Orientador: Héctor Luís Saint-Pierre / Banca: Janina Onuki / Banca: Clodoaldo Bueno / Resumo: Este trabalho visa identificar os objetivo brasileiros no tocante à edificação e à consolidação de medidas de confiança mútua entre o Brasil e a Argentina entre os anos de 1985 e 1994, a partir do estudo de fatores externos - e de sua articulação - dos condicionantes e preceitos da Política Externa Brasileira, utilizando como fontes documentos oficiais. A história das relações entre os dois maiores países do Cone Sul, que registrou uma rivalidade de longo prazo, abre na década de 1970 um precendente para um processo de dissolução de desconfianças que ganha continuidade ao longo da década de 1980, consolidando-se na década seguinte por meio da assinatura de diversos documentos que dissolvem as antigas percepções de ameaças. A despeito de todos os passos dados no sentido de aprofundar a cooperação entre os dois parceiros, esta não atingiu um nível satisfatório de dinamismo e institucionalização, o que nos convida a refletir sobre possíveis obstáculos colocados tanto por condicionalidades externas quanto pela natureza dos objetivos dos paceiros envolvidos. Nosso objetivo, pois, é analisar, sob a perspectiva do Brasil, o significado das Medidas de Confiança Mútua fundadas com a Argentina, buscando responder se constituíram um fim em si mesmo ou o instrumento para garantia de outros interesses. / Abstract: This work intends to identify the Brazilian objectives concerning the consolidation of Confidence Building Measures with Argentina, in the period from 1985 to 1994, starting from the study of external and internal factors and of brazilian's foreign policy precepts, based on readings of official documents. The History of the Brazilian-Argentinean relationship registers a long rivalry period that gives up space to a process of dissolution of distrusts, elapsed along the 1980's decade. The following decade (1990) consolidated this process through the signature of several documents. However, the cooperation between the two partners didn't reach a satisfactory level of dynamism, what drive us to contemplate about the possible obstacles imposed by the external conjuncture to this coopeation's relationship, and on the other hand, about the nature of the involved partner's objectives. / Mestre

In this dissertation I develop a theory that seeks to account for the variation in stability and conflict proneness we observe across regions. I propose that the observed variation in regional order in the international system is fundamentally rooted in the polar arrangements of the different regions. Specifically, I argue that regions that do not have clearly recognized regional powers are more prone to conflict, that their conflicts are more severe, and that these regions are more vulnerable to outside influence than those that do have such powers. Using an opportunity and willingness framework, I define regions as stable geographic spaces of interacting states behaving uniquely from the broader international system. In order to test these propositions, I make use of novel data defining both regional memberships and that identifies leading regional actors. The results show that not only do regional polarity have a strong explanatory effect, but they also suggest that it is necessary to take regional-level effects into account when analyzing international politics.

In a recent paper Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler have posited that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an example of several ¿trusting relationships¿. The authors assert that ¿since the end of the 1990s the trusting relationships embodied in the NPT have come under strain¿ and that this accounts for the fact that the ¿treaty is facing growing pressures that are eroding what has been an effective barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation¿. This article questions the assumptions underlying this analysis. It argues that the approach taken by Ruzicka and Wheeler fundamentally misconceives the dynamics of nuclear non-proliferation. The policy implications generated by this approach are impractical and downright dangerous as they fail to address the causes of proliferation and instead exacerbate the problem further.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "May 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-103). Also available online.

