This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

The period of English history between the second Civil War and the Restoration opened up seemingly unlimited possibilities for shaping the country�s future. The period likewise witnessed an unprecedented surge of political imagination, a development which is particularly visible in Interregnum utopianism. More than ever before, utopianism orientates itself to a hopeful and expectant reality. It is no longer fictional or contemplative. Its ambitions and fulfilment are political; there is a drive towards active political participation. Utopianism reshapes its former boundaries and reinvents itself as reality utopianism. Considering this new reality-orientated identity, the utopias of the 1650s are especially useful in providing an insight into the political imagination of this period. This thesis studies three reality utopias of the 1650s: Winstanley�s The Law of Freedom, Harrington�s Oceana and Hobbes�s Leviathan. Each work represents a uniquely different utopian vision: Winstanley imagines an agrarian communism, Harrington revives classical republicanism, and Hobbes stresses absolute sovereignty. These three different utopian visions not only illustrate the range of the political imagination; they provide an opportunity to examine different ways to deal with the existing political and social concerns of the Interregnum and different perspectives for ideal solutions. Interregnum utopianism is shaped by the expectations and violence of the English Revolution and accordingly it is characterised by the heightened hopes and fears of its time. Despite substantial differences in the three utopias, the elemental hopes and fears expressed in these works remain similar. The hope for change and a better future is negotiated textually with a fear of anarchy and violence. In the end a compromise between opportunity and security has to be found. It is this compromise that shapes the face of Interregnum utopianism and reflects a major aspect of the post-revolutionary political imagination in England.

Zugl.: Osnabrück, Univ., Diss., 2006

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Bibliography: leaves 103-107.

La filosofía política de Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) tiene como fundamento último una teología política que deduce del cristianismo el fundamento del poder absoluto del soberano. A esta altura del estado del arte, esto no resulta nada nuevo, y la importante literatura al respecto, que mencionaremos más adelante, así lo demuestra, lo que no deja de sorprender en un pensador que fue considerado por mucho tiempo como un ateo. Sin embargo, nos parece que el uso que hace Hobbes de las Escrituras es muchas veces incorrecto, inadecuado, reductor y acomodaticio, dejando fuera aspectos esenciales del cristianismo y, destacando sólo aquellos que les sirven para sus propósitos. De forma tal, que, por un lado, su teología política es discutible, y, por otro, su interpretación de las Escrituras acrecienta, en vez de disminuir, su fama de ateo. En consecuencia, pensamos, que es necesario realizar un análisis crítico del lugar que ocupa la religión, y el cristianismo, en su sistema de ideas para apreciar lo bien o mal fundada que resulta su filosofía política cuando a los argumentos filosóficos se agregan los teológicos. Éste será nuestro aporte al tema, la crítica a los fundamentos de su teología política. Creemos que Hobbes hace un uso abusivo de las Escrituras para darle un fundamento religioso a su política, de esta forma, pretende darle una mayor fuerza persuasiva a sus escritos, y un fundamento superior a su filosofía política. Ésta es nuestra tesis. Nuestra estudio, en consecuencia, tiene como propósito analizar la relación entre religión y política en la filosofía de Thomas Hobbes con el fin de evaluar el lugar que la religión ocupa en su filosofía política, al punto de que se pueda hablar de la existencia de una teología política en su filosofía. Entendemos por teología política, una política cuyos fundamentos son religiosos o teológicos.

Hobbes opera um arranjo argumentativo de forma a estruturar um novo esqueleto conceitual dos termos principais do seu original projeto politico-filosófico. O presente trabalho pretende dar conta de percorrer o labirinto argumentativo, que envolve a inclusao e a exclusao dos ambitos de validade entre lei natural e lei positiva. A trajetória intelectual hobbesiana é permeada por definições contrastantes entre termos e atua na direção de fazer com que uma possvel contenda sobre a extensao ou preeminencia entre os termos se dissipe, afrouxando a contraposição entre eles. Imagina-se ter um ganho de compreensao desse n6 com que amarra a lei natural e a lei civil, atendo-se a s suas articulaC6es. A exposição visa apontar alguns elementos-chaves da tessitura fina da relação entre lei natural e lei positiva, como, por exemplo, razão natural, razão soberana, ação e intenção, direito de resistência,"silencio da lei". Utiliza-se de partes da peça Antígona de Sófocles para ilustrar alguns dos seus pontos, somando a ela interpretações modernas que podem ser sugestivas do movimento teórico hobbesiano. Identifica-se, ao final, na literatura crtica, várias afirmações dos interpretes quanto a s reconciliações conceituais com que Hobbes opera e sugere-se que esse pode tambem ser o caso na relação entre lei natural e lei civil. Alem disso, propõe-se que esses elementos-chaves podem ser as pistas para percorrer esse labirinto argumentativo. / Hobbes makes a theoretical arrangement in order to structure a new skeleton of conception from main terms of his political and philosophical original project. The present text intends to search his theoretical labyrinth, which involves the spheres of inclusion and the exclusion between law of nature and civil law. The Hobbes~ way of argue is building with contrast definitions, but he pleads they are no antagonism. The author seeks understand how the links between right of nature and civil right are articulated. For this, he exposes key elements as natural right, reason of commonwealth, action and intention, right of self-defence, "silence of law". He lays hold of Antigone by Sofocles and modern interpretations hereof illustrate points of this presentation. In the end, it is showed opinions of specialists, who mention conceptual reconciliations in his system. It is suggested that conceptual reconciliation meet the case to describe the relationship between law of nature and civil law and also, the key elements are the traces to roam about his theoretical labyrinth.

