公司治理是否完善，不僅影響公司自身發展，亦會衝擊國家整體金融秩序。近年來，國際間在公司治理議題上，有強化股東權之趨勢。保護股東權益、便利股東權之行使，對於健全公司治理尤為重要。中國大陸1993年公司法中所架構的公司治理結構並不完整，其中關於少數股東權益的保障機制亦是寥寥無幾。中國大陸公司法於2005年進行了大幅修正。其中，為避免控制股東濫用多數決原則，破壞公司治理之監控機制，2005年公司法賦予少數股東多項權利。少數股東權之設計，不僅是防止董事會濫權，侵害股東利益的監督機制；也是股東平等原則下，少數股東在股東會採多數決下獲得平等對待的具體展現。 本文圍繞中國大陸2005年公司法中所規定的四項少數股東權展開，介紹少數股東之股東會召集權、提案權、代表訴訟和解散裁判訴請權在中國大陸公司法中的具體規定，整理台灣相關立法規定以供參考比較，并嘗試對中國大陸公司法提出完善建議，期能達到強化少數股東權保障之目的。 / Corporate governance not only influences company, but shocks global economics. In recent years, international tendency has strengthened the shareholders’ rights in corporate governance. It is obviously important for corporate governance to protect the shareholders’ rights and interests, and facilitate the exertion. The corporate governance structure in Mainland China Company Act of 1993 was not complete, which on minority interest protection system was also few. In 2005, Mainland China Company Act was substantially amended. In order to avoid abusing the majority rule, damaging monitoring system of corporate governance, Company Act of 2005 gives a number of minority shareholders' rights. This paper focuses on four minority shareholders’ rights in the Company Act of 2005, introduces their specific regulations, sorts out the relevant legislation in Taiwan for reference comparison, tries to put forward some suggestions on Mainland China Company Act to strengthen the protection of the minority shareholders’ rights.

如何使企業經營者善盡其責任，為公司治理之重要一環。在此議題上，除建立明確之責任規範，令企業經營者有所遵循外，在其違反法令侵害投資人或利害關係人之權益時，尚需建構一套健全有效之責任追究機制，始能克盡全功。 　　本論文基於上述之緣由，從董事與公司間之委任關係為出發，探討董事對內（公司）之責任，就其應盡之善良管理人注意義務與忠實義務，加以討論介紹。繼而探討董事對外之責任，以公司法第23條第2項規定為核心，論究其規範性質為侵權行為責任或法定責任，並討論其適用範圍。又證券交易法於95年1月11日修正增訂第14條之2至第14條之5關於獨立董事之規定，獨立董事之責任與一般董事之責任，有無差異，其責任有無減輕或免除之必要，本論文併加予探討。所謂「防止重於追究」，在董事發生違法行為時，如何能有效的予以制止，應為重要之課題。公司法第194條規定之股東制止請求權，同法第218條之2第2項規定之監察人制止請求權，為重要之規定。董事未聽勸阻，仍繼續違反法令及章程之行為，或董事之行為，已嚴重公司之權益，依公司法第212條規定股東會得決議，對其提起訴訟，依同法第213條規定除股東會另選代表之人外，由監察人代表公司提起。然而股東會多為大股東所把持，董事、監察人多為大股東所支持之人，欲令股東會決議對董事提起訴訟，有實際上之困難。因此，公司法第214條規定繼續一年以上，持有已發行股份總數百分之三以上股東，得請求監察人對董事提起訴訟，監察人於受請求之日起三十日內不提起訴訟時，請求之股東得為公司提起訴訟，此即為股東代表訴訟。但在我國實務上，股東代表訴訟寥寥可數，究其原因為制度上有重大之缺陷，本論文就此綜合各家學說，並參酌外國立法例，加以分析比較之。 　　自證券投資人及期貨交易人投資保護法於92年1月1日施行以來，證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心依該法提起之團體訴訟，蓬勃發展。稍後民事訴訟法於92年2月7日亦修正公布，除修正選定當事人之規定外，並增定第44條之1至第44條之4關於多數人訴訟程序之規定。上開二法制，使同一事件之多數受害人，得利用同一訴訟程序對於加害者進行求償。惟該二法之規定，是否臻於完善，能否達其立法目的，又該二法規定上差異，當事人於程序上如何選擇與交錯運用，本論文試加以分析探討。 　　公司法之股東代表訴訟、證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法之團體訴訟及民事訴訟法之多數人訴訟程序之規定，建構對公司董事求償之機制。本論文試綜合各家學說、實務之見解及他國立法例，提出修正建議，期供將來修法及實務運作之參考。 / How to make the enterprise directors fulfill the duty is a significant issue for corporate governance. Other than building transparent principles for directors to follow, it’s necessary to establish a pluperfect and efficient mechanism for responsibility enquiry when the director violates the interest of investors or stakeholders in order to accomplish good corporate governance. 　　Based on above reasons, this thesis introduces the internal responsibility of directors and discusses the good faith and due diligence for directors. Also, this thesis presents the external responsibility of director and discusses the nature and scope of regulation, i.e. legal responsibility or tort, in light of Article 23 section II. The Securities and Exchange Act revised the Article 14-2 to Article14-5 on January.11, 2006. These articles stipulate the responsibility of independent director and other directors. This thesis further discusses whether there is difference between the responsibility of independent director and other directors, or the necessity to mitigate or exempt the duty of independent director. According to the Company Act Article 194, in case the board of directors decide, by resolution, to commit any act in violation of any law, ordinance or the company's Articles of Incorporation, any shareholder who has continuously