This thesis is about common-sense psychology and its role in cognitive science. Put simply, the argument is that common-sense psychology is important because it offers clues to some complex problems in cognitive science, and because common-sense psychology has significant effects on our intuitions, both in science and on an everyday level. The thesis develops a theory of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology. Anthropomorphism, the natural human tendency to ascribe human characteristics (and especially human mental characteristics) to things that aren't human, is an important theme in the thesis. Anthropomorphism reveals an endemic anthropocentricity that deeply influences our thinking about other minds. The thesis then constructs a descriptive model of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology, and uses it to analyse two studies of the ascription of mental states. The first, Baron- Cohen et al. 's (1985) false belief test, shows how cognitive modelling can be used to compare different theories of common-sense psychology. The second study, Searle's (1980) `Chinese Room', shows 'that this same model can reproduce the patterns of scientific intuitions taken to systems which pass the Turing test (Turing, 1950), suggesting that it is best seen as a common-sense test for a mind, not a scientific one. Finally, the thesis argues that scientific theories involving the ascription of mentality through a model or a metaphor are partly dependent on each individual scientist's common-sense psychology. To conclude, this thesis develops an interdisciplinary study of common-sense psychology and shows that its effects are more wide ranging than is commonly thought. This means that it affects science more than might be expected, but that careful study can help us to become mindful of these effects. Within this new framework, a proper understanding of common-sense psychology could lay important new foundations for the future of cognitive science.

Theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others and to predict their behaviour based on inferences about their mental states, for example their perception, desires, or beliefs. Forty years ago, research on theory of mind originated from the question of whether or not chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have a theory of mind, a question that – after all this time – is still debated. In the present thesis, I investigate theory of mind and its precursors in birds of the crow family, specifically Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius), California scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica), and carrion crows (Corvus corone corone). Corvids have been reported to possess theory of mind-like abilities. This qualification reflects the fact that most research on theory of mind in these birds has revolved around the ability to respond to perceptual and desire states of conspecifics, and so far has not produced evidence for or against an ability to also respond to others’ beliefs. Further, it is unclear which mechanisms could be the basis of corvids’ abilities. Thus, there are two open questions in regard to corvid theory of mind my thesis aims to address. To address these questions, first, I investigated the ability of Eurasian jays to respond to the false belief of a conspecific in a caching paradigm, where the knowledge of a conspecific observer about the accessibility of two caching sites was manipulated (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 I explore which behavioural cues might present the basis of the jays’ ability to respond to the desire of a conspecific in a caching context. In Chapter 4, I report a study on biological motion perception in scrub-jays, a phenomenon suggested to be crucial for the detection of social agents. In Chapter 5, I assess scrub-jays’ sensitivity to gaze of a human and a conspecific. Finally, in Chapter 6, I report a study investigating the face inversion effect in carrion crows, an effect that is indicative of a ‘special’ relevance of faces. I conclude by discussing how the presented studies could help us inform our understanding of corvid theory of mind-like abilities.

Poor Insight is a common symptom of schizophrenia and it is conceptualised as having at least three principal components, namely unawareness of symptoms, unawareness of the need for treatment, and unawareness of the consequences of the disorder. These deficits have long been of clinical interest and have been shown to predict poorer treatment compliance, clinical outcome, social function, and response to vocational rehabilitation (Amador & David, 2004). Additionally, difficulties to establish and maintain social relationships are core features of schizophrenia, and there is evidence that these may to some extent stem from an alteration of the neural circuits that regulate social behaviour, and in particular deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) (Lee et al., 2004). While deficits in insight in schizophrenia have been widely and consistently reported in the literature, evidence on the nature of the ToM dysfunction in this disorder is still controversial. This is mainly due to methodological differences across studies as well as limitations regarding the instruments used for ToM assessment. The first aim of this research consisted of clarifying some of these issues -whether a specific ToM dysfunction existed in schizophrenia and whether this most suitably fitted in the state or trait deficit views- trying to overcome previous methodological drawbacks. We did so by the use of a well matched control group, by controlling for important confounds and by the inclusion of ToM instruments of different nature (verbal and pictorial tasks). Results of this project were included in a first paper (Pousa et al., 2008a) and also led to the publication of a letter discussing part of the conclusions of a recent meta-analysis on ToM in schizophrenia (Pousa, Ruiz & David, 2008). Following this preliminary work and on the basis of a number of phenomenological parallelisms between insight and ToM dysfunctions that could be appreciated both clinically and in the literature, we decided to explore the relationship between insight and ToM. Given the scarcity of previous studies specifically focused on this issue, the nature of the study was mainly exploratory. The most relevant results of this investigation led to a second paper (Pousa et al., 2008b).Besides the mentioned publications, two complementary published works are added in the present thesis for their relevance to the project. The first is the manuscript of the Spanish adaptation of the SUMD (Ruiz et al., 2007). The second is a chapter of a book on mental disorders from an evolutionary perspective, titled "Theory of Mind as an evolutionary brain module". This chapter describes the concept of ToM, its measurement, as well as its neurobiological basis and philogenetic development, and was part of the literature review carried out while working on the design of the project (Obiols & Pousa, 2005). References:- Amador X & David A. Insight and Psychosis. Awareness of illness in schizophrenia and Related Disorders. (2nd Edition) (2004). Oxford University Press. - Lee KH; Farrow TFD; Spence SA & Woodruff PWR. (2004) Social cognition, brain networks and schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine 34: 391-400.- Obiols, JE; Pousa, E. (2005) La Teoría de la Mente como módulo cerebral evolutivo. En J Sanjuan y CJ Cela Conde (Eds) 2005, cap 6, pp105-119. La Profecia de Darwin. Ars Médica. ISBN: 84-9751-090-9- Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Brébion, G; David, AS; Ruiz, AI; Obiols, JE. (2008a) Theory of mind deficits in chronic schizophrenia: evidence for state dependence. Psychiatry Research, 158: 1-10.- Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Navarro, B; Ruiz, AI, Obiols, JE; David, AS. (2008b) Exploratory study of the association between insight and Theory of Mind (ToM) in stable schizophrenia patients. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13, 210-232.- Pousa, E; Ruiz, AI; David, AS. (2008). Mentalising impairment as a trait marker of schizophrenia? Correspondence. British Journal of Psychiatry, 192, 312-315.- Ruiz, AI; Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Crosas, JM; Cuppa, S; Garcia-Ribera, C. (2008). Adaptación al español de la Escala de Valoración de la No Conciencia de Trastorno Mental SUMD. Actas Españolas de Psiquiatria, 36, 111-118.

