• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 78
  • 74
  • 27
  • 22
  • 16
  • 6
  • 5
  • 5
  • 5
  • 4
  • 4
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • Tagged with
  • 272
  • 176
  • 70
  • 68
  • 68
  • 63
  • 45
  • 40
  • 35
  • 34
  • 30
  • 29
  • 28
  • 27
  • 26
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
161

Le mythe de la souveraineté ; Dialectique de la légitimité, du Corps au contrat social

De Smet, François-Julien 11 May 2010 (has links)
Notion irréductible de notre univers politique, la souveraineté semble aujourd’hui dépassée, et appelée à céder sa place à d’autres modes de représentation de l’État et de la collectivité. Pourtant, les difficultés liées à son dépassement recèlent le fait que ce concept n’a rien en réalité rien d’évident : abstraite et mystérieuse, la souveraineté l’est par nécessité. Le cœur de cette abstraction, fossile théologico-politique, fonde sa légitimité. Ainsi, la souveraineté est surtout le produit d’un refoulement des sources et de la nature violente de l’autorité vers le Tiers autoritaire, notion médiane caractérisant la nécessaire conceptualisation de l’autorité légitime comme troisième terme institutionnalisé de la relation entre celui qui exerce l’autorité et celui qui la subit. Ce Tiers, au sortir de la théologie médiévale, s’est d’abord incarné dans le concept de Corps ; le corps de l’État dérive en droite ligne du corps du Christ d’abord, de celui de l’Église ensuite, et a offert à l’autorité, alors pensée sur un registre hétéronome, divin et naturel, un écrin la liant à une légitimité et une nécessité naturelles. Le mythe du Corps, pourtant, va petit à petit devenir celui du Père au fur et à mesure de la constitution de l’État, et singulièrement de la monarchie absolue. Le Père campe alors le caractère nécessaire de l’autorité devant être exercée par le créateur sur sa chose créée, mais permet de continuer dans le même temps à faire bénéficier les structures existantes de l’empreinte théologique représentée sur terre par des mandataires héréditaire – les princes. L’institutionnalisation de l’État, et la relative stabilité qui va en découler, va toutefois fournir le cadre apte à permettre à une pensée du sujet d’émerger, faisant naître des concepts qui, tels la multitude et le peuple, posent de plus en plus directement la question de la légitimité par la prise en compte de la volonté de ceux sur lesquels elle s’exerce. C’est ainsi que naîtront les théories du pacte social, qui tentent chacune à leur manière de concevoir un moment méthodologique où l’octroi du pouvoir soit a été cédé dans le passé, soit est toujours exercé par le peuple à chaque instant. Le mythe du contrat, ainsi, est celui par lequel la légitimité de l’autorité est conciliée avec l’origine du pouvoir. Cette liaison est rendue possible par le meurtre du Père, c’est-à-dire la suppression de l’autorité naturelle et nécessaire au profit d’une autorité conventionnelle et contingente. Or, le mythe du contrat est fragile ; il nécessite, pour juguler le flux de contingence qui émerge dès lors que la question de la légitimité se pose, que la question de la nature du pouvoir soit dûment maîtrisée. Cela demande que l’autorité ne prenne pas sa source dans le repli sur le présent permanent, c’est-à-dire sur le peuple, mais sur un critère de représentativité. Cela nécessite surtout un refoulement conscient de la nature et de l’origine de l’autorité vers un sur-moi qui constituera, à l’apogée de la modernité, le cœur abstrait de la notion de souveraineté. Or cette conception de l’autorité se fissure elle-même sous le poids d’une contingence qui, comme flux permanent, tend par nature à excéder son cadre. A terme, ainsi, l’étiolement de la souveraineté coïncide-t-il avec l’avènement du dogme des droits de l’homme, appelés sur un registre immanent à compenser la perte de sens induite par l’insuffisance de verticalité assumée par la modernité.
162

