依憲法第78條以及第79條規定，我國司法院大法官職司憲法之解釋，惟其具體運作方式，憲法並未明文；現行係依「司法院大法官審理案件法」及其施行細則等規定，作為大法官解釋憲法實務運作之規範。值得注意的是，大法官本身的實務運作結果又與前述規範並未一致，其中尤以大法官們對於是否擴大受理人民聲請憲法解釋標的之認定，最受爭議。當然多數的大法官認為應擴大受理解釋標的「法律或命令」可及於「判例、決議」，並據以受理審查及作出解釋。惟這些解釋是否是一個有充分理由的裁判（解釋），能否為其見解辯護，則是值得深入探究之議題，也是法律人論證志業的一大挑戰。 本文首先討論大法官內部對將判例、決議作為人民聲請憲法解釋標的之不同意見以及衍生的爭議。 其次，分析整理德沃金法理學的發展，從其理論發展之背景談起，將其理論主要區分為1970年代之權利論以及1980年代以詮釋理論再建構的兩個時期，權利論時期的原則論證，重點在說明分析其權利、詮釋、融貫、整全性等概念。 再以德沃金創立的哲學家法官海克力士在「精神損害賠償問題案」與「布朗控告托皮卡教育局案」，實踐整全法之裁判，建構發展出我國的海克力士大法官在解釋憲法的論證方法。 最後，以前述論述方法建構大法官將判例作為人民聲請憲法解釋標的之詮釋，並透過憲法解釋之制度、依法裁判、基本權保護等價值權衡，證立最符合融貫一致性的整全法理念之最佳詮釋。 / A Critical Analysis of the Reviewability of Precedent in Grand Justice Conference of R.O.C. Based on Dworkin’s Theory of Adjudiction In Accordance with Article 78 of the constituiton of the R.O.C., The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders. The Constitution Interpretation Procedure Act is hereby enacted. The grounds on which the petitions for interpretation of the Constitution may be made as follow : promulgated by when an individual, a legal entity, or a political party, whose constitutional right was infringed upon and remedies provided by law for such infringement had been exhausted, has questions on the constitutionality of the statute or regulation relied thereupon by the court of last resort in its final judgment. The thesis aims to examine the Reviewability of Precedent in Grand Justice Conference of R.O.C. in light of Dworkin’s Theory of Adjudiction.This thesis first describes the facts, issues and opions of Precedent in Grand Justice Conference of R.O.C., and after introducing a series of debates on Dworkin’s Theory of Adjudiction. In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin found a basis for judges through asserting that there exists principle. When a hard case occurs, there is no definite way of determining pre-existing law and this is when judges engage in law interpretation and the argument of principle. A more complete and detailed explanation in Law’s Empire. Dworkin developed a distinctive legal theory based on the core idea of integrity. The idea that we must treat like cases alike. Law as integrity assumes, that Judges must make their decisions on grounds of principle,not policy. They must deploy arguments why the parties actually had the legal rights and duties they enforce at the time the parties acted or at some other pertinent time in the past. Dworkin separates judicial decision making into two stages: fit and justification. During the fit stage, all prior judicial precedent chains that are above a specific threshold are identified. In the justification stage, the moral conception which best coheres with “the community’s moral traditions” is selected as the basis for a decision. To resolve conflicts over competing conceptions of morality, Dworkin believes judges adopt arguments of principle that weigh the value of each competing conception before making their final reasoned decision. The finaly, applying Dworkin’s judicial decision making stages(fit and justification)to argue the Precedent in Grand Justice Conference of R.O.C.

