Research into whether insider trading exists in the shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“JSE”). The purpose of the research is to examine the share price in target companies and to determine whether or not it increases significantly during the days immediately preceding a takeover, delisting or share buy-back announcement. Out of a total of 5,039 merger and acquisition transactions, during the six- year period from 2000 to 2005, only 30 transactions met the criteria of information availability and non-occurrence of confounding events. The Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAAR) of target companies during a 21-day event window period were examined. The examination of the CAAR was based on the historical bootstrapping technique and the CAAR was plotted on the frequency distribution to test for significance. The CAAR of the sample tested to be statistically significant in the days prior to the first public announcement. Evidence of a share price build-up in the days prior to the first public announcement was found. Controlling for confounding events, this price build-up could be indicative of insider trading. This research study seems to be the first study focused on insider trading and pre-announcement price run-ups on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Much work has been conducted on the signalling effect that a directors’ trade has on outsiders. This is based on the premise that insiders, or directors, shareholders and managers of companies have access to information about their companies that outsiders do not (Bhana, 2007; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2006; Hodgson and van Praag, 2006), raising questions about the efficiency of markets (Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Other research concludes that the greater the shareholding percentage or percentage control held by an insider, the greater would be their access to company information, and that this would lead directly to an increase in the strength of the signal to the market. Hillier and Marshall (2002) find that the abnormal returns occur most strongly where directors have increased their shareholding. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog in various studies found that the opposite is true, particularly for purchases, citing a perceived danger of increased entrenchment as the reason for this anomaly. This study will use the AltX of the JSE and attempt to show that there is a positive return on shareholder investment following an insider purchase and a negative return on investment following an insider sale as outsiders react to these signals and the information contained in these trades. This study will also attempt to prove that the percentage control of a director who purchases their own shares has an inverse relationship to the abnormal returns. This study uses the event study methodology and analyses the abnormal returns in the event windows extending back to twenty days prior to the events and for the following twenty days after the event. Abnormal returns are modelled using the control portfolio model of Mordant and Muller (2003) which is based on the Fama and French Three-Factor model. These abnormal returns are then tested for significance using T-tests and the bootstrapping technique. Relationships between shareholding interest and returns is established using linear correlation. No statistical significance could be found on the returns compared to the market following either a purchase or sale insider trade. However, it was found that the reaction to purchases was significantly higher than the reaction to sales, and results indicate that the reaction to sales on the AltX of the JSE leads to abnormal losses in the short term. This study finds that there is no indistinguishable relationship between shareholding and returns that are different to zero. While it is clear that other bourses internationally demonstrate clear evidence of the existence of signals contained in insider trades, and other South African studies find corroborative evidence on the JSE main board, there is no evidence that insider trades on the AltX contain any signalling value in them for outsiders, particularly pertaining to purchases. Although not economically significant, sales do suggest that there is information contained in the trade, but is this reaction in the market due to the information contained in the trade, or simply due to a culture of trading on market sentiment? / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Insider trading is one of the most unscrupulous financial crimes, as it results in people placed in positions of trust effectively stealing from those that they were supposed to protect. This research examined the volumes traded in shares listed on the JSE All Share index, to determine if it could be used as an indicator of insider trading, and whether it increases significantly in the days immediately preceding SENS announcements. The top five abnormal returns per share were generated using control portfolios. These were analysed manually to identify the most appropriate SENS announcement. From the 735 abnormal returns, 142 announcements qualified for the volume analysis, after the removal of confounding events. These announcements were classified into seven categories: BEE and governance; financial structure; investment/disinvestment; key personnel; mergers and acquisitions; trading update; and other. The average daily cumulative abnormal volume turnover (ACAVT) was examined using a 21-day event window period preannouncement. The preceding 63 days were used to calculate the benchmark. Three techniques were used to calculate ACAVTs – equations, t-tests and bootstrapping - which proved successful in determining ACAVT. The tests showed that overall the ACAVT was statistically insignificant. Two categories exhibited significant ACAVT – BEE and governance, and key personnel. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

