This study proposes to clarify the a fortiori argument’s components, structure, definitions, formulations, and logical status, as well as the specific conditions under which it is to be employed, both generally and in a Jewish context. Typically, the argument claims this: if a lesser (or greater) case has a feature, a correspondingly greater (or lesser) case has that feature too. While evident in ancient thought, the argument is often central to Jewish deliberations that may continue for centuries; so this Jewish use forms the main context and material of this study. However, as general reasoning employs the argument, tracing its common forms helps to delineate its terms and relations. While the argument aspires to be true and it can be deductively valid in those cases where heritable properties recur, it is more likely to be inductively probable. In any case, the thesis presents a number of deductive formalizations, while more complex treatments are left to the appendix or further study. Inasmuch as the a fortiori is claimed to be a type of analogy, both its likenesses and its differences are set out and exemplified in a number of comparative mathematical, practical, legal, and other formats. Once the conclusion’s feature is deductively valid or inductively likely, the amount that one accords to the feature in the new case needs to be determined. Logically, the a fortiori’s conclusion can be either limited to the same feature given in one of its premises or else proportioned to it in a way that suits both premises. Mathematically, the same outcome is just one possible ratio. However, the early Jewish stand of the Mishnah usually retains the same tradition or least onerous result as sufficient (the dayo) for the new case. A detailed analysis covers this and later Rabbinic use, and especially Maccoby’s recent claim that the same given alone is correct, which I show to be extreme, for even in a Jewish context it generates several problems. When one includes sensible a fortiori proportions and the possibility of mercy, good moral reasoning can be reconciled with true religious values and traditional precedents. In all, the conclusion’s amount, particularly in practical issues, involves an extra decision procedure that considers the relevant factors of the actual case. Once the a fortiori’s informal and formal aspects are dealt with adequately and its fallacious uses avoided, the argument’s overall reasonableness is better appreciated.

This study proposes to clarify the a fortiori argument’s components, structure, definitions, formulations, and logical status, as well as the specific conditions under which it is to be employed, both generally and in a Jewish context. Typically, the argument claims this: if a lesser (or greater) case has a feature, a correspondingly greater (or lesser) case has that feature too. While evident in ancient thought, the argument is often central to Jewish deliberations that may continue for centuries; so this Jewish use forms the main context and material of this study. However, as general reasoning employs the argument, tracing its common forms helps to delineate its terms and relations. While the argument aspires to be true and it can be deductively valid in those cases where heritable properties recur, it is more likely to be inductively probable. In any case, the thesis presents a number of deductive formalizations, while more complex treatments are left to the appendix or further study. Inasmuch as the a fortiori is claimed to be a type of analogy, both its likenesses and its differences are set out and exemplified in a number of comparative mathematical, practical, legal, and other formats. Once the conclusion’s feature is deductively valid or inductively likely, the amount that one accords to the feature in the new case needs to be determined. Logically, the a fortiori’s conclusion can be either limited to the same feature given in one of its premises or else proportioned to it in a way that suits both premises. Mathematically, the same outcome is just one possible ratio. However, the early Jewish stand of the Mishnah usually retains the same tradition or least onerous result as sufficient (the dayo) for the new case. A detailed analysis covers this and later Rabbinic use, and especially Maccoby’s recent claim that the same given alone is correct, which I show to be extreme, for even in a Jewish context it generates several problems. When one includes sensible a fortiori proportions and the possibility of mercy, good moral reasoning can be reconciled with true religious values and traditional precedents. In all, the conclusion’s amount, particularly in practical issues, involves an extra decision procedure that considers the relevant factors of the actual case. Once the a fortiori’s informal and formal aspects are dealt with adequately and its fallacious uses avoided, the argument’s overall reasonableness is better appreciated.

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Nominal arguments, such as the subject and the object are not grammatically required to be overt in Japanese, and are frequently unexpressed, approximately 50% of the time in written narrative texts. Despite this in high frequency of ellipsis, Japanese is not equipped with such familiar devices as the cross-referencing systems and verbal inflections commonly found in pro-drop languages for referent identification. Yet the mechanisms governing argument ellipsis have been little explicated. This thesis elucidates the linguistic mechanisms with which to identify the referents of ellipted arguments. / These mechanisms stem from three tiers of linguistic system. Each sentence is structured in such a way as to anchor the subject., (using Sentence devices following the principle of direct alignment), with argument inferring cues on the verbal predicate (using Predicate devices). These subject oriented sentences are cohesively sequenced with the topic as a pivot (using Discourse devices). These subject oriented sentences are cohesively sequenced with the topic as a pivot (using Discourse devices). It is this topicalised subject which is most prone to ellipsis. I develop an algorithm summing up these mechanisms, using naturally occurring texts. I demonstrate how it can detect the existence of ellipsis in sentences and track the referential identity of it. / A generalisation for ellipsis resolution and the way in which the algorithm is constituted is as follows. Sentence devices formulate sentences to make the subject most prone to ellipsis, discourse devices enable the interaction of wa (the topic maker) and ga (the nominative marker), which mark the majority of subjects, to provide the default reading for referent identification of ellipsis, and predicate devices furnish additional cues to verify that reading. Since Japanese is an SOV language, it is intuitively tenable from the perspective of language processing that the interplay of wa/ga representing subjects gives initial cues from predicate devices. This multiple layering of mechanisms, therefore, can determine referents for ellipted arguments more accurately.

