中共沿襲馬、列主義的宗教觀點，將宗教界定為替共產社會服務的工具，並認為宗教的本質是歷史過程的產物，其作用主要在於統戰或鬥爭的需要，最終將因社會主義的發展而消失，因此建政以來極力打壓、約制大陸境內的宗教及其團體。雖然中共的宗教政策隨著中國大陸社會的變化與全球化的影響，在胡錦濤時期有逐步開放的趨向，惟觀察中共建政以來的宗教政策脈絡，始終維持「開展統戰」和「防範滲透」基調，對臺灣宗教交流政策亦然。 2008年馬政府執政後，兩岸關係逐漸和緩，中共追求兩岸統一的意圖更為明顯，在胡錦濤「對內構建和諧社會、對外共建和諧世界」政策方針下，賦予宗教對臺統戰更大空間，兩岸宗教亦呈現交流活動趨增、境外教派參與增加、交流態樣多元且多為大陸發起等特點，另外中共以兩岸最普遍之媽祖文化做為對臺宗教統戰主軸，逐漸提升交流層級與規模，冀擴大對臺民間統戰成效。綜析胡錦濤近年兩岸宗教交流政策作為，預判中共未來對臺宗教工作，將朝全面爭取臺灣宗教界統一共識；透過宗教交流吸引臺商、信徒赴陸；加強基督教徒等外來宗教交流；以多元管道強化宗教工作成效；聯合抵制境外宗教勢力等面向發展。 綜合各方對兩岸宗教交流的影響評估，臺灣宗教團體能彰顯文化軟實力，在交流中對大陸社會擁有較強的影響力；大陸宗教自由度低度，惟管制宗教已有鬆動，後者跡象應與兩岸宗教交流具有關聯性；未來宗教慈善公益將為兩岸交流重點項目。據此，臺灣方面可在兼顧安全與發展的原則下，積極與大陸進行全面宗教交流，並以拓展宗教信徒、擴大宗教交流範圍，提高宗教自主運作能力，降低中共宗教統戰攻勢；此外，臺灣可以更主動出擊，以大甲鎮瀾宮、湄洲媽祖廟共同以媽祖繞境向聯合國申請非物質文化遺產為例，尋找與大陸更多的宗教合作機會，將兩岸儒、佛、道等傳統宗教，逐漸帶往國際社會，使兩岸共同擔起宗教全球化、中華文化全球化的角色，並藉以消彌兩岸政治、地域區隔的意識籓籬。 / Inheriting the Marxist-Leninist point of view on religion, the Chinese Communist authorities define religion as an instrument that serves the Socialist society. For them, religion is in essence a product of the historical process that serves the needs of the united front or struggles and is destined to fade out as Socialism marches on to the global stage. Therefore, since its establishment, the Chinese Communist regime has spared no effort in cracking down and suppressing religion and religious groups in mainland China. During Hu Jintao’s rule, the Chinese government has eased its stringent policy on religion in response to a changing Chinese society and international trends. But a closer look at the evolution of China’s religious policy reveals that its keynote has remained the same: conducting united front work on religious groups while preventing them from converging or colluding with dissident. This also goes for the Hu Jintao regime’s dealings with Taiwanese religious groups. Since President Ma Ying-jeou to power in 2008, ties between the two sides of Taiwan Straits have gradually thawed and Beijing is have increasing difficulty hiding its ambition for Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. Moreover, Hu Jintao’s policy to build a harmonious society in China and jointly shape a harmonious world has given religion a renewed role in Beijing’s united front against Taiwan. Religious exchanges between the two sides of Taiwan Straits have been warming and increasingly involve overseas groups. The forms of these exchanges are diverse and many of them are launched by the Chinese side. For instance, Beijing’s religious united front campaign targets believers of Goddess Matsu, the worship of which being common on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Beijing is pushing for upgrading the level and scale of such exchanges in hopes of producing more results of the united front against Taiwan . An overview of Hu Jintao’s policy on cross-Strait religious exchanges in recent years suggests that Beijing will seek to build consensus on reunification among Taiwan’s religious community, lure Taiwanese businessmen and believers to visit China, step up religious exchanges with Christians and believers of other religions, making progress on religious work through different means and keeping overseas religious forces at bay. Assessments of the implications of cross-Strait religious exchanges indicate that Taiwanese religious groups possess considerable cultural soft power and will be able to exert stronger influence on mainland Chinese society . China accords very limited freedom to local religious groups but is loosening its reins, which can possibly be connected to cross-Straits religious exchanges in recent years . In the future , religious charity events are expected to be the main theme of cross-Strait religious exchanges. Taiwan should actively engage in across-the-board religious exchanges with mainland China as long as it does not present problems for its security and development. Taiwan should focus on recruiting more believers, enlarging the scope of religious exchanges, increasing autonomy of religious groups and fending off mainland Chinese religious united front. In addition, Taiwan can also take the initiative to seek opportunities to cooperate with China to promote Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism on the international stage, e.g. applying for UN recognition of the pilgrimage of China and Taiwan’s Matsu believers to Da-Jia Chen-Lan Temple(Taiwan)and Meizhou Matsu Temple(China) as world cultural heritage. This way, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits will jointly assume the responsibility of promoting Chinese culture and religions in the international community and narrow their political and geographical gaps.