The first essay explores relations between political affiliations and illegal insider trading. Assessing illegal insider trading is challenging due to the nature of the activity. Researchers observe and evaluate only the detected portion of illegal trading, not all illegal transactions. This presents a problem when using traditional empirical techniques to investigate such activity. In our analysis we employ a bivariate probit model that takes into account the partial observability nature of insider trading and provides estimates for the determinants of both the commission and the detection of illegal insider trading. Among our findings, most notable is the influence of the SEC’s political structure on insider trading detection. We show that the political party affiliation within the SEC, past indictments by the SEC, and SEC budget play a crucial role in determining current prosecution. Past SEC indictments significantly decrease the likelihood to engage in illegal insider trading as well. Essay two investigates insider trading returns by corporate insiders in light of their firms’ lobbying activities. Lobbying is a channel firms often use to influence regulatory change. Firms also use lobbying to obtain information on upcoming legislative and regulatory changes that are significant to the firms’ future. Establishing and maintaining these political connections provides informational advantage not only to the firms engaged in lobbying but also to the insiders of these firms who receive an opportunity to base their trading decision on this potentially valuable information. Using data on firm lobbying activities, we provide evidence of an informational advantage acquired by corporate insiders of firms that develop these connections with policymakers. We find that insiders of lobbying firms gain additional return of 138 (156) basis points on their buys (sells) trades relative to transactions placed by insiders of firms that are not engaged in lobbying activities. We also document that the role of establishing and fostering lobbying contacts and the amounts spent on lobbying differ with type of insider transactions and length of investment horizons. The focus of the third essay is the impact of actual trading on material non-public information on firms’ securities. Finance and law scholars present theoretical arguments both in favor of and against trading on material non-public information. However, investigating empirically the actual impact of insider trading on the insider’s firm poses significant challenges due to the lack of precision in identifying from publically available data trades that are based on private information. In this study, we utilize Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) indictments of illegal insider trading to examine the impact of illegal insider trading on the firm. We provide evidence suggesting that illegal insider trading increases stock market liquidity for the involved firms. Our results imply that bid-ask spread following transactions based on private information is narrower for long-run windows. However, we also find results implying that informed trading is associated with reduced liquidity, when estimated with Amihud Illiquidity proxy, reflecting price impact of trades based on private information.

