Thesis advisor: Sarah Byers / In this thesis, I argue that the Stoic value theory and understanding of emotion is a theoretical abstraction of human agency over values and emotions that has limited pertinence to empirical human life. Towards this effort, I discuss the Stoic ethical naturalism that relies on oikeiôsis to illustrate their notion of eudaimonia. Moreover, I discuss Stoic epistemology and action theory to illustrate how the Stoics can place well-being completely within human agency. Drawing on their understanding of both human nature and agency, the Stoics derive a value framework and corresponding understanding of emotions that proposes a radical detachment and devaluation from all that lies beyond the moral character. However, I show through empirical evidence and logical reasoning how human agency is restricted and therein, disallows for the proposed radical detachment. Nonetheless, their philosophy on ethics can still be applied in a limited capacity to achieve therapeutic benefit and value. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Morrissey School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy. / Discipline: Departmental Honors.

O estoicismo de Sêneca apresenta traços que refletem sua condição pessoal de homem novo, de ator na história do Império Romano e de um pensador bastante livre. As linhas de seu pensamento, que se pode chamar de estóico-senequiano, estão presentes em toda sua obra: de maneira explícita, nas epístolas e nos diálogos; e implícita, na tragédia Hércules no Eta. Para essa tragédia, Sêneca buscou, como modelo principal, As Traquínias de Sófocles, cujas personagens recebem um tratamento tal, que se pode ler, em suas palavras e em suas ações, a expressão das virtudes e dos vícios nos três níveis: cósmico, imperial e individual. A relação entre essas três instâncias é garantida, principalmente, pela tensão sujeito-objeto e pela analogia como processo de conhecimento. Em seu pensamento bipolar, pode-se ler a presença dos princípios que perpassam toda a Natureza: o ativo (do lado do sujeito) e o passivo (na vertente do objeto). A expressão máxima do princípio ativo é, no universo, o Logos; no Império, a razão do príncipe, que constitui sua alma; no homem, a razão diretriz. O vício é o desequilíbrio em qualquer uma das instâncias, e consiste numa inversão que deixa a Razão fora do lugar que lhe cabe segundo a perfeição da Natureza. O reequilíbrio, no âmbito do Universo, se faz pela \"conflagração universal\"; no Império, pelo comando de um príncipe virtuoso; no indivíduo, pela prática da virtude, sob o comando da razão. Como no indivíduo, a virtude, que é igual à sabedoria, à felicidade, à liberdade, é conquistada paulatinamente, o homem, em relação a ela, pode ser um stultus, um uacillans, um proficiens ou um sapiens. No Hércules de Hércules no Eta, convivem as três instâncias: a cósmica na conflagração universal, a do Império Romano, nas alusões político-históricas, e a do indivíduo, na trajetória exemplar do herói rumo à sabedoria e à apoteose. Sua trajetória, dividida entre um velho e um novo Hércules, promove, ainda, a passagem do tempo mítico para o tempo legal, do herói marcado pela hybris para o marcado pela uirtus. / Seneca\'s stoicism presents features that reflect his personal condition as new man, as an actor in the Roman Empire History and as a free thinker. His lines of thought, which can be named as estoico-senequiano, are in all of his works: explicitly, in his epistles and dialogues; and implicitly, in his tragedy Hercules on Oeta. As main source of inspiration to this tragedy, Seneca used Sophocles\' The Trachiniae, in which can be read, through its characters\' words and attitudes, the expression of vice and virtue in three levels: cosmic, imperial and individual. The relationship between these three levels is granted, mainly, by the tension subject-object and by analogy as a process of knowledge. In Seneca\'s bipolar thought, one can notice the presence of principles that go beyond all nature: the active (subject\'s side) and the passive (that concerns the object). The major expression of the active principle is, in the universe, Logos; in the Empire, the prince\'s reason, which constitutes his soul; in men, the guideline reason. Vice is the disequilibrium in any of these instances, and is defined as an inversion that takes reason out of its proper place in accordance with nature\'s perfection. The equilibrium is recovered again, in the universe\'s scope, through universal conflagration; in the Empire\'s scope, through a virtuous prince\'s command; in the individual scope, through practicing virtue under the control of reason. Since in human beings, the virtue, which is considered the same as knowledge, happiness, and freedom, is gained gradually, the men in relation to it can be a stultus, a uacillans, a proficiens, or a sapiens. In Hercules from Hercules on Oeta, the three instances are together: the cosmic through the universal conflagration, the one from Roman Empire through the historical and political allusions, and the individual one, through the hero\'s brilliant way to knowledge and apotheosis. His way, divided into an old and a new Hercules, promotes the passage from a mythical time to a legal time, from the hero marked by hybris to the one marked by uirtus.

