Russian foreign policy from the mid-1960s has vacillated between periods of expansion and retrenchment in which the military and diplomatic reach of the state has extended to continents or been retracted to very modest conceptions of national defense. During this period, the financial centrality of energy exports has come to dominate the Russian economy, leading scholars and observers to draw a causal link between the two: as energy revenues go up, expansionism does as well, while declines in revenues lead Russia to behave less assertively. This dissertation outlines an alternative argument for petrostate foreign policy in which positive or negative revenue environments determine the menu of policy options available to policymakers, but that internal politics determine the content of those foreign policy choices. I argue that foreign policy choices are conditional on the mediating political institutions and circumstances existing at the time of booms and busts, namely that how energy revenue shocks affect foreign policy decision-making in a petrostate after a revenue shock depends on the political environment before the shock. The petropolitics foreign policy theory thus provides insight as to when the expansionism might occur. By focusing on revenue yet allowing politicians to retain agency, this “petropolitics” foreign policy theory links structural theories of foreign policy to leadership-driven models of political decision-making. This petropolitics theory then reassesses Russian foreign policy by analyzing leadership tenures from Leonid Brezhnev to Vladimir Putin. I show that Soviet expansionism in the Third World in the 1970s was not simply because of a positive revenue shock, but because of Brezhnev’s political weakness after his installation in a palace coup. Similarly, I show that Mikhail Gorbachev’s retrenchment of foreign policy commitments arose not solely from a lack of energy revenues, but from his political strength in light of the poor performance of his predecessors. Finally, I show that Vladimir Putin’s selective expansionism and retrenchment emerges in a skillful consolidation of domestic political strength, a fortuitous influx of energy revenues, and a willingness to change foreign policy strategies to serve a single preference of maintaining power. / text

The aim of this study is to serve as an introduction to the legal issues dealing with the presence of foreign states' armed forces in the territory of the Czech Republic and in any other receiving states' territory. Czech Republic has ultimate sovereignty under international law. It has supreme independent authority over her geographic area and is only restricted by the sovereignty of other states, international law itself and by freely accepted commitments. Chapter One is introductory and defines how as a consequence of its status as a sovereign state, Czech Republic joins international and supranational organisations and is part of many bilateral and multilateral security agreements. Such acts of its free will serve as a complex system of security measures that every state needs to undertake in order to secure its geographic area and its population. National security and safety is linked to international peace and security. One without the other cannot exist. Due to rapid developments and globalised world, the threats to states' security has changed. Nowadays, states need to face not only military threats, but non-military threats as well, such as economical, environmental, social or political challenges. States use multiple instruments for the purpose of overcoming these threats. One of the...

The accelerated trend of globalization has transformed the traditional role of the state. According to James Mittelman and Robert Johnston, the state is engaged in a courtesan role, which consists in shifting from serving citizens to acting as tacit partners in market relations, including with globally organized criminal groups. Building on the concept of the courtesan role of the state, this study addresses: (a) the general question of direct and indirect connections of states with illicit transactions in the post-Cold War, with a special attention to arms trafficking; (b) the reaction of the United States, as the remaining unique superpower, to the behavior of states associated with global illicit transactions, especially when involving security-sensitive cases such as arms transfer; (c) the security implications of this particular feature of the global illicit economy, particularly how threats are defined in international politics in the post-Cold War unipolar world. Focusing on the Argentina venta de armas case of illicit arms transfer to the Balkans and Ecuador in the 1990s, the research explores (a) the structural conditions and the domestic roots of a state engaged in illegal transactions in the post-Cold War; (b) the superpower's reaction to policies involving illicit transactions; (c) the security consequences. Through these venues, the dissertation aims at refining the debate in IR Theory to provide a better understanding of the international security dynamics in the post-Cold War.

This issue of WeltTrends features the debate about the future of the transatlantic relationship and world order after the Iraq war. It was started by Thomas Risse with his article in the previous edition. Thomas Risse elaborated on three main points of contention between the United States and Europe: the role of international law and multilateralism, democracy and human rights, and the strategy towards new security threats. <br>Most of the scholars, contributing to the debate in this issue agree with Risse in that there is no alternative to the transatlantic partnership and offer possible paths towards its renewal. The debate will be continued with additional comments and a rebuttal by Thomas Risse in the next Winter issue.

