In this thesis we study peer-based communities which are online communities whose services are provided by their participant agents. In order to improve the services an agent enjoys in these communities, we need to improve the services other agents offer. Towards this goal, we propose a novel solution which allows communities to share the experience of their members with other communities. The experience of a community with an agent is captured in the evaluation rating of the agent within the community, which can either represent the trustworthiness or the reputation of the agent. We argue that exchanging this information is the right way to improve the services the agent offers since it: i) exploits the information that each community accumulates to allow other communities to decide whether to accept the agent while it also puts pressure on the agent to behave well, since it is aware that any misbehaviour will be spread to the communities it might wish to join in the future, ii) can prevent the agent from overstretching itself among many communities, since this may lead the agent to provide very limited services to each of these communities due to its limited resources, and thus its trustworthiness and reputation might be compromised. We study mechanisms that can be used to facilitate the exchange of trust or reputation information between communities. We make two key contributions. First, we propose a graph-based model which allows a particular community to determine which other communities to ask information from. We leverage consistency of past information and provide an equilibrium analysis showing that communities are best-off when they truthfully report the requested information, and describe how payments should be made to support the equilibrium. Our second contribution is a promise-based trust model where agents are judged based on the contributions they promise and deliver to the community. We outline a set of desirable properties such a model must exhibit, provide an instantiation, and an empirical evaluation.

In this thesis we study peer-based communities which are online communities whose services are provided by their participant agents. In order to improve the services an agent enjoys in these communities, we need to improve the services other agents offer. Towards this goal, we propose a novel solution which allows communities to share the experience of their members with other communities. The experience of a community with an agent is captured in the evaluation rating of the agent within the community, which can either represent the trustworthiness or the reputation of the agent. We argue that exchanging this information is the right way to improve the services the agent offers since it: i) exploits the information that each community accumulates to allow other communities to decide whether to accept the agent while it also puts pressure on the agent to behave well, since it is aware that any misbehaviour will be spread to the communities it might wish to join in the future, ii) can prevent the agent from overstretching itself among many communities, since this may lead the agent to provide very limited services to each of these communities due to its limited resources, and thus its trustworthiness and reputation might be compromised. We study mechanisms that can be used to facilitate the exchange of trust or reputation information between communities. We make two key contributions. First, we propose a graph-based model which allows a particular community to determine which other communities to ask information from. We leverage consistency of past information and provide an equilibrium analysis showing that communities are best-off when they truthfully report the requested information, and describe how payments should be made to support the equilibrium. Our second contribution is a promise-based trust model where agents are judged based on the contributions they promise and deliver to the community. We outline a set of desirable properties such a model must exhibit, provide an instantiation, and an empirical evaluation.

abstract: As securities companies occupy an increasingly important position in the national economy, and the most valuable competitive advantage for whom is human resources; therefore, Security Industry practitioners pay close attention to the influences of securities companies' incentive mechanisms regarding to various business types. This paper finds that asymmetry of information in business models is the motivation of the gaming for all participants, through analyzing the differences of various business models of securities brokerage services. Further, various incentive mechanisms under different circumstances result in diverse strategies of gaming. It varies development paths of securities companies. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to theoretically deduce the most reasonable and optimal securities companies’ incentive mechanism. This paper intends to identify the principle component factors influencing securities brokerage services via questionnaire investigations towards 75 branches under the same securities company and 13 different securities companies, respectively. In addition, based on historical data, the paper aim to explain rationales between adjustments of incentive mechanisms and market shares of securities brokerage services.Lastly, combining author’s personal experience of various incentive mechanisms and development tracks in four securities companies that hopefully presents valuable information and clues for deducing the optimal securities company incentive mechanism. There are two critical agency relationships in securities brokerage services. One is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are directors of branches. The other is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are securities marketers or brokers. Because of such operational setup, information is highly asymmetrical between all parties. It brought prominent problems regarding agency relationship and motivation aspects. Under the certain circumstances, implementation of Incomplete Contracting Theory with franchising models in securities companies is quite useful. Specifically, for the former relationship between securities companies and marketers, the motivation effects of sub-license franchising are better than bonus compensation structure. Fixed salaries without bonus have the worst stimulating effects in such business model. For the latter relationship between securities companies and directors of branches, the agents focus on long term residual value claim rights, since it coincides with agents’ appraisals, focusing on incremental market shares and profit drawings. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2018

A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.

