In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and military power, there has been increasing interest in the U.S. in developing a strategic relationship with India in response. Most have seen this as a relatively recent framework for building U.S.-India relations after five decades of viewing the bilateral relationship either through a U.S.-India-Pakistan lens, or through a Cold War lens with India seen as a leader of the non-aligned movement and subsequently a de facto ally and security partner of the Soviet Union. A much-debated question among academics and policymakers has been whether India and the U.S. will ally or partner against China in the future. One set of answers asserts that a China threat-driven U.S.-India partnership is inevitable; a second contends that a China-driven U.S.-India alignment or partnership is highly unlikely, if not impossible. This dissertation shows that China has played an important role in shaping U.S.-India relations since the People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949. It explores past US-Indian interactions vis-à-vis China between 1949-1979 and makes evident that a US-India partnership against China is neither inevitable nor impossible. India has partnered, one could argue even allied, with countries against China--with the US in 1962 and the USSR in 1971. On the other hand, at other times, even when Indian and US policymakers have considered China to be threat number one, the countries' partnership has not been sustainable. The two countries have come together against China, but only when certain conditions are in place. This dissertation shows that they have partnered against China when they have agreed on (a) the nature of the threat, (b) the urgency of the threat, and (c) how to deal with the threat. In laying out this argument, this dissertation offers insights related to the future of the China-India-U.S. strategic triangle. More broadly, it also emphasizes that in considering when countries ally or partner, it is insufficient just to focus on threat itself or even perceptions of threat; it is also necessary to consider means: how states best think a threat can be met. / text

This thesis asks a simple question: what is the state of Canada’s sanctions practice since 1990? In a post-Cold War environment, sanctions have become one of the most commonly applied tools of statecraft. Sanctions are commonly applied to address all manner of crises be they interstate aggression, intrastate humanitarian crises, civil wars, illegal seizures of power, arms proliferation, and international terrorism. There has been no sustained analysis of Canada’s use of sanctions since Kim Richard Nossal’s book Rain Dancing, which only investigated Canada’s application of sanctions in comparison to Australia’s until 1990. Therefore, there is a significant gap in the general sanctions literature and, more worrisome, Canada’s foreign policy literature. This thesis conducts an investigation into Canada’s use of sanctions since 1990 to establish when, why and with whom Canada has applied economic sanctions. / October 2015

This thesis examines the nature and the extent of American economic power and influence in the 1960s in the context of the Anglo-American economic relationship. It also seeks to provide an insight into the workings of 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States in the economic realm. Finally, this examination attempts to establish the veracity of new more positive historical interpretations of the foreign policy of President Lyndon Johnson. The study argues that American economic power was not waning, as was previously suggested by some historians. It reveals that the Johnson Administration was able to use its financial assistance for sterling to extract significant concessions from the British government in its domestic economic policies. Indeed, the thesis demonstrates that the United States played a significant role in the formulation of British economic policy. The existence of transgovernmental networks between actors and agencies were instrumental in enabling the Johnson Administration to influence the policies of the British government. Moreover, this study contends that many of the most important decisions of the Labour government relating to monetary policy and the sterling exchange rate were influenced by considerations for the views of the United States. It concludes that the 'special relationship' was determined not by sentiment or shared culture, but largely by community of interest. Finally, the thesis concurs in and further develops the emerging positive revisionist interpretation of the European policy of President Johnson.

This thesis is a study of the pattern of politics and its effects on foreign policy advocacies in contemporary Burma. The focal point of the analysis is an examinatian of the various Burmese societal interests and their respective foreign policy demands.1 The methodology employed defines Burma's societal interest groupings in terms of ideology, interests, and objectives, While providing a functional mode! for the understanding of Burmese political processes. Foreign policy demands are to be classified as to bilateral relations with neighbours, to the Southern Asian international system, and to the global state system. The purpose of this study is to discover the socio-political mainsprings of the foreign policy demands articulated by both incumbent and competing societal interests. [...]

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain and their ability to work together in the Far East despite widely divergent policies towards the People's Republic of China. The American policy of non-recognition of the PRC and its active support of the Republic of China, in opposition to Britain's early recognition of the PRC, did not hamper British and American efforts to work together to wage or contain the Cold War. In reference to the crises in the area of the Chinese offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy, I would argue that the US and Britain put their differences aside during tense periods because they agreed generally on over-all policy, to disengage the PRC from the influence of the Soviet Union, but used different means to attain this goal. Both Britain and the US, to different degrees, attempted to establish 'two China's' in order to stabilize the situation in the Far East which left unchecked might trigger a third world war. The skirmishes in the offshore islands in 1954-55 and 1958 highlighted the danger of this situation and affected the related issues of the China seat in the United Nations, the embargo placed on trade with the People's Republic at the time of the Korean war, Hong Kong and the diplomatic relationships in the region. This thesis examines the impact of these issues on Far East policy, particularly, how agreements reached on the United Nations and trade issues affect British policy during the 1958 offshore islands crisis. The change in British policy from 1954 to 1958 is striking, reflecting external issues such as Suez and Harold Macmillan's rise to the office of prime minister. American policy, although less inflexible than is traditionally assumed, shifts slightly over the same period and attempts to normalize the situation by placing tighter controls on its ally, Chiang Kai-shek. As will be seen, British cooperation on Far Eastern issues was an important prerequisite for American manoeuvres in the region.