The presence of insider trading in a financial market is detrimental to its functioning. Traders with public information are always at a disadvantage when negotiating with agents in possession of inside information. Thus insider trading should increase risk and should lower participation in financial markets. In this study we investigate a channel through which inside information may be transferred to market participants: social connections based on common education. We hand-collect a novel data set of the educational background of members of the board of directors of Brazilian firms and portfolio managers of stock funds. Board members hold inside information on their firms that is valuable to fund managers. We propose that these agents may engage in active social interactions if they 1) attended the same educational institution, 2) within an overlapping time window, and 3) obtained the same degree. We study if such connections influence fund managers\' portfolio decisions. We find that fund managers tend to place larger bets in companies with which they possess this sort of educational connection. We also find that these connections are economically valuable: managers tend to conduct large purchases of connected stocks prior to large increases in their return, and also tend to sell them prior to downfalls. Finally, we study if market participants view increases in a company\'s connectivity as an increase in its risk. We find that increases in connectivity are followed by increases in expected returns. We also determine that the return of holding a portfolio long in highly connected stocks and short on stocks with few connections cannot be explained by the traditional risk factors. These two results indicate that the market does indeed see connectivity as a form of risk. This is, to our knowledge, the first study of its kind for Brazil. / A presença de insider trading em um mercado financeiro é prejudicial ao seu funcionamento. Investidores com informação pública sempre estão em desvantagem quando negociam com agentes que detêm informação privilegiada. Portanto, insider trading aumenta o risco e diminui a participação em mercados financeiros. Neste estudo nós investigamos um possível canal através do qual a informação interna à firma é potencialmente transferida para participantes do mercado: conexões sociais baseadas em uma educação comum. Nós coletamos manualmente uma base de dados inédita sobre a experiência educacional de dois grupos de agentes: membros do conselho de diretores de empresas brasileiras e gestores de carteiras de fundos de ações. Os membros do conselho possuem informação privilegiada sobre suas firmas que seria valiosa para os gestores de fundos. Nós propomos que esses agentes podem engajar em contato social ativo se eles 1) frequentaram a mesma instituição de ensino, 2) em janelas de tempo sobrepostas e 3) obtiveram o mesmo diploma. A partir daí, estudamos se tais conexões influenciam as decisões de investimento dos gestores de carteiras. Nós descobrimos que gerentes de fundos tendem a alocar posições maiores em companhias com as quais eles possuem esta conexão educacional. Nós também descobrimos que tais conexões são valiosas: gerentes tendem a realizar grandes compras de ações conectadas em antecipação a aumentos em seu retorno e tendem a vender essas ações antes de quedas. Finalmente, nós estudamos se participantes do mercado veem aumentos na conectividade de uma empresa como aumentos no risco da empresa. Nós descobrimos que aumentos na conectividade são seguidos de aumentos no retorno esperado. Nós também encontramos que o retorno de um portfólio comprado em ações de alta conectividade e vendido em ações de baixa conectividade não pode ser explicado pelos fatores de risco tradicionais. Esses dois resultados indicam que o mercado vê a conectividade como uma forma de risco. Este é, ao nosso conhecimento, o primeiro trabalho de seu tipo para o Brasil.

The presence of insider trading in a financial market is detrimental to its functioning. Traders with public information are always at a disadvantage when negotiating with agents in possession of inside information. Thus insider trading should increase risk and should lower participation in financial markets. In this study we investigate a channel through which inside information may be transferred to market participants: social connections based on common education. We hand-collect a novel data set of the educational background of members of the board of directors of Brazilian firms and portfolio managers of stock funds. Board members hold inside information on their firms that is valuable to fund managers. We propose that these agents may engage in active social interactions if they 1) attended the same educational institution, 2) within an overlapping time window, and 3) obtained the same degree. We study if such connections influence fund managers\' portfolio decisions. We find that fund managers tend to place larger bets in companies with which they possess this sort of educational connection. We also find that these connections are economically valuable: managers tend to conduct large purchases of connected stocks prior to large increases in their return, and also tend to sell them prior to downfalls. Finally, we study if market participants view increases in a company\'s connectivity as an increase in its risk. We find that increases in connectivity are followed by increases in expected returns. We also determine that the return of holding a portfolio long in highly connected stocks and short on stocks with few connections cannot be explained by the traditional risk factors. These two results indicate that the market does indeed see connectivity as a form of risk. This is, to our knowledge, the first study of its kind for Brazil. / A presença de insider trading em um mercado financeiro é prejudicial ao seu funcionamento. Investidores com informação pública sempre estão em desvantagem quando negociam com agentes que detêm informação privilegiada. Portanto, insider trading aumenta o risco e diminui a participação em mercados financeiros. Neste estudo nós investigamos um possível canal através do qual a informação interna à firma é potencialmente transferida para participantes do mercado: conexões sociais baseadas em uma educação comum. Nós coletamos manualmente uma base de dados inédita sobre a experiência educacional de dois grupos de agentes: membros do conselho de diretores de empresas brasileiras e gestores de carteiras de fundos de ações. Os membros do conselho possuem informação privilegiada sobre suas firmas que seria valiosa para os gestores de fundos. Nós propomos que esses agentes podem engajar em contato social ativo se eles 1) frequentaram a mesma instituição de ensino, 2) em janelas de tempo sobrepostas e 3) obtiveram o mesmo diploma. A partir daí, estudamos se tais conexões influenciam as decisões de investimento dos gestores de carteiras. Nós descobrimos que gerentes de fundos tendem a alocar posições maiores em companhias com as quais eles possuem esta conexão educacional. Nós também descobrimos que tais conexões são valiosas: gerentes tendem a realizar grandes compras de ações conectadas em antecipação a aumentos em seu retorno e tendem a vender essas ações antes de quedas. Finalmente, nós estudamos se participantes do mercado veem aumentos na conectividade de uma empresa como aumentos no risco da empresa. Nós descobrimos que aumentos na conectividade são seguidos de aumentos no retorno esperado. Nós também encontramos que o retorno de um portfólio comprado em ações de alta conectividade e vendido em ações de baixa conectividade não pode ser explicado pelos fatores de risco tradicionais. Esses dois resultados indicam que o mercado vê a conectividade como uma forma de risco. Este é, ao nosso conhecimento, o primeiro trabalho de seu tipo para o Brasil.