A landmark experiment by Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn, and Paul Bloom demonstrated that infants as young as 6 months old possess previously unrecognized abilities to form social evaluations. In the experiment, infants were shown a shape that was made to appear as if it was climbing a hill. In one event, another shape helped the climber up the hill, while in a separate event, a different shape prevented the climber from reaching the top. When offered a choice between the helping and hindering shapes, both 6- and 10-month-olds chose the helping shape over the hindering shape, showing that they had evaluated the actions and preferred the helper as a result. In an additional test, the climber was made to appear as if it was "choosing" the helping shape or the hindering shape. Infant looking times were measured in order to assess which "choice" was more surprising. Interestingly, the 6-month-olds looked equally for both events, while the 10-month-olds looked longer when the hinderer was approached. This demonstrated that the 10-month-olds were attributing preferences to the climber, and expected that the climber would prefer the helper just as they had. This ability was apparently beyond that of the 6-month-olds, but no assessment or explanation has been offered for why this would be. The current study attempted to remedy this problem by replicating this experiment with 7- and 8-month-olds. The 7-month-olds in this experiment performed as expected, preferring the helper over the hinderer. The 8-month-olds, however, showed no clear preference. This was unexpected and not easily explainable. Neither age showed a difference in looking time whether the climber approached the helper or the hinderer. These looking time data suggest that 7- and 8-month-olds are closer to 6-month-olds in their ability to attribute evaluations to other agents, indicating that these abilities do not develop until later infancy, around 9 or 10 months. However, lack of significant results on the looking time test need not indicate a lack of social knowledge, and may instead stem more directly from developing theory of mind abilities. Options for future studies pitting social knowledge against theory of mind are explored.

This study investigated the Internal State (IS) language input of parents, IS language use by children, and children’s performance on perspective taking and false belief Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. Two groups of participants were included: children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (N = 12, M chronological age = 7; 4, M language age = 6;0) and typically-developing (TD) children (N = 13, M chronological age = 6;0, M language age= 6;5), matched on language age. Independent means samples t-tests showed that the transcripts of the two groups of parents or the two groups of children did not differ in regards to total number of words, utterances, or mean length of utterance. ANOVAs were used to test for differences in IS language category or elaboration in the two groups (ASD, TD), in parents and children. For the parent data, no statistically significant differences emerged. For the analysis of child talk the ANOVA revealed that the main effect of group approached significance, with a trend towards TD children using more IS language than children with ASD. ANOVAs were also used to test for differences in ToM task performance (perspective-taking, false belief) in the two groups of children; TD children performed significantly better on ToM Tasks overall than the children with ASD. Partial correlations found that for the TD group, there were no significant correlations between the parent’s or the child’s use of IS language with the child’s performance on ToM tasks when chronological age was controlled for. For the ASD group, after controlling for chronological age and language age, the parent’s use of elaborated affect terms was significantly positively correlated with their child’s performance score on perspective-taking tasks, and the parent’s use of elaborated cognitive terms was significantly negatively correlated with their child’s performance on false-belief tasks. Also for the ASD group, the child’s use of simple affect terms was significantly positively correlated with their performance on false belief tasks after controlling for chronological age and language age. Findings are discussed in relation to prior research and clinical implications.

