Notre hypothèse est la suivante : pour des raisons différentes et avec des méthodes différentes, Derrida et Goodman ont, chacun, ébranlé l’un des deux piliers qui sous-tendent l’essentiel de la tradition philosophique. Derrida, par le jeu subtil de la différance, a fait vaciller la vaste entreprise de mise en ordre. Goodman, par la profusion de mondes construits et irréductibles les uns aux autres, remet en cause l’aspiration à l’unité. Nous avons tenté d’établir que la métaphysique s’est développée dans une dialectique de l’un et de l’ordre, se rétablissant sur l’un de ses pilastres quand l’autre faiblissait. Si donc les soubassements de l’histoire philosophique devaient être revisités – peut-être révisés – il serait fructueux d’user simultanément des propositions derridiennes et goodmaniennes. C’est l’originalité de ce projet. Il s’agit, pour neutraliser la récupération dialectique par l’autre pilier (par l’unité quand l’ordre faillit ou par la mise en ordre dans la multitude s’immisce) d’interroger la tradition suivant le double impératif de la déconstruction et du nominalisme, suivant le double prisme du dés-ordre de Derrida et du multiple de Goodman. Nous avons tenté d’établir que l’efficace d’une remise en cause du « mythe de l’un » ne peut se faire sans ébranler le « mythe de l’ordre ». Considérer conjointement les systèmes (ou des dé-systématisations) de Derrida et Goodman serait donc, suivant ce dessein, non seulement utile mais presque indispensable. Chacun d’eux permet d’éviter la récupération dialectique du schème de l’autre. L’étude est menée à partir d’un inconfort partagé face au concept de vérité. / Our hypothesis is the following : for different reasons and with different methods, Derrida and Goodman have both deconstructed one of the pillars of the Western philosophical tradition. Derrida, using the subtleties of the differance concept, has shaken the general entreprise of « organisation ». On the other hand, Goodman, by considering numerous constructed worlds that cannot be reduced one to the other, questions the desire of unity. We have tried to establish that metaphysics has developed in a dialectic articulation of order and unity, using one when the other fails. If the groundings of the history of philosophy were then to be revisited, it would be useful — if not necessary — to use simultaneously the derridean and goodmanian views. This the originality of this project. To break the dialectic mechanics using order to cure multiplicity, or the other way round, we have reconsidered the tradition using both deconstruction and nominalism, Derrida’s disorder and Goodman’s diversity. We have tried to show that the efficiency of the questioning of the « unity myth » depends on how far the « order myth » has been revised. Considering simultaneously both Derrida’s and Goodman’s systems allows to avoid the dialectic neutralisation of the proposal. The study is performed through the question of truth.

Boèce prétend avoir apporté une solution définitive aux deux grandes apories du corpus logique aristotélicien, l'aporie de l'universel et l'aporie des futurs contingents. Nous montrons qu'Abélard, à travers sa critique des reales, met en question ces deux solutions et leur substitue deux distinctions voulues comme aporétiques - entre res et status d'un côté et entre res et dictum propositionis de l'autre - qui naissent de la reconnaissance par Abélard du caractère fictif des solutions boéciennes aux grandes apories du corpus logique aristotélicien. Ces deux distinctions organisent une réflexion philosophique profondément novatrice que nous nous efforçons de décrire. / Boethius claims to have definitively solved the two great aporias of the corpus of Aristotelian Iogic, the universal aporia and the aporia of contingent futures. l demonstrate that Abelard,Through his critique of reales calls into question these two solutions and substitutes two distinctions that he wanted to he aporetique - between res and status on the one band andand dictum propositionis on the other hand - born of Abelard's recognition of the fictional character of the two Boetian solutions to the great aporias of the Aristotelician logical corpus. The two. distinctions pave the way for a profoundly new kind of philosophical reasoning,which this text mtends to describe.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-06-29T12:41:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 973078 bytes, checksum: 302bf7253aed6478fac0a90b1464f5b6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-29T12:41:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 973078 bytes, checksum: 302bf7253aed6478fac0a90b1464f5b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-04 / This study aims to investigate how is the critique of nominalist system ockhamiano front of realistic theories developed in the Middle Ages. For this research takes place we choose to trace an investigative path that begins with the elucidation of what the 'Quarrel of the Universal' in the Middle Ages and the establishment of typologies that bring together the theories of the period. Later we work with the contextualization of the logical system developed by William of Ockham setting the bases of your system and pointing out some of the realistic writers who are criticized by the author. So that the logic of the author system became clear we seek to elucidate the logic of the terms of their time, which means the author's nominalism and what are the logical tools that he used to implement his critique of realism, namely: the supposition, the connotation and the signification. Finally we seek to discuss and demonstrate what the nominalist response of the author face the realistic theoretical models, placing the universal only with mental existence, exerting a semantic function, and devoid of ontology and a reality that is outside the human mind, shifting the axis the discussion of the problem to the field of logic to the detriment of the ontological field. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar de que forma ocorre a crítica do sistema nominalista ockhamiano frente às teorias realistas desenvolvidas no medievo. Para que a presente pesquisa se realize optamos por traçar um caminho investigativo que se inicia com a elucidação do que seja a ‘Querela dos Universais’ no medievo e o estabelecimento das tipologias que congregam as teorias do período. Posteriormente trabalhamos com a contextualização do sistema lógico desenvolvido por Guilherme de Ockham fixando as bases de seu sistema e apontando alguns dos autores realistas que são criticados pelo autor. Para que o sistema lógico do autor se tornasse claro buscamos elucidar a Lógica dos Termos de seu tempo, o que significa o nominalismo do autor e quais são as ferramentas lógicas por ele usadas para implementar sua crítica ao realismo, a saber: a suposição, a conotação e a significação. Por fim buscamos discorrer e demonstrar qual é a resposta nominalista do autor frente aos modelos teóricos realistas, colocando os universais somente com existência mental, exercendo uma função semântica, e desprovidos de ontologia e de uma realidade que esteja fora da mente humana, deslocando o eixo da discussão do problema para o campo da lógica em detrimento do campo ontológico.