德沃金（Ronald Dworkin）提出了權利觀點（right-based view），主張政府不能管制仇恨言論（hate speech），權利觀點要求政府必須做到「平等尊重」（equal concern）與「平等關懷」（equal respect）每一位公民，使每位公民都因為獲得「關懷」與「尊重」而相互「平等」，若是政府管制仇恨言論，則政府便沒有做到平等尊重與平等關懷每一位公民，因此，政府不能管制仇恨言論。 藍騰（Rae Langton）為德沃金整理出了論證架構，然而卻主張：德沃金的權利觀點所得出的結論並非如同德沃金所說的「政府不應該管制仇恨言論」，而應該是「政府應該管制仇恨言論」。 為何德沃金與藍騰從同樣的論證架構與權利觀點出發，卻推導出兩種完全相反的結論？為了解決這個問題，我於本文將主張藍騰所整理出來的論證架構其實尚未涉及德沃金的權利觀點，並且我會引用消極自由（negative liberty）與積極自由（positive liberty）的概念，說明為何德沃金與藍騰對「政府應不應該管制仇恨言論」此議題的結論會有如此差異，最後我將證明德沃金的觀點較有道理。

自1970年代開始，「女性生殖（身體）自主權」的呼聲－爭取的主要是所謂的墮胎權－即伴隨著婦女運動的萌芽與發展，而始終具有一定的能見度，甚至成為婦女運動的主要訴求之一；與之相對（或者是對立）的，則是捍衛胎兒（胚胎）生命權的另一方。時至今日，與生殖自主權相關的墮胎爭議方興未艾，仍舊為法律爭議的焦點以及核心議題；另一方面，由於當代的醫療以及科學在技術上的進步與突破，雖一方面賦與了生殖更多的可能性，同時，也帶來了許多亟待解決的問題。無論是已紛擾半個世紀之久的墮胎權爭議，或者是被歸類為新興議題的生殖科技相關議題，概括觀之，這兩項爭議的論辯主軸，皆能夠廣義的包含在「生殖自由」－主張與生殖相關的私密行為，應交由個人自由決定，故必須盡可能地減少任何形式的干涉，以及「對於人類生命（human life）的保護」－主張應賦予任何形式的人類生命最低限度的生命權保障，或者至少為某種生命倫理的概念所約束，因而不應全然地任由個人恣意決定，這兩個彼此相互衝突的上位概念之下。 　　在《生命領域》（Life’s Dominion）一書的前半部，德沃金（Ronald Dworkin）由墮胎爭議出發，提出超越選擇權（pro-choice）與生命權（pro-life）的折衷觀點，主張無論是懷孕女性或者是胎兒（胚胎），其生命的神聖性與生命的內在價值，皆應納入考量並同時予以尊重，試圖為當代已陷入對立僵局的墮胎爭議，尋求某種和解之道。而康奈爾（Drucilla Cornell）所抱持的後現代女性主義立場則格外強調，墮胎爭議的論辯與解決，必須有女性觀點與意見的加入、甚至必須全盤採納，期能以更設身處地的方式，探討女性在社會以及性別結構中的處境，並聚焦於女性面臨墮胎決定時的兩難困境，為原本中性（neutral）、超然的墮胎爭議，帶入不可忽視的經驗性面向的討論。 　　德沃金與康奈爾皆分別針對墮胎爭議，提出其各自的看法與意見，而兩者所採取的立場以及所支持的見解，則各有其獨到之處；此外，德沃金與康奈爾在具體的墮胎爭議中所顯現的態度與提出的主張，也反映了德沃金與康奈爾其各自理論在立論基礎上的類似點以及相異之處。比較兩者理論的異同，對於我們以有別於以往的視野，觀照墮胎爭議的論辯－尤其在自主個人與社群關係的連結、針對正義理論所進行的反省，以及對於法律體系的架構與本質所採取的觀點等面向上，格外有所裨益；大致上來說，德沃金乃以自由主義脈絡及其整全性理論為基調，探討上述幾個理論發展的軸線，康奈爾則是以女性主義與後現代的角度，對這些議題進行處理。在針對墮胎爭議而提出的具體主張中，德沃金與康奈爾的相關論述所各自蘊含的深厚理論基礎，不僅開拓了墮胎議題討論的深度與廣度；另一方面，在墮胎爭議的論辯中，德沃金與康奈爾所採取的觀點以及立論基礎，亦提供了我們在處理當代生殖科技發展所帶來的新爭議時，一些重要的思考切入點與紛爭解決的大方向。 / Since the 1970's, the right of women’s reproductive self-determination has been put forward as one of the principal claim along with the developments of women’s liberation movements. Against this stream, those who defend right to life of fetus (embryo) called “pro-life” camp are in opposite position. Up to now, the controversy over "pro-choice" and “pro-life” is still clamoring. Besides, “abortion” as an important subject of debate is also what legal disputes focus on. On the other hand, the progress of the contemporary science, technology, and medical treatments even make reproduction techniques advance, thus create more possibilities on reproduction. Accompanied with such developments, lots of issues about new reproductive technologies are brought about and call for immediate solutions. Arguments on abortion which have assailed for a half century as well as reproductive technologies developing in recent decades and approximately esteemed as newly arisen subjects; in general, whether abortion disputes or new issues of reproductive technologies are both involved in the following superordinate but conflict concepts: First, “reproductive self-determination”, which asserts that all decisions on reproduction should ensue from personal choice and reduce any form of control as possible. Second, "protection of human life",　which advocates that human life of any form owns the right to life to a certain extent, thus should be guaranteed. 　