The ability to represent the mental states of others (i.e., Theory of Mind, ToM) is vital for social interaction. There is limited information on ToM knowledge in children with specific language impairment (SLI). These children have deficient language abilities that cannot be explained by hearing, cognitive, or neurological problems. Furthermore, children with SLI experience difficulty in initiating and maintaining social pretend play. Language, pretend play, and ToM typically develop in concert, which may indicate that they share an underlying capacity for representation. Given that language is deficient in children with SLI, these children may have problems with ToM, which might be related to their social behaviors during pretend play. This study was the first to investigate the association between ToM and pretend play in children with and without SLI. Twenty-two children with SLI and 22 with typical development (TD), between 48-71 months of age, participated in this study. Children engaged in a variety of ToM tasks and participated in two pretend play assessments: a standardized pretend play assessment and a role play activity. Children with SLI scored significantly lower on ToM tasks and engaged less often in some sophisticated forms of pretend play than their age-matched peers with TD. After controlling for language and SES, there were no significant associations between ToM and pretend play in children with and without SLI. When language groups were analyzed individually, different patterns of associations emerged for children with and without SLI. ToM was positively associated with pretend play in children with TD but negatively associated in children with SLI. Moreover, inconsistent patterns of associations were observed for some children with SLI (i.e., poor ToM understanding but sophisticated pretend play or vice versa). This study demonstrated that children with SLI may also have concomitant problems in ToM and pretend play, which may have implications for clinical assessment and intervention. The study contributes to the literature by investigating the link between ToM and different forms of sophisticated pretend play in children with and without SLI. Given the different patterns of partial correlations, future investigation of the relationship between ToM and pretend play relationship is warranted.

This thesis examines the effects of linguistic input on the development of children’s epistemic concepts. It draws upon two fundamental questions in the field of cognitive development: (a) whether distinctions between automatic and controlled forms of cognitive processing are indicative of underlying conceptual differences, and (b) whether language is critical to the process of concept development. To establish the background of the current research, a summary of how these theoretical questions have been addressed in other fields of cognitive psychology is first provided (Chapter 1). These questions are then re- examined within the specific domain of epistemic concept development (Chapter 2). Changes in false-belief processing that occur between infancy and the early preschool years are discussed in relation to two competing theories of false-belief development. A framework to explain how language promotes children’s transition between automatic and controlled forms of processing is then provided. It is suggested that language facilitates change by both reducing the cognitive demands associated with controlled response tasks as well as assisting with the formation of robust epistemic representations. An empirical study that was designed to examine the effects of epistemic language (i.e., verbs and syntax) on children’s automatic and controlled processing of belief is then described (Chapters 3 to 5). Eighty-four children (Mage = 3;5 years), who initially failed elicited measures of false-belief, were trained with visual contexts of true- and false-belief. The critical manipulation across three conditions was the linguistic input presented in conjunction with these contexts. Children heard narrations that contained either (a) the description of an agent’s actions without an epistemic verb, (b) a familiar epistemic verb (thinks) across both contexts, or (c) the familiar epistemic verb in contexts of true-belief and a novel epistemic verb (gorps) in contexts of false-belief. Results demonstrated a significant advantage for children who were trained with epistemic verbs on spontaneous measures of false-belief (i.e., anticipatory gaze). Significant effects of epistemic verb exposure were also demonstrated in novel contexts of belief induction. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to theories that make distinct predictions about the role of language in epistemic concept development (Chapter 6).

This study assessed the relationship between children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ epistemological development and their evaluations of different teaching methods. Participants were presented with different teaching scenarios in which the domain (scientific or moral), nature (controversial or noncontroversial), and method (lecture or discussion) were varied to determine if this affected participants’ rating of the scenarios. Epistemological development was assessed in three domains: aesthetic, value (moral), and physical truth (science). Ninety-six participants (7–8-, 10–11-, 13–14-year-olds, and college students) were included in the study. In general, it was discovered that older participants (13-14-year-olds and college students) preferred discussion methods, while younger participants (7-8 and 10-11-year-olds) did not discriminate between lectures or discussions. However, all participants took the domain, nature, and method into consideration. Epistemological development was predictive of participants’ preference for teaching methods, but only in the value domain.