This essay compares three contemporary interpretations of Stoic philosophy with an academic account of Stoicism provided by Pierre Hadot. The comparison is made by performing a discourse analytical reading of three books about contemporary Stoicism, focusing on the presentation of Stoicism from two perspectives: Stoicism as a philosophy of life, and the metaphysical constituents of Stoic practices and principles. This is then compared with Pierre Hadot’s theory, Philosophy as a Way of Life, and his account of Stoic practices and principles underlying metaphysical constituents. This study is situated within an area of research that links philosophy and the study of religion. The study discovered that the contemporary interpretations of Stoicism differ in their relationship to Pierre Hadot's academic account of Stoicism. One book does not relate to Hadot's account of Stoic metaphysics at all, nor to his theory Philosophy as a Way of life, due to a lack of general discussion of Stoic theory. The other two books relate to Hadot’s academic account, but to varying degrees. This study's structure includes a summary of the current field of research, followed by a theoretical discussion of Stoic philosophy, metaphysics, and Pierre Hadot's theory. Thereafter follows a description of the method used in the study and the following analysis demonstrates how the interpretation of the texts was conducted. The study concludes with the results of the analysis and a discussion of the findings' implications for this area of research.

O nosso trabalho consiste na tradução e no estudo do De Ira do filósofo estoico e político romano Lucio Anêu Sêneca. A obra é endereçada ao seu irmão Novato que, supostamente, o indaga como conter essa paixão. Assim, nos 3 livros, o filósofo apresenta a gênese dessa paixão e os males causados por ela para, por fim, apresentar meios para extirpa-la da alma. A defesa dos ensinamentos do Estoicismo ecoa explicitamente nos diversos exemplos dados pelo filósofo quando contraposta com as demais escolas filosóficas da época. Assim, a ira é tratada como a paixão mais danosa dentre todas as paixões do homem. / Our dissertation consists in the translation and study of De Ira from the Stoic philosopher and Roman politician Lucious Annaeus Seneca. The book is addressed to his brother Novato who supposedly inquires him how to restrain this passion. Thus, in three books, the philosopher presents the genesis of that passion and the evils caused by it to finally introduce ways to extirpate it from the soul. The defense of the Stoicism\'s teachings explicitly echoes in several examples given by the philosopher when contrasted with other philosophical schools of the time. So wrath is treated as the most damaging passion among all human passions.

In the current sociological literature, there is very little research on the subject of the love shared between parents and children, and contemporary intimate father’s role in connection to Scottish and Romanian masculinities. Drawing from the aesthetic theory of emotions postulated by Ian Burkitt (2014) and from Esther Dermott’s (2008) reframing of modern fatherhood according to intimacy theory, the present research has looked at a specific group of men’s experiences of love. As such, it sees involved fathers as embedded in an intimate network of relationships: to their children, their partner and their own parents. Presenting results from 47 qualitative semi-structured interviews with a sample of middle-class and working-class, resident and non-resident, Romanian and Scottish fathers, the study explored fathers’ embeddedness in a particular class, culture and family configuration in relation to what guides them to adopt certain forms of emotionality. Results show that involved fathers understand love primarily as an activity (it is something they do), in which both love and power are intermingled, as power in the context of fathering is deeply relational, and socially-constructed as much as love is. In order to maintain loving relationships to their children, involved fathers also do emotion work in discursive and embodied ways. Providing is influenced by the intimate father’s discourse, which has permeated both cultures due to globalization and is increasingly commodified, but fathers can also resist this discourse. The cultural perspective of their fathering has more similarities in common than differences, while class differences appear more prominently, further emphasizing structural inequalities in how love can then be practised. Therefore, the ways in which fathers express their emotions are balanced between the masculine emotional demands of stoicism and the novel discursive prerogative for intimate self-disclosure (or between love and detachment). To help us understand how these tensions are created and then resolved, I have developed the concept of ‘emotional bordering’ from Barrie Thorne’s concept of gender borders (1993). Ultimately, it is argued that investigating love in relation to culturally-diverse masculinities as they interact with the intimate father’s role can offer sociologists a fresh perspective on intimate inequalities by further enhancing the vulnerability of the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’. It can also give a different understanding to the role of ideals in the nexus of family practices, into which practices of love and of fathering are embedded.

