Religious Studies is making possible a scholarly study of many aspects of human religious traditions and practices, but the field has yet to articulate fully the ability of such study to affect the creation of new approaches to intractable social and political problems. Many of these problems have as their basis religious justifications, yet the rigor of academic thought has only barely begun to clarify the underlying religious reasoning. Through this essay I intend to provide clarity to some of the underlying religious justifications for war and violence by examining the religious writings of two widely recognized theologians that firmly oppose war and violence, John Howard Yoder and Mohandas Gandhi. The result is an examination on the utility of using religious ideas as sources of insights and strategies for addressing social and political issues such as war and violence.

This dissertation develops a new theory of specific and overall socio-political freedom and discusses its role in normative political theory. The aim is to dissolve some of the conceptual confusions that have often beset previous discussions and to develop a theoretical framework with which to approach questions of public policy. This dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part, I develop a new account that specifies under which conditions a person is specifically free and when she is unfree to do something. It is shown that republican accounts of freedom are unsatisfactory and that a trivalent liberal account that equates freedom with ability is most plausible. A new analysis of unfreedom is defended according to which a person is made unfree (as opposed to merely unable) to do something only if she would have this freedom in a better and available distribution that another person could have foreseeably brought about. In the second part, I discuss how to move from an account of specific freedom and unfreedom to a measure of overall freedom. I develop a new and simple aggregation function and argue that the measurement of overall freedom requires both quantitative and evaluative factors. In the third part, I then discuss what role freedom should play in a theory of distributive justice. Instead of freedom deontologically constraining the reach of distributive justice, freedom should be one of its distribuenda. I will first discuss how best to distribute freedom across a person’s lifetime and how this impacts on discussions of paternalistic policies. It will then be shown that we ought not simply maximise freedom between persons, not aim to give everyone enough freedom nor aim at equal freedom. Instead, distributing freedom requires a principle that combines maximisation with a concern for fairness.

Ce travail propose une interprétation de la pensée anticoloniale du psychiatre et philosophe politique martiniquais Frantz Fanon. Il se proposera de la comprendre comme une philosophie sociale de l’existence. Il s’agira, pour l’analyser, de replacer Fanon dans son époque, en contextualisant son œuvre par rapport à l’histoire du colonialisme moderne, notamment en Afrique, mais aussi de relire Fanon à la lumière de la pensée contemporaine aux fins de déceler ce qui, dans son œuvre, demeure actuel. Cette recherche se déploiera en deux temps. La première partie aura pour objectif de dévoiler les fondements racistes du colonialisme en en explorant les conséquences dans plusieurs domaines : droit et politique, notamment, mais aussi économie et psychiatrie. Le concept de « prise de vies », qui sera opposé à celui de « prises de terres » élaboré par Carl Schmitt, servira de fil conducteur à cette recherche. Il s’agira de soutenir que la disqualification de certains groupes humains seule rendit possible l’accaparement des territoires ultramarins. Ce sont les modalités de cette disqualification qu’explicitera ce premier moment. La seconde partie portera sur les modèles de résistance à cette domination dont Fanon propose une formulation inédite. On verra comment c’est par la répétition transformatrice de ce qui est que peut surgir la nouveauté dans l’histoire. Répétition dans la différence, fut-elle violente, qui constitue le cœur même de la pensée fanonienne. Ainsi la répétition africaine des nations européennes ; ainsi le panafricanisme qui seront finalement abordés. Il s’agira donc de dessiner les contours de l’« ontologie » existentielle et politique de Frantz Fanon. / This thesis offers an interpretation of Martiniquais political Philosopher and Psychiatrist Frantz Fanon. It proposes to understand his thinking as a social philosophy of existence. Analyzing it requires to put Fanon back in his time, by setting his work in its context, through modern colonialism history, especially in Africa, and by reading Fanon in light of contemporary thinking, in order to find what in his work remains up to date. This research will unfold in two parts. The first part will explore the very specificities of the colonial model of domination, which have been rather disregarded until these days. The second part will focus on the models of resistance to this domination, like revolutionary actions, to which Fanon gives an original expression. The racist bases of colonialism will be revealed through its numerous implications in Law and Politics, and also in Economy and Psychiatry. The concept of “life-appropriation”, while opposed to Carl Schmitt’s concept of “land-appropriation”, will be the vital lead of this research. The issue will be to maintain that disqualification of specific human groups alone made it possible to monopolize oversea territories. Modalities of this disqualification will be made explicit. The second part aims at showing how Fanon develops what could be named speculative politics, in response to colonial dehumanization. A thinking which objects are less concepts or ideas than actual historically localized power struggles.

Against Sally Haslanger’s influential position, I argue that gender is not needed to ensure the just treatment of sexually differentiated human bodies. Gender is only needed if the just treatment of socially important sexual differences is most effectively realized through the use of gender terms, such as “woman” or “man.” In light of this aforementioned condition, I assess the following phenomena: sex differences relevant to health and medicine, reproduction, and childcare. In all of these cases, compared to gender terms, non-gender terms, such as “female,” “pregnant person,” or “lactating person,” more simply and accurately capture the morally relevant features of socially important sexually specific phenomena. For this reason, I find that the gender is not needed for justice.

