Using recently declassified material, this thesis traces the Commandant Thomas Holcomb' s role in the development of the Marine Corps Defense Battalion. It thus combines biographical and institutional history. Holcomb was an excellent strategist, manager, and publicist. The defense battalion provides a case study for examining Holcomb's leadership as well as the larger historical context. On a tactical level, planners designed these units to defend island outposts against air, sea, and amphibious assaults. In holding island bases in the western Pacific, defense battalions fit into the grand strategy of the United States Navy. The units comprised one half of the Corps's dual mission: amphibious assault and base defense. Defense battalions also served an equally pivotal public relations function as Holcomb struggled -albeit with little success -- to secure scarce resources for the Corps. Understanding Holcomb's actions and the defense battalion's development illuminates the mentality of America's military and government before World War II. / Department of History

This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine.

The title of The Edifice Complex presents two metaphors which combine to form the focus of this study's research. The first of these refers to the Oedipus Complex of Freudian psychology: metaphorically, Marine recruits fall in love with the folklore of the Marine Corps they wish to join, yet unwittingly change that Corps over time, thus figuratively killing the older generations of Marines--their forefathers in uniform. In the second metaphor, the edifice is the structure of informal folklore and recorded history; the complex is the rites of passage or maze traversed in time by Marines. As Marines are indoctrinated in the Marine Corps' culture, they internalize the meanings of the edifice's building blocks: its symbols, rituals and myths. Bit by bit, generations of Marines individually and collectively alter the shape of the metaphorical maze and change the meanings of some elements of folklore. The purpose of the study was to analyze the causes and effects of cultural change affecting Marines and the Marine Corps from the mid-1950s to the mid1980s. Using ethnographic field methods and content analysis, the researcher investigated internal and external planned and unplanned changes in the Marine Corps. Cultural data was collected during 1984 and 1985 from print, motion picture and other media, and through interviews with Marine infantrymen, recruiters, journalists, drill instructors, historians, musicians and others, in several cultural settings. The study focused on the cultural reality of primarily male, enlisted Marines. Findings support the working hypothesis that folklore is a behavior-shaping tool which the Marine Corps effectively uses to control the behavior of Marines. Findings reveal that cultural changes have allowed or caused some Marines to value the Marine Corps materially as a source of valuable competencies and material rewards rather than professionally or patriotically as the calling of the profession of arms. Conclusions of The Edifice Complex parallel conclusions in organizational change theory, in that changes in the symbolic realm of the organization's culture are most difficult to change but have significant impact upon members of the organization. Findings and conclusions are also mutually supported in the educational, social and behavioral psychologies.

No description available.

Historians John W. Dower, Craig Cameron, and Ronald Takaki argue that the Pacific War was a war of extermination fueled by race hate. Therefore, the clash between the military forces of the Japanese Empire and United States of America yielded a "kill or be killed" environment across the battlefields of the Pacific. This work examines the conduct of the Second Marine Division during its campaign of conquest against the Japanese held island of Saipan from June 15, 1944-July 9, 1944. It is based upon traditional military history sources to test their theories in context of the conduct of Marines toward Japanese soldiers and civilians during the Saipan campaign. Did Marines practice a war of extermination or conduct themselves in a humane manner?

Master of Arts / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / Immediately after World War I, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps implemented an officer education program. Called the Marine Corps Schools (MCS), the Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, gave the schools the mission of educating officers throughout their career. MCS struggled during its first decade of existence due to operational tempo and a poor curriculum. The direction of MCS changed greatly with the assignment of James Carson Breckinridge as the commanding officer in 1928. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role Breckinridge, an unconventional and intellectual officer, played in reviving the MCS and turning it into the authority on Small Wars and Amphibious Operations. It will show that Breckinridge, drawing on observations made of college education systems, focused the Marine Corps Schools on the task of teaching officers to analyze problems and find solutions and not rely on memorized book answers.

This thesis explores the activities of the U.S. Marine defense battalions from October 1939 to December 1942. More specifically, it explains why Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) decided to continue the defense battalions as separate entities when, by mid-1943, it needed additional men to replace its combat losses and to create new divisions. In this process HQMC disbanded other special units, such as the raider battalions, parachute battalions, barrage balloon squadrons, and the glider squadrons. It retained, however, the defense battalions because of their versatility and utility as demonstrated during the various operations they conducted in Iceland and the Central and South Pacific. In these locations defense battalions performed as: (a) island garrisons, (b) antiaircraft artillery units, and (c) landing forces. Their success in carrying out these missions led to their retention as separate entities throughout World War II.

The purpose of this study is to examine from a public relations point-of-view, the public image impact on the United States from the efforts of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' response to the tsunami crisis. The thesis analyzes the disaster that affected so many nations, and the humanitarian response of the United States Navy and Marine Corps in Operation Unified Assistance and the role of Navy Public Affairs following the earthquake and tsunami disaster and the importance of visual media.

This study is an operational and tactical study of a battle fought by the U. S. 1st Marine Division near "the Punchbowl," an extinct volcano of military value in the Taebaek Mountains of Korea, from late August through mid September 1951. That engagement was to be the last 1st Marine Division offensive of the Korean War. This battle, for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges, has received little coverage from historians. That it is all but forgotten is surprising, since it was one of the hardest fought for United States Marines in the war. The casualties were high, and Americans did not understand why so many had to die for a war that seemed to already be set to conclude by negotiations. This study tells the story of that battle more completely than ever before, and assesses its significance to the course of the Korean War.

Literature review -- Methodology -- Body of project : Fire in the belly. / Dept. of Journalism