Debatterna om Hobbes och Rousseaus politiska ståndpunkter är långvariga och välpublicerade. Min ambition i denna mylla har varit att koncentrera mig på en fixerad och konstitutiv fråga, nämligen hur deltagande respektive författare tyckte att folket borde vara i fattandet av politiska beslut - sådana svaren formuleras i Leviathan och The Social Contract. Den kontextualistiska metoden synes naturlig för historisk idéanalys, i synnerhet som en betydande del av undersökningen kommer behöva ta itu med hermeneutiska problem: för att ge förståelse åt Hobbes och Rousseaus politiska filosofier är det nämligen nödvändigt att ha kännedom om de kontexter i vilka de formades. Teorin som appliceras är Kuhns teori om paradigm, kompletterad med Foucaults koncept om episteme. Med paradigm respektive episteme menar Kuhn och Foucault ett temporärt a priori-förhållande som definierar den intellektuella räckvidden inom en specifik disciplin. Bakgrunden mot vilken Hobbes Leviathan tolkas är således det stormiga engelska 1600-talet, Richelieus Frankrike (där Hobbes residerade under nästan hela det decennium som föregick skrivandet av Leviathan), hans personliga biografi etc. Kontextualiseringen av The Social Contract inkluderar bl.a. Machiavellis inflytande, Rousseaus personliga biografi, och upplysningen. Hobbes och Rousseau är överens om att suveränen bör ha absolut makt över alla medborgare. Med denna premiss blir frågan hur de definierar suveräniteten central. För Hobbes är suveränen samtliga medborgare sammanfogade till “one and the same Person” i ett förbund där envar avsäger sig sin “Right of Governing” sig själv och transfererar “thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions”. Emellertid  tillägger han att folket endast är “made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented [...] For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One.”  Rousseaus definition av suveräniteten är allmänviljan omsatt i praktik. Skillnaden mellan allas vilja och allmänviljan är att “while the former considers private interest and is merely a sum of particular wills” exkluderar allmänviljan “the pluses and minuses, which mutually cancel each other out” tills endast det gemensamma intresset återstår.  Efter att suveränen etablerats är alla medborgare, enligt Hobbes, förpliktigade att agera unisont i enlighet med de beslut suveränen fattar. I samma anda är suveränen “the sole Legislator”. Sammantaget är Hobbes mening att en person (eller församling) bör vara enväldig beslutsfattare, och att folket, således, inte bör ha något inflytande i politiska frågor. Det är sant att suveränen beskrivs som samtliga medborgare sammanfogade till “one and the same Person”, men då det är tydligt att denne är en faktisk person (eller församling av faktiska personer) och det är “the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One” förefaller detta vara av metafysisk innebörd. Övervägande Hobbes svar på frågan - hur deltagande folket borde vara i fattandet av politiska beslut - är det således tydligt att medborgarna inte vid något skede (efter upprättandet av en “commonwealth”) bör vara delaktiga i den politiska beslutsprocessen.  I kontrast till Hobbes menar Rousseau att suveräniteten inte kan representeras. Vidare anser han att “The people subject to the laws should be their author”. Som vi sett är suveräniteten hos Rousseau identisk med allmänviljan omsatt i handling. När allmänviljan ska definieras i en specifik fråga föreslår Rousseau en “assembly of the people” varpå en motion presenteras och var och en “expresses his opinion on this by voting, and the declaration of the general will is taken from the counting of the votes”. Medelst detta system menar han att varje enskild medborgares makt är lika med suveräniteten delat med antalet medborgare. I The Social Contract argumenterar Rousseau följaktligen för att alla medborgare (endast vuxna män) bör vara jämlika i fattandet av politiska beslut. Ställd inför frågan föreslår Rousseau direktdemokratiska och bindande omröstningar - där alla medborgare tillåts rösta och alla röster är likvärdiga.