Thesis (MPhil (Information Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Africa’s socio-economic reconstruction and development is constrained by the spate of violent conflicts afflicting the continent. Internecine strife and humanitarian concerns have prompted international debates surrounding the efficacy of existing conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies. With Africa seemingly in a semi-permanent state of tension and crisis, and the inability of the global and continental systems and structures to effectively deal with these situations, it requires a disentanglement of a “complex interplay of institutional-bureaucratic and political dynamics,” that place the continent at the centre of intervention dilemma. At the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts on the continent did not wither away, but have become so complex, thus confounding efforts to achieve sustainable peace. This complexity requires greater efforts to improve international, regional and subregional institutional capacities and contingency instruments to facilitate effective responses. The key emphasis within the international community is to enhance instruments to facilitate early detection of conflict situations in order to initiate preventive actions. Put differently, conflict prevention can be facilitated through the dynamic improvement of the processes, structures and functions of (conflict) early warning systems (EWS). In addition, political will is crucial towards the operationalisation of such systems to ensure swift and coordinated implementation of preventive actions. Cedric de Coning argues that conflict early warning systems can “improve our ability to generate the political will necessary to authorize preventive action much earlier in the conflict cycle, by improving our ability to estimate the potential future cost of inaction, and the way we bring this information to the attention of decision makers.” Schmeidl also argues that “early warning needs to be seen as a precondition to developing political will, and thus initiate (or better inform) reasonable response strategies.” However, existing organisational structures crucial for facilitating and expediting conflict prevention initiatives, suffer from “inertia” due to entrenched political structures, hierarchies and competing interests. The United Nations (UN) is an international body with the authority to facilitate conflict prevention. However, it is constrained by organisational complexities such as sectional political self-interest and the “bureaucratic red tape in large bureaucracies”, thus hampering its ability to swiftly and with the correct mandate, to respond to a call for preventive intervention. Hence the devolution of the responsibilities for the settlement of conflicts to the regional and subregional bodies. Conflicts have also “tended to pay little respect to State borders, proving the necessity for inter-State cooperation.” Because of the regionalisation of conflicts, the case of inter-regional collaboration has become increasingly vital as the “appropriate initial actors in seeking to defuse tensions and resolve local disputes within the region.” To this end, stronger intergovernmental mechanisms to facilitate early recognition of conflict situations and early intervention to prevent eruption or mitigate escalation have to be maintained. African countries, as a result, bear the burden of peace interventions from the African Union (AU) which consists of 53 members, to regional economic communities (RECs) such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), which consists of 14 members. These organisations are attenuated by bureaucratic ineptitude for adaptive behaviour that impact on swift and flexible responses. Nation states with diverse historical backgrounds, different political systems and unequal economic strengths are inclined to have fundamental inequalities in power and influence. Consequently, opposing political values, national interest and competing rationalities underlining their actions become sources of contention and impede the establishment of a common ground. These hurdles breed tensions and suspicion that impact on coordination of effort and information sharing regarding conflict situations. Thus, to surmount these barriers, it is imperative to reconcile competing interests through comprehensive inclusiveness, cooperation and effective collaborative partnerships among various stakeholders, particularly civil society and political decision makers. ‘Preventive action’ must, insists the International Peace Academy (IPA), “not be considered as an expedient product or event, but as a continuous, organic process that necessitates a highest degree of inclusiveness and multisectoral participation in dialogue and peace-building. These aspects should be institutionalised within the inter-regional organisations to establish the culture of common effort for common purpose. In the interest of collective effort and to expand AU’s capacity for conflict prevention, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2003. The PSC is defined as “a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in Africa. Apparently, the PSC, as an instrument of conflict prevention on the continent, is also aimed at achieving unity of thought in dealing with the threats to peace and stability. In conflict situations, state sovereignty, political desirability and competing goals often render peace processes ineffective due to differences regarding the best course of action. The PSC is regarded as the means to create a platform for shared understanding and common vision regarding the challenge of conflict prevention. Still, to be more effective, it requires a strong collaboration with subregional organisations (e.g. SADC) and multisectoral participation of, for example academics, research institutes, civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). The main thrust should be to create a shared framework for political decision makers to make “collective sense” of the problems on the continent, and be in a position to synchronise efforts to achieve peace and stability. Conversely, the AU and also SADC remain politically diverse organisations. As such, operationalisation of conflict prevention initiatives is likely to encounter obstacles emanating from, as Gina van Schalkwyk indicated, “conflict around political values amongst states in the [sub]region and …disputes on the basis of divergent interpretations [of policies]. This creates a paradox between the necessity of conflict prevention and the divergent national interests. Convergent thinking and creating a shared outlook in the existing organisational frameworks (e.g. SADC) is imperative in order to generate political will and to facilitate improved decision making and implementation of proactive responses in the prevention of conflicts.

Defense diplomacy is the cooperative use of military forces through activities like officer exchanges and training exercises. Although individual practices have long existed, strikingly little scholarly attention has yet been paid to either defense diplomacy as a feature of international relations or its uses as a tool of statecraft. This study critically examines the concept of defense diplomacy and the underlying mechanisms that empower it. I argue that defense diplomacy functions as a military variant of soft power which relies on the processes of norm diffusion and state socialization to influence the strategic thinking of foreign governments. Specifically, by bringing soldiers from different countries into contact with one another in collaborative environments, defense diplomacy allows for the cultivation of transnational links capable of shaping worldviews. As with similar networks in civil society, the ties fostered by defense diplomacy form pathways which allow for the rapid diffusion of geopolitical norms, practices and priorities across borders. The key with defense diplomacy is that these networks span governing elites allowing for the direct translation of shared ideas into policy. This dissertation uses two case studies to illustrate how defense diplomacy has been employed by the United States as a foreign policy tool. The first case examines the use of defense diplomacy by the United States to rebuild its alliances with Australia and the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War. Though initially envisioned as temporary measure to help restore trust after that divisive conflict, defense diplomacy emerged the basis for America’s regional engagement strategy. The second case concerns how defense diplomacy was employed by the United States in the Philippines during the Global War on Terror. Uniquely, the Philippine government restricted American forces operating within its territory to non-combat missions. This compelled Washington to rely on defense diplomacy as the primary means of combating groups like Abu Sayyaf. The ensuing focus on strengthening local institutions ultimately proved successful in helping to mitigate the militant threat within the archipelago. / 2020-09-29T00:00:00Z

