Thesis advisor: Liane L. Young / Thesis advisor: Elizabeth A. Kensinger / Theory of mind refers to the process of representing others’ mental states. This process consistently elicits activity in a network of brain regions: the theory of mind network (ToMN). Typically, theory of mind has been understood in terms of content, i.e. representing the semantic content of someone’s beliefs. However, recent work has proposed that ToMN activity could be better understood in the context of social prediction; or, more specifically, prediction error—the difference between observed and predicted information. Social predictions can be represented in multiple forms—e.g. dispositional predictions about who a person is, prescriptive norms about what people should do, and descriptive norms about what people frequently do. Part 1 examined the relationship between social prediction error and ToMN activity, finding that the activity in the ToMN was related to both dispositional, and prescriptive predictions. Part 2 examined the semantic content represented by moral claims. Prior work has suggested that morals are generally represented and understood as objective, i.e. akin to facts. Instead, we found that moral claims are represented as far more social than prior work had anticipated, eliciting a great deal of activity across the ToMN. Part 3 examined the relationship between ToMN activity and metaethical status, i.e. the extent that morals were perceived as objective or subjective. Objective moral claims elicited less ToMN activity, whereas subjective moral claimed elicited more. We argue that this relationship is best understood in the context of prediction, where objective moral claims represent strong social priors about what most people will believe. Finally, I expand on this finding and argue that a theoretical approach incorporating social prediction has serious implications for morality, or more specifically, for the motivations underlying normative compliance. People may be compelled to observe moral rules because doing so maintains a predictable social environment. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Thesis advisor: Ellen Winner / Despite the widespread involvement of individuals in drama either as performers or audience members, psychologists know very little about the cognitive and affective underpinnings of acting. Acting may provide a powerful lens through which to understand how we understand our own and others' minds. In this dissertation, I review research on theory of mind, empathy, and emotion regulation, show how these three skills are related to acting theory and acting training, and discuss studies I have previously completed demonstrating correlations between skill in acting and skill in theory of mind, empathy, and positive emotion regulation. I then completed four studies. Study 1 was a longitudinal study comparing children (ages 8-10) receiving acting vs. visual arts training over the course of one academic year testing the hypothesis that acting training in childhood is causally related to development of advanced theory of mind, positive emotion regulation, and empathy. Study 1 found that children in acting classes gain in empathy and expression of emotion over a year above children involved in other art forms. Study 2 was a qualitative study designed to determine the kinds of habits of mind taught, explicitly and implicitly, in acting classes for children (ages 8-10). The purpose of Study 2 was to determine the extent to which acting teachers strive to teach theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation in their acting classes. Study 2 found that children in acting classes at this age are taught about physicality and motivation, with no emphasis on empathy or emotion regulation and only a slight emphasis on theory of mind. Study 3 was parallel to Study 1, but with young adolescents, aged 13-15. Study 3 found that adolescents involved in acting classes gain in their empathy, theory of mind acuity, and expressive emotion regulation over the course of a year over and above adolescents involved in other art forms. Study 4 was parallel to Study 2, with acting classes for adolescents. Study 4 found that adolescent acting classes focus on theory of mind and motivation, without any emphasis on empathy or emotion regulation. I conclude by considering the potential impact of this research on our understanding of typical development in theory of mind, empathy, emotion regulation, and on our understanding of individuals deficient in these skills. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

