Partant du contexte colonial canadien, la thèse souhaite déterminer la fonction de la figure du « sauvage américain » chez Thomas Hobbes. La thèse est ainsi divisée en deux parties. La première porte sur l'évolution du couple « sauvagerie et civilité » depuis l'Antiquité jusqu'à la modernité. On y fait un survol étymologique, discursif et mythologique en guise de contextualisation. Et on parcourt également le thème chez des auteurs allant de More et Machiavel à Bodin et Grotius, en passant par Vitoria, Las Casas, Sepúlveda, Botero, La Boétie et Montaigne. La seconde partie porte sur la figure proprement hobbesienne du « sauvage ». On y trouve le premier inventaire exhaustif de ses occurrences dans l'œuvre de Hobbes. L'étude tente ainsi de faire sens du caractère fondamentalement ambigu de cette figure, et ce, selon les axes épistémologique et politique. Sur le plan du savoir, la figure est confinée dans une agnotopie où elle est à la fois ignorante et ignorée. Sur le plan du pouvoir, elle est une figure à la fois purement apolitique et l'image du « petit gouvernement de famille » dont nous parle le Léviathan. Dans cette ambiguïté, qui est aussi celle de l'état de nature, on reconnait chez Hobbes l'effacement des structures politiques autochtones que décrivent clairement les récits coloniaux. Et on découvre aussi l'effacement du pouvoir de la mère qui est tenu sous silence dans la théorie du contrat, ce qui suggère, peut-être, un désir de contourner le problème des structures matrilinéaires. La conclusion synthétise ces ambiguïtés en faisant du « sauvage » hobbesien une figure liminaire jouant un rôle clé dans le récit de l'État souverain. On peut en effet reconnaitre dans ce récit un rituel discursif de passage où le sujet doit revêtir le déguisement du « sauvage » afin de produire la « civilité » du sujet moderne européen. Ce serait là la part sauvage qui se cache dans la doctrine de l'État moderne.

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Cette thèse vise à cerner les raisons historiques, intellectuelles et affectives de l’importance que reçoit le problème de la vulnérabilité individuelle dans la culture politique des sociétés modernes. Il s’agit de tenter de comprendre pourquoi et par le concours de quelles transformations normatives et structurelles nous en sommes venus, comme citoyens, à attendre de l’État qu’il nous protège des affres de l’existence. L’oeuvre philosophique de Thomas Hobbes, fondée sur une anthropologie individualiste où l’homme apparaît mû par deux affects, le désir et la crainte, nous paraît être la première formulation théorique de ce problème de la vulnérabilité, et à ce titre, nous posons qu’elle a été déterminante pour l’institutionnalisation d’une rationalité politique proprement moderne. De manière à saisir quelles ont pu être les conditions de possibilité de la philosophie de Hobbes, de même que son influence sur l’imaginaire politique occidental, il nous faut tenter de comprendre non seulement pourquoi l’affectivité humaine a pu se trouver ainsi posée comme enjeu du gouvernement, mais comment elle est aussi liée, de manière générale, au fonctionnement des institutions sociales, lequel est historiquement contingent. Il en va ainsi d’une interrogation, que nous poursuivrons dans un relevé des principaux concepts à l’aide desquels Sigmund Freud, Norbert Elias, Max Weber et Michel Foucault ont pensé les modalités du façonnement social et historique de la subjectivité, et par le biais de laquelle nous espérons expliquer pourquoi le « type d’homme » sur lequel s’appuie le régime libéral moderne implique le vécu d’une expérience affective marquée par un rapport tendu entre le désir et le sentiment de la vulnérabilité.