Doctor of Philosophy / This study defines Theory-of-Mind as the ability to experience one’s own mind and understand the minds of others to the extent necessary to make sense of human behaviour and the world. Since the concept of Theory-of-Mind was first applied to people with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), lack of Theory-of-Mind has been used to explain their cognitive difficulties (National Research Council, 2003), along with social, communicative and imaginative impairments (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994). Previous studies have tended to think of Theory-of-Mind in terms of a simple binary of deficit or credit; to exclude the voices of people with ASD; to emphasise the cognitive aspects of Theory-of-Mind over its affective aspects; and to emphasise understanding the minds of others over experiencing one’s own mind. This study aims to address these issues by investigating Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced by students with ASD and objectively understood by their teachers. It is the first attempt in the study of Theory-of-Mind to include the voices of individuals with ASD along with the professional views of their teachers. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, supported by philosophy of mind and special education. A grounded theory approach and a mixed methods research design combine to build and strengthen a theory of Theory-of-Mind. For Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced, 20 senior secondary and post secondary school students with ASD from Republic of Korea were interviewed and student-produced documents were reviewed to draw out their inner experiences. The Korean Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Korean Vineland Social Maturity Scale were employed to assess IQ and social competence. For Theory-of-Mind as objectively understood, their teachers’ beliefs regarding their students with ASD were sought through in-depth interviews, a review of teacher-produced documents and administration of a newly developed Teacher Questionnaire. This study reports differences between Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively observed, and variations within the components of Theory-of-Mind. The role of imagination in Theory-of-Mind and the relationships between Theory-of-Mind components, IQ and social competence are discussed. As a result, a Theory-of-Mind continuum model and Theory-of-Mind Typology is proposed.

This thesis is an ethnography of the indigenous religion, education system and social organization of the community living in the central mountains of Sikka Regency on the island of Flores in Indonesia. The question that has motivated my research is ‘how are the ideas and practices of this community’s indigenous cosmology taught and learned so to persist with continuity through generations?’ In answer I explore the ways in which cosmological ideas and practices are taught to be valued as truth as they are embodied during the practical activity of ritual. This study advances a performative theory of ritual education through a combination of Gregory Bateson’s theory of the ecology of mind and Roy Rappaport’s theory of ritual and sanctification / I begin with a critical examination of the representations of the community in question that have been made by scholars and neighboring populations. I argue that these representations wrongly imply a static and bounded community. Instead, I contend that the community is constituted by dynamic village and clan relationships anchored on sentimental and structural forms of individual belonging to particular villages and clans. This belonging is principally developed through individuals’ adherence to the indigenous cosmology, locally called Adat. I continue by discussing the educational methods by which this cosmology is perpetuated. Ritual language lessons concerning education insist that from an early age community members participate fully in daily religious life (particularly in the practice of ritual) under the guidance of close family. I then describe the learning environments found in childhood, marriage and mortuary rites. Following Bateson, I argue that during ritual contexts participants ‘deutero-learn’ embodied skills that are patterned by previous experiences, and generate the future conditions, of these same ritual contexts. / In addition to traditional educational settings, the Adat cosmology is now taught in Indonesian primary and high schools in ‘local content curriculum’ classes. I compare Adat education based on participation in ritual with that of modern schools, and I argue that in the classroom the indigenous cosmology is abstracted from its performative underpinnings. Adat is embodied differently in ritual and school contexts, and the tensions caused by these differences lead to transformations in Adat knowledge. I end this thesis by contextualizing my findings with national discourses of indigeneity and intercultural education.

Doctor of Philosophy / This study defines Theory-of-Mind as the ability to experience one’s own mind and understand the minds of others to the extent necessary to make sense of human behaviour and the world. Since the concept of Theory-of-Mind was first applied to people with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), lack of Theory-of-Mind has been used to explain their cognitive difficulties (National Research Council, 2003), along with social, communicative and imaginative impairments (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994). Previous studies have tended to think of Theory-of-Mind in terms of a simple binary of deficit or credit; to exclude the voices of people with ASD; to emphasise the cognitive aspects of Theory-of-Mind over its affective aspects; and to emphasise understanding the minds of others over experiencing one’s own mind. This study aims to address these issues by investigating Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced by students with ASD and objectively understood by their teachers. It is the first attempt in the study of Theory-of-Mind to include the voices of individuals with ASD along with the professional views of their teachers. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, supported by philosophy of mind and special education. A grounded theory approach and a mixed methods research design combine to build and strengthen a theory of Theory-of-Mind. For Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced, 20 senior secondary and post secondary school students with ASD from Republic of Korea were interviewed and student-produced documents were reviewed to draw out their inner experiences. The Korean Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Korean Vineland Social Maturity Scale were employed to assess IQ and social competence. For Theory-of-Mind as objectively understood, their teachers’ beliefs regarding their students with ASD were sought through in-depth interviews, a review of teacher-produced documents and administration of a newly developed Teacher Questionnaire. This study reports differences between Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively observed, and variations within the components of Theory-of-Mind. The role of imagination in Theory-of-Mind and the relationships between Theory-of-Mind components, IQ and social competence are discussed. As a result, a Theory-of-Mind continuum model and Theory-of-Mind Typology is proposed.