held the shares of the company for a period of one year or longer may request the board of directors to discontinue such act. Article 218-2 stipulated, in case the board of directors or any director commits any act, in carrying out the business operations of the company, in a manner in violation of the laws, regulations, the Articles of Incorporation or the resolutions of the shareholders' meeting, the supervisors shall forthwith advise, by a notice, to the board of directors or the director, as the case may be, to cease such act. These two articles are important statutes for efficiently deterring the illegal conduct of director. According to the Company Act Article 212, the shareholders' meeting shall resolve to institute an action against a director when the director continues illegal conduct. In case of a lawsuit between the company and a director, the supervisor shall act on behalf of the company, unless otherwise provided by law; and the meeting of shareholders may also appoint some other person to act on behalf of the company in a lawsuit. Article 214 also stipulate, shareholder(s) who has/have been continuously holding 3% or more of the total number of the outstanding shares of the company over one year may request in writing the supervisors of the company to institute, for the company, an action against a director of the company. In case the supervisors fails to institute an action within 30 days after having received the request, then the shareholders shall file such request may institute the action for the company. However, the cases filed by shareholder are very rare in our courts. The thesis will analyze foreign legislation to resolve the deficiency of our system. After the Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Act became effective on January 1, 2003, Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center filed many class actions on behalf of investors. The Code of Civil Procedure amended and promulgated on February 7, 2003. The amendment revised the party selection clause and added Article 44-1 to 44-4 which is related to class action. The above amendments provide class action for large numbers of people whose cases involve common questions of law and/or fact. This thesis analyzes the difference between the above amendments and examine whether the legislative goal will be achieved by those statues. The statutes about class action instituted by representative of shareholders、 Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Center or other people set up the mechanism responsibility enquiry of director. This thesis analyzes various theories, case law and legislative regulations of other countries and provides suggestions for amending our law in future.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(法学) / 甲第18028号 / 法博第161号 / 新制||法||147(附属図書館) / 30886 / 京都大学大学院法学研究科法政理論専攻 / (主査)教授 前田 雅弘, 教授 洲崎 博史, 教授 北村 雅史 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Laws / Kyoto University / DGAM

在法人格獨立之原則下，公司對董事、監察人是否提起訴訟，原則上應由公司之意思機關決定，並由公司之代表人代表公司進行。然而，當公司內部機關失靈，代表人怠於為公司行使權利時，我國公司法在第214條以下訂立少數股東例外情形下可代位公司對不法之董事提起訴訟之代表訴訟制度。但我國現行公司法下之股東代表訴訟制度，存有起訴之門檻過高、起訴股東負擔之訴訟風險與成本過大之重大缺失，導致實務上甚少股東代表訴訟之實際案例。因此，立法者於民國98年增訂證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法(下稱投保法)第10條之1，使財團法人證券及期貨交易人保護中心(下稱投保中心)可以自己名義為公司提起代表訴訟，不受公司法起訴門檻之限制。探究增定投保法第10條之1之背景可能係考量目前環境仍不適合全面免除少數股東提起代表訴訟之起訴門檻，以避免股東濫行起訴而影響公司正常經營。故立法者藉由具有公益性質之投保中心，在主管機關之監理下，於投資人保護法限制之範圍內對公司之不法董事或監察人提起代表訴訟，以追求小股東權益之維護與公司經營利益與董事、監察人負擔責任三者間最大平衡。 然而，立法者於公司法之外，另於投保法制訂股東代表訴訟之制度，將產生投保中心提起之股東代表訴訟在雙軌制度下是否回歸適用公司法規定之爭議。又股東代表訴訟制度於投保法修法後仍存有許多爭議，投保法第10條之1之規定僅解決起訴誘因不足之問題。縱透過投保中心依投保法規定代位公司起訴，投保中心提起之代表訴訟亦存有維護公司利益與維護公益之內涵是否一致之爭議。又投保中心提起之股東代表訴訟常遇到證據偏在造成舉證困難之問題，縱以刑事附帶民事程序方式提起訴訟，仍存有訴訟程序進度緩慢，且刑事判決認定之結果難以解決民事求償程序中具體判斷公司之損害現今是否仍然存在、損害範圍為何及有無重大性之問題。是本文除在第五章介紹投保法現行規範及實務運作之狀況外，另於第六章透過英美法制之比較，針對股東代表訴訟中當事人之範圍、其他股東之程序保障、內部救濟程序先行之效力三大爭議進行我國現行股東代表訴訟制度之檢討，冀希能作為未來股東代表訴訟修法方向之參考。