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In this thesis I will offer an extended discussion and critique of an important social constructivist book, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), focusing on its reception and its standing in science and technology studies in the fifteen years since its publication. This work claims to be an "origins" story for the modern form of life that we now call the scientific community, and this claim has not itself been contested strongly by other scholars. Central to Shapin and Schaffer's argument for the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge, is the contrast they find between the community orientation of Robert Boyle and the anti-community stance of Thomas Hobbes. In the course of this thesis, I question the validity not only of this contrast, but of the origins story itself. I suggest that while experimental, communally-practiced science and modernity did emerge together around the end of the seventeenth-century, the qualities of science that Shapin and Schaffer suggest are distinctive of modern science might more accurately be represented as distinctive of modern science. In other words, I suggest that the story of Leviathan and the Air-Pump is not so much an origins story for science as it is emblematic of the early influence of widespread European modernist culture on scientific practices. Leviathan and the Air-Pump is an important case to study in order to unravel the strands of science and modernity because it occupies simultaneously both the early and late margins of the modern period: first, by taking the contested but emergent modernism represented by Robert Boyle as its subject and, second, as a work of scholarship that sits on the far margins of the modern period. My method is to treat Shapin and Schaffer's work as a central primary source for understanding how contemporary science and technology studies scholarship deals with early modern science. A side product of this analysis is to suggest strongly that Shapin and Schaffer's account of the social construction of scientific knowledge is itself socially constructed: that is, it is highly selective in its presentation and interpretation of historical evidence. I also consider what the implications may be for separating modernity from science, and for thinking about how science might be practiced in the age that will follow -- perhaps is already following -- the modern period. / Master of Science

Ma thèse vise à établir une comparaison détaillée entre la pensée de G.W.F. Hegel et celle de Thomas Hobbes. L’hypothèse avancée par ce travail est la suivante : pour ce qui concerne l’explication de certains phénomènes de la vie pratique – le lien entre désir et conscience de soi, le rôle de la passion et de la félicité dans l’action, la genèse du droit et la nature de la souveraineté étatique – Hegel et Hobbes partagent un même lieu conceptuel de départ. Notamment, deux points fondamentaux de la critique de Hobbes à l’éthique ancienne ont des racines profondes dans la pensée de Hegel : la récusation de la question classique de la vie meilleure, et la supériorité de l’art sur la nature. Le désir est décrit par les deux penseurs en tant que mouvement d’auto-affirmation individuelle, non plus comme une tendance théologiquement orientée ; la volonté de l’homme devient, également, la source de toute normativité. L’enquête sur les affinités aura pourtant une fonction préparatoire à l’analyse des divergences théoriques essentielles entre les deux penseurs. Chez Hobbes, la limitation du désir est la condition de l’édification de l’ordre, tandis que la Bildung [éducation] hégélienne est le moyen de la rationalisation du désir. Finalement, le désir individuel n’est chez Hegel qu’une forme de manifestation du désir de la raison de se donner présence et durée dans la réalité. / This thesis aspires to establish a detailed theoretical comparison between the thought of G. W. F. Hegel and that of Thomas Hobbes. It is my contention that the two thinkers have a common starting point on many fundamental problems of human practical life, such as the account of desire and self-consciousness, the role of passion and happiness in human agency, the phenomenon of right and the nature of the political sovereignty of the State. One of my central points will be the deep connection of Hegel’s practical thought with two points of the Hobbesian criticism of ancient ethics: namely, the refutation of the classical question of the good life as the basis of human conduct and association, and the superiority of art over nature. Hence, desire is described by both thinkers as a movement of individual self-affirmation and causality over the world, not as a teleological tension towards different kinds of goods; and the human will becomes, for both equally, the source of all practical, juridical and political normativity. Nonetheless, the account of these similarities will be preparatory to the analysis of the crucial differences between Hegel’s and Hobbes’ solutions. Whereas for Hobbes the limitation of the natural desire of man is the prerequisite for all order, Hegelian Bildung [education] is the mean of the rationalization of desire. In the last analysis, the desire of individuals is for Hegel a form of manifestation of the all-pervading impulse of reason to give itself presence and endurance in reality.