A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.

Inducement prizes-where cash rewards are given to motivate the attainment of targets--have been long used to encourage scientific research, develop technological innovations, or stimulate individuals, groups, and communities to accomplish diverse goals. Lately, prizes have increasingly attracted the attention of policy-makers, among others, due to their potential to induce path-breaking innovations and accomplish related goals. Academic research, however, has barely investigated these prizes in spite of their long history, recent popularity, and notable potential. This research investigates prizes and the means by which they induce innovation. It uses an empirical, multiple case-study methodology, a new model of innovation applied to prizes, and multiple data sources to investigate three cases of recent aerospace technology prizes: a main case study, the Google Lunar X Prize (GLXP) for robotic Moon exploration; and two pilot cases, the Ansari X Prize (AXP) for the first private reusable manned spacecraft and the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge (NGLLC) for flights of reusable rocket-powered vehicles. The investigation unveils the dynamics of prizes and contributes a better understanding of their potential and disadvantages in a context in which more traditional mechanisms are used to induce innovation. This research shows that prizes are a more complex mechanism and their investigation requires analyzing entrant- and context-level factors generally not considered by the literature. Prizes complement and not replace patents and other incentive mechanisms. The incentives offered by prizes attract entrants with diverse characteristics, including unconventional entrants--individuals and organizations generally not involved with the prize technologies. Entrants are generally attracted by the non-monetary benefits of participation and the potential market value of the technologies involved in competitions. Many more volunteers, collaborators, and partners also participate indirectly and support official entries as they also perceive opportunities to accomplish their personal and organizational goals. The monetary reward is important to position the competition in the media and disseminate the idea of the prize. Prizes can induce increasing R&D activities and re-direct industry projects to target diverse technological goals, yet the evolution of prize competitions and quality of the technological outputs is generally difficult to anticipate. The overall organization of prize R&D activities and their outputs depend on entrant-level factors and can only be indirectly influenced by setting specific competition rules. The most remarkable characteristic of prize R&D activities is their interaction with fundraising efforts which, in some circumstances, may constrain the activities of entrants. Prizes can also induce innovation over and above what would have occurred anyway, yet their overall effect depends significantly on the characteristics of the prize entrants and the evolution of the context of the competition. The ability of prizes to induce innovation is larger when there are larger prize incentives, more significant technology gaps implicit in the prize challenge, and open-ended challenge definitions. To successfully induce technological breakthroughs, prizes may require complementary incentives (e.g. commitments to purchase technology) or support (e.g. seed funding.) Prizes are particularly appropriate to, for example, explore new, experimental methods and technologies that imply high-risk R&D; induce technological development to break critical technological barriers; accelerate technological development to achieve higher performance standards; and, accelerate diffusion, adoption, and/or commercialization of technologies. They involve, however, higher programmatic risks than other more traditional mechanisms and their routine use, and/or challenge definitions that overlap, can weaken the incentive power of the mechanism. Successful implementation of competitions requires many parameters to be properly set.