In Ronald Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion, Dworkin offers a compromised standpoint on the controversy of abortion, claiming that whether the expectant mother or the fetus (embryo) should both be given the respect of "the sanctity of life". Dworkin attempts to attain certain agreement on abortion issues rather than variance. Different from Dworkin’s devoting himself to eliminating the antagonism between “pro-choice” and “pro-life”, as a postmodern feminist, Drucilla Cornell emphasizes on the female perspective, concerning about female’s predicament in the gender structure in particular. While applying her abstract notions to concrete abortion issues, Cornell focuses on the dilemma which nearly every female should confront while making the abortion decision. This insight of Cornell brings the "neutral" abortion controversy into more profound discussions. Dworkin and Cornell state their opinions on abortion controversy respectively, and each of their statement is original and simultaneously reflects different foundations on which their theories are based behind concrete abortion issues. Discussions on similarities and dissimilarities of theories between Dworkin and Cornell not only help to regard abortion issues in a different and brand new way, but also expand the widths and depths of the discussions on abortion disputes: Particularly, the relation between the individual and the community, the gender consciousness which Cornell stresses on, theories of judgments and legal structures, and so on. Broadly speaking, Dworkin proceeds his statements from liberalism and his theory of integrity; on the contrary, Cornell sets out from points of view of feminism and postmodernism. Finally, put issues from abortion towards the developments of the contemporary reproductive technologies, the main foundations and argumentations which Dworkin and Cornell provide for abortion debates may also guide us to deal with issues of developments of the contemporary reproductive technologies.

自世界上第一部成文著作權法—安妮法案 （The Statute of Anne）在1709年問世以來，著作權問題迄今仍一直是紛擾不休。著作權問題的發展一直以來跟科技的進步息息相關。而關於著作權存續期間的問題，一直是著作權領域中最富爭議性的問題之一，兩百年來，這個問題持續不斷的形成各個時代共通的難題，從不曾真正畫下句點。 德沃金是當代西方世界最富盛名的一位法哲學家之一，他提出以權利作為核心的裁判理論，試圖解決當法官在面臨沒有明確的法律條文或判例可資作為依循的困難案件時，應如何作出判決的問題。本文以美國聯邦最高法院於2003年所作成的Eldred v. Ashcroft案判決作為觀察的重點，在Eldred v. Ashcroft一案中，雙方當事人最大的爭議在於著作權存續期間的延長是否合憲？本文認為，關於著作權存續期間是否合憲的問題屬於著作權法上的困難案件。 因此，本文試圖透過德沃金所提出的裁判理論來觀察Eldred v. Ashcroft案中，美國各級法院裁判的理由構成是否建構在權利的基礎上。本文也希望從Eldred案著作權存續期間延長的爭議中，一審到三審雙方當事人與美國各級法院法官的裁判與主張，提供一個我國法院裁判時可以參考與依據的借鏡，透過外國法院與學說對於這個問題的處理，來幫助我國解決同樣的爭議，並逐步建構我國的裁判理論。