Da crítica de Hannah Arendt à pretensão da soberania extrapolamos, na primeira parte desta tese, uma problematização do recorrente equívoco do pensamento projetar o absoluto, impróprio a nossa existência plural. Observamos, em Hobbes e em Berlin, como esse absoluto, em seu existir simulado, sempre se apresenta ao modo de uma dualidade, na qual a verdade ou emancipação plena equivale à falsidade ou opressão plena, a revelação divina, à dedução jurídica, e vice-versa. Enquanto, por detrás dessa farsa, a realidade se reproduz, contingentemente, nos conflitos entre limites que se tensionam, contorcendo-se sobre si mesmos. Após uma breve problematização da permanência da farsa do absoluto e da dualidade, mesmo no pensamento que se levanta contra ela, retornamos a Arendt, uma pensadora que se diferencia em sua aceitação da prática política e da espontaneidade, a partir da qual busca compreender como os valores e possibilidades republicanas a beleza plural da dignidade comum, mesmo que imperfeitamente defendida em seus escritos efetivam-se sem precisarem se sustentar no absoluto. Na segunda parte, considerando-se que ela, não obstante, retorne ao e ilustre os equívocos do retorno ao absoluto, iniciamos uma requalificação de seu pensamento, com intuito de mantê-lo coerente com a condição de contingência. Partindo do tema do conflito e tensão entre passado e futuro, o qual recorta toda a sua obra, concentramo-nos nos escritos do início de sua carreira acadêmica, mais diretamente dedicados à compreensão da experiência totalitária que a afetou como judia alemã. Após uma breve introdução aos traços gerais do que seria uma ontologia consistente da pluralidade e da contingência, exploramos a questão da responsabilidade, observando como alguns desses traços se apresentam. Do pária ao parvenu, da conservação à mudança, do idealismo ao realismo, da antiguidade à modernidade, observamos como não somos soberanos, nem vassalos: somos a responsabilidade que se manifesta em sua contingência e espontaneidade, nas tensões dos conflitos entre pluralidades. / From Hannah Arendts critique of the pretension of sovereignty, we extrapolate, in the first part of this thesis, a problematization of the recurring mistake of thought projecting the absolute, improper to our plural existence. We observe, in Hobbes and Berlin, how this absolute, in its simulated existence, always presents itself as a duality, in which full truth or emancipation corresponds to full falsehood or oppression, divine revelation corresponds to juridical derivation, and vice-versa. Throughout, behind this farce, reality is reproducing itself, contingently, in the conflicts between limits that tension each other, writhing over themselves. After a brief problematization of the perpetuation of the farce of the absolute and of duality, even by thinkers that rise against it, we return to Arendt, a thinker that differentiates herself by her welcoming of politics and spontaneity, from which she seeks to understand how republican values and possibilities the plural beauty of common dignity, even if imperfectly advanced by her become effective without having to find support on the absolute. In the second part, considering that Arendt, nonetheless, returns to and illustrates the mistakes of returning to the absolute, we begin a requalification of her thought, with the intention of keeping it coherent with the condition of contingency. Starting from the theme of conflict and tension between past and future, which traverses her entire academic production, we focus on her early writings, more directly devoted to understanding the totalitarian experience that affected her as a German Jew. After a brief introduction to the general traits of a consistent, however incipient, ontology of plurality and contingency, we explore the question of responsibility, observing how some of these traits present themselves. From the pariah to the parvenu, from conservation to change, from idealism to realism, from antiquity to modernity, we observe how we are neither sovereigns nor vassals: we are the responsibility that manifests itself in its contingency and spontaneity, in the tensions of the conflicts between pluralities.

Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson “The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?” In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization. My question for this was as follows: Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories? During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found: 1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation 5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract. The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation. The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization. / Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson "Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?" I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen. Min fråga var följande: Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna? Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt: 1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta 5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet. De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier. Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.