A versão infantil do Teste de Ler a Mente nos Olhos (Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version ) de Simon Baron-Cohen, é composto por 28 fotografias da região dos olhos de indivíduos com diferentes expressões e tem como objetivo uma quantificação da habilidade do indivíduo em inferir estados mentais a partir de expressões faciais, sendo usualmente utilizado como um instrumento para avaliação de Teoria da Mente. Neste trabalho foi feito um estudo de validade de uma versão em português do teste, visando maiores esclarecimentos acerca de suas propriedades psicométricas. O teste foi aplicado em uma amostra controle de 434 crianças de dois estados brasileiros, São Paulo e Santa Catarina, cursando o ensino fundamental e em uma amostra clínica de 20 crianças diagnosticadas com Transtornos do Espectro do Autismo. Foram encontrados um índice de consistência interna (alfa de Cronbach) de 0,718 e variância estatisticamente significativa de acordo com o ano escolar. Não foram encontradas diferenças significativas com relação ao sexo e Estado. Não houve diferença estatisticamente significativa nos escores dos grupos controle e clínico. Os resultados foram, portanto, parcialmente favoráveis para validade de construto, mas não foram encontradas evidências de validade critério / The \"Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version\" by Simon Baron-Cohen, consists of 28 photographs of the eye region of people with different expressions and aim a quantification of the individual\'s ability to infer mental states from facial expressions, and is usually used as an instrument for assessing Theory of Mind. This paper is a study of validity of a Portuguese version of the test, seeking further clarification about its psychometric properties. The test was applied to a control group of 434 children from two Brazilian states, Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina, in elementary school and a clinical group of 20 children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders. We found an index of internal consistency (Cronbach\'s alpha) of 0.718 and statistically significant variance in accordance with the school year. There were no significant differences with regard to gender and state. There was no statistically significant difference in the scores of clinical and control groups. The results were therefore partially favorable to construct validity, but there was no evidence of criterion validity

A versão infantil do Teste de Ler a Mente nos Olhos (Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version ) de Simon Baron-Cohen, é composto por 28 fotografias da região dos olhos de indivíduos com diferentes expressões e tem como objetivo uma quantificação da habilidade do indivíduo em inferir estados mentais a partir de expressões faciais, sendo usualmente utilizado como um instrumento para avaliação de Teoria da Mente. Neste trabalho foi feito um estudo de validade de uma versão em português do teste, visando maiores esclarecimentos acerca de suas propriedades psicométricas. O teste foi aplicado em uma amostra controle de 434 crianças de dois estados brasileiros, São Paulo e Santa Catarina, cursando o ensino fundamental e em uma amostra clínica de 20 crianças diagnosticadas com Transtornos do Espectro do Autismo. Foram encontrados um índice de consistência interna (alfa de Cronbach) de 0,718 e variância estatisticamente significativa de acordo com o ano escolar. Não foram encontradas diferenças significativas com relação ao sexo e Estado. Não houve diferença estatisticamente significativa nos escores dos grupos controle e clínico. Os resultados foram, portanto, parcialmente favoráveis para validade de construto, mas não foram encontradas evidências de validade critério / The \"Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version\" by Simon Baron-Cohen, consists of 28 photographs of the eye region of people with different expressions and aim a quantification of the individual\'s ability to infer mental states from facial expressions, and is usually used as an instrument for assessing Theory of Mind. This paper is a study of validity of a Portuguese version of the test, seeking further clarification about its psychometric properties. The test was applied to a control group of 434 children from two Brazilian states, Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina, in elementary school and a clinical group of 20 children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders. We found an index of internal consistency (Cronbach\'s alpha) of 0.718 and statistically significant variance in accordance with the school year. There were no significant differences with regard to gender and state. There was no statistically significant difference in the scores of clinical and control groups. The results were therefore partially favorable to construct validity, but there was no evidence of criterion validity

This thesis adopts a cognitive-phenomenological approach to Apollonius’ presentation of psychological imagery, thus eschewing the cultural-determinist assumptions that have tended to dominate Classical scholarship. To achieve this, I analyse relevant theories and results from the cognitive sciences (Theory of Mind, agency, gesture, conceptual metaphor), as well as perceived socio-literary influences from the post-Homeric tradition and the various advances (for example, medical) from contemporary Alexandria. This interdisciplinary methodology is then applied to the Argonautica in three large case studies: Medea and the simile of the sunbeam (3.755-60), Heracles and the simile of the gadfly (1.1286-72), and, finally, the poem’s overall psychological portrayal of Jason. In so doing, I show that Apollonius conforms to cognitive universal patterns of psychological expression, while also deploying and deepening his specific culture’s poetic, folk, and scientific models.