<p dir="ltr">I investigate how we can make the content of international instruments on human rights, such as covenants and treaties, frequently applicable in all contexts. Further, I argue that the problem of widespread implementation of human rights norms is two-fold insofar as it concerns (i) recognition of their content, which is often difficult due to cultural or political disputes, and/or (ii) the enforcement of related policies through administrative institutions. After laying out the scope of the project, I propose to use the causal and explanatory properties of social contract theory to elaborate on the relationship between informal (cultural) and formal (legal) norms of human rights. Indeed, I maintain an interpretation of this theory that combines its justificatory powers, like traditional contractarians, and its explanatory role, like contemporary contractarians have done, and I suggest that there is a third, namely, the causal role. From that conceptual framework, I show a successful case of implementation of human rights norms in Colombia, which was one of the countries participants of the Latin American wave of constitutionalism in the 1980s and 1990s. This intense period of constitutional changes in the region allowed for an openness towards international human rights norms in dialogue with national experiences and customs. The relevance of this case study is that it will help me identify lessons and strategies potentially applicable on a global scale. Indeed, I show how a reconsideration of the national political pact contained in political constitutions may be a successful strategy to strengthen the incorporation of human rights norms into the legal domestic sphere. The last part of the dissertation project surveys one possible external solution for the problem of implementation: military humanitarian interventions. I conclude that military interventions do not fit within the model of social contract theory and the justification of its employment in difficult cases may proceed only with certain conditions extracted from the contract.</p>

<p>  </p> <p>This dissertation is a series of articles that put Hannah Arendt’s political thought in conversation with current social and political phenomena, namely the refugee crisis, political action under the circumstances of oppression, and the neoliberal turn in feminism.</p> <p>My first chapter joins the contemporary Arendt scholarship that parallels her account of the refugee condition and the current global refugee situation. I first analyze the image of human rights and plurality in <em>The Origins of Totalitarianism</em> and discuss the cosmopolitan response to the issues raised by Arendt. I then argue that <em>The Human Condition </em>offers an opening for a new understanding of Arendtian action that is not tied to traditional citizenship and will thus be more accommodating of refugees.</p> <p>My second chapter explores the possibility of Arendtian political action under oppression. I offer an analysis of Arendt’s separation of society versus politics and point out the limitation that this distinction places on what forms of action count as properly political. I then argue that in order to overcome this restriction, Arendt needs to recognize that 1) for marginalized groups, navigating both the social and political obstacles involves sacrifices that constitute political action, and 2) our discriminated against identity can become an instrument of political action.</p> <p>My third chapter offers an Arendtian analysis of neoliberal feminism. I begin by identifying three main ways neoliberal feminism strips the feminist movement of its collective, egalitarian, and emancipatory character. I then introduce Arendt’s account of modern capitalist labor, exclusive and inclusive solidarity, and individual self-transformation in the face of systemic obstacles. I use these Arendtian concepts to point out flaws in neoliberal feminism and offer an alternative that promotes the liberatory goals of the feminist movement. </p>

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Critical Realism, the Capabilities Approach, and Marxism, all have underdeveloped theoretical problems. For Critical Realism, the ceteris paribus clause, which is used to asses an ideological critique, does not properly specify what other things warrant the dismissal or acceptance of said critique. For the Capabilities Approach, a proper ontology or metaphysics is missing, and the claim that the Capabilities Approach can be metaphysically neutral is false. Finally, Marxism is good at describing the more onerous aspects of capitalism (e.g., alienation, exploitation, crisis), but it does not provide normative force for seeing these descriptions as bad. I argue that these three schools of thought, when connected through the ontology of Critical Realism, can be rendered mutually inclusive, and each theory can help address the lacuna in its respective counterpart. Critical Realism gives to Marxism and the Capabilities Approach ontological justification, and the Capabilities Approach gives to Critical Realism and Marxism normative force. And finally, Marxism gives to the Capabilities Approach a more radical, but consistent twist that furthers the goal of realizing our shared human powers.

<p dir="ltr">In my dissertation, “Scanlonian Contractualism and Animals,” I take T.M. Scanlon’s ethical contractualism, convert it into a political theory, and apply it to deriving the duties of justice we owe to nonhuman animals. Here is the narrative structure of my dissertation. First, I argue in chapter 1 that nonhuman animals should be included within the scope of morality, or justice, as contractualism construes this notion. Animals are some of the “others” to whom we owe duties, particularly duties of justice. To this effect, I defend a revised version of the argument from marginal cases. </p><p dir="ltr">Second, I tell the reader how contractualism works in detail in chapters 2 and 3, making modifications and conversions into political philosophy along the way. Crucial for my discussion will be the debate between Derek Parfit and Scanlon over issues such as how to take numbers into account within contractualism. Scanlon’s considered view is that personal reasons should be added up to determine what we ought to do, but this is not the aggregation of impersonal value, for example, as in utilitarianism.</p><p dir="ltr">In chapter 4, a major step taken is the conversion of political contractualism into a form of Rawlsian political liberalism. Political liberalism takes the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines on life’s important questions as a permanent feature of liberal democracy. In order to address this pluralism, political liberalism seeks to provide a political conception of justice that can be endorsed by people who differ on fundamental ethical, philosophical, and religious matters. My version of animal rights contractualism adopts this framework, but it takes work to show how animal rights and political liberalism are compatible.</p><p dir="ltr">Third, in chapter 5, a neutral metric for the harm of death will be suggested, following the requirements of political liberalism to offer a political conception of various aspects of our theories. This needs to be done because the harm of death is a complex, contested philosophical issue. The contractors need this metric to figure out what burdens are imposed by death. A neutral metric is meant to be one that can be endorsed by adherents of different comprehensive philosophical viewpoints in an overlapping consensus.</p><p dir="ltr">Fourth, and finally, some of the specific political duties we have to nonhuman animals will be stated. I survey some of the most common topics that are usually explored here, such as factory-farming, medical research, and hunting. The hope is that at the end of the work, the reader will be convinced that contractualism provides a plausible account of what we owe to each animal.</p>

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