The current president of the United States, Donald Trump, has been identified as the reason for a large shift in American foreign policy towards a doctrine closer to that of political realism. This claim has led us to examine if this transformation could be detected and described if we analyzed and compared Trump’s foreign policy doctrine with his predecessor, Barack Obama, through the lens Thomas Hobbes, whose ideas are at the core of the three modern schools of political realism. Accordingly, in this thesis, we deduce an analytical framework from the original corpus of Hobbes, where anarchy is divided into moral and empirical variables, identified as the primary factors for behavior in international settings. This is then applied inductively via a comparative qualitative content analysis to two primary documents, the National Security Strategies of 2010 containing the foreign policy doctrine of Obama, and the National Security Strategy of 2017 containing the doctrine of Trump. Our thesis shows a large shift in how the Presidents view the world in moral terms, or how they see it fit for the American executive to act on the international stage. And a relatively minor shift in empirical terms, or their perception of the foundational reality of the world system which they both consider to be of an anarchical nature closely connected to the theoretical model presented by our interpretation of Hobbes

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 403449.pdf: 1307913 bytes, checksum: d37dc850efafc7968b4633b01f6260fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-23 / O presente trabalho objetiva oferecer uma an?lise e uma interpreta??o da teoria pol?tica de Thomas Hobbes ? luz da ci?ncia do s?culo XVII e das descobertas operadas pela f?sica moderna em sua jun??o com a matem?tica. O texto se inicia com a abordagem do solo hist?rico sobre o qual se situa a filosofia de Hobbes, sobretudo com Euclides e Galileu, e caminha na dire??o da transposi??o dos movimentos f?sicos dos corpos para a funda??o do estado civil. Destaca-se uma no??o de filosofia que parte de uma base l?gico-proposicional e material para, ent?o, chegar a uma teoria pol?tica configurada na positividade formal da lei e no ordenamento jur?dico do Estado. Da apropria??o da tradi??o cient?fica moderna, emerge uma nova imagem do homem que, apesar de racional, est? submetido a movimentos inerciais no sentido mais laico do termo. Tais movimentos revelam a complexa e conflitiva condi??o a que est? submetida a natureza humana, pela potencial guerra de todos contra todos. Como solu??o para essa quest?o, Hobbes prop?e uma teoria pol?tica pautada no acordo das vontades e na transfer?ncia m?tua de direitos, transpondo elementos da filosofia natural para a filosofia civil, sobretudo na adequa??o da lei da queda livre dos corpos e do princ?pio da in?rcia aos movimentos dos corpos humanos na vida em sociedade. Nessa configura??o, o homem faz, de um lado, a guerra em nome da sobreviv?ncia e, de outro lado, cria o Estado como fruto de sua vontade num intrincado c?lculo que tra?a - muito mais do que a guerra - os melhores caminhos rumo ? preserva??o e ? paz. O que est? pressuposto na teoria pol?tica de Hobbes ? a an?lise do fisicalismo dos corpos e sua regulamenta??o externa pelo estado absoluto. Tal fisicalismo, no entanto, ao mesmo tempo em que representa a base sobre a qual se sustenta o modelo de Estado hobbesiano, nos leva a identificar os limites dessa teoria pol?tica, que pode n?o dar conta do fisicalismo radical identificado na origem dos corpos. A apropria??o desses elementos nos permite afirmar que o modelo pol?tico apresentado por Hobbes funda direitos e deveres num contrato de justifica??o da soberania dado pela vontade e autoriza??o, cuja marca principal ? a defesa. O Estado, n?o obstante ? sua face absoluta, apresenta-se como um construto artificial universal que agrupa a diversidade, abrindo os caminhos da autoriza??o pol?tica e da obriga??o moral.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-05-13T14:38:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dinastia_solipsismo.pdf: 1241002 bytes, checksum: 4e91919775f9f37d4453e52f880c5f9d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-13T14:38:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dinastia_solipsismo.pdf: 1241002 bytes, checksum: 4e91919775f9f37d4453e52f880c5f9d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-25 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A proposta de abordagem do presente estudo pretende analisar o solipsismo soberano na sociedade internacional através das premissas político-jurídicas de Thomas Hobbes no contexto contemporâneo relativo à manutenção da paz e da segurança internacionais, sobretudo na análise do mundo pós Segunda Guerra Mundial, da Carta das Nações Unidas de 1945 e, por consequência, do principal órgão da referida instituição, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU). A partir da análise temporal centrada na passagem do jusnaturalismo à instituição de um sistema internacional de dominação política, demonstrar-se-á a estabilização do sistema político-internacional por meio das Resoluções e a manutenção do status quo mundial pela regra de unanimidade das grandes potências (direito de veto), apresentando as dimensões de instrumentalização do poder nas relações internacionais, inseridos claramente na perspectiva hobbesiana. Em tal concepção, o Direito Internacional Público assume mínimas funções instrumentais de garantia de paz e de segurança, com vistas à salvaguarda da temporalidade estável do Leviatã mundial hobbesiano. Além disso, demarcando os Direitos Humanos como legitimação por eloquência, a retórica jurídico-minimalista apresentada pelos discursos contemporâneos na política global resta constatada, o que torna a pesquisa, muito além de uma observação e de uma descrição do