Prior research has demonstrated that bilinguals outperform monolinguals on tasks requiring set shifting – that is, the ability to shift between different ways of thinking about an object or situation. For example, bilingual children have been shown to outperform monolingual controls on false-belief tasks and on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task. The present study aimed (a) to examine whether the bilingual advantage in false-belief and DCCS tasks can be replicated when accounting for languages/cultures and socio-economic status and (b) to determine whether inhibitory control, metarepresentation, and/or working memory underlie the advantage, if any exists. Three language groups (24 English monolingual, 24 French monolingual, and 24 English-French bilingual preschoolers) were tested on the following tasks: false-belief (FB) tasks, the DCCS task, an inhibitory control task (Stroop task), a metarepresentation task (Identity Statements task), a working memory task (Backward Word Span), and receptive language proficiency tests. Socio-economic status was measured through a parental questionnaire containing questions about parental income and education. Results showed that the three language groups were equivalent on socio-economic measures. Despite having significantly lower language proficiency scores, bilinguals’ raw scores on FB and DCCS tasks did not differ from monolinguals’ raw scores. After statistically controlling for language proficiency and age, bilinguals had significantly higher FB scores, but did not differ from monolinguals on DCCS scores. Analyses were then performed to determine whether inhibitory control, metarepresentation, and/or working memory help bilinguals “do more” in FB “with less” language proficiency. Working memory emerged as the likely candidate that compensates for the negative effect of bilingual children’s low language proficiency on FB performance because, after controlling for age and language proficiency, it was the only cognitive ability that fulfilled both criteria: (a) its measure correlated significantly with FB and (b) there was a bilingual advantage over both monolingual groups in the measure. A mediation analysis confirmed that the working memory measure significantly mediates the relation between bilingual status and FB while controlling for age and language proficiency. Both components of the working memory measure – that is, understanding of task instructions and maintenance/manipulation capacity – mediate this relation.

An individual`s eyes provide a wealth of information during social interactions. The present research investigates the social adjustment implications of one gaze behaviour, specifically, shared attention, which is the tendency to follow an interlocutor`s directed gaze to attend to the same object or location. Recent clinical research suggested that gaze control reflects the capacity to differentiate self from other at the attentional level, since patient populations with poor gaze control abilities (i.e., schizophrenic patients) were also found to exhibit difficulty in differentiating between the self and another agent. Four studies were conducted to examine whether flexible gaze following behavior, specifically the ability to inhibit gaze-following, when the situation warrants, would be positively linked with two markers of adaptive social functioning: sociocognitive abilities and self-close other(s) differentiation. Based on previous research that gaze cues linked to upright (but not inverted) faces trigger reflexive gaze following mechanisms, an upright face condition was used to assess social cueing mechanisms and an inverted face condition, as a control for non-social cueing mechanisms in a gaze control task with realistic (Study 2) and schematic faces (Studies 1, 3, and 4). Studies 1-4 showed that more flexible gaze following behavior predicted superior sociocognitive abilities, as indexed by higher capacity to infer the mental states of others in both young and older adults (Studies 1-3), as well as in clinical populations (i.e., Parkinson’s Disease [PD] patients, Study 4). Studies 2-4 further revealed that poorer gaze control predicted decreased self-close other differentiation in both younger and older adults. In Study 2, poorer gaze control performance characterized young adults from enmeshed family systems, which allow limited private space and emotional autonomy. In Studies 3 and 4, poorer gaze control predicted decreased cognitive-affective differentiation from one’s spouse and lower marital quality in healthy elderly couples (Study 3) and elderly couples, where one spouse had PD (Study 4). The present findings argue for the existence of a unified sociocognitive network, perpetually shaped by one’s interpersonal history, and which encompasses perceptual mechanisms, specialized for face and gaze processing and higher-order cognitive mechanisms, specialized for processing the meaning (s) of social environments.