Orientador: Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T03:35:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Malbouisson_IaraVelascoeCruz_M.pdf: 1013402 bytes, checksum: d9fab04e3710fe9e8d5bbf376e49bfdc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: Essa dissertação tem por objetivo geral investigar as noções de ciência e conhecimento científico de Nicole Oresme (1323?-1382). Mais precisamente, procura-se situar o projeto filosófico de Oresme no contexto do século XIV e de seu progressivo afastamento da concepção aristotélica de ciência enquanto um saber demonstrativo, necessário e evidente. Desse modo, procura-se investigar de que maneira e por quais razões Oresme fala em causas prováveis, bem como qual o papel que a matemática ocupa em sua epistemologia probabilista. Para tanto, empreende-se a análise de algumas passagens do comentário de Oresme ao De anima de Aristóteles, e procura-se sobretudo apresentar e explicar a ciência de figurar qualidades e movimentos que Oresme formula, em seu Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum, com o intuito de assinalar as causas prováveis de diversos fenômenos naturais / Abstract: The objective of this thesis is to investigate Nicole Oresme's notions of science and scientific knowledge. More specifically, we attempt to place Oresme's philosophical project in the context of fourteenth-century natural philosophy, with its progressive departure from an Aristotelic conception of science as an evident, necessary and demonstrative knowledge. Hence, we investigate how and for which reasons Oresme speaks of \probable causes" and \probable explanations", and try to determine the role that mathematics plays in his probabilistic epistemology. For this effect, we analyse some passages of Oresme's commentary on Aristotle's De anima and seek, above all, to present and explain the science of figuring qualities and movements formulated by Oresme in his Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum for the pourpose of assigning probable causes to various natural phenomena / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content the truth of which does not require mathematical objects to exist. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more than we otherwise would be able to about, or yielding a greater understanding of, the physical world. Mathematical objects to not need to exist for mathematical language to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences and show that they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which shows that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show the hermeneutic fictionalist position that emerges is preferable to any alternative which interprets mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects.