sistema político-internacional a partir de categorias de Thomas Hobbes, uma articulação perceptiva e reflexiva do despotismo e das controvérsias arrojadas nos processos de manutenção da paz e da segurança internacionais. / The main approach of this study intends to analyze the sovereign solipsism in the international society through the political and legal premises of Thomas Hobbes, in the contemporary context related to the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in the analysis of the post World War II scenario, as well as the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and, moreover, the main body of that institution: the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). From the temporal analysis focused on the passage of natural law to the establishment of an international system of political domination, it will be demonstrated that the stabilization of the international-political system occurs through Resolutions and the maintenance of the global status quo through the great owers’ unanimity rule (veto right), showing the dimensions of the instrumentalization of power in the international relations field, clearly inserted in a Hobbesian perspective. In this conception, Public International Law assumes minimal and instrumental functions of maintaining peace and security, in a stable temporal safeguarding view of the Hobbesian Leviathan. Moreover, marking Human Rights as a legitimation for eloquence, the rhetoric presented by legal and minimalist contemporary discourses on global politics remains questioned, making the research a perceptive and thoughtful articulation of despotism and the controversies found within the process of maintaining peace and international security, well beyond the observation and description of the political-international system through Thomas Hobbes categories.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T14:16:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariana Levit Kaufmann.pdf: 678295 bytes, checksum: 1a01185c17fd1be6c7bd3135a0faa696 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-03-02 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This dissertation analyzes some aspects of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) that led to his involvement in a series of polemics in the seventeenth-century England. For the development of the subject, in a first step, we intend to discuss certain important aspects of his conception of religion in order to understand the reasons why the philosopher was called an atheist , spreader of heresies and enemy of the christian values. In a second step, we will discuss aspects that structure his natural philosophy, his vision of what is knowledge and what is world . Following up, we will make a comparison between two of the methods adopted by the philosophers involved in the polemics. On one side, the approach based on the deductive method, a priori, with a mathematical and logical character which was defended by the author of De Corpore while, on the other side, the methodology structured on the effects obtained through the experimentations of nature, a posteriori, which was adopted by many of the members of the Royal Society. We hope to clarify some of the main reasons why the polemics did take place, that might help us to better understand the discussions that involved the author of Leviathan e some of the members of the Royal Society, specially Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and John Wallis (1616-1703). We therefore intend to obtain the explicit reasons why Hobbes was considered a threat to other thinkers and ecclesiastics of his time. In this way, we will analyze fundamental hobbesian ideas like his conception of God, his critics to the immortality of the soul as well as his structure of a totally necessary world. We will observe in which way such ideas became dangerous to society and how his critics saw them. At last, was the image built over the atheist Hobbes, in fact, related to his belief in God? / Esta dissertação analisa alguns aspectos da filosofia de Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) que propiciaram seu envolvimento em uma série de polêmicas na Inglaterra seiscentista. Para tanto, num primeiro momento, objetivamos discutir certos aspectos importantes de sua concepção de religião a fim de compreender por quais motivos o filósofo foi chamado de ateu , de propagador de heresias e de inimigo dos valores cristãos. Num segundo momento, abordaremos aspectos que estruturaram sua filosofia natural, sua visão de mundo e de conhecimento. Em seguida, faremos uma comparação entre dois dos métodos que foram adotados pelos filósofos envolvidos nessas polêmicas. Por um lado, a abordagem baseada no método dedutivo, a priori, de caráter matemático e lógico que era defendida pelo autor do De Corpore, enquanto de outro lado aquela que se estruturava sobre os efeitos obtidos por meio de experimentações da natureza, a posteriori, que foi adotada por vários dos membros da Royal Society. Esperamos esclarecer alguns dos principais motivos pelos quais as polêmicas de fato ocorreram e assim, talvez, poderemos compreender melhor as discussões que envolveram o autor do Leviatã e alguns dos membros da Royal Society, especialmente Robert Boyle (1627-1691) e John Wallis (1616-1703). Temos a finalidade, portanto, de explicitar os motivos pelos quais Hobbes era considerado uma ameaça para outros pensadores e eclesiásticos de seu tempo. Desta forma, analisaremos idéias hobbesianas fundamentais como sua concepção de Deus, suas críticas à imortalidade da alma bem como a sua estruturação de um mundo absolutamente necessário. Observaremos de que maneira idéias como essas se tornaram perigosas para a sociedade e como seus críticos as viam. Enfim, será que a imagem que se construiu sobre o ateu Hobbes tinha de fato relação com sua crença em Deus?