No description available.

"Stand Up and be Counted" explores how American racial and religious beliefs guided the American encounter with Arab nationalism in the 1950s. It utilizes both traditional archival sources and less traditional cultural texts. Cultural texts, such as, movies, novels, travelogues, periodical articles, and folk sayings, are used to elucidate how Americans viewed and understood Arab peoples, and also religion. Archival records from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, National Archives, and John Foster Dulles Papers at Princeton University are used to elucidate how these beliefs shaped the Eisenhower administration‘s policy in the Middle East. The first chapter provided a brief introductory history of the Arab nationalist movement, reviews the literature, and introduces the dissertation's argument. The second chapter demonstrates that American culture established a canon of racialized beliefs about Arabs. These beliefs forged a national identity by constructing an Arab, to use Edward Said‘s famed term, "other." Americans to project what they believed they were not onto Arabs in an effort to establish what they were. The third chapter demonstrates that historical events caused subtle, yet important, shifts in how Americans perceived Arab peoples over the years. By focusing on the 1920s, 1940s, and 1950s "Stand Up and Be Counted" elucidates that historical events compelled specific racialized associations to assume greater prominence during these periods. The fourth chapter demonstrates that these racially filtered perceptions guided the Eisenhower administration's decision to oppose Arab nationalism. Arab nationalist leaders, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, advocated adopting a neutralist stance in the cold war. Administration officials, however, reasoned that Arabs' innate gullibility and irrationality would ultimately allow Soviet leaders to outwit and subjugate them—perhaps without them knowing it had even occurred. These racialized assumptions, the sixth chapter reveals, compelled the administration to labor to contain Arab nationalism, even after the combined British-French invasion of the Suez Canal. The seventh chapter establishes that many considered the United States to be a covenanted nation, a nation chosen by God to lead and save humanity. Beginning in the 1930s, however, many Americans came to fear that material secularism at home and abroad were threatening this mission. The monumental nature of these dual secularist threats prompted many to advocate for the formation of a united front of the religious. Among those who subscribed to this understanding were President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The eighth chapter established that this conceptualization of religion guided the administration's decision to promote King Saud of Saudi Arabia as a regional counter weight to Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement. The ninth chapter reveals that this strategy was fraught with peril.

Many scholars observed that the "China threat" narrative greatly influenced the contours of Chinese foreign policy beginning in the mid-1990s. While scholars initially devoted significant attention to this change, there is little systematic analysis of the actual policy shift, particularly over the past decade. This thesis explores current manifestations of China's "Goodwill Agenda," examining three strains of Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century: culture, institutions and aid. The paper also evaluates the success of this so-called campaign, using global surveys to determine if the new orientation correlates with changed global opinions about China. Despite extensive efforts, my findings indicate that the Goodwill Agenda has not been successful at improving China's reputation abroad.

For a variety of reasons since 1979, the United States of America has severed all political ties and retreated to a policy of enacting economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Such reasons include security concerns and human rights abuses. Historical research and surveys of economic data suggest that the sanctions have had limited effectiveness on the Iranian economy. Furthermore, the increasing tension between the United States and Iran caused by sanctions would also suggest that the latter is unlikely to curb its foreign policy to suit the interests of the U.S. My research indicates that despite the current malady of issues that define the American-Iranian relationship today, a once prosperous and peaceful partnership existed between the two countries only a short time ago. In conclusion, it will be shown that both countries would be financially and militarily better off if sanctions were eased and their peaceful partnership might be restored.

There has been a dangerous gap between American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese foreign policy, a gap contributing to acceptance of the Thucydides Trap. With the help of a theoretical framework and empirical evidence, this paper aims to summarize and understand the differences, in an effort to help overcome them and prevent a self-fulfilling prophecy. The author identifies five variables that shape perceptions and then categorizes Chinese foreign policy along several dimensions. Using the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative as case studies, the author finds that US and Chinese interpretations of Chinese behavior along these dimensions are influenced by different variables. While the Chinese views are more affected by history, American perceptions are driven by considerations of power. The two countries understand both identity and norms differently, as well. By showing where the two countries' perceptions diverge, the author hopes to help reduce misunderstandings. The paper concludes with some practical recommendations along these lines.