In this thesis, I have attempted to show a connection between nor:ms for argumentation and requirements of a liberal democracy. The way in which we arrive at our decisions in a democracy is through the argumentative process. This argumentative process can be differentiated into eight separate argumentative dialogues, each having their own respective goals and initial situations. Given democracy's reliance on these argumentative dialogues, I derived three requirements which follow from our basic conception of democracy, i.e. government by the people. These three requirements are participation, trust and understanding. From these three requirements, I argued that it is possible to derive nor:ms of argumentation which in turn support and foster these requirements of democracy. They are fairness, honesty, and clarity, respectively. By bringing together political philosophy and argumentational theory, I have shown that the quality of one's arguments have direct consequences for democracy. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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<p><strong>Purpose: </strong></p><ul><li>Which type of social critique does hiphop music present and is it possible to categorize the critique?</li><li>Is it possible to categorize the social critique ideologically on the basis of socialism, liberalism and conservatism?</li></ul><p><strong>Procedure and method: </strong>A qualitative text method has been used to see which arguments the songs portray. Two different analyzes has been used. The first one was a theory based on Thomas Denk and Daniel Silanders book: <em>Att studera demokratisering</em> and Arvidssons book: <em>Musik och politik hör ihop</em> and its purpose were to categorise the critique. The second one was based on a book by Reidar Larssons: <em>Politiska ideologier i vår tid</em>. With the purpose to ideologically classify the critique.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>The social critique that was found in the songs where the following: <strong>poverty, education system, ethnicity, racism, elite governing, misused power by the police, welfare, religion, justice system, ghettos and the war on Iraq. The social </strong>critique came from socialism and liberalism. The arguments from socialism where the class society and the critique that came from the liberalisms side was: political power, freedom and harassment from the police. Conservatism was not represented in the songs.     <strong> </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p>

Purpose: Which type of social critique does hiphop music present and is it possible to categorize the critique? Is it possible to categorize the social critique ideologically on the basis of socialism, liberalism and conservatism? Procedure and method: A qualitative text method has been used to see which arguments the songs portray. Two different analyzes has been used. The first one was a theory based on Thomas Denk and Daniel Silanders book: Att studera demokratisering and Arvidssons book: Musik och politik hör ihop and its purpose were to categorise the critique. The second one was based on a book by Reidar Larssons: Politiska ideologier i vår tid. With the purpose to ideologically classify the critique. Results: The social critique that was found in the songs where the following: poverty, education system, ethnicity, racism, elite governing, misused power by the police, welfare, religion, justice system, ghettos and the war on Iraq. The social critique came from socialism and liberalism. The arguments from socialism where the class society and the critique that came from the liberalisms side was: political power, freedom and harassment from the police. Conservatism was not represented in the songs.

This dissertation engages previous research in political science and psychology by arguing for the importance of oral arguments from a communication perspective, examining justices' rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments, introducing Sensemaking as a new model of judicial decision making, and discussing the legal and cultural impact of justices' rhetorical discursive interaction in Morse v. Frederick, Kennedy v. Louisiana, and District of Columbia v. Heller. In contrast to the aggregate behavioral models and longitudinal studies conducted by political scientists and psychologists, this study examines these specific cases in order to gauge each justice's individual interaction in oral argument and to determine how certain justices may have controlled the discursive flow of information within oral arguments, which in turn may have influenced the Court's decision making ability. The dissertation begins with an introduction, providing an overview of the development and study of legal rhetoric from the Greeks to present day. A review of prior literature in law, political science, and psychology displays how fields outside of communication view oral arguments and reveals where communication may provide valuable contributions to the study of Supreme Court oral arguments. Theoretical and methodological approaches adopted for the study of oral arguments are discussed. Analysis within the dissertation begins with an overview of the inherent complexity found within oral arguments and applies the previously discussed theoretical and methodological approaches to the case of Morse v. Frederick as a means of determining theoretical and methodological validity. Following analysis of Morse v. Frederick, a second case, Kennedy v. Louisiana is analyzed to determine if similar results will occur. Final consideration is given to a third case, District of Columbia v. Heller, to understand whether justices' behavior may deviate in more socially and politically sensitive cases. The dissertation concludes with suggestions for lawyers and judges based upon this study's findings and makes recommendations to scholars for further areas of research.