A mental model of the another person’s state of mind including their thoughts, feelings, and beliefs, otherwise known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can be created to better predict their behavior and optimize our own decisions. These representations can be explicitly modeled during both the development and presence of stable cooperation via communication outcomes, allowing us to understand the sophistication or depth of mental coordination, involved in an individual’s social perception and reasoning. Almost all current scientific studies of ToM take a spectatorial approach, relying on observation followed by evaluation (e.g., the Sally-Anne Task). However given evidence that social cognition fundamentally shifts during valuationally significant social encounters with others, this study adopts a second-person approach. Each participant’s actions under dynamic uncertainty influence the joint reward probabilities of both, favoring cooperation and coordination. Only Teachers have knowledge of the correct action-reward contingencies, while Learners must ascertain the Teacher’s directive and correctly adjust their actions to obtain the optimal reward. The complexity of cooperative behaviors cannot be captured with simple reinforcement learning models, however a similarity in valuation exists, probing further investigation.

<p><p><em>Bakgrund</em></p><p>Forskning har visat att personer med autism har svårigheter med "theory of mind", förmågan att sätta sig in i andra personers tankar och känslor. Det leder till en annorlunda förståelse av sociala sammanhang. Tankestilen påverkar samspelet med pedagoger och kräver ett anpassat bemötande.</p><p><em>Metod</em></p>Sju halvstrukturerade intervjuer med pedagoger som arbetar i särskolan och undervisar elever med autism. Flertalet pedagoger undervisar i grundsärskolan. Deltagarna uppmuntrades bland annat att beskriva elever med utmanande beteende och berätta om vad de anser är ett bra bemötande. Intervjuerna kretsade mycket kring olika former av kravsituationer.<p><em>Resultat</em></p>Pedagogerna anpassar bemötande och undervisning på en rad sätt för att passa elever med svag "theory of mind". Framför allt anpassas kommunikationen på ett genomtänkt sätt. Pedagogerna skiljer sig i hur de bemöter elever i kravsituationer. Flera pedagoger förespråkar ett bemötande som inte utgår från pedagogens eget sätt att tänka. Studien visar hur pedagogerna trots den utgångspunkten återgår till att förstå utmanande beteende som medvetet och provokativt.<p><em>Diskussion</em></p>Studien diskuterar möjliga samband mellan den pedagogiska miljön och hur pedagoger beskriver och tolkar utmanande beteende. Idén att ostrukturerade och/eller stränga miljöer hänger ihop med en förståelse av eleverna som medvetet "testande" och manipulerande förs fram. Studien utmynnar i ett förslag på ny definition av utmanande beteende, som bygger på omgivningens svårighet att förstå och tolka beteendet.</p>

Bakgrund Forskning har visat att personer med autism har svårigheter med "theory of mind", förmågan att sätta sig in i andra personers tankar och känslor. Det leder till en annorlunda förståelse av sociala sammanhang. Tankestilen påverkar samspelet med pedagoger och kräver ett anpassat bemötande. Metod Sju halvstrukturerade intervjuer med pedagoger som arbetar i särskolan och undervisar elever med autism. Flertalet pedagoger undervisar i grundsärskolan. Deltagarna uppmuntrades bland annat att beskriva elever med utmanande beteende och berätta om vad de anser är ett bra bemötande. Intervjuerna kretsade mycket kring olika former av kravsituationer.Resultat Pedagogerna anpassar bemötande och undervisning på en rad sätt för att passa elever med svag "theory of mind". Framför allt anpassas kommunikationen på ett genomtänkt sätt. Pedagogerna skiljer sig i hur de bemöter elever i kravsituationer. Flera pedagoger förespråkar ett bemötande som inte utgår från pedagogens eget sätt att tänka. Studien visar hur pedagogerna trots den utgångspunkten återgår till att förstå utmanande beteende som medvetet och provokativt.Diskussion Studien diskuterar möjliga samband mellan den pedagogiska miljön och hur pedagoger beskriver och tolkar utmanande beteende. Idén att ostrukturerade och/eller stränga miljöer hänger ihop med en förståelse av eleverna som medvetet "testande" och manipulerande förs fram. Studien utmynnar i ett förslag på ny definition av utmanande beteende, som bygger på omgivningens svårighet att förstå och tolka beteendet.