<p>In situations of armed violence and insecurity, how do civilians influence the political environment around them? In this dissertation, I present three different studies that broadly engage this question. In concert, the papers presented herein offer new insights on civilians' relationship to armed conflict through a focus on victimization, participation, attitudes on resistance, and the effects of civilian resistance on aggregate levels of violence. </p><p>The first study explores the effects of victimization on political participation. I argue that previous answers to this question have overlooked a key variable for predicting civilian behavior: individual level social context. As a step forward in connecting social support networks to behavioral outcomes, I present the kinship network as a novel measure that captures an individual's valuable and private social interactions. I find that survivors of criminal violence with strong ties to kinship networks are most likely to attend political meetings. By highlighting variation in behavior across victims, I challenge previous work which only examines differences in participation between victims and non-victims. </p><p>Motivated by the assumption that attitudes are a precursor to action, my second study examines civilian attitudes on the efficacy of resistance in regions of protracted violence. Using an original survey fielded in Mexico, I explore the conditions under which civilians are likely to view nonviolent or violent methods as useful tools for change. I first test whether several demographic factors--age, gender, income, knowledge about civil resistance, and media consumption--influence attitudes toward resistance. Moving beyond these variables, I then test whether perceptions about government responsibility affect these attitudes. Specifically, I argue that civilian attitudes towards resistance methods are informed by which political actor civilians view as responsible for their security problems. I find that the predicted probability of viewing nonviolent action as more effective than violent action increases by 20.8% for those who attribute security responsibility to local authorities, compared to other actors. Using an embedded survey experiment, I then address the empirically relevant question of whether these attitudes about resistance correlate with action. I find that compared to those who do not view resistance as useful, respondents who view nonviolence as effective are "supportive types'' who are more willing than others to support local resistance groups, regardless of the methods these groups employ. Together, these analyses provide important information for civilian organizers seeking to mobilize latent support for resistance. Moreover, they enrich our understanding of the ways in which communities can reduce violence in order to reclaim political control during armed conflicts.</p><p>Last, I present an aggregated analysis on the evolution of armed conflict in Mexico. The criminal war in Mexico is extremely complex: Drug Trafficking Organizations, citizens, government agents, amongst others, are all relevant actors within the dynamic evolution of the conflict. Existing research, however, typically ignores the interdependencies inherent to these networks. Using a new collection of machine-coded event data, I generate conflict networks for each year from 2004 to 2010. In doing so, I make three major contributions. First, I offer insights into the potential promise and pitfalls of using machine-coded data for country-level analysis. Next, after cleaning and improving upon the original data, I generate yearly networks, which capture a wide range of violent-related actors. Importantly, I demonstrate how these networks illustrate the interdependent nature of the Mexican conflict and present new insights, such as how government coordination changes in response to cartel violence over time. Finally, I use a latent space approach to identify previously unobservable violence between government actors, criminal groups, and civilians. This research design serves as a platform for future research to investigate the effects of major civilian-led events--such as mass protests--on the evolution of armed conflict.</p> / Dissertation

Consacrer une thèse à la lutte contre le crime organisé aux Émirats Arabes Unis peut paraître assez étonnant. La sécurité dans ce pays atteint un niveau très élevé et les autorités gardent un contrôle très ferme sur une population composée à 90% d’étrangers. Considérés généralement comme un des pays les plus sûrs au monde, le crime organisé n’a pas sa place aux Émirats. Mais le sujet se justifie parce que la lutte contre le crime organisé ne se conçoit que dans un cadre global qui met au premier plan les pays aux économies avancées. Les Émirats sont parties prenantes à la stratégie et à la coopération internationale qui se développent fermement depuis plus d’une trentaine d’années pour réduire les organisations criminelles. Ces organisations toujours actives ont été rejointes par des organisations terroristes qui se financent par des trafics et des activités illégales. Cette jonction entre le crime et le terrorisme, prouvée par les enquêtes sur le terrain, est un facteur d’aggravation de l’instabilité et un défi pour les forces de police. Dans le Golfe, région sensible, il convient de surveiller étroitement les flux commerciaux qui peuvent dissimuler des activités criminelles. Mais il faut aussi, détecter les flux financiers issus d’activités criminelles qui sont recyclés dans l’économie prospère des Émirats. Sur ces deux plans, les Emirats jouent un rôle décisif en raison de ses moyens financiers importants, des technologies de surveillance et de la volonté politique de ses dirigeants. Cette thèse replace l’action des Emirats dans le cadre normatif et institutionnel fixé par des traités, relayé sur place par le droit national. Dans ce domaine, il n’est pas raisonnable de viser la disparition du crime organisé qui est une activité liée à la globalisation des échanges mondiaux. L’objectif des Emirats est de ne pas permettre l’implantation du crime organisé sur son territoire. De ce point de vue, ce but est atteint et les efforts des autorités et des forces de police des Emirats sont tendus vers une consolidation de ce résultat pour l’avenir. / A thesis devoted to the fight against organized crime in the United Arab Emirates may seem rather surprising. Security in this country is at a very high level and the authorities maintain a very strong control over a 90% foreign population. Generally regarded as one of the safest countries in the world, organized crime has no place in the UAE. But the subject is justified because the fight against organized crime can only be conceived in a global framework that puts countries in advanced economies at the forefront. The UAE is a major partner in the strategy and international cooperation that has been developing steadily for more than 30 years to reduce criminal organizations. These still active organizations have been joined by terrorist organizations that finance themselves through trafficking and illegal activities. This junction between crime and terrorism, proven by field investigations, is a factor in worsening instability and a challenge for police forces. In the Gulf, there is a need to closely monitor trade flows that may conceal criminal activity. But it is also necessary to detect financial flows from criminal activities that are recycled in the prosperous economy of the UAE. On both counts, the UAE plays a decisive role because of its significant financial resources, surveillance technologies and the political will of its leaders. This thesis places the action of the Emirates in the normative and institutional framework established by treaties, relayed by national law. In this area, it is unreasonable to target the disappearance of organized crime, which is an activity linked to the globalization of world trade. The achievable objective of the Emirates is not to allow the implantation of organized crime on its territory. From this point of view, this goal is achieved and the efforts of UAE authorities and police forces are tense towards a consolidation of this result for the future.