Prior research has demonstrated that bilinguals outperform monolinguals on tasks requiring set shifting – that is, the ability to shift between different ways of thinking about an object or situation. For example, bilingual children have been shown to outperform monolingual controls on false-belief tasks and on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task. The present study aimed (a) to examine whether the bilingual advantage in false-belief and DCCS tasks can be replicated when accounting for languages/cultures and socio-economic status and (b) to determine whether inhibitory control, metarepresentation, and/or working memory underlie the advantage, if any exists. Three language groups (24 English monolingual, 24 French monolingual, and 24 English-French bilingual preschoolers) were tested on the following tasks: false-belief (FB) tasks, the DCCS task, an inhibitory control task (Stroop task), a metarepresentation task (Identity Statements task), a working memory task (Backward Word Span), and receptive language proficiency tests. Socio-economic status was measured through a parental questionnaire containing questions about parental income and education. Results showed that the three language groups were equivalent on socio-economic measures. Despite having significantly lower language proficiency scores, bilinguals’ raw scores on FB and DCCS tasks did not differ from monolinguals’ raw scores. After statistically controlling for language proficiency and age, bilinguals had significantly higher FB scores, but did not differ from monolinguals on DCCS scores. Analyses were then performed to determine whether inhibitory control, metarepresentation, and/or working memory help bilinguals “do more” in FB “with less” language proficiency. Working memory emerged as the likely candidate that compensates for the negative effect of bilingual children’s low language proficiency on FB performance because, after controlling for age and language proficiency, it was the only cognitive ability that fulfilled both criteria: (a) its measure correlated significantly with FB and (b) there was a bilingual advantage over both monolingual groups in the measure. A mediation analysis confirmed that the working memory measure significantly mediates the relation between bilingual status and FB while controlling for age and language proficiency. Both components of the working memory measure – that is, understanding of task instructions and maintenance/manipulation capacity – mediate this relation.

No description available.

Often overlooked in the study of theory of mind (ToM) development, the understanding of motivational states, such as goals and desires, is both an important capacity in its own right and also a likely precursor to more advanced social and cognitive skills. This dissertation explored infants' and toddlers' reasoning about agents' motivational states, linking those representations to the domains of language and prosocial development. Parts I and II of the dissertation asked about toddlers' abilities to use representations of others' motivational states to guide helping behaviors. Part I used a spontaneous helping paradigm with two goal objects, one previously liked and the other disliked. Three- but not 2-year-olds helped appropriately by giving an actor her desired object, reflecting prosocial concern for others' specific desires at age 3. Part II probed the understanding of goals and helping of 14- and 24-month-olds. After establishing that toddlers encode simple reaching actions as goal-directed, a series of 4 experiments using an object-giving paradigm investigated toddlers' abilities to use goal representations to guide helping. The results indicate that 24- but not 14-month-olds used representations of prior goals to inform their helping behaviors; 14-month-olds were capable of using only current goals to guide helping. Part III of the dissertation asked whether there is continuity in the developmental relationship between language and ToM by investigating links between toddlers' understanding of motivational states and their vocabulary size. Experiment 1 found no correlation between the vocabulary size of typically hearing toddlers and their performance on tasks measuring motivational state understanding. Experiment 2 compared the same motivational state understanding of typically hearing toddlers and deaf toddlers with smaller vocabularies, finding no differences in performance between groups. The results of these experiments indicate that the link between language and false belief that is present at age 4 does not extend to motivational state reasoning in the toddler years. Together the findings of this dissertation highlight important limits and boundary conditions on young children's reasoning about motivational states. Further research is needed into the developmental trajectory and mechanisms of theory of mind reasoning. / Psychology

In the current study, children’s understanding of false belief, intention, and their ability to distinguish the appearance of a character from its reality was investigated. Seventy-two three to five years olds were recruited from several preschools in the Silicon Valley in California. During the experiment, children were shown an animated movie in a computer and asked the false belief, intention, and appearance-reality distinction questions. Following the animated movie, children were also asked if they understand 10 mental words that depicted the human mind, such as think, want, believe, etc. The relationship between the children’s knowledge of the human mind and the mental words they understood was explored. Results of the current study revealed that children who were four and half to five performed better than children three and half to four on false belief tasks. Children’s performance on intention and appearance-reality distinction questions did not differ significantly across age. However, girls’ performance was superior to boys’ performance on intention questions. Similarly, girls’ knowledge of overall naïve psychology was also superior to that of boys. Moreover, the order of the naïve psychology concepts that children passed in current study was from intention to appearance-reality distinction and then false belief. Finally, the regression analysis of the data revealed that the mental word vocabulary children processed was closely related to naïve psychology development. More specifically, the number of total mental words that were reported by children or assessed by contextual questions was a significant predictor of naïve psychology knowledge.