Hobbes' foundation for peace and property

Cust, Michael Shaun Christopher 23 September 2008 (has links)
I defend Hobbes’ foundation for peace and property. His foundation for peace and property is his major argument for why society’s moral order (i.e. collection of rules of interaction) should be based on the principles of non-interference and exclusive use of material objects. His foundation is that in the absence of both a recognised moral order and government, it would be rational, or felicity maximising, for individuals to agree to a moral order constituted by peace and property. The cogency of his foundation depends on the accuracy of the second of the two steps of his state of nature thought experiment. In the first step, he formulates the state of nature by defining it as a social state of affairs with no government, by arguing that, as a consequence of there being no government, there would be no recognised moral order, and by assuming there would be relievable scarcity. In the second step, he theorises that interactions this anarchic state of affairs would be periodically violent. Also, the second step is informed by his theory of human nature, that is, his theory of the major characteristics common to all humans. Given that his foundation’s cogency is subject to the accuracy of the second step of his state of nature thought experiment and that the second step of his thought experiment is informed by his theory of human nature, my defence of his foundation involves arguments in favour of his theory of human nature, his state of nature, and his foundation. I first contend that the six characteristics that compose his theory of human nature are true. I next argue that the second step of his state of nature thought experiment – his theory that state of nature interactions would be periodically violent – is accurate. Lastly, I argue that his foundation is true, that it would be felicity maximising for individuals to agree to a moral order based on peace and property in the absence of government and a recognised moral order. To make my argument, I construct a hypothetical bargain between individuals in the state of nature where they choose between Hobbes moral order based on peace and property and the sort of moral order most contemporary political philosophers would propose as alternative (e.g. one based on general non-interference and a redistribution requirement) as their improvement over the state of nature. I argue that individuals would choose the former over the latter as their improvement because the former is purely mutually beneficial while the latter is only partly mutually beneficial.
163

Om man är fri, är man då lycklig? : En studie av begreppen frihet och lycka i Thomas Hobbes politiska filosofi

Morar, Natalia January 2011 (has links)
With a background in the 17th century’s English political events, but also the ideological scene of that time, the purpose of this essay is to analyze two concepts, freedom and happiness, in Thomas Hobbes’s political writings. Hobbes is well known for his political works, mostly for Leviathan, where his thoughts about government and religion are exposed. But what does he say about freedom? And what about happiness? The study shows that Hobbes’s political thought is quite original from this aspect too. Freedom and happiness are defined both from an individual and a political perspective. His philosophical system is based on materialism and mechanism, and so is his view on the concepts of freedom and happiness. In the study of the concept of freedom attention is paid to another concept associated in a way with freedom: free will. Both Hobbes’ view on free will and the connection between the two of them are highlighted. The aim is to find a connection between freedom and happiness in Hobbes political philosophy. It is found, but it changes according to the perspective one starts to look at it. The title is a question: You are free, so are you happy? Looking into Hobbes’s political writings an attempt to answer this question is made. One conclusion can be: one can be both free and happy as part of a society.
164

Hobbes' foundation for peace and property

Cust, Michael Shaun Christopher 23 September 2008 (has links)
I defend Hobbes’ foundation for peace and property. His foundation for peace and property is his major argument for why society’s moral order (i.e. collection of rules of interaction) should be based on the principles of non-interference and exclusive use of material objects. His foundation is that in the absence of both a recognised moral order and government, it would be rational, or felicity maximising, for individuals to agree to a moral order constituted by peace and property. The cogency of his foundation depends on the accuracy of the second of the two steps of his state of nature thought experiment. In the first step, he formulates the state of nature by defining it as a social state of affairs with no government, by arguing that, as a consequence of there being no government, there would be no recognised moral order, and by assuming there would be relievable scarcity. In the second step, he theorises that interactions this anarchic state of affairs would be periodically violent. Also, the second step is informed by his theory of human nature, that is, his theory of the major characteristics common to all humans. Given that his foundation’s cogency is subject to the accuracy of the second step of his state of nature thought experiment and that the second step of his thought experiment is informed by his theory of human nature, my defence of his foundation involves arguments in favour of his theory of human nature, his state of nature, and his foundation. I first contend that the six characteristics that compose his theory of human nature are true. I next argue that the second step of his state of nature thought experiment – his theory that state of nature interactions would be periodically violent – is accurate. Lastly, I argue that his foundation is true, that it would be felicity maximising for individuals to agree to a moral order based on peace and property in the absence of government and a recognised moral order. To make my argument, I construct a hypothetical bargain between individuals in the state of nature where they choose between Hobbes moral order based on peace and property and the sort of moral order most contemporary political philosophers would propose as alternative (e.g. one based on general non-interference and a redistribution requirement) as their improvement over the state of nature. I argue that individuals would choose the former over the latter as their improvement because the former is purely mutually beneficial while the latter is only partly mutually beneficial.
165