本論文主要在探討俄羅斯東正教政教關係之演變。在研究方法上，主要依據”政教關係”的理論以及相關的文獻分析來進行之。本文的架構以教會過去的歷史、俄羅斯官方的意識型態以及政府的宗教政策之演變為主軸，據此來探討一九九一年底之後，俄羅斯政教關係之變化。 本論文共分五章。第一章說明本文之研究方法與架構。第二章則將帝俄時期至一九八五年以前的俄羅斯政教關係的歷史背景作一簡單的敘述。一九一七年以前，東正教一直是俄羅斯的國教。與其他的教派相比，東正教會享有許多特權，例如，它得以免除稅務以及公民應盡之義務。在蘇聯時期，東正教會喪失原來獨享之特權並且遭受到殘酷之宗教迫害；不過這種情況到戈巴契夫上台以後有了轉變。 本文第三章首先題到戈巴契夫在蘇聯境內實行政治與經濟領域之革新，這些政策伴隨官方意識型態之轉變，導致政府宗教政策的大幅修正，政教關係也因此有所突破。此時俄羅斯東正教會再度受到重視，並且可以進行它的復興工作。在蘇聯解體之後，東正教在俄羅斯的政治上依然扮演著重要的角色。在第四章裏我們將探討教會與俄羅斯政府之間如何相互影響。第五章將對本文作一個總結，並討論俄羅斯政教關係可能的發展方向，以及俄羅斯東正教之未來前景。 / This dissertation focuses on the changes in the relationship between the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church. The methodology for this thesis is based on the “Politics-Religion Mutuality”Theory and the analysis of documents pertaining to the two related parties. The framework of this study is based upon three essential topics: the history of the church, the evolution of Russian ideology and the religious policies of Russian government.Analyzing these three topics we may find out how the Russia politics-religion relationship changes after the end of 1991. There are five parts to this thesis. Each part has a chapter devoted specifically to it. In chapter one the methodology and the framework of this dissertation will be expounded. In chapter two the author gives an outline of the history of the relationship between the state and the church. Before 1917 the Russian Orthodox Church was the state church of Russia. Being the official church, the Russian Orthodox Church had many privileges as compared with other denominations, for example, it was exempt from assessments and civic obligations. In the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church lost its monopolistic power and suffered brutal religious persecution. This, however changed when M. Gorbachev headed the government. Chapter three, the turning point, shows the new policies in political and economic domains within the USSR enacted enforced by Gorbachev. These changes to the official ideology also led to large-scale changed in religious policy. At this time the Russian Orthodox Church became highly regarded again in the USSR and could proceed with its own revival. After the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Orthodox Church was still highly regarded and played an important role in Russia's politics. In chapter four we investigate how the church and the government influenced each other. In chapter five we conclude with a summery, the possible development of mutuality between the Russian Orthodox Church and the prospects of the Russian Orthodox Church.