This dissertation examines Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policy. It demonstrates that contrary to the received wisdom on nuclear behaviour, Canada does not think ‘strategically’ in the nuclear field. I argue that while the decision-making of great powers may be straightforward in the nuclear field, non-great powers can afford to be more ambivalent and even less cautious. The focus of the dissertation is on Canada’s nuclear export decisions from the 1950s to the late 1970s. My contention is that middle powers, like Canada, are rarely influenced by military-strategic interests, but that they, nonetheless, act according to their own particular self-interests when determining whether or not to export nuclear materials and technology. In looking at Canada’s nuclear decision-making from its entry into the nuclear age until the late 1970s, the dissertation offers three findings. First, Canada does not make decisions that fit a military-strategic calculus. Second, Canada is often ambivalent in the nuclear field. I argue that Canada can afford to be ambivalent because constraints on its decision-making do not stem primarily from security concerns or existential threats but from beliefs as to what Canada should do and should be in global affairs. Finally, Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policies have been defined primarily by its place – both real and imagined – in the world as a middle power. The argument rests on insights draw from liberal IR theory as well as domestic politics explanations of nuclear behaviour. My contention is that Canada’s decision-making has been influenced by domestically held beliefs and perceptions of its identity – that is, where Canada ranks on the figurative power spectrum and what values it professes in relation to other actors in the international system. My research thus makes a contribution to the literature on nuclear supply and on the broader literature on nuclear behaviour, more generally.

169 f. / Submitted by Santiago Fabio (fabio.ssantiago@hotmail.com) on 2012-12-17T20:44:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 5757575757.pdf: 2911611 bytes, checksum: c8e2a74e66ebbe487551d547a0a46a12 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-12-17T20:44:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5757575757.pdf: 2911611 bytes, checksum: c8e2a74e66ebbe487551d547a0a46a12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / A temática da segurança tem ganhado cada vez mais importância no cenário global diante dos crescentes desafios abarcados pelas transformações econômicas, políticas, ambientais, humanitárias e culturais contemporâneas. Estes desafios contribuíram para alimentar o debate em torno de uma concepção mais ampla de segurança internacional, tensionando perspectivas mais tradicionais das relações internacionais juntamente com novas abordagens que priorizam os indivíduos como centro da análise e ampliam os estudos de segurança para áreas até então desconsideradas pelo viés mais estrutural e geopolítico. Paralelo a essa tensão, encontram-se os Estados Unidos e seu posicionamento na ordem internacional pós-1989, que apresentou e apresenta, por meio de sua estratégia de segurança nacional, uma política externa que tem fortes impactos no cenário internacional, destacando a contínua relevância deste país para o mundo em constante transformação. De modo a colocar essas diversas questões em diálogo, tanto no que diz respeito às muitas dimensões da segurança internacional como a posição dos Estados Unidos para uma arquitetura mundial (tendo em mente que sua posição é efeito de um aparato complexo que envolve não somente os EUA, mas sua interação com os demais atores no cenário global), este trabalho resgata a concepção foucaultiana de governamentalidade, extrapolando este conceito para a esfera internacional através das análises das relações entre saber/poder e discurso. A governamentalidade é definida por Michel Foucault como o “conjunto constituído pelas instituições, procedimentos, análises e reflexões, cálculos e táticas que permitem exercer esta forma bastante específica e complexa de poder, que tem por alvo a população, por forma principal de saber a economia política e por instrumentos técnicos essenciais os dispositivos de segurança”, tendo como fundamento de sua existência um regime de verdade que consiste basicamente no livre mercado. A ideia de governamentalidade da ordem internacional consiste essencialmente na percepção de que o regime de verdade em torno dos mercados aponta para uma série de práticas organizadas, as quais podem ser provenientes da ação de um ou mais atores internacionais, individualmente ou em conjunto, tendo como objeto de atuação as populações e repercutindo internacionalmente. Os Estados Unidos se encontram no cerne da discussão uma vez que suas estratégias de segurança internacional refletem uma razão de Estado que tem no regime liberal sua premissa maior, constituindo dispositivos de segurança em defesa de uma ordem internacional liberal. Esta relação não é construída unicamente pelo governo norte-americano, mas conta com o suporte de importantes atores de política externa nos Estados Unidos, as think tanks, organizações de pesquisa e advocacy promotoras e propagadoras de ideias. Estas possuem um importante papel na governamentalidade da ordem internacional não apenas pela influência que exercem junto ao governo na formulação de estratégias políticas e à opinião pública norte-americana, mas também porque compartilham do regime de verdade defendido pelo Estado norte-americano. Este trabalho traz o exemplo de três importantes think tanks norte-americanas (The Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations e American Enterprise Institute) a fim de mostrar o papel que elas desempenharam na governamentalidade da ordem internacional pós-1989, tendo como foco o próprio campo da segurança internacional. / Salvador