The analyses in this dissertation were designed to identify 1) whether there is an age effect among three-, four-, and five-year-old preschool children for false-belief understanding, deceptive ability, and deception detection ability, 2) whether there is a gender effect among preschool children for false-belief understanding, deceptive ability, and deception detection ability, 3) whether there is a relationship between false-belief understanding, deceptive ability, and deception detection ability in preschool children, and 4) whether there is a relationship between peer acceptance and false-belief understanding, deceptive ability, and deception detection ability among preschool children. Participants were 78 (34 male, 44 female) preschool children of mixed ethnicity who were between three to five years of age. All subjects completed four tasks that assessed false-belief understanding, deceptive ability, deception detection ability, and peer acceptance. Results from the four-way repeated measures mixed-model analysis of variance (2 Gender x 3 Age x 2 False-Belief Understanding x 2 Deception) suggest that there is a task effect, age effect, gender effect, and false-belief understanding effect for deception among preschool children. Children received significantly higher scores on the deception detection ability task than they did on the deceptive ability task. This indicates that young children find deception detection to be easier than deceptive ability. In addition, this also provides evidence that deceptive ability and that deception detection are two separate constructs. This is further supported by the principal components analysis, which extracted two separate components for deception intelligence. In addition, three-year-old children perform significantly lower than four- and five-year-old children on deception tasks. However, there is not a significant difference between the performances of four- and five-year-old children on deception tasks. This supports previous research that four years of age appears to be the critical age for the emergence of Machiavellian Intelligence (Peskin, 1992; Peterson, 2003). Moreover, males perform significantly better on deception tasks than females. Furthermore, there is a significant positive correlation between deception detection ability and peer acceptance. Children who obtain higher deception detection ability scores are ranked as being more liked by their peers.

No description available.

The capacity to mentally project the self into the future or, what has recently been termed “episodic foresight” is an emerging topic of study in developmental psychology. The aim of this dissertation was to review available research on this topic and explore its development in two groups of children: typically-developing preschoolers and children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This dissertation had two main goals. The first goal was to explore whether tasks thought to measure episodic foresight in children are related and whether, as has been hypothesized, they were related to theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF). Study 1 showed that after controlling for age and language ability, episodic foresight tasks were not intercorrelated, nor were they individually related to ToM or EF tasks. Importantly, however, an episodic foresight composite score was related to several EF tasks. Specifically, the results suggested a significant relation between episodic foresight and inhibitory control. The second goal of this dissertation was to explore the development of episodic foresight in children with ASD. Specifically, I tested whether children with ASD would perform more poorly on a series of episodic foresight tasks than a mental-age matched group of typically-developing children. Study 2 revealed significant group differences on several episodic foresight tasks, suggesting that children with ASD showed impairments in thinking about themselves in the future. These results are a timely contribution to the research on episodic foresight and will hopefully aid in the further development of tasks that adequately measure this important cognitive ability in children.

This study assessed the relationship between children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ epistemological development and their evaluations of different teaching methods. Participants were presented with different teaching scenarios in which the domain (scientific or moral), nature (controversial or noncontroversial), and method (lecture or discussion) were varied to determine if this affected participants’ rating of the scenarios. Epistemological development was assessed in three domains: aesthetic, value (moral), and physical truth (science). Ninety-six participants (7–8-, 10–11-, 13–14-year-olds, and college students) were included in the study. In general, it was discovered that older participants (13-14-year-olds and college students) preferred discussion methods, while younger participants (7-8 and 10-11-year-olds) did not discriminate between lectures or discussions. However, all participants took the domain, nature, and method into consideration. Epistemological development was predictive of participants’ preference for teaching methods, but only in the value domain.