Da crítica de Hannah Arendt à pretensão da soberania extrapolamos, na primeira parte desta tese, uma problematização do recorrente equívoco do pensamento projetar o absoluto, impróprio a nossa existência plural. Observamos, em Hobbes e em Berlin, como esse absoluto, em seu existir simulado, sempre se apresenta ao modo de uma dualidade, na qual a verdade ou emancipação plena equivale à falsidade ou opressão plena, a revelação divina, à dedução jurídica, e vice-versa. Enquanto, por detrás dessa farsa, a realidade se reproduz, contingentemente, nos conflitos entre limites que se tensionam, contorcendo-se sobre si mesmos. Após uma breve problematização da permanência da farsa do absoluto e da dualidade, mesmo no pensamento que se levanta contra ela, retornamos a Arendt, uma pensadora que se diferencia em sua aceitação da prática política e da espontaneidade, a partir da qual busca compreender como os valores e possibilidades republicanas a beleza plural da dignidade comum, mesmo que imperfeitamente defendida em seus escritos efetivam-se sem precisarem se sustentar no absoluto. Na segunda parte, considerando-se que ela, não obstante, retorne ao e ilustre os equívocos do retorno ao absoluto, iniciamos uma requalificação de seu pensamento, com intuito de mantê-lo coerente com a condição de contingência. Partindo do tema do conflito e tensão entre passado e futuro, o qual recorta toda a sua obra, concentramo-nos nos escritos do início de sua carreira acadêmica, mais diretamente dedicados à compreensão da experiência totalitária que a afetou como judia alemã. Após uma breve introdução aos traços gerais do que seria uma ontologia consistente da pluralidade e da contingência, exploramos a questão da responsabilidade, observando como alguns desses traços se apresentam. Do pária ao parvenu, da conservação à mudança, do idealismo ao realismo, da antiguidade à modernidade, observamos como não somos soberanos, nem vassalos: somos a responsabilidade que se manifesta em sua contingência e espontaneidade, nas tensões dos conflitos entre pluralidades. / From Hannah Arendts critique of the pretension of sovereignty, we extrapolate, in the first part of this thesis, a problematization of the recurring mistake of thought projecting the absolute, improper to our plural existence. We observe, in Hobbes and Berlin, how this absolute, in its simulated existence, always presents itself as a duality, in which full truth or emancipation corresponds to full falsehood or oppression, divine revelation corresponds to juridical derivation, and vice-versa. Throughout, behind this farce, reality is reproducing itself, contingently, in the conflicts between limits that tension each other, writhing over themselves. After a brief problematization of the perpetuation of the farce of the absolute and of duality, even by thinkers that rise against it, we return to Arendt, a thinker that differentiates herself by her welcoming of politics and spontaneity, from which she seeks to understand how republican values and possibilities the plural beauty of common dignity, even if imperfectly advanced by her become effective without having to find support on the absolute. In the second part, considering that Arendt, nonetheless, returns to and illustrates the mistakes of returning to the absolute, we begin a requalification of her thought, with the intention of keeping it coherent with the condition of contingency. Starting from the theme of conflict and tension between past and future, which traverses her entire academic production, we focus on her early writings, more directly devoted to understanding the totalitarian experience that affected her as a German Jew. After a brief introduction to the general traits of a consistent, however incipient, ontology of plurality and contingency, we explore the question of responsibility, observing how some of these traits present themselves. From the pariah to the parvenu, from conservation to change, from idealism to realism, from antiquity to modernity, we observe how we are neither sovereigns nor vassals: we are the responsibility that manifests itself in its contingency and spontaneity, in the tensions of the conflicts between pluralities.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Josete Soboleski.pdf: 743392 bytes, checksum: a8051d1524c0e3212c4784984798ce82 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-12-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present work aims to investigate the role of fear in the unfolding of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes. It is known that men are equal by nature. This equality is also an equal fear, since an individual can not be characterized as stronger than others and this makes them fearful. This fear is not any fear, but fear of losing his life, his greatest asset, so violent. Because they are equal, it may happen that men want the same thing at the same time and that leads to violent confrontation, as Hobbes called a state of war of all against all. From this perspective, men find themselves unprotected and insecure and seek the formation of the body politic the solution to the problem of insecurity. The goal here is to demonstrate that the fear of violent death is a major cause of the state institution, or a political passion motivating the state also has a very important role: to be an ally of the sovereign power in law enforcement and education of subjects. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar o papel do medo no desdobramento da teoria política de Thomas Hobbes. É sabido que os homens são iguais por natureza. Essa igualdade também é uma igualdade no medo, uma vez um indivíduo não pode ser caracterizado como mais forte do que os outros e isso os torna temerosos. Este medo, não é um medo qualquer, mas o medo de perder a vida, seu maior bem, de forma violenta. Por serem iguais, pode acontecer de os homens desejarem a mesma coisa ao mesmo tempo e isso os leva ao confronto violento, que Hobbes denomina como sendo um estado de guerra de todos contra todos. Sob essa perspectiva, os homens vêem-se desprotegidos e inseguros e buscam na formação do corpo político a solução para o seu problema de insegurança. O objetivo aqui é demonstrar que o medo da morte violenta é uma das principais causas da instituição do Estado, ou seja, uma paixão política motivadora que tem no Estado também um papel muito importante: ser uma aliada do poder soberano na aplicação das leis e educação dos súditos.