Este trabalho analisa o “movimento de securitização” ambiental no sistema internacional, a partir da ação dos Estados Unidos como ator securitizador. Tendo como base as proposições de Buzan, Waever e Wilde, investiga-se as definições e critérios estabelecidos pelo discurso norte-americano ao enunciar as mudanças ambientais como uma ameaça existencial à sua segurança e a evolução deste discurso ao longo das duas últimas décadas, onde o aparelho militar burocrático norte-americano formula o conceito de segurança ambiental como uma maneira de legitimar o governo em face à sensibilidade da população norte-americana. / This paper analyzes the environmental "securitization movement" in the international system, from the action of the United States as securitizer actor. Based on the propositions of Buzan, Waever and Wilde, investigates the definitions and criteria established by the north-American discourse by articulating environmental change as an existential threat to its security and the evolution of this discourse over the past two decades, where the north-American military bureaucratic apparatus formulated the concept of environmental security as a way to legitimize the government in view of the sensitivity of the American population.

[pt] Essa dissertação busca fazer uma análise da relação entre o governo colombiano do Presidente Álvaro Uribe Velez(2002- ) e as populações internamente deslocadas em decorrência do conflito colombiano. A principal premissa dessa pesquisa é a de que tal relação é condicionada por duas diferentes representações da segurança internacional: a da Guerra contra o Terror e o da segurança humana. A partir disso, tentaremos argumentar que, nesse caso, a combinação dessas duas representações produz um contexto social muito específico, de forma que nós não podemos analisar os impactos desses discursos baseados em significados atribuídos a priori. Teremos que recorrer à sociologia crítica de autores como Pierre Bourdieu e Bernard Lahire para analisar os usos dessas noções e de suas propriedades, nos concentrando sobre a análise do discurso da segurança humana e de seu papel na edificação do corpo normativo para a proteção das populações internamente deslocadas. Baseados em concepções a priorísticas, seríamos levados a concluir que práticas informadas pelos discursos da segurança humana e da Guerra contra o Terror seriam incompatíveis. Contudo, na Colômbia, onde os deslocados internos são a expressão mais evidente da violência excessiva que prevalece no campo, o governo concentra a operação dessas políticas de forma a evitar a responsabilidade pela produção da violência. Nesse contexto, os discursos não somente convergem, mas a segurança humana cumpre um papel relevante na legitimação da Guerra contra o Terror. / [en] This dissertation proposes an analysis of the relation between the Colombian government of the President Álvaro Uribe Velez(2002- ) and the populations internally displaced as a consequence of the Colombian conflict. The main assumption of this research is that this relation is conditioned by two different representations of international security: the War on Terror and the human security discourses. Based on that, we argue that, in this case, the combination of these two representations produces a specific social context, in a way that we can’t analyze the impact of these discourses based on a priori conceptions of them. We will rely on the critical sociology from authors like Pierre Bourdieu and Bernard Lahire to understand the uses of these notions and their properties, focusing on the analysis of human security and its role in the edification of the normative body for the protection of internally displaced persons. If we departed from a priori conceptions of these notions, we would assume that practices informed by the discourses of the War on Terror and human security would be incompatible. However, in Colombia, where the internally displaced are the most evident expression of the violence that prevails in the countryside, the government concentrates the operation of these policies in order to avoid responsibility for the production of violence. In this context, not only do these representations converge, but the human security plays a relevant role on the legitimization of the War on Terror.