Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 92-96).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2009 Feb 20

In this thesis, I explore the issue of epistemic responsibility. I start by examining an argument against the use of critical thinking made by Michael Huemer. Huemer argues that critical thinking is not epistemically responsible, because it is not as truth conducive as credulity. Huemer instead argues that credulity should be the default approach taken by non-experts. After dissecting this argument, I go on to examine one of the critics to Huemer’s argument: David Kary. Kary argues that critical thinking and credulity are not mutually exclusive and can therefore be combined in an epistemically responsible way. Kary further argues that one must consider the social components of epistemic responsibility, and that when one does so, it is evident that truth conduciveness is not the only component of epistemic responsibility. I extend Huemer and Kary’s discussion by arguing that epistemic responsibility is even more complex. Epistemic superiority, equality and inferiority are fluid positions that change depending on context, and this must be considered when evaluating epistemic responsibility. The consequence of this approach is that a combination of critical thinking and credulity is the most responsible alternative. I end by arguing for the intellectual virtues and benefits of embracing this argument.

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[pt] O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em analisar como o movimento que nasceu dentro da filosofia analítica do século XX denominado Epistemologia das Virtudes poderia representar um ponto de inflexão dentro da epistemologia contemporânea, sobretudo ao trazer para dentro da teoria do conhecimento elementos antes considerados exclusivamente do campo da ética ou da moral. Investigo, para tanto, como essa corrente responde a alguns dos principais problemas da teoria do conhecimento, presentes desde os escritos de Platão (428 - 348 a.C.) chegando até os dias atuais, em especial no tocante às disputas que ocuparam espaços centrais dos debates epistemológicos entre as décadas de 1960 e 1980. / [en] The aim of this work is to analyze how the movement born within the analytical philosophy of the 20th century called Virtue Epistemology represents a turning point within contemporary epistemology, especially by bringing elements previously considered exclusively from the field of ethics or morals into the theory of knowledge. Therefore, I investigate how this current answer to some of the main problems of the theory of knowledge, present since the writings of Plato (428 - 348 BC) until the present day, especially regarding the disputes that occupied central spaces of epistemological debates between the 1960s and 1980s.

This thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced, contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in formal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter builds on this to reject arguments from Gödel's paradox and incompleteness theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter 3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann's notion of open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos and Kneebone's dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the importance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathematical rigour.