This thesis examines the effects of linguistic input on the development of children’s epistemic concepts. It draws upon two fundamental questions in the field of cognitive development: (a) whether distinctions between automatic and controlled forms of cognitive processing are indicative of underlying conceptual differences, and (b) whether language is critical to the process of concept development. To establish the background of the current research, a summary of how these theoretical questions have been addressed in other fields of cognitive psychology is first provided (Chapter 1). These questions are then re- examined within the specific domain of epistemic concept development (Chapter 2). Changes in false-belief processing that occur between infancy and the early preschool years are discussed in relation to two competing theories of false-belief development. A framework to explain how language promotes children’s transition between automatic and controlled forms of processing is then provided. It is suggested that language facilitates change by both reducing the cognitive demands associated with controlled response tasks as well as assisting with the formation of robust epistemic representations. An empirical study that was designed to examine the effects of epistemic language (i.e., verbs and syntax) on children’s automatic and controlled processing of belief is then described (Chapters 3 to 5). Eighty-four children (Mage = 3;5 years), who initially failed elicited measures of false-belief, were trained with visual contexts of true- and false-belief. The critical manipulation across three conditions was the linguistic input presented in conjunction with these contexts. Children heard narrations that contained either (a) the description of an agent’s actions without an epistemic verb, (b) a familiar epistemic verb (thinks) across both contexts, or (c) the familiar epistemic verb in contexts of true-belief and a novel epistemic verb (gorps) in contexts of false-belief. Results demonstrated a significant advantage for children who were trained with epistemic verbs on spontaneous measures of false-belief (i.e., anticipatory gaze). Significant effects of epistemic verb exposure were also demonstrated in novel contexts of belief induction. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to theories that make distinct predictions about the role of language in epistemic concept development (Chapter 6).

An individual`s eyes provide a wealth of information during social interactions. The present research investigates the social adjustment implications of one gaze behaviour, specifically, shared attention, which is the tendency to follow an interlocutor`s directed gaze to attend to the same object or location. Recent clinical research suggested that gaze control reflects the capacity to differentiate self from other at the attentional level, since patient populations with poor gaze control abilities (i.e., schizophrenic patients) were also found to exhibit difficulty in differentiating between the self and another agent. Four studies were conducted to examine whether flexible gaze following behavior, specifically the ability to inhibit gaze-following, when the situation warrants, would be positively linked with two markers of adaptive social functioning: sociocognitive abilities and self-close other(s) differentiation. Based on previous research that gaze cues linked to upright (but not inverted) faces trigger reflexive gaze following mechanisms, an upright face condition was used to assess social cueing mechanisms and an inverted face condition, as a control for non-social cueing mechanisms in a gaze control task with realistic (Study 2) and schematic faces (Studies 1, 3, and 4). Studies 1-4 showed that more flexible gaze following behavior predicted superior sociocognitive abilities, as indexed by higher capacity to infer the mental states of others in both young and older adults (Studies 1-3), as well as in clinical populations (i.e., Parkinson’s Disease [PD] patients, Study 4). Studies 2-4 further revealed that poorer gaze control predicted decreased self-close other differentiation in both younger and older adults. In Study 2, poorer gaze control performance characterized young adults from enmeshed family systems, which allow limited private space and emotional autonomy. In Studies 3 and 4, poorer gaze control predicted decreased cognitive-affective differentiation from one’s spouse and lower marital quality in healthy elderly couples (Study 3) and elderly couples, where one spouse had PD (Study 4). The present findings argue for the existence of a unified sociocognitive network, perpetually shaped by one’s interpersonal history, and which encompasses perceptual mechanisms, specialized for face and gaze processing and higher-order cognitive mechanisms, specialized for processing the meaning (s) of social environments.