Preaching is a corporeal activity. Gospel proclamations emerge from theological imaginations cultivated through embodied life. However, bodies beyond the pulpit present challenges for preaching. Wounded bodies, in particular, lay bare the inherent limitations of theological discourse. This dissertation offers a homiletical vision rooted in a close reading of the book of Job. Elevating an interpretation of Job as a theological aid for homiletics, this dissertation explores how bearing faithful witness to the wounds of those beyond the pulpit transforms preaching. Many homileticians have attended questions that relate directly to the thesis of this dissertation. Feminist and womanist homileticians such as Anna Carter Florence and Lisa Thompson have validated the epistemic authority of those who testify from marginalized social locations, laying the groundwork for my claims about the epistemic relevance of wounded bodies beyond the pulpit. Homileticians have also addressed the crisis of theological speech in the presence of suffering. Particularly, Christine Smith and Joni Sancken have contributed to a growing body of literature that urges preachers to transform their practices in light of radical suffering. However, an enfleshed homiletic presses beyond trauma-awareness as it engages the inherent limitations of theological discourse at the site of suffering, opening itself to transformation by another’s testimony. This dissertation adds a distinct mode of transformation to a converging homiletical discussion on bodies and suffering: that of bearing witness, as informed by ethicist Kelly Oliver. Bearing witness is a way of engaging others that recognizes that one’s body is ethically bound to others. Embracing the concepts of social flesh and social material advanced by Sharon Betcher and Mayra Rivera, I argue that wounded bodies are not entirely disjointed from the preacher, to be apprehended across an untraversable rift. Rather the space between is a shared social fabric, wherein the preacher is ethically implicated in the testimonies of others. Preachers bear a responsibility to faithfully engage another’s wounds, even as they challenge or confound the preacher’s theological imagination. Thus, bearing witness opens the possibility for an enfleshed gospel to emerge—a gospel that is accountable to the bodies beyond the pulpit. / 2024-12-16T00:00:00Z

Eyewitness testimony has as long history in the court system, and is very persuasive to juries. Jurors are hard pressed to ignore a witness' assertion of a perpetrator's identity. However, the juror's perception of eyewitness testimony is problematic as it has been documented as inaccurate and unreliable in numerous experiments. With the advent of DNA testing and efforts such as The Innocence Project, it has become apparent that faulty eyewitness accounts are central to many wrongful convictions. The intent of this thesis was to explore how law enforcement can facilitate more accurate eyewitness accounts via their interview process. Research suggests that a key problem in the current interviewing system is "post-event information," or outside information introduced by leading questions, exposure to police conversations or other witnesses' accounts. This information can contaminate a witness's memories of events and lead them to report things they did not see. The current experiment explores the effects of 1) warning and educating witnesses about suggestibility and 2) interviewing with leading or open-ended questions. Accuracy scores were then compared for each condition. The hope was to gain insight into methods for improving accurate recall of events and reducing memory contamination from "post-event information."

In a large body of research, Elizabeth Loftus (1975) first illuminated major concerns about the inaccuracy of eyewitness accounts. The primary goal of the present research was to test whether training regarding common eyewitness mistakes and witness suggestibility could improve eyewitness accuracy. The experimental group watched a presentation on research conducted by Elizabeth Loftus (1975) on eyewitness testimony and suggestibility during a Psychology course. Afterwards, an actor interrupted the classroom and had a discussion with the teacher. Students were asked a series of questions about the disruption. Some of the questions were leading and suggested certain things about the disruption that were inaccurate. After the misleading questions were asked, students were instructed to write a brief summary of what they saw. One week later, the students were asked direct questions about the disruption. A control group did not receive the presentation on eyewitness testimony, but witnessed the exact same event as the experimental group and followed the same procedure. The results suggest that participants who were trained were not as influenced as participants in the control group. Additionally, students in the control group reported the actor's behavior as more threatening than did the experimental group. This research not only adds to the existing literature, but has the potential to improve current eyewitness identification procedures in order to strengthen our justice system.

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Thesis advisor: Richard Atkins / The topic of this thesis is testimonial epistemic injustice in the courtroom context. Testimonial epistemic injustice occurs when someone’s testimony is unduly downgraded (credibility deficit) or unduly upgraded (credibility excess) due to a structural social prejudice held by the listener. Examples of structural social prejudices are prejudices concerning race, gender, class, and degree of education obtained by the testifier. Credibility assessments are influenced by listeners’ biases, the social context of the interaction, and the perceived disposition of the testifier. In this paper, I intend to examine (1) what testimonial epistemic injustice is and (2) what can be done to address testimonial epistemic injustice in courtrooms. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Scholar of the College. / Discipline: Philosophy.

In my thesis I ask the epistemological question: If a speaker testifies to some proposition p to some hearer, and the hearer learns that p, must that speaker believe that p? Those who maintain the traditional view in the epistemology of testimony claim that testimony is primarily a way in which speakers transmit beliefs to hearers. If this is the case, then in order to transmit the belief that p, the speaker must be in possession of a belief that p. Other epistemologists reject this view altogether and argue that when speakers stand in the right sort of epistemic relation to the statements they issue they properly testify. My project carves out a position between these two views. I argue that speakers need not believe p, but speakers must be in some appropriate epistemic state with respect to p in order to properly testify to p. On my view, understanding is among the epistemic states that can place a speaker in the right sort of epistemic relation to p. Thus, if p is a consequence of a speaker's understanding of a subject, the speaker is licensed to testify that p. / Master of Arts

Suggestibility occurs when inaccurate information is incorporated into currently existing memories. The present study examined the effect of forewarning on suggestibility, including the influence of working memory capacity (WMC). The main hypotheses are that forewarnings will reduce suggestibility compared to the control group and that high-WMC will yield lower suggestibility compared to medium- and low-WMC. The final hypothesis is that WMC and forewarning will interact such that low-WMC individuals will benefit more than high-WMC individuals from the forewarning. A sample of 123 college students was recruited. Participants watched a clip of the TV-show 24. WMC was then assessed followed by the presentation of a misleading narrative. Prior to listening to the narrative, they read a set of instructions that sometimes contained the forewarning. After listening to the misleading narrative, participants took a test over their memories of the film. A 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted and found a main effect for forewarning. No other effect was significant. The current results only support the first main hypothesis that forewarning reduces suggestibility. These results could be used to help prepare eyewitnesses to resist misinformation in the period between witnessing an event and reporting the event during a later trial.