. In the process, the CP uses the asset-based approach which focuses on the strengths of people. The investigation was conducted on the basis of qualitative interviews and a focus group discussion. The results have shown that the CP was able to identify competencies and, thereby, has helped to increase the self-confidence of people. In the area of employment, the impact of the CP showed some limitations as it was not yet sufficiently recognized by the society of BiH. Employers have given little feedback on the CP. The public sector, especially, needs a paradigm shift in the recognition of informally and non-formally acquired competencies by the CP. / Development Studies / M.A. (Development Studies)

La diplomatie énergétique russe qui est au cœur de ce travail diffère des politiques industrielles classiques adoptées régulièrement par les États afin de développer leur pays, relancer son économie ou certains secteurs industriels. Elle entend en effet utiliser les ressources naturelles de la Russie, et singulièrement son potentiel énergétique (sachant que la Russie est à la fois producteur, consommateur, pays de transit) afin de retrouver son statut de grande puissance. Ce retour de puissance devant permettre à la Russie de sortir de la période de transition pour redevenir un acteur de premier rang dans un monde global redessiné par la fin de la guerre froide. Il s’agit pour elle de faire entendre sa voix, de participer en qualité de partenaire égal aux décisions et à l’élaboration des nouvelles normes rendues nécessaires par le bouleversement engendré par la fin de la guerre froide.<p><p>La diplomatie énergétique russe s’affirme pendant les années 2003-2004, comme une démarche pragmatique, un moyen opportuniste de rencontrer un projet politique en utilisant un des rares leviers dont dispose ce pays appauvri et affaibli – sa puissance énergétique qu’il s’agit de transformer un outil de puissance politique, raison pour laquelle la politique étrangère russe va être mise au service de ce projet. Le travail fait donc référence aux spécificités internes de la Russie et au contexte international afin d’identifier les faiblesses et les forces de cette diplomatie spécifique.<p><p><p>Russian energy diplomacy, with which this work is uniquely concerned, differs from the classic industrial policies adopted by states in order to re-launch their economies or certain industrial sectors. It has consisted of putting Russia’s natural resources and particularly its energy potential (as a producer, a consumer, and a transit country) to the practical purpose of restoring its status as a great power. For Russia, the return to power would permit the country to emerge from its period of transition and become a leading actor in the world reshaped by the ending of the cold war. It is a matter of making its voice heard, as an equal partner in international decisions and the formulation of the new political norms necessitated by post-cold war upheaval. <p><p>In 2002-2004 Russia developed this energy diplomacy as a pragmatic and opportunistic means of attaining a political objective with one of the few levers at the disposal of an impoverished and enfeebled country – that is to say, its energy potential, which it turned into a political tool. To this effect, Russian foreign policy has been made to serve the same project. Consequently this work deals with internal specificities and the international energy context, in order to probe both the weakness and the strength of this particular form of diplomacy. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The official reaction of the Russian Federation and of the People's Republic of China to the announcement made by the United States in December 2001 to abrogate the almost thirty years old Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has been remarkably weak, given their sustained and coordinated opposition to the deployment of strategic defences against ballistic missiles (BMD). Because the existing literature, particularly balance of power theory, under-explored this puzzle and fails to provide a satisfactory explanation to it, a neoclassical realist model building on structural and unit-level variables is proposed to supplement this caveat. It is argued that Russia, as a stagnant great power experiencing trouble at the domestic level, bandwagons with the United States because it discounts the medium- and long-term threat posed by BMD. China, a rising developmental state, is soft balancing because it resents the project and the threat it poses to its security. It has not hard balanced so far because there is an acknowledgement that this could jeopardize its power base, as the telling example of the USSR collapse illustrated.

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references.