Orientador: Yara Adario Frateschi / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T09:21:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_LuizCarlosSantosda_D.pdf: 1871671 bytes, checksum: 4e4eb0be592c737ddc209125531b3a81 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: No presente trabalho procuro apresentar como o método resolutivo-compositivo ou geométrico estabelece uma relação fundamental entre filosofia natural e política nas bases do pensamento hobbesiano mais sistemático. Nesse registro, busco mostrar como Hobbes entende que as definições geométricas não seriam apenas descritivas ou especulativas, mas também prescritivas e práticas. Por isso, as definições da geometria euclidiana não apenas descreveriam a forma de uma figura estática, mas também prescreveriam um possível modo de geração ou de construção desses objetos. Da perspectiva hobbesiana os axiomas fundamentais da geometria euclidiana podem ser demonstrados, por isso estes postulados devem ser entendidos como princípios de construção ou de autoridade, mais do que de conhecimento. Desse prisma, a geometria euclidiana poderia ser entendida como uma ciência capaz de orientar tanto o entendimento quanto as ações humanas. Com base nisso, procuro mostrar como a filosofia natural e política de Hobbes se funda sobre uma aplicação desse método a uma mesma matéria: os homens e suas paixões. É nesse registro que, no decorrer de todo o presente trabalho, procuro elucidar como as paixões humanas (matéria tanto da filosofia natural quanto da política) são vistas por Hobbes sob a ótica do mesmo método geométrico, mas ora como efeito (do movimento externo que afeta os sentidos humanos) e ora como causa (do movimento voluntário dos homens no mundo). Sob esta perspectiva, procuro evidenciar de que modo o caráter convencional do método hobbesiano se aplica aos termos do contrato social constitutivo de um Estado civil soberano, presente nas bases de uma filosofia que entende as ciências e o próprio conhecimento como sinônimos de poder / Abstract: In this thesis I try to present as the resolutive-compositive or geometric method establishes a fundamental relationship between natural philosophy and policy on the fundamental principle of hobbesian thought. In this sense, I try to show how Hobbes believes that the geometric definitions would not only descriptive or speculative, but also prescriptive and practices. Therefore, the geometry definitions describe not only the form of a static picture but also prescribe a possible way of generation or building these objects. For the Hobbesian perspective the fundamental axioms of Euclidean geometry can be demonstrated, so these postulates must be understood as principles of construction or authority rather than knowledge. From this angle, Euclidean geometry could be understood as a science capable of guiding both the understanding and human actions. These actions regarded both as a knowledge and authority. Based on this, I seek to show how natural philosophy and policy is based on an application of this method to the same matter: men and their passions. In this way, throughout this work I try to elucidate how human passions (matter of natural philosophy and politics) are seen by Hobbes from the perspective of the same geometric method, but sometimes as the effect (of the external movement affects the human senses) and sometimes as cause (the voluntary human movement in the world). From this perspective, I try to show how the conventional character of the Hobbesian method applies to the terms of the constitutive social contract of a sovereign civil State that are present on the basis of a philosophy that understands the science and knowledge itself as power synonymous / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

<div>Philosophers who affirm the existence of propositions contend that the contents of declarative sentences, beliefs, doubts, and so on are entities (the things picked out by the term “propositions”), and that these entities have truth-values. Unsurprisingly, there’s rampant disagreement among those philosophers about sorts of things are called “propositions”. Propositions have been identified with sui generis abstract objects, interpreted facts, properties, and types of cognitive acts (this is not an exhaustive list). Despite this debate, most agree that propositions are representations (this is how they come to have truth-values), and that propositions are not to be identified with token mental representations. I agree that propositions are representations, but argue that propositions are mental representation tokens. The view I defend has sparse contemporary support, but has an impressive pedigree—ancestral views were widely popular in the late medieval, and early modern periods. In this dissertation I argue at length against contemporary criticisms that this view is still credible.</div><div>In chapter one, I defend a mentalist semantics; that is, I argue that linguistic representation is parasitic on mental representation: for a sentence to mean that p is for it to express (or be conventionally used to express) the thought that p. Once this is established, I argue in chapter two that mental representations (as opposed to non-mental ones) are ideal candidates to serve as the contents of sentences and propositional attitudes. I compare my preferred view, that propositions are token mental representations, against rival views (sorted into two groups) and show that a cost benefit analysis of each favors my position. In chapter three, I start exploring what these mental representations might be like. I argue that they’re structured entities whose constituents are modes of presentation of the things represented. I decline to analyze the relation which unites these modes of presentation, but argue (contra some contemporary philosophers) that this relation is not predication. Finally, in chapter four, I argue against the widely popular view that propositions have the things they’re about as constituents. I show that such a view cannot accommodate thoughts about nonexistent entities. I propose that the modes of presentation which are constituents of propositions are non-descriptive, but criticize the mental file conception of non-descriptive modes of presentation.</div>

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This thesis is devoted to the analysis of the realist view in the dispute about the nature of universals at Prague university during the reign of Wenceslas IV. At the same time, I explore the realism of the beginning of the fifteenth century in the Czech intellectual environment with regard to its international influences, with which I deal both synchronically and diachronically. I inquire into Prague realism as an original tradition of thinking, which is inspired by the philosophy and logic of foreign thinkers, but such influence is recontextualized into the Czech intellectual environment in a completely unprecedented way. My epistemological framework is based in inductive research, which I conduct by combining the results derived from the analysis of independent datasets of primary data. Such methodological choice enables me to carry out triangulation, i.e. finding the objective truth through approaching the topic from various viewpoints. I reach the conclusion that the dispute about the nature of universals at Prague university at the beginning of the fifteenth century cannot be reduced to the opposition between the nominalism of German masters and the realism of Czech masters, but realism can be apprehended as an important school of thought in terms of establishing an independent tradition of...

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