This thesis looks at how the Roman poet Lucan uses the character of Cato to elucidate his beliefs about Fortune and Stoicism. The traditional Stoic view of Fortune views it as a force for good that allows people to improve through hardship. Lucan portrays Fortune as a purely antagonistic force that actively seeks to harm the Roman people and corrupt even good individuals like Cato. Lucan's Fortune arranges events to place Cato in a situation where it is impossible to maintain his virtue. Rather than providing him an opportunity to improve in the civil war, Fortune makes it so that whatever choice Cato makes, he becomes guilty. Brutus' dialogue with Cato in Book 2 of Pharsalia illuminates the position that Cato is in. Brutus looks to Cato as the traditional Stoic exemplar that can forge a path for virtue in civil war. However, Cato admits that joining any side in the civil war would cause him to become guilty. Fortune's support of Caesar and its dominance over contemporary events has forced Cato into this situation. Cato's desert march in Book 9 continues to show Fortune's dominance over Cato by continually denying him opportunities to gain virtue for himself. Lucan's portrayal of Fortune shows his rejection of Stoic teaching about Fortune and the ultimate futility of trying to remain virtuous in a time of civil war.

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The modern principle of freedom of subjectivity sets a moral standard which radically departs from Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean: modern moral agents, exemplified by the rising middle class, are granted the right to develop extreme dispositions towards goods like honour and wealth. Given that Aristotle considers such goods divisible in the sense that when one person gets more another gets less―the basic definition of distributive injustice―it isn’t surprising that modern philosophers like Kant have trouble reconciling this right with duty to others. Failing to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily in ethical terms, Kant and others turn to aesthetics, but Kant, at least, takes no account there of moral agents’ interest in the actual existence of goods. In this respect, the alternative to the Kantian aesthetic response I document in my dissertation is more Stoic than modern. This response, the modern mediocre-artist narrative, features a mediocre artist who fails to achieve the new standard of distributive justice and a genius who ostensibly succeeds. Though other critics discuss the ethical dimension of mediocre-artist narratives, they don’t consider the possibility that the mediocre artist’s failure might be due to the ethical dilemma just described. They therefore tend to uphold uncritically the narratives’ negative judgments of mediocrity, ascribing the latter’s failure to egotism. By contrast, I examine the genius’ artistic efforts for evidence of a similar failure. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the genius does indeed fail, albeit less spectacularly, arguing on this basis that egotistical characterizations of mediocrity are unjust. But the mediocre aren’t the only victims: in “concealing” genius’ failure, mediocre-artist narratives ignore unmet claims on its fruits. Finally, I invoke Derrida’s notion of the “lesser violence” to outline a new genre that recognizes the unattainability of the modern standard of justice. I call this genre morally progressive, rejecting Jürgen Habermas’ view that freedom of subjectivity has hit a dead end, and that we must backtrack to a philosophical turning indicated but not taken by Hegel, namely, the path of intersubjective freedom.

The modern principle of freedom of subjectivity sets a moral standard which radically departs from Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean: modern moral agents, exemplified by the rising middle class, are granted the right to develop extreme dispositions towards goods like honour and wealth. Given that Aristotle considers such goods divisible in the sense that when one person gets more another gets less―the basic definition of distributive injustice―it isn’t surprising that modern philosophers like Kant have trouble reconciling this right with duty to others. Failing to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily in ethical terms, Kant and others turn to aesthetics, but Kant, at least, takes no account there of moral agents’ interest in the actual existence of goods. In this respect, the alternative to the Kantian aesthetic response I document in my dissertation is more Stoic than modern. This response, the modern mediocre-artist narrative, features a mediocre artist who fails to achieve the new standard of distributive justice and a genius who ostensibly succeeds. Though other critics discuss the ethical dimension of mediocre-artist narratives, they don’t consider the possibility that the mediocre artist’s failure might be due to the ethical dilemma just described. They therefore tend to uphold uncritically the narratives’ negative judgments of mediocrity, ascribing the latter’s failure to egotism. By contrast, I examine the genius’ artistic efforts for evidence of a similar failure. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the genius does indeed fail, albeit less spectacularly, arguing on this basis that egotistical characterizations of mediocrity are unjust. But the mediocre aren’t the only victims: in “concealing” genius’ failure, mediocre-artist narratives ignore unmet claims on its fruits. Finally, I invoke Derrida’s notion of the “lesser violence” to outline a new genre that recognizes the unattainability of the modern standard of justice. I call this genre morally progressive, rejecting Jürgen Habermas’ view that freedom of subjectivity has hit a dead end, and that we must backtrack to a philosophical turning indicated but not taken by Hegel, namely, the path of intersubjective freedom.