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Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has visibly increased its work towards developing a nuclear program. This is alarming to many because Iran's ambitions for its nuclear program are unclear and whether it is on a quest for nuclear weapons is unknown. The Iranian government is largely anti-West, anti-Israel, and now, with the downfall of Iraq, is in a position to spread its influence throughout the Middle East. This thesis examines the evolution of the Iranian nuclear program, the relationship between the United States and Iran and how this relationship will likely have a significant influence on the ability of Iran to develop a nuclear program. The goal is to assess the current status of the situation and examine the possible policies the United States could implement towards Iran and its nuclear program. / Master of Arts

This thesis analyses international state behaviour by countries that share a historic legacy, and examines the delicate relations between West Germany, Austria and Israel in the wake of the Second World War as a case study. In it I propose a model - 'diplomacy of memory' - for this currently untheorized form of diplomatic conduct in order to explain how countries use official memories of their past on the international stage. Linking the interdisciplinary concept of collective memory with International Relations, my study characterizes the practice of 'diplomacy with memory' as a distinct policy undertaking that shapes and broadcasts historical narratives internationally for strategic foreign policy objectives. To empirically test the diplomacy of memory model, this thesis investigates the two cases of West German-Israeli and Austrian-Israeli relations in the aftermath of World War II. Within these selected pairs, four core bilateral debates are analysed: first, reparation payments to Israel in 1951/52; second, the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1960/61; third, the Six-Day War in 1967 and fourth, the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis of 1973. While the first two cases explore how the memory of the Nazi past is leveraged as part of later diplomatic strategies, the latter two, which concern West Germany's and Austria's reaction to the Middle East conflict, reveal a more subtle connection between national memories and foreign policy choices around key international conflicts. This study engages in historical inquiry, based on archival documents and other primary sources in all three countries, to demonstrate how a country's collective memory is invented and deployed on the international stage. Combining the theoretical aim of specifying the link between national narratives and diplomacy with the qualitative analysis of two historic cases, this thesis rests at the intersection of International Relations and History.

In this issue, we continue and complete the debate on the future of the transatlantic relationship and of world order after the Iraq war. The debate was initiated by an article by Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) in WeltTrends 39, which has provoked a remarkable reaction within the German academic community, as documented in WeltTrends 40. This issue features additional comments and the rebuttal by Thomas Risse. <br>Most authors believe that the transatlantic partnership is in a serious crisis, but claim that it remains without an alternative for both sides of the Atlantic.

In this issue, we continue and complete the debate on the future of the transatlantic relationship and of world order after the Iraq war. The debate was initiated by an article by Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) in WeltTrends 39, which has provoked a remarkable reaction within the German academic community, as documented in WeltTrends 40. This issue features additional comments and the rebuttal by Thomas Risse. <br>Most authors believe that the transatlantic partnership is in a serious crisis, but claim that it remains without an alternative for both sides of the Atlantic.

Following the end of the Cold War and the political fall-out from the Tiananmen incident, the US and China ended the last century and began the new one with three well publicised fall outs: the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the Spy Plane Incident in 2001. In each of these incidents the two states immediately resorted to confrontation and animosity before shifting towards a peaceful resolution. How did these transformations become possible? How did this relationship plunge towards confrontation over three apparent accidents? What factors were shaping these events and the main actor's behaviour? This thesis provides an alternative framework for analysing these interactions; one that takes into account dynamics other than those emphasised in neo-utilitarian approaches to IR. Emphasising social dynamics, I ask a series of ‘how possible' questions so as to lend insight into the processes of change that have taken place. I examine each case in detail and develop an argument that focuses upon investigating how the situations arose, how meaning was constructed and renegotiated, how identities were produced, and how emotional dynamics were drawn upon. Chapter One introduces the puzzles that this thesis will be addressing before setting out the conceptual focus of the research. Chapter Two provides a theoretical discussion relating to the current literature surrounding US-Chinese relations, before setting out the theoretical assumptions and methodological tools that I employ. Chapters Three, Four and Five represent the empirical ‘heart' of the thesis, with each providing detailed analysis of the interaction in question. To finish, Chapter Six highlights the themes that have emerged over the course of the empirical investigations, before concluding with a discussion relating to the contribution to the literature and possible avenues of future research.