Studies indicate that young only children are more likely than those with siblings to have egocentric tendencies. Egocentrism is a maladaptive behavior from a lack of Theory of Mind understanding, which is the ability to take on the perspectives of others and to discern emotional cues. The current study determines whether or not only children are more likely respond negatively to teacher criticism. Only children (N=100) and those with siblings (N=100) aged six years were be tested on tasks measuring egocentrism, ToM understanding, and their response to teacher constructive criticism. Only children are expected to have lower ToM task scores, respond more negatively to criticism, and to be more likely to display traits of egocentrism than those with siblings. These potential results indicate that there is something developmentally beneficial in having a sibling(s), which promotes social and emotional competency in young children that is not necessarily prevalent for only children. Further research should examine children at an even younger age to determine when and how the difference in ToM understanding occurs.

This study examined the development of social cognition in children with and without autism spectrum disorder (ASD), as well as the influence of behavioral and molecular genetics on these higher-order cognitive abilities. Specifically, it was hypothesized that children with ASD would perform more poorly on all social cognitive tasks compared with typically developing peers. In addition, it was hypothesized that typically developing children who performed better on a simpler social cognitive task at ages 3 or 4 would perform better at follow-up (i.e., one time between the ages of 6-10). Lastly, it was hypothesized that children who had at least one risk allele in both the DRD4 and the 5-HTTLPR polymorphisms would perform worse than those who had at least one risk allele in either polymorphism, who, in turn, would perform worse than children without any risk alleles. The twin sample included 62 families of multiples (twins, triplets, or quadruplets) who were recruited through the Southern Illinois Twins and Siblings Study (SITSS), and the ASD sample included 25 children who were recruited from the Center for Autism Spectrum Disorders at SIU. Significant group differences were found for children's performance on all of the social cognitive tasks. Furthermore, results showed that some areas of social cognition (theory of mind and the understanding of non-literal language) are more influenced by genetic factors than are other cognitive skills. Lastly, results from the molecular genetic analyses suggest that basic social cognitive skills (e.g., theory of mind) may be influenced by underlying biological factors in the serotonergic and dopaminergic pathways. The present study provided useful information on how psychological and genetic factors influence the development of social cognitive abilities in children with and without ASD.

Children with developmental delays often do not acquire perspective taking skills without training. These skills are imperative to the ability to relate to others socially and the development of appropriate social behavior. They may lack the ability to recognize that another person’s view may differ from their own, or that reality may differ from appearance. This study used deictic relational training to aid in the development of a ‘Theory of Mind’ and the acquisition of perspective taking skills. The PEAK relational training system was used in a special education classroom to train YOU and I relations, as well as YOU and I reversal, to two nine year old students with intellectual disability. Multiple exemplar training was then used to promote the generalization of these perspective taking skills to an in situ deceptive container task. One subject participated in the first two training phases, but was absent for the remainder of the study. The second subject successfully completed all training phases and was then able to correctly respond when asked to report what the perspective of another individual would be.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to accurately predict and reason about the mental states and beliefs of others, has yet to be explored in Emerging Adulthood, the 18-25 age range characterized by variability and developing a flexible worldview. The current study attempts to predict accuracy and response time on two ToM tasks, The Mind in the Eyes task (MiE), and the Empathetic Accuracy Paradigm (EAP) task by acting experience (whether the participant has acted in a live theater performance) and college experience (freshmen, sophomore, etc.) in 116 college participants. It was hypothesized that regression models including acting experience and college experience will account for more variance than models including only demographic variables and that the models including acting and college experience will significantly predict accuracy and response time on all ToM tasks. All such models predicting accuracy were significant, while only a model predicting response time on the EAP task was significantly predictive. It was hypothesized that acting experience will enable participants to use Theory of Mind skills faster and more accurately (Goldstein & Winner, 2012). Multiple regression analyses confirmed that acting experience is a significant predictor in all models predicting accuracy on Theory of Mind tasks, however response time was a significant predictor in only one of two tasks. It was also hypothesized that college experience will result in a more flexible worldview, open to multiple viewpoints and opinions, significantly influencing response time and accuracy. Multiple regression analyses revealed college experience approached significance in a model predicting accuracy on the MiE task, but no other significant contributions. Implications for the benefits of acting and college experience, the study of Theory of Mind in Emerging Adulthood, and practical applications of the findings in academia and therapeutic settings are discussed.