民主原則之規範性困境，今日已於所有民主國家的政治生活中，展現為層出不窮的民主危機。尤其因為民粹威權主義於成熟民主國家的大行其道，民主危機的解決已成為當代民主迫在眉睫的問題。為求取釜底抽薪的解決之道，則必須從理論層面出發，對民主之概念進行徹底的反省。然而，法學本身顯然難以克服此一困境，而必須將道德哲學與政治哲學的理論資源與方法納入視野之內，以便從規範性證立民主的基本內涵開始，循序漸進地獲致其反映於制度層面應有的具體內容。 　　過往的民主理論證立民主之所以具有無法克服的困難，是因為其終須依賴當代多元社會下有爭議的道德信念。對此，本文以Jürgen Habermas的「論辯倫理學」為基礎，從而對民主的基本精神提出無爭議的規範性證立。透過論辯倫理學的進一步推演，Habermas亦導出「法律論辯理論」，以說明法律作為施展強制力的工具是如何被證立的。藉由結合論辯倫理學與法律論辯理論，便能將民主強制付諸於日常生活的實踐之中，據此呈現出民主作為憲法原則的應有樣貌。植基於此一的路徑，本文拓展了Habermas的理念，從而證立並闡發民主的核心精神。 　　此一依循論辯倫理學及法律論辯理論所獲致的民主原則內容，即為審議民主理論。依據前述的理論奠基，本文認為審議民主理論蘊含的內容可歸結為「論辯之基本權」以及「政治平等諸規則」兩大理念，並能透過基進民主理論的批判以深化對後者的理解，從而闡發審議民主理論的基進意涵。「基進審議民主」明確而豐富的內容不僅宣告著民主原則規範性困境之解決，也同時於實踐上提出了化解民主危機的制度建議。 / In the political life of all democracies, the normative dilemma of principle of democracy has appeared as endless crises of democracy. Accrodingly, to solve the crisis of democracy thus becomes an urgent issue for the contemporary democracy. As populist authoritarianism propagated on a upsetting scale around developed democracies, finding a resolution also grows more significant. To solve this problems once and for all, we must proceed forward from a theoretical perspective that indicate a profound reflection on the concept of democracy. Because jurisprudence becomes manifest in lack of proper paths to overcome this dilemma by itself, incorporating the theoretical resources and methods of ethics and political philosophy into the field of vision may be imperative and necessary. With the foundation that justifies fundamental connotations of democracy in a normative approch, we will obtain the specific contents that democracy reflects at the institutional level progressively. 　　Previous works on democratic theory are so difficult to justify democracy per se because their justifications depending on controversial moral beliefs in contemporary plural society drift into failure. In this regard, Jürgen Habermas advanced the “Discourse Ethics” which suggests a non-controversial normative justification of democratic essences as the most promising theory at present. Through employing Discourse Ethics, Habermas deduced “Discourse Theory of Law” to explain how to justify law as a compulsory instrument. In this manner, democracy can be forced into daily life, via combining Discourse Ethics and Discourse Theory of Law, to draw a ideal form as a a constitutional principle. Through the illustration of Habermas's doctrine, this thesis tries to broaden the ways to understand and describe the democracy. 　　“Deliberative Democracy” is the very idea derived from Discourse Ethics and Discourse Theory of Law. Based on the foundations of the above, this thesis suggests that the contents of Deliberative Democracy can be attributed to the two basic concepts including “fundamental rights of discourse” and “rules of political equality”, which, through criticisms of radical democracy, shall be further deepen the understanding of the latter to elucidate what radical meanings do Deliberative Democracy have. With specific and profuse contents, radical deliberative democracy not only invents a solution to the normative dilemma of principle of democracy, but puts forward institutional proposals to resolving crises of democracy in practice simultaneously.