Barns fem första levnadsår präglas av en omfattande utveckling av språkliga förmågor och exekutiva funktioner, vilka är färdigheter som visat sig ha en stor påverkan på hur barn utvecklar förståelse för sina egna och andras tankar, det vill säga deras Theory of Mind. En central aspekt inom forskning har varit att undersöka hur förmågorna samvarierar vid olika åldrar. Syftet i föreliggande studie var att undersöka sambandet mellan Theory of Mind, språkliga förmågor och exekutiva funktioner hos barn i tre års ålder med typisk utveckling. Av intresse var även att undersöka om det förelåg skillnader i resultat mellan pojkar och flickor samt om de del-tagande barnens demografiska förhållanden vad gäller antal äldre och/eller yngre syskon, socio-ekonomisk status och vuxenkontakt påverkade de deltagande barnens Theory of Mind. Totalt medverkade 30 barn med typisk utveckling, varav 16 var flickor och 14 var pojkar. Åldersanpassade testmaterial användes för att undersöka Theory of Mind, grammatisk förmåga, semantisk förmåga, kognitiv flexibilitet, arbetsminne och fonemdiskrimination. Den demografiska informationen inhämtades i form av en enkät som föräldrarna fick fylla i. Resultatet indikerar att treåriga barns förmåga att hantera och förstå Theory of Mind-uppgifter samvarierar med både grammatisk förmåga och kognitiv flexibilitet. Samvariationer påträffades även mellan grammatisk förmåga och kognitiv flexibilitet, vilket stärker att språk, exe-kutiva funktioner och ToM har ett beroendeförhållande till varandra. Föreliggande studie framhåller att samtliga förmågor är mer eller mindre integrerade vid olika åldrar och korrelationerna visar på att vissa delförmågor inom språk, ToM och exekutiva funktioner går hand i hand och utvecklas i samspel med varandra. Specifikt kan den exekutiva komponenten kognitiv flexibilitet och den språkliga förmågan grammatik ses som viktiga förmågor för just treåriga barns ToM. / A childs’ first five years are characterized by an extensive development of language abilities and executive functions. These are skills that have demonstrated large impact on how children develop their understanding of their own and others’ thoughts, that is, their Theory of Mind. Within contemporary research, a central question has been to investigate how these abilities correlate at different stages of age.  The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between Theory of Mind, language and executive functions in typically developed three-year-old children. A central part in this study was also to assess whether differences in performance between boys and girls occurred and also if the number of younger and/or older siblings, socioeconomic status, and adult contact did affect the children’s performance.  A total of 30 children with typical development participated, of whom 16 were girls and 14 were boys. Age-appropriate test materials were used to examine, Theory of Mind, grammatical ability, semantic ability, cognitive flexibility, working memory, and phonetic discrimination. The demographic information was based on a questionnaire that parents of the participating children had to answer.  The result of this study indicates that the three-year child's ability to manage and understand tasks that assess Theory of mind seems to covariate with both grammatical skills and cognitive flexibility. A Correlation was also found between grammatical skills and cognitive flexibility, which indicate that language ability, executive functions and ToM have a strong dependent relationship.  The present study confirms that all abilities are more or less integrated at different ages and the correlations indicate that certain abilities in language, ToM and executive functions are de-veloped in interaction with each other. Specifically, the executive component cognitive flexibility and the grammatical ability are important abilities for three-year children’s ToM.

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abstract: Understanding sources of knowledge (e.g., seeing leads to knowing) is an important ability in young children’s theory of mind development. The research presented here measured if children were better at reporting their own versus another person’s knowledge states, which would indicate the presence of introspection. Children had to report when the person (self or other) had knowledge or ignorance after looking into one box and not looking into another box. In Study 1 (N = 66), 3- and 4-year-olds found the other-version of the task harder than the self-version whereas 5-year-olds performed near ceiling on both versions. This effect replicated in Study 2 (N = 43), which included familiarization trials to make sure children understood the question format. This finding is in support of the presence of introspection in preschool-aged children. In the same studies, children also showed evidence for theorizing about their own and others knowledge states in a guessing task (Study 1) and in true and false belief tasks (Study 2). These findings together indicate both introspection and theorizing are present during young children's theory of mind development. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2015

abstract: A cornerstone of children’s socio-cognitive development is understanding that others can have knowledge, thoughts, and perceptions that differ from one’s own. Preschool-aged children often have difficulty with this kind of social understanding, i.e., they lack an explicit theory of mind. The goal of this dissertation was to examine the role mental state language as a developmental mechanism of children’s early understanding of their own mental states (i.e., their introspective ability). Specifically, it was hypothesized that (1) parents’ ability to recognize and appropriately label their children’s mental states and (2) children’s linguistic ability to distinguish between their mental states shapes the development of children’s introspective ability. An initial prediction of the first hypothesis is that parents should recognized differences in the development of children’s self- and other-understanding in order to better help their children’s introspective development. In support of this prediction, parents (N = 400, Mage = 58 months, Range = 28-93 months) reported that children’s understanding of their own knowledge was greater than children’s understanding of others’ knowledge. A prediction of the second hypothesis is that children’s linguistic ability to distinguish between and appropriately label their own mental states should determine their ability to make fined grained judgments of mental states like certainty. In support of this prediction, children’s (N = 197, Mage = 56 months, Range = 36-82 months) ability to distinguish between their own knowledge and ignorance states was associated children’s ability to engage in uncertainty monitoring. Together, these findings provide support for the association between children’s linguistic environment and ability and their introspective development. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Psychology 2018

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