Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America. / Bibliography: p. 185-188.

This thesis offers a comparison between liberalism, Dewey’s pragmatism, and Confucianism on their views of community. Today, as China struggles with the influences of modernity, the relations between its Confucian heritage and liberal democracy have been much debated. Some scholars contend that classical Confucianism and the communitarian critique of liberal politics converge, because they both challenge the dominance of modern liberalism. Among the communitarian theories, John Dewey’s theory of democratic community comports well with the Confucian doctrine of community to argue against rights-based liberalism. For in a Confucian community, as in a Deweyan democracy, public consensus is often achieved at the aesthetic and practical levels rather than based on the claims of reason. For pragmatists like Dewey and Confucians, experiencing the world aesthetically is a practical way to improve the social functions of everyday life. In this thesis, following John Dewey, I argue that as a crucially communicative and social practice, art plays a key role on communal harmony. When traditional Confucian China as a ritual-based community is grounded in aesthetic practices, it is comparable and compatible with Dewey’s view of community. In addition, the Confucian theory of community is a source for putting contemporary communitarian ideas into practice. I conclude that by relating aesthetics to his democratic theory, Dewey puts forth a theory of pragmatist community that suits well with the Confucian ideal.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 14, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-232) and index.

Den här uppsatsen behandlar hur elevers reflekterande kring en utveckling inom ett ämne från årskurs sex till årskurs nio ser ut. Materialet består av ett inspelat material från vårterminen 2009. Skolan som eleverna har gått på är en friskola som arbetar utifrån portfoliometoden. Inom portfoliometoden är reflektion ett viktigt verktyg som eleverna ska använda sig av. I skolans kursplaner står det att elever ska kunna reflektera kring bland annat sin egen utveckling vilket också är syftet med den uppgift eleverna har fått i det granskade materialet. Jag har försökt att fånga elevernas reflektioner i ett analysschema som jag konstruerat utefter John Deweys teori och analys av reflektionen. Det jag tycker mig se är att eleverna har en bra förmåga att reflektera och de verkar vana med verktyget. De flesta verkar ställa sig frågan varför de gjort som de gjort och försöker komma på förslag genom tidigare erfarenheter och dra slutsatser därefter. / 2010ht4687

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This thesis attempts to present John Dewey and Confucian views regarding self-realization and its implication for education. Although there is an increasing body of comparative literature examining the two schools of thought, the examination of the two philosophers’ theories from a perspective of self-realization is greatly lacking. Examining Deweyan notion of self as social, ethical and ever-growing, and the Confucian concept of self as Ren (Humane), He (Harmonious) and Cultivating, self-realization will be illustrated as the expansion, enhancement and enrichment of the individual resulting from a closed gap between oneself and one’s environment. Such unity of self as the feature of self- realization not only illustrates Deweyan and Confucian philosophical theories toward the development of an individual, it also reflects their notions of education as means and ends to realize unification at all levels. / Thesis (Master, Education) -- Queen's University, 2009-09-01 10:34:58.687

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My thesis is an attempt to show the brilliance and novelty of John Dewey's theory of knowledge, instrumentalism. The main objective of my thesis is to explain Dewey's theory of knowledge, which he coined instrumentalism, and to describe how instrumentalism as a theory of knowledge overcomes the pitfalls of competing theories within the philosophical tradition. Dewey's theory of instrumentalism does not assume that ideas are mental entities nor that ideas are true if they somehow match or fit with the object in question; thus, Dewey's theory presents a different view opposed to what we have usually called coherence, or correspondence theories of knowledge. Dewey also argued that consciousness and thinking are functions of a complex organism in transaction with its environment and thus consciousness is an instrumentality not a thing-in-itself.

I offer an interpretive reconstruction of John Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics. I explore the function and interrelation of a number of terms that are central to Dewey’s metaphysics, including “nature,” “continuity,” “generic traits of existence,” the “qualitative,” “experience,” and “emergence.” In place of a strictly “pluralistic” idea of nature, I suggest that a Deweyan model provides the basis for understanding nature as a continuous whole. The generic traits of existence are the most general ontological features of nature; they are operative in all that exists, but manifest in unique ways within every particular existence. Because all things share these traits, they can be understood as the ground for naturalistic continuity, for how all existences are capable of interacting within a common world. Generic traits are best understood as the underlying patterns or rhythms of nature, patterns that are “tensional” or oppositional. I propose that “tension” is at the heart of any productive process. Through characterizing generic traits in this way, I link them to an emergent theory of generation. Thus, the generic traits of existence are the common grounds for particular existences, relations among existences, and the generation of new existences and relations. Experience is a broad term, but Dewey provides the basis for differentiating among types of experience in accordance with their functionalities, as well as their contextual “size” or “scope.” We can discuss Deweyan experience as an integrated series of emergent contexts or fields that include what he terms, in order of diminishing size, culture, mind, subconscious, consciousness, and cognitive thought. This emergent scheme shows why culture is a directive field of experience, and that cognitive or reflective thought is only a small portion of our experiential process. Through reflecting upon the nature of various experiential contexts, through treating these contexts as our empirical data, we can engage in what Dewey terms “metaphysical inquiry.” If knowledge itself is understood within a broader experiential context, the ways in which knowledge integrates into experience, the “forms” of our meanings, can tell us a great deal about basic features of existence.