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of the policy shift from strategic stability (the policy that guided U.S. and Soviet nuclear doctrine and acquisition strategies throughout the Cold War) to a new strategy privileging ballistic missile defence (BMD). Prior to this shift BMD programs were considered by both sides to be financially untenable, technologically unreliable, and dangerously destabilising and potentially catastrophic, primarily because they risked undermining the stability of a second strike capability and other stabilizing features of mutually assured destruction (MAD). I argue that this new environment is making missile defence a viable alternative to massive nuclear arsenals. In this new security environment Canada remains an anomaly. Canadian officials support NATO BMD programs but reject any bilateral and/or bi-national negotiations with Washington on continental BMD for North America. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that Canada, through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement on early warning radars, is in fact part of missile defence.

The New Zealand Labour Party's election victory on 14 July 1984 resulted in an official rejection of the global strategy of nuclear deterrence. This action was the most fundamental challenge to the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty on 1 September 1951. This thesis is concerned with the effect of Prime Minister David Lange's personality on the resulting dispute between the two nations. This qualitative study utilises a theoretical framework articulated by Margaret G. Hermann which seeks to demonstrate the relationship between the idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders and the foreign policy behaviour of their respective nations. In order to effectively conduct this study, a number of key individuals involved in various aspects of the ANZUS dispute were interviewed by this author. It should be noted that David Lange was seriously ill throughout the course of this study and was unable to be interviewed by the author. Sir Geoffrey Palmer declined to be interviewed for this study. Following the introductory chapter of this study, a review of the literature concerned with the analysis of leadership and personality is undertaken. The powers of the Prime Minister in the New Zealand political system are examined as are the events surrounding the execution of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS dispute. This thesis then assesses the effect of Lange's personality on the dispute through an examination of situational factors, and a variety of aspects of his personality. This thesis finds that Lange's personality was instrumental in determining the course of events in the ANZUS crisis. Furthermore, this study concludes that Hermann's theoretical framework is a useful tool in determining the effect of a leader's personality on a particular foreign policy outcome.

In 1942 Curtin officially turned Australia to the United States for support and regarded the United States as Australia’s ally in World War II. Curtin’s call to the US set a precedent for Australia’s foreign and defence policy to rely on American support. This thesis analyses the Australian effort to become an ally to the Americans in the early 1950s and to increase American interest in the defence of Southeast Asia. ANZUS and SEATO culminated the Australian effort in bringing the Americans to the defence of Southeast Asia and Australia. Australia believed that it had ‘a special relationship’ with the United States through the formation of these treaties and regarded these treaties, especially ANZUS, as the cornerstone of Australia’s defence. The United States, however, did not give any special significance to these treaties and continued to treat Australia as it treated other friendly countries. The main focus of this thesis is on how the American-Australian alliance forged through ANZUS and SEATO influenced Australian foreign policy regarding Southeast Asia, especially in relation to issues such as the West New Guinea sovereignty problem, the defence of Malaya, Konfrontasi and Vietnam. The central argument is to examine how the American connection affected Australian foreign policy in Southeast Asia. As both countries saw the importance of this area to their strategic and defence interest and were heavily involved in the defence of Southeast Asia after World War II, this thesis will analyse on how the Australians reacted to and interacted with the Americans. This thesis reveals that Australia’s suggestions, plans, views and opinions regarding events in Southeast Asia were constantly rejected by the Americans. This rejection however, did not deter the Australian government from continuously pursuing a policy that would impress the United States. Australia tried hard to be a ‘good buddy’ to the Americans and became ever more subservient and submissive to American wishes. Although there were cases where Australia tried to pursue a policy that differed from the Americans, as in West New Guinea prior to 1959 and in the defence of Malaya, these Australian efforts could not sustain pressure from other actors and were doomed to failure without the support of the Americans. The failure to pursue independent policies was influenced by the increasingly dependent attitude of the Australian government towards the Americans and the fear that Australia would be left alone to defend itself. As Britain, Australia’s traditional ally’s influence in Southeast Asia was in decline,Australia perceived that it did not have other choices but to cling ever more tightly and submissively to the Americans for its own survival.