[pt] A estrutura de contratos de Parcerias Público-Privadas (PPP) tem como característica o compartilhamento de riscos do projeto entre o governo e investidor. PPPs têm longo prazo de maturação, volumes elevados de investimentos iniciais e incerteza quanto às receitas. O comportamento futuro de agentes públicos e privados pode transmitir um risco adicional, tornando projetos pouco atrativos quando informações relevantes não ficam evidentes em um contrato. A teoria dos jogos tem sido um instrumento amplamente utilizado para trazer soluções analíticas quando o problema de assimetria de informação está presente. Portanto, este trabalho utiliza os conceitos de teóricos de mecanismos compatíveis com incentivos para PPPs objetivando: (i) aprimoramento de falhas contratuais ex-post via condições ex-ante ; (ii) aprimorar um modelo de jogo de renegociação de PPPs, mostrando como o comportamento oportunista pode ser evitado. Analisa-se o processo de concessão do Complexo Maracanã, como caso ilustrativo via uso de proposições, lemas e teoremas, mostrando que o edital do Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro é sub-ótimo do ponto de vista da Teoria de Desenho de Mecanismos. / [en] The Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) contract structure is characterized by the sharing of project risks between the government and the investor. PPPs have long maturation maturities, high initial investment volumes and revenue uncertainty. The future behavior of public and private agents may carry an additional risk, making projects unattractive when relevant information is not evident in a contract. Game theory has been a widely used instrument to provide analytical solutions when the problem of information asymmetry is present. Therefore, this thesis uses the concepts of mechanism theorists compatible with incentives for PPPs, aiming: (i) improvement of ex-ante and ex-post contractual failures; (ii) to improve a PPP renegotiation game model, showing how opportunistic behavior can be avoided. It analyzes the concession process of the Maracanã Complex as illustrative case via use of propositions, lemmas and theorems, showing that the State Government s announcement of Rio de Janeiro is sub-optimal from the point of view of the mechanisms of Design Theory.

Questa tesi include tre capitoli che si concentrano sulle politiche pubbliche e la tutela della salute. Il primo capitolo esamina l’effetto dell’incremento delle aliquote dell’IVA su alcune bevande sul loro consumo. I risultati dell’analisi empirica suggeriscono che l'aumento dell'aliquota IVA ha ridotto il consumo di alcolici, birra e bevande gassate, mentre l’effetto sul consumo di vino non è statisticamente significativo. Tuttavia, questo risultato generale cambia se si considerano sotto-gruppi di individui. Il secondo capitolo studia l’impatto del salario minimo sulla salute della popolazione cinese. Le stime indicano che i salari minimi reali sono negativamente e significativamente correlati con lo stato di salute della popolazione sia nel breve che nel lungo periodo, un risultato che potrebbe essere spiegato dalle condizioni di lavoro più stressanti conseguenti all’introduzione di un salario minimo più elevato. Infine, il terzo capitolo analizza gli effetti dei meccanismi di incentivazione sui comportamenti degli operatori sanitari del settore delle cure primarie nell’ambito della gestione dell'ipertensione. La nostra indagine empirica suggerisce che gli incentivi finanziari negativi potrebbero motivare gli operatori sanitari a migliorare la qualità dei servizi legati alla gestione dell'ipertensione, mentre né gli incentivi finanziari né diverse modalità di valutazione delle prestazioni sembrano influenzare la qualità dei servizi. / This dissertation includes three chapters which focus on the relationship between public policies and healthcare. The first chapter examines whether tax policy is effective in changing the unhealthy drinking behaviours of individuals. My findings suggest that the VAT rate increase is effective in reducing the consumption of spirits, beer and carbonated beverages, while it is not effective for wine. However, this general result change when looking at sub-groups of individuals. The second chapter studies how real minimum wages affect population health in China. I conclude that real minimum wages are negatively and significantly related to population health, a result which might be explained by the role of more stressful working conditions as a consequence of a higher minimum wage. Finally, the third chapter analyses the effects of incentive mechanisms on the behaviours of primary health workers and the subsequent effects on the quality of hypertension management. The empirical investigation suggests that negative financial incentives could motivate primary health workers and improve the quality of hypertension management. However, neither positive financial incentives nor different modes of performance evaluation are significantly related to the quality of hypertension management.