From Virtue to Rights¡GAn Historical Perspective

Liu, Yung-Ming 02 August 2006 (has links)
Virtue is the way to conduct oneself and is the develop guidance and the behavioral principle that lead the people of the past, present, and future to fulfill morals. Decency, well-being, and happiness are the ultimate goals that people seek and are the standards for people to discuss and define behaviors. Therefore, the reason that the becoming of moral people through fulfilling decency is that decency is itself the truth and the highest value among all existences. Decency itself is the concept for all concepts described by Plato, and is spiritual in the rational world. Mankind should avoid being blinded by physical or material values when pursuing values, and should position such pursuing within the spiritual life and metal happiness. Aristotle, however, believes that while a natural person transforms to a moral person, individual¡¦s utmost decency should be dominated by group¡¦s utmost decency. After modern liberalism has prevailed, Hobbes sees human ethics are based on jungle justice, and the evil among interpersonal relationship requires organizing a strong and powerful society to protect oneself and development. Organizing of such society shall break the traditional ethics to establish modern ethics. Despite Locke sees ethics and decency are social customs and compliance of laws, but social customs and laws are not the base, which should be interests and natural rights because interests and natural rights are the foundation, on which the developments of social customs and laws are based. These fundamental base for moral principles is established under free will, and because of mankind¡¦s freedom, ethical behaviors, social responsibilities, and public welfare are developed. Kant, however, believes that virtue comes from primarily good will and sets its position on utmost decency and all values are under utmost decency. Moral principles are, on the other side, unparalleled order, which is absolute, pervasive, and unconditional. Constant says that despite there is difference between freedom of the people of the past and the freedom of the people of present time, but the freedom of the people of the past may not be denied entirely or yearned for because the era now is an open society. Freedom of the past and freedom of present time are equally important. Miller believes that there is not just quantitative difference in happiness, but also qualitative difference. That is, spiritual happiness if far beyond physical happiness. Spiritual happiness is difficult to satisfy and physical happiness is easier to satisfy. Therefore, people who seek for spiritual happiness have stronger pride and do not wish for perish. Hayek says social order is a self-initiated and volunteer order, rather than constructed organized order. Therefore, every person should obey rules for common and righteous behaviors. Such system rules are formed naturally while people interact with each other. Rawls sees justice as the priority decency for social system and is the guiding principle for a society. If ethic does not match with truth, then it must be abandoned or revised. Principles of justice must be constructed from pure procedural justice. Thus it can be seen that the moral and decency of the philosophers listed herein can be concluded that there will be no moral if there is no freedom.
166

The Will Of The Sovereign And Contract In Thomas Hobbes And John Locke

Atasoy, Tanay 01 August 2008 (has links) (PDF)
This study mainly investigates the reason of living in civil society, the motives of people to live under the government and necessity of commonwealth by design to live in peace based on modern social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes has a decisive role for developing a western political thought and Locke goes a step further to put superiority of the community and latitude of thought in his theory. In order to examine these topics, similarities of both philosophers in terms of their effort on setting free political thoughts from medieval world view, and their differentiations regarding considerations on human nature, desires and rights of men, formation of the society and the role of government are focused on.
167

The war on terror tensions in the social contract post-September 11 /

Snyder, David. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.
168

Yttrandefriheten i svensk media : Debatten om Charlie Hebdo och Lars Vilks

Nielsén, Dan January 2015 (has links)
This paper explains the relationship and different arguments concerning freedom of speech. It uses Swedish newspaper columns, such as editorial pages, as its main source. The paper is mainly based upon the work of John Stuart Mill and his book On Freedom and Thomas Hobbes work Leviathan. The main focus is to see if there’s any connection between the Swedish newspapers and the theories which in itself is based upon the two works. The method that was used throughout this thesis was a content analysis which means that all of the newspaper articles and columns were analyzed and put into three different categories with category number one being based upon John Stuart Mill and his ideas, and number three being based upon Thomas Hobbes. Number two worked as a middle way and combined both of the theories. In those separate categories they were read and analyzed after arguments. Arguments that were often recurring were the main focus and were also the ones that were used for the final conclusion. The conclusion was based on the articles and the output was that the majority of the articles actually went on the same line as John Stuart Mill and that a few would like to see some kind of restriction on freedom of speech.
169

The honor motive in international relations

Ofek, Hillel 13 December 2013 (has links)
Government / This report aims to broaden the horizon of research questions in international relations by encouraging a greater appreciation for the complexity of individual and collective motivations. More specifically, the report focuses on why the honor motive is ignored in the discipline and why it deserves more attention. / text
170

Geometrical physics : mathematics in the natural philosophy of Thomas Hobbes

Morris, Kathryn, 1970- January 2001 (has links)
My thesis examines Thomas Hobbes's attempt to develop a mathematical account of nature. I argue that Hobbes's conception of how we should think quantitatively about the world was deeply indebted to the ideas of his ancient and medieval predecessors. These ideas were often amenable to Hobbes's vision of a demonstrative, geometrically-based science. However, he was forced to adapt the ancient and medieval models to the demands of his own thoroughgoing materialism. This hybrid resulted in a distinctive, if only partially successful, approach to the problems of the new mechanical philosophy.

Page generated in 0.0622 seconds