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State responsibility is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, punished with sanctions, admonished to keep their promises, bound by treaties, and held liable for debts and reparations. But why, and under which conditions, does it make sense to assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to individual leaders and officials? The purpose of this thesis is to resurrect and develop a forgotten understanding of state responsibility from the political thought of Thomas Hobbes. Chapters 1 and 2 examine the two dominant theories of state responsibility and propose a Hobbesian alternative. According to the agential theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents like human beings, with analogous capacities for deliberation and intentional action. According to the functional theory, states can be held responsible because they act vicariously through their organs, much as principals act vicariously through agents. What makes Hobbes unique is that he considers states to be 'persons'-entities to which actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed-even though they are neither agents nor principals. Hobbes' idea of state personality relies on the concepts of authorization and representation, not of agency and intentionality, nor of functions and organs. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 develop the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility and apply it to three sets of problems. Chapter 3 addresses problems of attribution, such as whether the actions of dictators count as acts of state and whether states can commit crimes. Chapter 4 addresses problems of identity, such as whether revolutions and annexations negate the state's identity and hence its responsibilities. Chapter 5 addresses problems of distribution, such as whether the subjects of the state ought to bear the costs of debts and reparations that their state incurred before they were born. I argue that the Hobbesian theory provides better answers to each set of problems than the agential and functional alternatives.

Cette thèse vise à cerner les raisons historiques, intellectuelles et affectives de l’importance que reçoit le problème de la vulnérabilité individuelle dans la culture politique des sociétés modernes. Il s’agit de tenter de comprendre pourquoi et par le concours de quelles transformations normatives et structurelles nous en sommes venus, comme citoyens, à attendre de l’État qu’il nous protège des affres de l’existence. L’oeuvre philosophique de Thomas Hobbes, fondée sur une anthropologie individualiste où l’homme apparaît mû par deux affects, le désir et la crainte, nous paraît être la première formulation théorique de ce problème de la vulnérabilité, et à ce titre, nous posons qu’elle a été déterminante pour l’institutionnalisation d’une rationalité politique proprement moderne. De manière à saisir quelles ont pu être les conditions de possibilité de la philosophie de Hobbes, de même que son influence sur l’imaginaire politique occidental, il nous faut tenter de comprendre non seulement pourquoi l’affectivité humaine a pu se trouver ainsi posée comme enjeu du gouvernement, mais comment elle est aussi liée, de manière générale, au fonctionnement des institutions sociales, lequel est historiquement contingent. Il en va ainsi d’une interrogation, que nous poursuivrons dans un relevé des principaux concepts à l’aide desquels Sigmund Freud, Norbert Elias, Max Weber et Michel Foucault ont pensé les modalités du façonnement social et historique de la subjectivité, et par le biais de laquelle nous espérons expliquer pourquoi le « type d’homme » sur lequel s’appuie le régime libéral moderne implique le vécu d’une expérience affective marquée par un rapport tendu entre le désir et le sentiment de la vulnérabilité.