La thèse de doctorat en science politique s’attache à comprendre le rôle des partis politiques parlementaires d’opposition en Russie entre 2005 et 2010. Elle se fonde sur l’étude des branches régionales du Parti communiste de la Fédération de Russie (KPRF), du Parti libéral-démocrate de Russie (LDPR) et de Russie juste à Tomsk, en Sibérie occidentale. Toute la problématique de ces trois partis d’opposition est liée à ce paradoxe :dans les années 2000, il existe en Russie des partis qui se positionnent comme étant d’opposition - dans un système partisan dominé par Russie unie - tout en se montrant loyaux envers le régime politique et ses principaux dirigeants.<p>Les données, recueillies au cours de huit mois et demi de recherche de terrain en Russie, sont essentiellement qualitatives. Une approche organisationnelle et fonctionnelle de l’étude des partis est utilisée afin de comprendre le rôle de ces trois formations dans le système politique russe. <p>La thèse s’attache à tester trois hypothèses :les partis parlementaires d’opposition remplissent certaines fonctions dans le système politique qui leur assurent le soutien d’électeurs et d’adhérents ;les organisations partisanes du LDPR, du KPRF et de Russie juste sont centralisées de manière à limiter la marge de manœuvre des branches locales et permettre un contrôle étroit de l’appareil central ;ces trois partis transforment au sein des institutions parlementaires le soutien des électeurs en soutien pour le régime.<p>Tout d’abord, il apparaît que le KPRF, le LDPR et Russie juste remplissent d’autres fonctions dans le système politique que celle de légitimation/stabilisation (Lavau, 1969). Ces fonctions sont multiples. Les activités électorales indiquent que ces trois partis servent, d’une part, de plateforme d’accès aux organes du pouvoir pour les entrepreneurs, d’autre part, la fonction d’expression est assurée en ce que les partis expriment des problèmes, proposent une alternative, et disqualifient certaines pratiques. Pendant les élections, et au sein du parlement régional, les partis assurent dans une certaine mesure la fonction d’organisation de l’opposition. Enfin, le KPRF, le LDPR et Russie juste remplissent, de différentes façons, la fonction d’assistance à la société.<p>Ensuite, la thèse a vérifié que les trois partis ont une structure interne centralisée à Moscou, tout en mettant en évidence l’interdépendance qui existe entre le siège fédéral et les branches régionales dans chaque parti. Une marge de manœuvre, différente selon les trois formations, existe donc au niveau des branches locales.<p>Enfin, l’exemple de Tomsk montre qu’une loyauté formelle envers le régime et une opposition réelle sont possibles. Cela implique des ambiguïtés, notamment concernant l’activité des députés de ces partis au sein des parlements locaux./The PhD thesis starts with this paradox: in the 2000s, the Russian party system is dominated by United Russia called the party of power. Nevertheless, this system also allows the existence of parties that claim to be the opposition, while being loyal to the political regime and its leaders. How do these parties resolve this paradox? <p>The doctoral dissertation in political science seeks to understand the role of parliamentary opposition parties in Russia between 2005 and 2010. It is based on the study of regional branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Just Russia (SR) in Tomsk, Western Siberia. The qualitative data were collected during eight and a half months of field research in Russia. An organizational and functional approach to the study of political parties is used to understand their role in the Russian political system.<p>The thesis tests three hypotheses: first, the opposition parliamentary parties perform certain functions in the political system that gives them the support of voters and members. Second, the party organizations of the LDPR, the KPRF and Just Russia are centralized to limit the flexibility of local branches and allow tight control of the central apparatus. Third, we examine if these parties transform the support of voters into support for the regime in the parliamentary institutions at the local level.<p>The results show three elements. First, it shows that the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia perform several functions in the political system. On the one hand, they are platforms for businessmen to access to the organs of power; on the other hand, they express problems, offer an alternative, and disqualify some practices. During elections, and within the regional parliament, parliamentary opposition parties perform to a certain extent the function of organizing opposition. Moreover, the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia support citizens in various ways. <p>Then, the dissertation verifies that the three parties have a centralized internal structure. But it also highlights the interdependence between federal headquarters and regional branches within each party. <p>Finally, the case of Tomsk shows that formal loyalty to the regime, and a real opposition at the same time, is possible as far as the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia are concerned. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Joint Program in Oceanography (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences; and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution), 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. / This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclear weapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former Soviet Union's nuclear fuel reprocessing and weapons testing facilities (i.e. Mayak, Tomsk-7, and Semipalitinsk) are located within the Ob drainage basin. The atom ratios 240Pu/239Pu, 237Np/239Pu, and 137Cs/240Pu, measured by magnetic-sector ICP-MS, are used to distinguish between contamination derived from global fallout and contamination derived from local sources. Deposition chronologies estimated for sediment cores are used to construct a record of weapons related contamination at the sites sampled. Contaminant records indicate that in addition to debris from atmospheric weapons tests, materials derived from local sources have also played a role in nuclear weapons related contamination of the Ob region. Isotopic data presented in this study clearly demonstrate that non-fallout contamination has been transported the full length of the Tobol, Irtysh, and Ob Rivers (i.e. the tributaries draining Mayak, Semipalitinsk, and Tomsk-7, respectively). In several instances, unique isotopic compositions are observed in sediments collected from tributaries draining each of the suspected non-fallout sources. In such cases, these materials and their deposition ages have been used to link contamination in the Ob delta to Mayak, Tomsk-7, or Semipalitinsk. Linear transport rate estimates (km yr-1) indicate that contaminated sediments transit between source tributaries and the Ob delta on time-scales of [less than or equal to] l year. / (cont.) These estimates suggest that a catastrophic release of contamination due to dam failure at one of the many reservoirs located at both Mayak and Tomsk-7 that contain high levels of radioactive waste would result in measurable levels of contamination in the delta within as little as 1 year. Isotopic concentrations in sequentially extracted sediments containing weapons related contamination reveal that the majority of plutonium and neptunium (80 to 90 percent) behaves in a similar fashion regardless of the source and is removed by treating the sediments with citrate-dithionite. This indicates that plutonium and neptunium are not truly refractory and likely associate with redox sensitive sedimentary components. Isotopic ratios measured in extracted fractions suggest that only a minor fraction of contamination is associated with acid leachable or acid digestible sedimentary phases. / by Timothy Cope Kenna. / Ph.D.

No description available.

James Caesar Petrillo, President of the American Federation of Musicians, called a strike effective July 31, 1942, prohibiting union members from making any disc recordings or electrical transcriptions. The present study recounts the history of that strike, including efforts to end it, reactions to it by various government and trade organizations and the circumstances under which it finally did end. The study focuses on the effect of the strike on radio broadcasters, both directly (through recordings they used) and indirectly (through the strike's effects on the recording and related industries), and concludes that it changed the character of radio's music somewhat, but had little detrimental effect on radio's profits.