acase@tulane.edu / The relationship between microstructure, efficiency and data frequency give us a new opportunity to test information (e.g. events and news) efficiency assimilation for Mexican ADRs and their underlying Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV) stocks It also allows to corroborate whether in emerging markets, specifically in the Mexican market, insider trading could be present but it may not be necessarily detected by market efficiency tools only. Using a proprietary dataset of Mexican Stock Exchange (Mexican Bolsa) intraday prices for underlying stocks and their respective Type II and III ADRs quoted in NASDAQ, AMEX and New York Stock Exchange, time series analysis related to price dynamics and event studies methodologies were applied. Non-linearity of the prices was tested, finding no statistical evidence of such behavior, which led to conclude linearity in them. Volatility transmission was also analyzed, finding that external shock can impact both markets having a recursive behavior; shocks in Mexican market has an impact also in American Market and vice versa. Using a standard Event Studies methodology we tested for nine different corporate events (dividends, changes in capital structure, acquisitions, mergers, takeovers, spin offs, sell offs, joint ventures and privatizations) and seven different classes of stocks in both markets, looking for parallelism in cumulative abnormal returns, volatility, trade volume and Granger causality. The results are a statistically significant behavior similar in both markets (for both CARs and volatility). The evidence of Granger-causality in ADR / underlying stock was detected in both ways: underlying stocks Granger cause the ADRs and vice versa. The results corroborate a non-arbitrage behavior in both markets and no evidence of insider trading in ADRs / underlying stocks in both markets / 1 / Polux E. Diaz Ruiz

The decisions of the federal government such as new legislation, bills and reforms can have serious implications for the financial markets, especially in terms of corporate profitability and shareholder value. As the overseers of federal agencies, U.S. Senators are arguably the most important participants in these decision making processes, in addition to being the most informed investors in the market. As such, Senators may be able to capitalize on their superior networks and information through stock trading. The portfolios traded on such insider information should generate abnormal returns against the market index. This study conducts an analysis of the abnormal returns on common stock purchases reported by U.S. Senators between 1995 and 2012. This paper recreates congressional buy portfolio using a consistent methodology throughout the entire sample period considered by earlier studies. While the sample size is reduced, the methodology used in this analysis relies on actual transactions dates to maximize accuracy. An analysis of the abnormal returns of the common stock investments of U.S. Senators during the period 1995 – 2012 shows that Senators are generally poor investors: purchases made by senators underperform the market index by approximately 3% a year.

Abstract The study attempts to filter the public trading data, based on TESC and TEJ to get the proxy variable of insiders¡¦ trading. We estimate the proxy variable of insider trading according to the Security and Exchange Act. The correlation between the daily return and time-series proxy variables are significant and the proxy variable is a factor for the return. The paces of information releasing are different by capital levels. When the capital is under 40 billion, the information will be released within 4 days. The portfolio of the proxy variable in 4 factors Fama and French model is only effective in small capital levels. In the aspect of the price levels, the time series proxy variables are significant but the effects are different among the levels of price. The portfolio of the proxy variable in 4 factors Fama and French model is only effective in the lower price levels

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