This thesis mainly concerns the concept of social contract with the selected authors. First, I deal with various authors and their concepts, then focuses on their comparison. This thesis has a politico-ethical character. The selected authors are Thomas Hobbes and his "Leviathan, or substance, form and power of the state ecclesiastical and political," and John Locke "Second Treatise on Government", Baruch Spinoza and his "Political debate" and "Theological-political treatise," and finally, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his work "The social contract."

Dans "Les passions de l’âme", Descartes fait de l’admiration « la première de toutes les passions ». L’admiration n’est plus, comme dans la tradition antique du Thaumazein, la passion distinctive du philosophe, elle devient le premier moment de la vie affective de l’homme dans son rapport aux choses extérieures. Passion de la première rencontre, l’admiration ne serait finalement que la passion de l’enfance – condamnée à se dissoudre dans la connaissance à laquelle elle donne lieu. Une telle disparition est-elle pour autant inéluctable ? Qu’est-ce qui doit être supposé de la nature de l’admiration pour qu’il soit acceptable de la faire durer dans le temps ? L’admiration est-elle une passion dynamique qui incite à penser ou au contraire un affect statique qui empêche l’exercice de la raison ? L’analyse cherche à mettre au jour la manière dont l’admiration est devenue un problème central de l’anthropologie classique. La promotion cartésienne de l’admiration, loin d’être un geste singulier, se trouve ainsi réinscrite dans son contexte théorique. À partir de textes philosophiques, médicaux, moraux et esthétiques du XVIIe siècle, il s’agit de se demander si,loin d’être seulement subie, comme le corrélat affectif d’une ignorance inaugurale,l’admiration peut également faire l’objet d’une maîtrise technique susceptible de la produire et de la reproduire indéfiniment à des fins stratégiques ou récréatives. Dès lors qu’elle est soustraite à la stricte exigence épistémique, l’admiration peut en effet se présenter comme la finalité spécifique de l’existence mondaine aussi bien que des productions artistiques du grand siècle, que l’on peut alors considérer comme le siècle de l’admiration. / In The Passions of the Soul, Descartes presents wonder as «the first of all passions». Wonderis no longer, as it used to be in the antic tradition of thaumazein, the philosopher’s distinctive passion, but the first moment in a man’s emotional life, regarding his relationship to external items. As the passion of the first encounter, wonder appears reducible to the childhood’s passion - condemned to dissolve itself in the knowledge it enables. Is such a disappearence unavoidable ? How must one think the nature of wonder to make admissible its duration intime ? Is wonder a dynamic passion spuring one to start thinking or on the contrary, a static effect preventing the exercice of reason ?The analysis tries to uncover the way wonder became a central problem in classic anthropology. Cartesian’s promotion of wonder, far from being a singular act, is fully put inits theoretical context. Based on philosophical, medical, moral and aesthetics texts from the17th century, we ought to ask if, far from being only suffered - as the emotional correlate ofan inaugural ignorance -, wonder can be technically masterd and likely to be produced andreproduced endlessly, for strategic or recreational purposes. When substracted from the strict epistemic requirement, wonder can actually present itself as the specific end of the social existence or of the artistic productions of the Great Century - which can be now regarded asthe century of wonder.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000403449-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 1307913 bytes, checksum: d37dc850efafc7968b4633b01f6260fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / The present work aims at offering an analysis and an interpretation of Thomas Hobbes’s political theory to the light of the science of the XVII century and the discoveries operated by the modern physics in its junction with the mathematics. The text initiates with the approach of the historical ground on which it is the philosophy of Hobbes, above all with Euclides and Galileu, and goes on the direction of the transposition of the physical movements of the bodies for the foundation of the civil state. A notion of philosophy that starts from a logical-propositional and material base is distinguished, then, to reach a political theory configured in the formal positivity of the law and the legal system of the State. From the appropriation of the modern scientific tradition, a new image of the man emerges that, although rational, is submitted to inertial movements to the most lay direction of the term. Such movements disclose the complex and conflituous condition that is submitted the human nature, for the potential war of all against all. As a solution for this question, Hobbes considers a political theory based on the agreement of the wills and on the mutual transference of the rights, transposing elements of the natural philosophy to the civil philosophy, above all in the adequacy of the law of the free fall of the bodies and the principles of the inertia to the movements of the human bodies in life in the society. In this configuration, man makes, from one side, the war on behalf of the survival and, on the other side, he creates the State as the result of its will in an intricate calculation that traces - much more than the war - the best ways through the preservation and the peace. What is estimated in the political theory of Hobbes is the analysis of the physicalism of the bodies and its external regulation for the absolute state. Such physicalism, however, at the same time that represents the base on which is supported the model of the Hobbes State, it identifies them to the limits of this political theory, that can not account the identified radical physicalism in the origin of the bodies. The appropriation of these elements allows us to affirm that the political model presented by Hobbes goes deep on the rights and the duties in a contract of justification of the sovereignty given by the will and the authorization, which the main mark is the defense. The State, apart its absolute face, presents as an universal artificial construct that groups the diversity, opening the ways of the political authorization and the moral obligation. / O presente trabalho objetiva oferecer uma análise e uma interpretação da teoria política de Thomas Hobbes à luz da ciência do século XVII e das descobertas operadas pela física moderna em sua junção com a matemática. O texto se inicia com a abordagem do solo histórico sobre o qual se situa a filosofia de Hobbes, sobretudo com Euclides e Galileu, e caminha na direção da transposição dos movimentos físicos dos corpos para a fundação do estado civil. Destaca-se uma noção de filosofia que parte de uma base lógico-proposicional e material para, então, chegar a uma teoria política configurada na positividade formal da lei e no ordenamento jurídico do Estado. Da apropriação da tradição científica moderna, emerge uma nova imagem do homem que, apesar de racional, está submetido a movimentos inerciais no sentido mais laico do termo. Tais movimentos revelam a complexa e conflitiva condição a que está submetida a natureza humana, pela potencial guerra de todos contra todos. Como solução para essa questão, Hobbes propõe uma teoria política pautada no acordo das vontades e na transferência mútua de direitos, transpondo elementos da filosofia natural para a filosofia civil, sobretudo na adequação da lei da queda livre dos corpos e do princípio da inércia aos movimentos dos corpos humanos na vida em sociedade. Nessa configuração, o homem faz, de um lado, a guerra em nome da sobrevivência e, de outro lado, cria o Estado como fruto de sua vontade num intrincado cálculo que traça - muito mais do que a guerra - os melhores caminhos rumo à preservação e à paz. O que está pressuposto na teoria política de Hobbes é a análise do fisicalismo dos corpos e sua regulamentação externa pelo estado absoluto. Tal fisicalismo, no entanto, ao mesmo tempo em que representa a base sobre a qual se sustenta o modelo de Estado hobbesiano, nos leva a identificar os limites dessa teoria política, que pode não dar conta do fisicalismo radical identificado na origem dos corpos. A apropriação desses elementos nos permite afirmar que o modelo político apresentado por Hobbes funda direitos e deveres num contrato de justificação da soberania dado pela vontade e autorização, cuja marca principal é a defesa. O Estado, não obstante à sua face absoluta, apresenta-se como um construto artificial universal que agrupa a diversidade, abrindo os caminhos da autorização política e da obrigação moral.