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In this essential guide to the past, present and future of bio-warfare, international security expert Malcolm Dando draws a wealth of ecperience and research to uncover the truth about the alarming failure of international community to place effective curbs on the use of this deadly weapon.

<p>For scholars of international relations, reputation for resolve - the belief that an actor will stand firm in future disputes - has served as a seminal explanation for the outcome of interstate crises. Scholars studying state reputation remain divided as to which characteristics of the state determine reputation for resolve. Recent scholarship questions this traditional state-centric view of international relations, indicating leaders can be as influential as states in international affairs. My dissertation investigates whether individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently from the states they serve. In doing so, my dissertation bridges the state-centric and leader-centric literatures, contributing to our understanding of both reputations for resolve and the impact of individual leaders on international politics. My theory focuses on reputation development as I examine which information decision-makers use to make assessments of resolve. As leaders are the primary arbiters of foreign policy and interact substantially with each other during international crises and negotiations, I conclude that leaders should be able to develop independent reputations for resolve based on their behavior while in office. I further theorize that, due to the ways in which individuals access and process information, a leader's early actions while in office will matter more in assessments of his/her resolve, making initial reputations difficult to change. </p><p> To test my theory against alternative hypotheses, I employ a multi-methods research design using experimental surveys, statistical duration analysis, and a historical case study. The experiments focus on the internal causal mechanisms by which individuals process information to make predictions of a leader's resolve. To test the external validity of my theory, I employ a duration analysis to examine how the resoluteness of a leader's response to a crisis helps prevent that leader from being a target of future crises. Finally, the case study uses process tracing methods to investigate the extent to which individual leaders develop reputations for resolve over time. Through these multiple methods, I find robust evidence that leaders do develop reputations for resolve independently from their state's reputation. The experiments indicate that leader behavior is influential on perceptions of resolve even when accounting for state-based characteristics. Furthermore, I find that participants are more likely to seek out and prioritize leader-based information. I also find that early perceptions of resolve have a significant impact on later perceptions. The duration analysis indicates that the resoluteness of a leader's behavior can affect his/her risk of future crisis onset. Finally, the case study shows that potential challenger leaders do take leader-based information into account when making assessments of resolve and that a leader's early behavior is particularly influential to the development of his/her reputation for resolve. Based on this evidence I conclude that leaders can develop reputations for resolve. These reputations are primarily based on a leader's statements and behavior, even when controlling for state-based variables, and are resistant to change once formed.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis utilizes social influence theory and computational tools to examine the disparate impact of positive and negative ties in nuclear weapons proliferation. The thesis is broadly in two sections: a simulation section, which focuses on government stakeholders, and a large-scale data analysis section, which focuses on the public and domestic actor stakeholders. In the simulation section, it demonstrates that the nonproliferation norm is an emergent behavior from political alliance and hostility networks, and that alliances play a role in current day nuclear proliferation. This model is robust and contains second-order effects of extended hostility and alliance relations. In the large-scale data analysis section, the thesis demonstrates the role that context plays in sentiment evaluation and highlights how Twitter collection can provide useful input to policy processes. It first highlights the results of an on-campus study where users demonstrated that context plays a role in sentiment assessment. Then, in an analysis of a Twitter dataset of over 7.5 million messages, it assesses the role of ‘noise’ and biases in online data collection. In a deep dive analyzing the Iranian nuclear agreement, we demonstrate that the middle east is not facing a nuclear arms race, and show that there is a structural hole in online discussion surrounding nuclear proliferation. By combining both approaches, policy analysts have a complete and generalizable set of computational tools to assess and analyze disparate stakeholder roles in nuclear proliferation.