Hobbes opera um arranjo argumentativo de forma a estruturar um novo esqueleto conceitual dos termos principais do seu original projeto politico-filosófico. O presente trabalho pretende dar conta de percorrer o labirinto argumentativo, que envolve a inclusao e a exclusao dos ambitos de validade entre lei natural e lei positiva. A trajetória intelectual hobbesiana é permeada por definições contrastantes entre termos e atua na direção de fazer com que uma possvel contenda sobre a extensao ou preeminencia entre os termos se dissipe, afrouxando a contraposição entre eles. Imagina-se ter um ganho de compreensao desse n6 com que amarra a lei natural e a lei civil, atendo-se a s suas articulaC6es. A exposição visa apontar alguns elementos-chaves da tessitura fina da relação entre lei natural e lei positiva, como, por exemplo, razão natural, razão soberana, ação e intenção, direito de resistência,"silencio da lei". Utiliza-se de partes da peça Antígona de Sófocles para ilustrar alguns dos seus pontos, somando a ela interpretações modernas que podem ser sugestivas do movimento teórico hobbesiano. Identifica-se, ao final, na literatura crtica, várias afirmações dos interpretes quanto a s reconciliações conceituais com que Hobbes opera e sugere-se que esse pode tambem ser o caso na relação entre lei natural e lei civil. Alem disso, propõe-se que esses elementos-chaves podem ser as pistas para percorrer esse labirinto argumentativo. / Hobbes makes a theoretical arrangement in order to structure a new skeleton of conception from main terms of his political and philosophical original project. The present text intends to search his theoretical labyrinth, which involves the spheres of inclusion and the exclusion between law of nature and civil law. The Hobbes~ way of argue is building with contrast definitions, but he pleads they are no antagonism. The author seeks understand how the links between right of nature and civil right are articulated. For this, he exposes key elements as natural right, reason of commonwealth, action and intention, right of self-defence, "silence of law". He lays hold of Antigone by Sofocles and modern interpretations hereof illustrate points of this presentation. In the end, it is showed opinions of specialists, who mention conceptual reconciliations in his system. It is suggested that conceptual reconciliation meet the case to describe the relationship between law of nature and civil law and also, the key elements are the traces to roam about his theoretical labyrinth.